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Summary
The period of G e o r g i a n  h i s t o r y  c overed by this study,
1 80 1 - 1 92 1, was one of rapid change, a period in w h i c h  
Georgia was reunited after 400 years of division, regained 
its i n d e p e n d e n c e  and then lost it again. It was a period 
too in which Georgians’ emotional attachment to the nation 
and c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of their c o r p o r a t e  id e n t i t y  g r e a t l y  i n ­
creased. This d i s s e r t a t i o n  e x a m i n e s  the var i o u s  f actors 
that played a part in this development and seeks to explain 
why, d espite the spread of n a t i o n a l  a w a r e n e s s  a m o n g  all 
classes and a widespread and manifest concern for national 
r e naissance, that a pop u l a r  n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t  never 
emerged.
It looks first at Georgia’s historical development, the 
emergence in the 11th-13th centuries of a centralised state, 
Georgians' r e l a t i o n s  wit h  n e i g h b o u r i n g  peoples, and the 
events lead i n g  up to the country's i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the 
Russian Empire in 1801, before going on in chapters two and 
three to examine the socio-economic factors underlying the 
a c c e l e r a t i o n  of the c o u n t r y ’s n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  in the 
19th and early 20th centuries. It is argued that a l t h o u g h  
the raw m a t e r i a l  of G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n h o o d  - a c o m m o n  and 
d i s t i n c t i v e  language, shared h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r a l  traits, 
and o c c u p a t i o n  of a r e c o g n i s a b l e  t e r r i t o r y  - e x i s t e d  long 
before the 19th century, .'that') it was only with the breakdown 
of feudal relations, the development of trade, the spread of 
c o m m o d i t y  relations, the e x p a n s i o n  of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
network and the growing interdependence of town and country 
in the 19th century, that Georgians overcame the divisions 
inf l i c t e d  on the country by f oreign i n v a s i o n s  and the
ambitions of rival principalities.
The i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a  into the Russian E m p i r e  
also brought the Georgian intelligentsia into contact with 
Russian and European thought and led in the 1860s and 1870s 
to the e m e r g e n c e  of a new g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n s  who
identified the nation and its future not with the monarchy
or nobility, but with the people. Convinced that education 
was the key to na t i o n a l  c ultural revival, the G e o r g i a n  
r a d i c a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  b e g a n  a c a m p a i g n  for n a t i o n a l  
enlightenment, the aim of which was to heighten the people's 
a w a r e n e s s  of their natio n a l  i d e n t i t y  and p r o v i d e  the
cultural basis for national revival. For reasons which the
f o u r t h  c h a p t e r  s e e k s  to e x p l a i n ,  this n e w  g e n e r a t i o n  
rejected separatism and sought to realise its goals within a 
democratic Russia, liberated from the autocracy.
Chapter five looks at the e m e r g e n c e  of the S o c i a l -  
Democrats as a mass party in Transcaucasia and the reasons 
for the p e r s i s t e n t  failure of the o vertly n a t i o n a l i s t  
parties to make any i m p a c t  on their support in the w o r k i n g  
class and peasantry. It e x a m i n e s  too the g r a d u a l  shift in 
the p o s i t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  on the 
national question and their acceptance by the beginning of 
the f i r s t  w o r l d  w a r  tha t  the k e y  to its s u c c e s s f u l  
r e s o l u t i o n  was the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a u t o n o m o u s  n a t i o n a l  
units or cantons e x p r e s s l y  for the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of 
c u l t u r a l  a f f a i r s .  By s e p a r a t i n g  c o n t r o l  of c u l t u r a l  
concerns in this way from the state administration, it was 
hoped to prevent attempts to assimilate minority national­
i t i e s  by the m o r e  p o w e r f u l  n a t i o n a l  g r o u p s  l i k e  the 
Russians. W i t h  the natio n a l  q u e s t i o n  thus settled, so it 
was believed, the proletariats of the various nationalities
c o u i a  trien i u c u s  a n m r  u u u i v i u e u  ctoaenuxun un one e x a o o  
struggle.
In the final two chapters, the d i s s e r t a t i o n  seeks to 
e x p l a i n  an a p p a r e n t  p a r a d o x :  h o w  a f t e r  50 y e a r s  of
proclaiming the importance of the union with revolutionary 
Russia, the Georgians came to declare independence; and why 
the Georgian Social-Democrats, for so long the advocates of 
d e v o l v i n g  n a t i o n a l i t y  a ffairs fro m  the state, should 
u l t i m a t e l y  have found t h e m s e l v e s  c o m p e l l e d  to stress the 
primacy of national unity and the national idea.
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A Note of Transliteration
Georgian language sources are transliterated in accord­
ance with the system employed in the Catalogue of Georgian 
Books in the British M u s e u m , which is set out b^low. Where 
there are Russian and Georgian versions of a name or place, 
I have used the G e o r g i a n  throughout. Thus, Dseret'eli not 
Tsereteli; Zhordania not Zhordaniya; Atchara not Adzharia; 
Bitchvint'a not Pitsunda; the Mtkvari rather than the river 
Kura; Sighna'ghi not Signakhi; and T'bilisi not Tiflis. 
When quoting contemporary sources I have, where appropriate, 
used the sp e l l i n g  Tp'ilisi, w h ich was the form used in 
Georgian throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Georgian transliteration key
d k
ds
tch
d fc kh
a e 
3 v
%  z
CO o S? gh
3 q
<5 sh 
fi ch 
(5 ts
01 t'
o i
to r 
Jj s
viii
ance with the system used by the journal Soviet Studies (see 
below), except in cases of names or places, such as Moscow, 
which have widely accepted English spellings.
a a H i  p r  m sh
6 b ft 1 c s nj s h c h
B V K k T t  *b *
r  g ji 1 y  u h  y
S d  M m  $ f h *
( e ) e  e h n x  kh  9 e
3K zh  O o ' t s  K) yu
3 z n p ^  ch  h ya
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Introduction
W h ile a c o n s i d e r a b l e  v o l u m e  of r e s e a r c h  has been 
devoted to the relationship between the Russian Empire and 
its Europ e a n  mi n o r i t i e s ,  in particular, the Poles and 
Ukrainians, very little has been written in the English lan­
g u age about G e o r g i a  or the Georgians. This is in part b e ­
cause of the country’s geographical obscurity, lodged on the 
b o u n d a r i e s  of Europe and Asia and a midst the tangle of the 
C a u c a s i a n  m o u n t a i n s  and the Pontic Alps, but no doubt also 
because of the difficulties in carrying out research in the 
USSR into the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the Russi a n s  and the 
n a t i o n a l  minori t i e s ,  and the u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  e m p h a s i s  in 
Soviet studies in the West on the Slavic and Cent r a l  A s i a n  
parts of the USSR. The benefits, moreover, of s t u d y i n g  a 
relatively small republic whose culture and language are so 
different from the rest of the country, are less immediately 
obvious. In this respect, the G e o r g i a n s  have been r ather 
less fortunate than their neighbours in Transcaucasia, the 
Armenians, whose diaspora has made a substantial contribu­
tion in the West to our k n o w l e d g e  of A r m e n i a n  c u l t u r e  and 
history.
Even within the USSR, despite the enormous contribution 
of Georgians to Russian Social-Democracy, albeit primarily 
to its Menshevik wing, little of merit has been written o u t ­
side of Georgia itself either in general terms or about the 
more specific issues that are the concern of this disserta­
tion, the d e v e l o p m e n t  of the natio n a l  q u e s t i o n  in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, and the factors that gave rise at 
the turn of the c entury to one of the few m a s s - b a s e d  soci a l -  
d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e m e n t s  in the Russian Empire. M o r e o v e r ,
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d e s p i t e  the t r a n s l a t i o n  of m u c h  G e o r g i a n  a c a d e m i c  output 
into Russian, most of it remains in the vernacular only.
This dissertation examines the development of national 
consciousness in Georgia and its relationship with the e m e r ­
gence of the Georgian social-democratic movement, and seeks 
to p r o v i d e  an e x p l a n a t i o n  of the f o r c e s  that led to 
Georgia's d e c l a r a t i o n  of i n d e p e n d e n c e  in 1918 and to i n v a ­
sion by Soviet Russia in 1921. It is hoped that in the pro­
cess it will also make a contribution to understanding why 
f actors such as rapid s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  change, the e c o n o m i c  
exploitation of one nationality by another, the emergence of 
national intelligentsias and chauvinism come to be associa­
ted w i t h  the f o r m a t i o n  of strong n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t s  in 
s o m e  areas but produce e n t i r e l y  different r e s p o n s e s  e l s e ­
where.
In 1918 the Georgian Mensheviks declared Georgia's in­
dependence from Russia, an act which in many repects can be
seen as the natu r a l  c u l m i n a t i o n  of the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c ,  
political and intellectual developments in Georgia since its 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the R u s s i a n  E m p i r e  in 1801. T h o u g h  the 
abrogation that year of the Treaty of Georgievsk between the 
East Georgian kingdom of K'art'l-Kakhet'i and Russia, which 
had granted the latter control of Georgian foreign policy in 
return for r e c o g n i t i o n  of the s o v e r e i g n t y  of the G e o r g i a n  
monarchy in internal affairs, was made with scant regard for 
the i n t e rests of the G e o r g i a n  people, there can be little 
doubt that it paved the way for the economic and ethnograph­
ic r ecovery of Geor g i a  and the c o a l e s c e n c e  in the latter 
part of the 19th century of a strengthening awareness among 
all classes of their national identity.
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It is clear from the literature extant from the period 
that at the height of Georgia’s development in the 13th cen­
tury, b efore s u c c e s s i v e  invasions u n d e r m i n e d  the unity of 
the medieval state and brought its "golden age" to a close, 
that ;its p o p u l a t i o n  a l r e a d y  had a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d  sense of 
ethnic identity based on an awareness of a shared and unique 
language, shared myths and customs, and a religion, Christ­
ianity, that set it in conflict with most of .the surrounding 
world. The c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  state, the 
development of trade and communications, and protracted w a r ­
fare against n e i g h b o u r i n g  peoples, moreover, wer e  all 
factors that s t r e n g t h e n e d  that sense of cultu r a l  i d e n t i t y  
and helped forge the unity of the Georgian people. However, 
with the d ecline of the state and the r e s u r g e n c e  of feudal 
fiefdoms, the stren g t h  of G e o r g i a n s ’ a w a r e n e s s  of their 
group identity waned, so that by the 18th c e n t u r y  the past 
unity of the state was a dim memory for all but a few.
Georgia's i n c o r p o r a t i o n  i n t o  the R u s s i a n  E m p i r e ,  
h owever, p r o t e c t e d  it from the a l m o s t  incessant i n v a s i o n s  
from Persia and Turkey which, over the preceding 400 years, 
had not only arrested but also set back national social and 
economic development, and signalled the end of the country's 
d i v i s i o n  into w a r r i n g  principalities. R e l e a s e d  f r o m  its 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  survival, and at last p r o v i d e d  w i t h  a 
m o d i c u m  of stability, the p o p u l a t i o n  was able, to r e d i r e c t  
its energies into the economy. In the ensuing 50 years, the 
provincial barriers to national integration were gradually 
eroded as the development of trade, commodity relations and 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  e n c o u r a g e d  people to extend t h e i r  h o r i z o n s  
well beyond the boundaries of their own communities. By the
m i d - 1 9 t h  century the basis f o r ’ the r e - e m e r g e n c e  of a
u w i  «i. w w u li x vy 11 ci u a i r c a u y  u c c u  xcijlu d£>
commercial relations between the various parts of the coun­
try, w h i c h  had been s e v e r e l y  di s r u p t e d  since the M i d d l e  
Ages, regained their former vigour.
The i m p o s i t i o n  of a Rus s i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  R ussian 
laws and the opportunities provided by the educational sys­
tem were to have a deep effect on the development of Georg­
ian society. The a b r o g a t i o n  of the Treaty of G e o r g i e v s k  
broke the p o w e r  of the G e o r g i a n  m o n a r c h y  and, by r e n d e r i n g  
re d u n d a n t  the t r a d i t i o n a l  function of the n o b i l i t y  as a 
military caste entrusted with the defence of its subjects, 
u n d e r m i n e d  an im p o r t a n t  aspect of its raison d'etre in the 
eyes of the peasantry. By the 1850s, moreover, the feudal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the no b i l i t y  and peasantry, once the 
mainstay of Georgian society, was coming to be an impediment 
to further e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  and the cause of g r o w i n g  
social tension between the two classes.
The cultural effects of the enforced union also wrought 
considerable changes, particularly in the upper reaches of 
society, where the nobility found itself compelled to shed 
the customs and tastes acquired through centuries of Persian 
dominance and reorientate itself to the Russian bureaucracy 
and the European manners of the Russian dvoryanstvo. Aware 
too of the a d v a n t a g e s  c o n f e r r e d  by a Europ e a n  e d u c a t i o n  to 
progr e s s  in the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  those w h o  could 
afford it sought places for their children in Russia's u n i ­
versities.
The c o n s e q u e n c e s  of the i n t e r a c t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  
students with the Russian intelligentsia were, however, to 
be more f a r - r e a c h i n g  than the m u n d a n e  a m b i t i o n s  of their 
parents. Greatly influenced in the 1830s by the preoccupa­
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tion of Russian intellectuals with idealism and their search 
for R u s s i a ’s role in history, and spurred by contact with 
Polish n a t i o n a l i s m ,  the G e o r g i a n  inte l l i g e n t s i a ,  small 
though it may have been, began to take up the t h e m e  of the 
G e o r g i a n  n a tion and to seek to s t i m u l a t e  r e s e a r c h  into its 
h i s t o r y  and t r a d i t i o n s .  As e l s e w h e r e  in E u r o p e ,  the 
inte l l i g e n t s i a ,  wit h  its v ision of a ne w  global order of 
nation states, sought not merely to encourage the revival of 
a sense of ethnic community, but to discover in history the 
origins and laws of growth of the Georgian nation.
The t u r n i n g  point, however, in 19th cent u r y  G e o r g i a n  
intellectual development came in the 1860s with the appear­
ance of a new generation of students who, like their Russian 
peers, turned away from the abstract idealism of the 1830s 
and for the first time identified the nation and its history 
wi t h  that of the mass of the people. Figures like Ilia 
T c h a v t c h a v a d z e , Akaki Deseret'eli and K irile L o r t ’k ’i p ’an- 
idze, all students in Russian universities in the late 1850s 
and early 1860s, were to establish a movement for national 
r e n a i s s a n c e  in Georgia, based on b r i n g i n g  e d u c a t i o n  to the 
people and raising the level of cultural attainment to that 
of the most a d v a n c e d  nations of Europe, w h i c h  was to 
dominate the intellectual debate in Georgia for the next 30 
years and to exert a considerable influence on the attitudes 
of Georgian Social-Democrats to the national question.
Their rise to prominence coincided with the introduc­
tion in the 1860s and 1870s of the laws on the emancipation 
of the peasantry, and it was these, h o w e v e r  i m p e r f e c t  or 
l i m i t e d  they may have been, which, by u n d e r m i n i n g  the 
perso n a l  d e p e n d e n c e  of the p e a s a n t r y  on their l a n dlords,
paved the way for the further e c o n o m i c  and national i n t e ­
gration of the Georgian people.
The a c c e l e r a t i n g  intrusion of m o n e y  into e c o n o m i c  
relations, crop s pecialisation, land short a g e  and the 
g r e a t e r  m o b i l i t y  a f f o r d e d  by the a b o l i t i o n  of s e r f d o m  and 
the i m p r o v e m e n t  of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  all c o n t r i b u t e d  to the 
growing economic interdependence of the different parts of 
the c ountry and to the steady drift of the p o p u l a t i o n  from 
the countryside to the towns.
Despite the tsarist administration’s policy of settling 
A r m e n i a n s  on G e o r g i a n  territory, the e x p l o i t a t i o n  of the 
p e a s a n t r y  by the p r e d o m i n a n t l y  A r m e n i a n  m o n e y - l e n d i n g  
community, and the occasional contact of Georgian peasants 
with the Russian bureaucracy, judiciary and military, there 
was little i n t e r - e t h n i c  tension in the countryside, not 
least because Georgians comprised the vast majority of the 
population.
In the t o w n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  the s i t u a t i o n  w a s  v e r y  
different. The domination of commerce by Armenians, parti­
cularly since the late 18th century, had, even b e f o r e  
Georgia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire, led to the 
Georgians becoming a minority within their own capital city, 
a sit uat ion a c c e n t u a t e d  in the 19th c entry both by the e x ­
pansion of commerce and industry and the massive influx of 
Russi a n s  into the tow n  f o l l o w i n g  its e s t a b l i s h m e n t  as the 
autocracy's administrative and military centre in the C a u c a ­
sus. By the 1860s the R ussian p o p u l a t i o n  of T'bilisi 
exceeded that of the Georgians, although this situation was 
reversed by the 1890s.
The latter, however, not only found themselves a m i n o r ­
ity w i t h i n  their own capital but also forced to a c c e p t  the
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most menial jobs. With credit facilities monopolised by the 
Armenians, the bureaucracy dominated by Russians and nation­
ality coming increasingly to act as a determinant of social 
status, the Georgians in T ’bilisi, most of whom were migrant 
peasant workers, were concentrated in the least privileged 
strata of society.
Compelled by circumstances to abandon the familiarity 
and relative p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  of their rural c o m m u n i t i e s ,  
p e a s a n t s  fro m  all over Georgia, on e n t e r i n g  this a l ien e n ­
vironment for the first time, found common ground in their 
shared language, cultu r a l  traits and e c o n o m i c  misfo r t u n e .  
This fusion of Georgians from different parts of the country 
in the working-class districts of T'bilisi and their resent- 
ment both of national and economic repression provided the 
radi c a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  w i t h  a r e c e p t i v e  a u d i e n c e  for its 
views on social justice and national renaissance. Fuelled 
by the tsarist g o v e r n m e n t ' s  ende a v o u r s  to e r a d i c a t e  the 
Georgian language, the movement for national enlightenment 
q u i c k l y  g a t h e r e d  m o m e n t u m  in the last years of the 19th 
cent u r y  and spread beyond the t o wns to the v i l l a g e s  and 
countryside.
Yet w h i l e  the d e c l a r a t i o n  of i n d e p e n d e n c e  in 1918 can 
in certain r espects be seen as the c u l m i n a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  
integration over the preceding 100 years and the emergence 
of the m o v e m e n t  for n a t i o n a l  renaissance, in m a n y  other 
r e s p e c t s  it r e p r e s e n t e d  the n e g a t i o n  of the hopes and 
aspirations of the Georgian people and its political lead­
ers.
A l t h o u g h  d e v e l o p m e n t s  in the social, e c o n o m i c  and 
political life of Georgia in the 19th century led to greater
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awareness among Georgians of their corporate identity and to 
a new c o n v i c t i o n  in the w o r t h  of and a r e a d i n e s s  to defend 
their cultural heritage, their growing indent ification with 
the nation did not conclude at any time in the formation of 
a m o v e m e n t  for natio n a l  independence. For most G e o r g i a n s  
separation from Russia in 1918, though voluntarily declared, 
was made without celebration and with deep regret. In fact, 
ever since the return of the new g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  
intellectuals from the universities of Russia in the 1860s, 
the m o v e m e n t  for n ational r e n a i s s a n c e  in G e o r g i a  was p r e ­
dica t e d  upon the c o n v i c t i o n  that natio n a l  c u l t u r a l  rights 
could best be secured within a democratic Russia liberated 
from the stifling influence of the autocracy.
The G e o r g i a n  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  and p e a s a n t r y  i n d e e d  
remained largely impervious to the propaganda of the nation­
alist parties that appeared in Georgia in the early years of 
the 20th century, p r e f e r r i n g  instead to ident i f y  their 
i n t e rests with those of the C a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  of the 
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, one of the reasons 
for whose success in Georgia was its understanding of both 
the social and national-cultural aspirations of the people. 
Noe Zhordania, the leader of the C a u c a s i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  and 
P r e s ident of the G e o r g i a n  R e p u b l i c  in 1918-21, w r i t i n g  in 
1908 stated that while the Georgian people had an undoubted 
thirst for national schools, literature and culture,
...it rejects n a t i o n a l  p olitics today just as it 
did in the past. It set out on this path from the 
very b e g i n n i n g  and even n o w  has not deviated.
This is the histo r i c  path of the G e o r g i a n  people 
by w h ich it is d i s t i n g u i s h e d  fro m  other c u l t u r a l  
nations. Therefore, w h e n  G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o - 
cracy demands cultural autonomy for its nation and 
not pol i t i c a l  autonomy, it is r e f l e c t i n g  life's 
course, r e a c h i n g  the h e a r t - f e l t  w i s h e s  of the
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g r a m m e .
It is the i n t e ntion of this study to e x a m i n e  the 
a c c u r a c y  of this c l a i m  and to seek to explain why it was 
that the Georgians, despite their undoubted concern for the 
achievement of national cultural rights, despite having to 
endure the provocation of the tsarist regime’s unconcealed 
chauvinism and despite their awareness of and anger at the 
e c o n o m i c  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of G e o r g i a ’s n atural resources, did 
not seek to e m u l a t e  the many na t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t s  of 
central and southern Europe by struggling for the establish­
ment of a national state.
By looking at the various factors - historical, cultur­
al, social, e c o n o m i c  and pol i t i c a l  - that can be seen to 
have conditioned the attitudes of the Georgian people in the
19th century, it is hoped both to provide s o m e  of the 
a n s w e r s  to this q u e s t i o n  and to shed light on the reas o n s
why they should have rejected one c o l l e c t i v i s t  ideology, 
nationalism, in favour of another, socialism.
In light of this apparent rejection of nationalism, the 
final two chapt e r s  look on the one hand at the r e a s o n s  w h y  
Georgian Social-Democracy, in evident •contradict ion of its 
l o n g - s t a n d i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  to s e p a r a t i s m ,  should have felt 
c o m p e l l e d  to declare G e o r g i a ’s independence, and on the 
other, at the wa y  in w h i c h  the e x p e r i e n c e  of i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  
albeit in the most trying c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a l t e r e d  both the 
Social-Democrats perception of the national question, moving 
them towards embracing many of the views of their nationalst 
opponents, and that of the Georgian people.
1. Noe Zhordania, K ’art'veli khalkhi da n a t s i o n a 1 i z mi (The 
Georgian People and Nationalism) (K’ut’aisi, 1908), p. 6.
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Chapter One
The Historical Background to the National Question
1 . 1 Early History
Situated on the border between Asia and Europe and for 
ce n t u r i e s  at the c r o s s r o a d s  of the trade routes b e t w e e n  
W e s t e r n  and N o r t h e r n  Europe on the one hand and the M i d d l e  
East and the Orient on the other, Georgia has long been sub­
jected to the often c o n f l i c t i n g  i n f l u e n c e s  of Persian, 
G r e c o - R o m a n , B y z a n t i n e ,  A r a b , T u r k i s h  and, more recently, 
Russ i a n  cultures, each of w h i c h  has played a part in the 
formation and evolution of a Georgian national identity.
Although inhabiting the Asian side of the Caucasus, the 
Georgians1 proximity to Europe and their economic and cul­
tural ties with first the classical world and subsequently 
B y z a n t i u m  from very early in their h i s t o r y  pr o v i d e d  a 
counter to the all-pervasive Persian influence elsewhere in 
Asia Minor. The adoption of Christianity too in the fourth 
century A.D. ensured a strong cultu r a l  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  
Europe, an affinity, moreover, that at least until the 13th 
cent u r y  was further c o n s o l i d a t e d  by Georgia's i n t e g r a t i o n  
into the cultural and intellectual life of Byzantine Europe.
Despite this westward orientation, Georgians, like the 
other peoples of Transcaucasia, had close commercial rela­
tions both wit h  each other and the Persians, w h i l e  I r a n i a n  
culture, as is evident in the style of dress of the Georgian 
nobility, the incorporation of Persian loan words into the 
native vocabulary, similarities in their art and the appear­
ance of Persian themes in Georgian medieval literature, r e ­
m a i n e d  a m a jor i n f l u e n c e  in the country, even w h i l s t  its
association with Constantinople was at its greatest.
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I n f l u e n c e d  though not o v e r w h e l m e d  by larger and more 
p o w e r f u l  peoples, the G e o r g i a n s  g r a d u a l l y  e m e r g e d  as a 
separate and recognisable people occupying a clearly identi­
fiable area of land, p o s s e s s i n g  a d i s t i n c t i v e  culture, 
speaking a common and unique language and observing a reli­
gious faith that set them apart from their neighbours. This 
j u x t a p o s i t i o n  to the s u r r o u n d i n g  and f r e q u e n t l y  h ostile 
world forced them into an early awareness of their separate 
group identity.
C o n t e m p o r a r y  G e o r g i a  oc c u p i e s  v i r t u a l l y  all the area 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  lived in by G e o r g i a n  s p e a k i n g  people and in 
this respect is rather s m a l l e r  than Geor g i a  was at the 
height of its powers in the early 13th century. The country 
itself is split in two by the Likhi m o u n t a i n s  w h i c h  curve 
south from the C aucasus d o w n  to the Pontic Alps a l o n g  the 
south coast of the Black Sea. This range has always played 
an important part in Georgian history and in the conscious­
ness of the G e o r g i a n  people. At the time of the f o r m a t i o n  
of the original Georgian states of Colchis (known as Egrisi 
by the Georgians) and Iberia from the sixth to f ourth 
c e n t u r i e s  B.C., it was the Likhi or Su r a m i  range as it is 
alternatively known that divided the states. Georgians liv­
ing in Iberia in the east came to distinguish themselves in 
a v e r y  b a s i c  w a y  f r o m  W e s t  G e o r g i a n s ,  c a l l i n g  t h e m  
" I m i e r n i " ,  or t h o s e  l i v i n g  that side, a n d  t h e m s e l v e s  
"Amierni", those living this side. After the M o n g o l s ’ and 
Tamurlane’s combined devastations had shattered the unity of 
the Georgian state from the 13th to 15th centuries, this old 
geographical division reasserted itself until the period of 
Russian rule. West Georgia was dominated by the Kingdoms of
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Ap'khazet'i (Abkhazia), Imeret'i, Samegrelo (Mingrelia) and 
Guria, and East Georgia by those of K'art'li and Kakhet'i.
Archaeological evidence suggests that ancestors of the 
present Georgians inhabited the region some 600 to 700,000 
years ago and that the Georgian tribes were already evolving 
a d i s t i n c t i v e  culture d uring the Bronze Age. By the sixth 
century B.C. and the creation of the state of Egrisi, the 
e s s e n t i a l  tribal c o m p o n e n t s  of the G e o r g i a n  people had 
formed, based on a merging of local tribes with neighbouring 
peoples like the Hittites, Mitanni and Urartians, who in the 
course of centuries of wars and migration had settled there. 
These tribes, all speaking Georgian or at least dialects of 
it, were the K'art's, Megrel-Chans and the Svans.
A c c o r d i n g  to R o m a n  records (most n o t a b l y  Strabo's), 
a v a i l a b l e  fro m  the first c entury B.C., it is clear that 
despite growing cultural and linguistic unity the two states 
persisted, divided by the rib of m o u n t a i n s  and a d i f f e r e n t  
e c o n o m i c  life. As yet, Egrisi, with its links w i t h  the 
Greco-Roman world and well-developed trade networks, was the 
more advanced and civilised, but it was Iberia, populated by 
the K 'a r t 1 s or later K'art'velebi , w h i c h  was to b e c o m e  the 
hub of the united kingdom of Sak'art'velo (the Georgian name 
for Georgia).
W h i l s t  a c o m m o n  tongue and g r o w i n g  trade links w e r e  
strengthening the ties between the two states, the spread of 
C h r i s t ianity, adop t e d  in 337 A.D. by King M i r i a n  of Iberia 
and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  in the fifth cen t u r y  A.D. of the 
K h u t s u r i  or G e o r g i a n  e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  scripts, and the s u b ­
sequent flourishing of Georgian ecclesiastical (in particu­
lar, hagiographical) literature undoubtedly helped consoli­
date ties. Gradually the East-Georgian written and spoken
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language o usted Greek fro m  its posit i o n  of p r o m i n e n c e  in 
Egrisi.
The w e a l t h  of Egrisi, and the s t r ategic po s i t i o n  of 
both Georgian states attracted the attentions of the great 
p o w e r s  of Asia Minor, the Arabs, the Persians and the 
Byzantine Empire. During the sixth century, the war between 
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  and the Persians was c o n c e n t r a t e d  on the 
Transcaucasian region. The mutual attrition of the contend­
ing powers allowed the Georgians to rid their lands of both 
by the end of the century, only to see the m  r e o c c u p i e d  by 
the Arabs soon after. Re m a r k a b l y ,  the G e o r g i a n s  s u r v i v e d  
the c o u n t l e s s  i n v asions and in the ninth c entury the House 
of B a g r a t i o n i  began to e s t a b l i s h  some order a m o n g s t  the 
q u a r r e l l i n g  clans and to e m e r g e  as the d o m i n a n t  n a m e  in 
Georgian society for the next thousand years.
A series of d y n a s t i c  a c c i d e n t s  and skilful d i p l o m a c y  
concentrated the kingdoms of Ap'khazet'i, Basiani, K'art'li 
and Tao into the hands of Bagrat B a g rationi or Bagrat III. 
He strove to crush the o p p o s i t i o n  of the feudal lords and 
princes and to c e n t r a l i s e  power. Thus the basis was laid 
for the Georgian feudal monarchy that- was to flourish from 
the late 11th to 13th centuries. In this period East and 
West G e o r g i a  were united and the p o w e r  of the f e u d a l  lords 
s u b j u g a t e d  to that of the crown. Georgia's e c o n o m y  f l o u r ­
ished and internal and external trade reached a new level of 
development not to be achieved again until the 19th century. 
The country's military fortunes, too, were at their height.
This was also "the Golden Period" of the Georgian arts. 
The subordination of the church allowed an imaginative lay 
literature to spring into prominence, most remarkably with
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o u u i ' a  n u s t ' a v e u ' s  v e p ' K r u s u q a o s a n i  u n e  k. n 1 g n t in the
P a n t h e r ’s Skin). E c c l e s i a s t i c a l  a r c h i t e c t u r e  r eached the
high point of its d e v e l o p m e n t  wit h  the c a t h e d r a l  at K'ut’-
1aisi and the churches of Shatberdi and Dolisi Khana. M e t a ­
llurgical arts, notably e n a m e l  work, reached a level of 
development unrivalled elsewhere.
But the f l o u r i s h i n g  of the G e o r g i a n  arts, like the 
country’s economic and political development at their peak 
in the reign of Queen T ’a m a r  (1184-1212), was brought to an 
untimely end by the Mongol invasions beginning in 1230 and 
by the ravages w r e a k e d  by T a m u r l a n e ’s h o rdes in the late 
14th and 15th centuries. T a m u r l a n e  invaded G e o r g i a  eight 
ti mes before he finally o v e r c a m e  its resistance. He left 
the economy shattered and the population halved.
Over the next 400 years Geor g i a  was d o m i n a t e d  by the 
rival great p o w e r s  of the M i d d l e  East, Persia and the 
Ottoman Empire, and herself descended back into the petty, 
d e b i l i t a t i n g  str u g g l e s  of feudal lords and kingdoms. The 
e c o n o m y  c e a s e d  to p r o g r e s s ,  the a r t s  w e r e  b e r e f t  of 
innovation and for all but a few, the idea of Georgian unity 
was lost. In fact, the G e o r g i a n  princes (t ’a vadebi ) had no 
m o r a l  s c r u p l e s  a b o u t  t u r n i n g  for T u r k i s h  or P e r s i a n
r>
assistance in their intrigues against each other.
At least until the 18th century Georgia was effectively 
divided into two spheres of influence, w i t h  the d i v i d i n g  
line once mor e  the Likhi mountains. In the west the k i n g ­
doms of A p ’khazet'i, Guria, Imeret'i and S a m e g r e l o  w e r e  
under Turkish control, while in the east, at various differ­
ent times and to varying degrees the Persians prevailed over 
the k i n g d o m s  of K ’art'li and Kakhet'i. An i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n ­
s e q u e n c e  of this latter r e l a t i o n s h i p  was the i n f l u e n t i a l
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role of the Georgian monarchy and aristocracy in the affairs 
of the Persian court.
Despite the i n t e n t i o n s  of the more able of G e o r g i a ’s 
kings to unite the country, circumstances prevailed against 
them. No single kingdom was strong enough to dominate the 
others. All were preoccupied with an elemental struggle for 
survival. T o w a r d s  the close of the 17th century, it is 
true, Vakhtang V of K ’art’li attempted to put his son on the 
Imerian throne at K ’ut’aisi, but the Turks reminded the Shah 
that a T u r c o - P e r s i a n  treaty of 1632 a c c o r d e d  p o l i tical 
r e c o g n i t i o n  to the de facto d i v i s i o n  of G e o r g i a  into their 
r e s p e c t i v e  spheres of influence. Vakhtang's effo r t s  to 
w i d e n  his own p o w e r  base ran counter to the t e rms of this 
a g r e e m e n t ,  and he was c o m p e l l e d  to back down. A l t h o u g h  he 
tried on at least a n o t h e r  three o c c a s i o n s  to r e i n s t a t e  his 
son, he failed every time, and the issue e m p h a s i s e d  the 
li m i t e d  scope for indepe n d e n t  action open to the G e o r g i a n  
kingdoms. The p r o b l e m  was that nei t h e r  Persia nor Turkey 
could accept their i n d e p e n d e n t  status and any m o v e s  by one 
k i n g d o m  to spread its a u t hority over a n o t h e r  was r e g a r d e d  
(no doubt correctly) as an a t t e m p t  by one or the other of 
the great powers to extend its power.
In the 18th century, thanks in part to the c o l l a p s e  of 
the Persian e m p i r e  into one of its p e r i o d i c a l  bouts of 
anarchy, but thanks also to the ability of King Erekle II of 
the united k i n g d o m s  of K'art'1 - K a k h e t ' i , East G e o r g i a  
revived its fortu n e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  to b e c o m e  the d o m i n a n t  
power in the Transcaucasus and North-West Persia. A similar 
recovery was ef f e c t e d  by S o l o m o n  I in Imeret'i. Erekle, 
t h o u g h ,  w a s  a w a r e  of the e p h e m e r a l  n a t u r e  of his
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cessant military campaigns against rival khanates, t'avade- 
bi_, and the i n c r e a s i n g l y  p o w e r f u l  Lek (Lezghin) tribes in 
the East Cauca s u s  exacted a heavy toll in h u m a n  c a s u a l t i e s  
and demanded burdensome taxation of an already hard-pressed 
peasantry. Consequently, he sought the help of the Russian 
Empire, hoping to play both upon the avidity of its imperial 
designs for Persian territory around the Caspian Sea and on 
their shared religion. This was not the first time that the 
Georgians had looked to Russia. Vakhtang VI had appealed in 
the early 18th century for Russian aid to Peter the Great, 
and although it was perhaps naive of the Georgian monarch to 
have expected Russian assistance solely on the grounds of a 
shared faith, the a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to h i m  if his 
kingdom were to continue its resistance to Persian dictates 
were very limited, a fact r e a l i s t i c a l l y  faced by Erekle II 
in 1 783 when he signed the Treaty of G i o r g i e v s k  wit h  
Catherine II.
Erekle hoped that by transforming his kingdom, which by 
now more closely resembled a Transcaucasian federation pop­
ulated in almost equal numbers by Georgians, Armenians and 
Tatars, into a Russian protectorate, K'art'l-Kakhet'i would 
a cquire the peace needed for the e c o n o m y  to r e c u p e r a t e  and 
the busin e s s  of r e v i v i n g  his country's f ortunes to begin. 
Peace, t o o , . w a s  ess e n t i a l  to the s t a b i l i s i n g  of social 
relations and the reinforcement of the role of the Georgian 
aristocracy. The e x t r e m e  burdens borne by the p e a s a n t r y  
d uring the 18th century had s t r a i n e d  their patie n c e  to the 
limit and e x a c e r b a t e d  rel a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  p e a s a n t s  and the 
landed nobility. With the pe a s a n t s  unable to far m  in a 
stable environment and having to cope with military levies,
1 6 .
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the size of surplus produce left to the aristocracy, however 
hard they squeezed, was correspondingly small. Both, there­
fore, stood to gain from peace, and the a r i s t o c r a c y  in 
particular.
The negotiations in 1788 caught Erekle at his weakest. 
The khan a t e  of Erevan was in revolt, S o l o m o n  I of Imeret'i 
had just died f o l l o w i n g  a heavy defeat at the hands of the 
Turks and he had still not r e c o v e r e d  from the death of his 
son two years previously.^
Erekle s u r r e n d e r e d  G e o r g i a n  s o v e r e i g n t y  over foreign 
affairs to the Russians, as well as the right of investiture 
of the Georgian monarchy, but retained control of domestic 
affairs. The G e o r g i a n  Church r e m a i n e d  autoce p h a l o u s .  In 
return, the Russi a n s  wer e  obliged to protect K'art'l- 
Kakhet'i from any a g g r e s s i o n  and to treat it, in this r e ­
spect, as if it were a part of the empire.
The e n s u i n g  18 y e a r s  up to the i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of 
K'art'l-Kakhet'i into the R ussian E m p i r e  in 1801 d e m o n ­
s trated the o n e - s i d e d n e s s  of the a g r e ement. For the G e o r ­
gians the treaty was a m a t t e r  of life or death, for the 
Russians, a matter of convenience. Whilst the treaty coin­
cided wit h  their p e r c e i v e d  int e r e s t s  they w o u l d  up h o l d  it 
but no altruistic sentiment nor moral scruple would oblige 
them to keep to it if their interests dictated otherwise.^
In 1785 the Turks invaded G e o r g i a  but Erekle, a i d e d  
only by a token Russian force, turned them back in Jaro and 
Borchalo.^ When, though, the Russo-Turkish war broke out in 
1787, the small Russian garrison withdrew beyond the Cauca­
sus, leaving G e o r g i a  unprotected. M e a n w h i l e  P e r s i a n  f o r ­
tunes were reviv i n g  under the l e a d e r s h i p  of the court
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eunuch, Agha Muhammed, who in 1795 turned his attentions on 
Georgia. Again the Russians left K'art11-Kakhet ' i wide 
o p e n ,  w h i l e  the G e o r g i a n  a r m y ,  w h i c h  w a s  g r o s s l y  
outnumbered, was forced to fall back from T'bilisi, leaving 
it to the Shah's sadistic vengeance. T ’bilisi was razed to 
the ground and the population in another of its many battles 
for survi v a l  r u n n i n g  in a line from the M o n g o l s  to T a m u r -  
lane, to Shah Abbas and now Agha Muhammed, suffered drastic 
losses in the unequal struggle. A c c o r d i n g  t o ;p r e - r e v o l u ­
tionary Georgian historian Zurab Avalishvili, the population 
of Kakhet'i declined by 50 per cent during the period of the 
Russian protectorate,^ while it is estimated that the popu­
lation of G e o r g i a  as a w h o l e  had failed from the five 
million claimed by the Georgian annals in the 13th century®
to between 770,000 and 800,000 by the beginning of the 19th 
Qcentury.7
The Russians, of course, lost nothing through K'art'l- 
Kakhet'i's misfortunes. In fact, it suited the m  to see the 
Georgians exhaust themselves before coming to their assist­
ance. Nothing better emphasised their dependence on Russian 
arms. W h e n  in 1 796 the R u s s i a n s  did fin a l l y  arrive, the 
joint Georgian and Russian army swept the Persians back to 
D e r b e n d , si zed Baku and all the land up to Karabagh. By 
then, howev e r ,  the country was d e v a s t a t e d  and E r e k l e  was 
close to death wit h  no one of his stature to f o l l o w  him. In 
1798, he died leaving the crown to his son Giorgi XII. With 
K'art'1- K a k h e t ' i in chaos, the R u s s i a n s  began to m a n o e u v r e  
to put an end to the Bagra t i d  m o n a r c h y  in a n t i c i p a t i o n  of 
Giorgi's death. When in D e c e m b e r  1800 this happened, it 
m a r k e d  the end of a dynasty. On 18th J a n u a r y  1801, by the
Manifesto of Tsar Paul, the territories of K'art'1-Kakhet'i
w ere i n e u r ^ u r a t e u  i nto tne e m p i r e .
1.2 Social Relations in the Eighteenth Century and the 
First Half of the Nineteenth Century
a ) Nobility and Peasantry
W h a t e v e r  the Russian m o t i v e s  for the a n n e x a t i o n  of 
Georgia, high a m o n g  which were the desire for t e r r i t o r i a l  
expansion into North-West Persia and control of the Caspian 
Sea trade, to threaten the Ottoman Empire’s north-east flank 
and to exploit G e o r g i a ’s m i n e r a l  wealth, there can be no 
doubt that as a consequence of the ’’voluntary” unification, 
the conditions were established for rapid social and econo­
mic change in the course of the 19th century. The tsarist 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  forcibly re u n i t e d  Georgia ( I m e r e t ’i was 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  in 1810, Guria in 1829, S a m e g r e l o  in 1857, 
Svaneti in 1858, A p ’k h a z e t ’i in 1864, and Atchara a f t e r  the 
R u s s o - T u r k i s h  war of 1877-78), and brought the peace and 
stability needed if the country was to break free f r o m  the 
enervating effects of a backward feudal socio-economic sys­
tem and its petty dynas t i c  rivalries. In doing so R ussia 
shifted Georgia from the Asian orbit into Europe.
Open no w  to w i der trade c o n t a c t s  with the Wes t  and to 
the influence of new social and economic ideas, and exposed 
increasingly to the destabilising effects of industrialisa­
tion, urbanisation, increased mobility and wider c o m m u n i c a ­
tions, Georgia was shaken from its feudal lethargy.
By r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g  p o l i tical unity and s e t t i n g  in 
motion the process of economic integration, Russia paved the 
way for the c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  n ation in the 
latter half of the century. Despite its colonial treatment 
of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , e x p l o i t i n g  its r e s o u r c e s  w i t h o u t
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attempting to invigorate the local economy with any strength 
of its own, the forces re l e a s e d  by the c o u n t r y ’s gradual 
modernisation helped erode the feudal mentality of the pop­
ulation, and, in particular, the peasantry. The process 
was, of course, a long one, and by no m eans c o m p l e t e  by the 
beginning of the 20th century, but gradually increased m o b i ­
lity, the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the serfs, land shortage and 
experience of urban work conditions changed the values and 
a s p i r a t i o n s  of the p e a s a n t r y  and their p e r c e p t i o n  of the 
world. With his spatial awareness stimulated by new econo­
mic forces, by the need to leave his land and seek w o r k  
elsewhere, and by improved means of communication, the pea­
sant's previous narrow sense of allegiance and belonging to 
his i m m e d i a t e  vicinity, landlord, c o m m u n e  or family, was 
able to expand to encompass wider and more abstract loyal- 
ties such as to his class or to the nation. In theory, at 
least, the possiblity of creating a mass-based nationalist 
movement had emerged by the turn of the century.
Georgia in 1801 was in a state of total disarray, split 
politically, territo r i a l l y ,  e c o n o m i c a l l y  and socially. 
F u r t h e r m o r e  its a g r i c u l t u r a l  base had been w r e c k e d  by the 
long succ e s s i o n  of wars (K'art'l-Kakhet'i was s e v e r e l y  
damaged by the Persian invasion) and now lacked the manpower 
for a quick recovery. In these circumstances and given the 
level of socio-economic development attained in the Georgian 
kingdoms, it w ould be quite m e a n i n g l e s s  to speak at this 
stage of a u nited G e o r g i a n  nation, a l t h o u g h  the basis for 
its future e m e rgence, that is, a c o n t i g u o u s  area of land 
o c c u p i e d  by a people who, by and large, spoke the same 
language, shared the same re l i g i o n  and p o s s e s s e d  a c o m m o n
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culture and history, was and had been present for some time. 
As yet, though, society r e m a i n e d  strictly h i e r a r chical, 
d o m i n a t e d  by its feudal institutions, and any sense of 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with the Georg i a n  nation r e m a i n e d  weak, 
limited to an inchoate awareness of a shared history, reli­
gion and language.
Although from about the 12th century serfdom or baton-
qm o b a  as it was k n o w n  in Georgia, was the basis on which
1 nsociety was organised, its extreme stratification was the 
product of the preceding stage of feudalism, patronqm o b a , a 
stage which the doyen of Georgian historians, Ivane Javakhi- 
shvili, cl a i m s  was r e m a r k a b l y  s i m i l a r  to the f e u d a l i s m  of 
Western Europe in the Middle Ages. As well as allowing for 
the exi s t e n c e  of free, s m a l l - s c a l e  producers, the entire 
society was divided from top to bot t o m  into lords and s u b ­
jects. By the tim e  of G e o r g i a ’s i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the 
Russian empire, the t ’a v a d e b i , the heads of the great 
families or clans, had long since been exempted from feudal 
service, but the aznaurni or lesser nobility r e m a i n e d  
d e p e n d e n t  v a r i o u s l y  on the king, the c h u r c h  a n d  the 
t 'a vadebi. Many aznaurni, despite the fact that their 
status conferred on them special privileges and exemptions 
from obligations, were little wealthier than the peasantry. 
Furthermore, they were themselves subdivided, with the royal 
or king's aznaurni enjoying greater status that the rest.
This same stratification affected the peasantry, too, 
with each category p o s s e s s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  rights and p r i v i ­
leges. British His t o r i a n  W.E.D. Allen refers to the the
existence of six such categories,11 and Davit’ Gvritishvili 
1 ?to nine.
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One of the problems of defining the term "serf" is that 
the Georg i a n  wor d  used, qma, has the a d d i t i o n a l  m e a n i n g  of 
"subject" or "vassal". Just as £ a £ ron_i denoted "owner", 
"protector", "guardian", "lord" and "king", so the ter m  qma 
was in its turn used to denote a "subject", even though he 
were a didebuli aznauri (a promoted or honoured noble) or a 
d i d e b u 1^ i official. The His t o r i a n  of Queen T'amar speaks, 
for instance, of the Queen's didebulni (plural form), namely 
of Zakharia Panaskevteli and Daniel Kalmakheli as "the good 
q m ani" (plural form), the favoured of the patroni, that is, 
as good vassals of the sovereign. The H i s t o r i a n  of Queen 
T'amar calls the Shirvanshah, whose domains were under the 
Queen's protection, "the £ m a  of T'amar the king". Thus 
everyone, i n c l u d i n g  the t'av a d e b i , was a qma. Wit h  the 
c ollapse of central authority, however, p o w e r  r e v e r t e d  to 
the main feudal lords, who consolidated their hold over the 
lesser nobility living wi t h i n  their domains, r e i n f o r c i n g  
serfdom or batonqm oba in the process as the dominant form of 
social relationship, while the word £ma came increasingly to 
a s s u m e  the c o n n o t a t i o n  of " s e r f " J  ^  This can be c o n f u s i n g  
if one considers that not only peasants were q m a n i , but all 
those who possessed a patroni including the lesser nobility. 
Whatever the causes of differentiation of status within the 
nobility itself, the fact that e m e r g e s  is that the e x a g ­
geratedly hierarchical nature of the social structure had by 
the 18th century com e  to act as a brake on the free d e v e l o p ­
ment of social relations and consequently on the emergence 
of wider loyalties such-as to the nation.
There have been attempts, notably by Georgian national­
ists, to suggest that class rel a t i o n s  in the 13th to 19th
centuries were harmonious, and that both nobles and peasants
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re g a r d e d  b a t o n q m oba as m u t u a l l y  beneficial. Theirs, h o w ­
ever, was an idealised version of the reality. To some 
extent they resemble the liberal intelligentsia of the 18th 
century, men like S u l k h a n - S a b a  Orbeliani, Davit' G u r a m i -  
shvili and even kings Vakhtang VI and Erekle II in desiring 
a situation in which
the lord's and serf's m u t u a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  were 
clearly determined. The serf should be obligated 
to show fear to his lord, reverence, obedience and 
correct devotion, whilst the lord should be duty- 
bound to practise paternal charity and a loving 
brotherliness towards his serf. ^
The difference between them is that whereas the 18th century 
liberals u n d e r s t o o d  that such r e l a t i o n s h i p s  no longer 
existed and hoped for their restoration, many late 19th and 
early 20th century nationalists imagined that 18th century 
Georgia had been characterised by the existence of mythical
harmony in class relations.
A t t e m p t s  to suggest that class struggle was i n c r e a s ­
ingly c o m m o n  in this period met with a host i l e  r e c e p t i o n  
from Georgian nationalists at the end of the 19th and early
20th centuries. Perhaps over-reacting to the tsarist a d m i n ­
istration's efforts to Russify the country and demean Geo r ­
gia's culture and history, many Georgians became excessively 
s e n sitive to any work that did not depict G e o r g i a  in a 
favourable l i g h t . I v a n e  Javakhishvili, writing in 1904, 
devoted a book to the criticism of this phenomenon in which 
he pointed out that Georgia's interests were not best served 
by either ignoring or f a l s i f y i n g  its p a s t . 1^ Thus T'. 
Z h o r d a n i a ,  w r i t i n g  in the p a p e r  A k h a l i  k ' a r t ' l i ( N e w  
K'art'li), attac k e d  the work of S. Avaliani, Kr est 'yansk i i 
vopros v Z a k a v k a z ' e , w h o s e  offence had been to a r g u e  that
23
the p o s i t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  peasants in the 18th century was 
very severe. In response, Zhordania wrote:
The book leaves a very heavy i m p r e s s i o n  on the 
Georgian reader, with disgust causes him to say of 
our forefathers: You were savages and ca n n i b a l s
and we spit on your graves.
T '. Z h o r dania went on to assert that in Georgia "a solid 
moral and f a m i l y  link ruled relations b e t w e e n  lord and 
serf1 . 1 ^
Even amongst the scarce material available in English 
on the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  there is a tendency to r o m a n t i c i s e :  
Oliver W a r d r o p  w r o t e  after his travels in G e o r g i a  in the 
1880s:
The relations between the gentry and the peasantry 
are excellent; they are on terms of such a f f e c ­
t i o n a t e  f a m i l i a r i t y  that the l a t e r  a l w a y s  
addresses their prince by his pet name.
He added that
the perfect u n a n i m i t y  in the aims of the people 
renders an elaborate organisation unnecessary.
Even in the most auspicious of circumstances this would have 
been a tende n t i o u s  claim; as it was, made in the years just 
after the emancipation of the Transcaucasian peasantry, when 
land s hortage and the r e l u c t a n c e  of a large part of the 
aristocracy to make any concessions to their one-time serfs 
had led to a serious d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in their r e l a t i o n s  and 
when even the a r i s t o c r a c y  was divided a m o n g s t  itself, it 
lacks credibility.
It served the interests also of those seeking a revival 
of the Bagratid monarchy in the early 19th century to paint
a scene of pastoral h a r m o n y  and to express their own
24
dynastic inte n t i o n s  in terms of the "people's" interests. 
That this image is false is demonstrably illustrated by the 
detailed records kept by the church of their estates. Thus, 
as early as 1712 Georgian serfs were resisting their obliga- 
tion. to pay feudal dues. In 17 A 9 the serfs of Bolnisi 
church refused to pay their dues to the archb i s h o p  of 
Bolnisi and the Kat'alikos Antonius was forced to intervene. 
S i m i l a r  refusals took place at Urbnisi (1776), M a n g l i s i  
(1794) and Ruisi (1794).21 These records refer only to 
church property, records for private prope r t y  being muc h  
scarcer. However, d o c u m e n t s  r e l a t i n g  to deali n g s  b e t w e e n  
the n o b i l i t y  and peasants provide e x a m p l e s  of i n d i v i d u a l  
c o m p l a i n t s  and hards h i p  caused by different t 'a vadebi and 
a z n a u r n i , evidence of an increase in the n u m b e r  of p e a s ­
ants a b a n d o n i n g  their plots and turn i n g  to ba n d i t r y  and 
instances of widespread rebellion against the feudal system. 
They note, for example, an u p r i s i n g  in Imeret'i in 1786 in
which the peasantry attacked the homes of certain members of 
the aristocracy and which was only suppressed following an 
act of deceit in w h ich the I m e r i a n  king invited 20 of the 
peasantry's elders to meet him and discuss their grievances, 
only to execute two and i m p r i s o n  the r e m a i n d e r  on their
P  *3
arrival. J
Erekle II was justifiably concerned by the mood of his 
serfs and, given the long and frequent campaigns made by his 
armies and the demands they made on a peasantry already e x ­
ploited by their landlords and taxed to meet the needs of a 
complex state administration, it is not surprising that he 
s h o u l d  be a m o n g s t  t h o s e  c a l l i n g  for a r e v i v a l  of the 
s u p p o s e d l y  original virtues of b a t o n q m o b a . He sought to
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ease the strain on the population, too, by r e c r u i t i n g  
mercenaries from amongst the Cherkess clans2Zt and by intro­
ducing m e a s u r e s  to f a c i l i t a t e  release from s e r f d o m . ^e 
did not, however, e n v i s a g e  a b a n d o n i n g  the feudal system. 
Erekle's unease gives some indication of the limitations on 
the peasantry’s loyalty to the state. As serfs they had few 
rights, being, in effect, the raw m a t e r i a l  of the s t a t e ’s 
a m b i tions, and the producers of its food and goods and, as 
such, had little cause for strong, positive identification 
with the interests of the monarchy. To some extent, though, 
a c o m m o n  religion, langu a g e  and ethnic o r igin helped 
strengthen ties between the state and people, although under 
Erekle II, K ’art'l-Kakhet’i was rather more pan-Caucasian in 
character than Georgian and contained a mixture of peoples 
and religions.
However, w h i l e  G e o r g i a n s  retained a dim a w a r e n e s s  of 
their separate and unique identity and while the church and 
the popular t r a d i t i o n s  of oral poetry and s t o r y - t e l l i n g  
ensured a knowledge of a shared history and past unity, any 
sense of political unity that might once have existed in the 
’’Golden Age” of Georgian history had long since been eradi­
cated by the rivalries of the feudal lords. Thus by the end 
of the 18th century it is highly i m p r o b a b l e  that a n y t h i n g  
more than an unconscious and inarticulate sense of national­
ity existed amongst the mass of the people.
There were signs, however, that Georgia was developing 
a l i b e r a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  i n f l u e n c e d  by the E u r o p e a n  
en l i g h t e n m e n t ,  w h ose most e m i n e n t  m e m b e r s  wer e  V a k h u s h t i
? ft
Bagrationi, Anton Bagr a t i o n i  and Davit G u r a m i s h v i 1 i . 
Seek i n g  to revive an interest in G e o r g i a n  h i s t o r y  and c u l ­
ture and its further development, they nevertheless remained
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unable to extend that culture to include the peasantry. For 
the most part, the Georgian aristocracy remained as d o min­
ated by its feudal m e n t a l i t y  as it had done for the previ o u s  
500 years. Moreover, that the concept of "Georgia” meant as 
little to it as it probably did to the p e a s a n t r y  is e v i ­
denced by its readiness to put aside ethnic and rel i g i o u s  
s cruples and invite foreign assi s t a n c e  for its d y n a s t i c  
ambitions. Even in the 18th century there were intrigues
against Erekle aimed at the restoration of rival branches of
2 7the royal family.
b ) Russian Annexation and the Georgian Nobility
While the Russian invasion may have been morally inde­
fensible insofar as it blatantly disregarded the Treaty of 
G e o r g i e v s k  and t r a m p l e d  on the rights of a f r i e n d l y  state, 
it was n e v e r t h e l e s s  the case that m e m b e r s  of the G e o r g i a n  
government had themselves been questioning the effectiveness 
of the treaty and a sking w h e t h e r  Georgia m ight not best be 
served by g r e a t e r  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the R u s s i a n  Empire. 
M a n y  felt that only this w o u l d  ensure Russian c o m m i t m e n t .  
In 1799 Giorgi XII sent an ambassador to St. Petersburg with 
instructions to surrender the realm to the full authority of 
Tsar Paul, a sking only that the Bagratid f a m i l y  r e t a i n  its 
royal dignity.2® The Russians, however, preferred to wait 
on the Georg i a n  king's i m p e n d i n g  death and then r e s o l v e  
matters as they saw fit.
In N o v e m b e r  1800 the tsar w r o t e  to the c o m m a n d i n g  
officer in the Caucasus:'
The w e a k e n i n g  of the king's h ealth gives gr o u n d  
for e x p e c t i n g  his decease; you are, therefore, 
immediately to dispatch, as soon as this occurs, a 
proclamation in Our name that until Our consent is
27
r e c e i v e d  no a c t i o n  s h o u l d  be t a k e n  e v e n  to
nominate an heir to the Georgian t h r o n e .
At the end of December 1800 Giorgi died, leaving Prince 
D a v i t 1 and Prince Iulon to squabble over the right to 
succession. Meanwhile the Russians rendered their arguments 
a c a d e m i c  by the p u b l i c a t i o n  of a m a n i f e s t o  issued on 12th 
S e p t e m b e r  1801 a n n o u n c i n g  K*art11 - K a k h e t 1i's incorporation 
into the empire. Naturally this caused considerable anxiety 
amongst the Georgian nobility, but there was no coordinated 
opposition. In fact three factions e m e r g e d . O f  these, 
one group, gathe r e d  around Prince D a v i t 1, r e q u e s t e d  only 
that the terms outlined by his father Giorgi XII in 1799 be 
a dhered to, wh i l s t  a second, focused on Iulon, d e m a n d e d  
that the conditions agreed to in 1783 be honoured. The third 
group welcomed Russian annexation believing that it was the 
only way Georgia could be protected against Persian and 
Turkish a g g r e s s i o n  and that it f a c i l i t a t e d  the task of 
unifying the country and strengthening the economy. There 
were also those who simply regarded Russian annexation as an 
opportunity to gain revenge over Davit’.
I n s t e a d  of c a p i t a l i s i n g  on the c o n f u s i o n  in the 
Georgian nobility the Russian military authorities destroyed 
what residue of good will that had existed towards them by 
forcing the no b i l i t y  and other emi n e n t  members- of the 
c o m m u n i t y ,  under threat of arrest, to s w e a r  a l l e g i a n c e  to 
the tsar. However, al t h o u g h  the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
quickly suc c e e d e d  in a n t a g o n i s i n g  all factions w i t h i n  the 
Georgian elite, the interests, although not the intentions, 
of those who re g a r d e d  the R ussian o c c u p a t i o n  as a m e a n s  to 
bring together and r e i n v i g o r a t e  the G e o r g i a n  lands, and
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those of the administration temporarily c o i n c i d e d . M a n y  
Georgians, for instance, enthusiastically joined the tsarist 
a r m y  and its c a m p a i g n s  against the P ersians and Turks, 
seeking in Russian power, the means by which Georgia could 
regain lost territory and secure protection against future 
invasion.
W hilst it was the case that Russian policy inside 
Georgia was steadily alienating the nobility, a significant 
p ar t  of it c o n t i n u e d  to r e g a r d  R u s s i a ’s p r e s e n c e  as 
necessary, although only for as long as Georgia was too weak 
to defend itself. They sought, in other words, to m a n i p u ­
late Russian strength to their own ends. The tsarist a d m i n ­
istration saw things rather d i f f e r e n t l y  and had a vested 
interest in supplanting the power of the Georgian nobility.
It saw the Transcaucasus as a stepping stone to further 
e x p a n s i o n  into Asia, as a source of raw m a t e r i a l s  for its 
own nascent industry, and possibly, too, as a m e a n s  to 
influence trade between Europe and Asia. What Russia least 
wanted was an independent, self-assertive Georgian govern­
ment.
Either the Georgians underestimated Russian strength or 
they overestimated their own ability to negotiate independ­
ence once they had re c o v e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  to look after 
themselves. It seems more likely that they underestimated 
the Russians. As one Georgian historian has put it:
This was a t * a vad a z n a u r  i - patriotic road to the 
attainment of freedom which essentially assisted 
the tsarist Russia in the consolidation and exten­
sion of its power in Georgia.
By the 1820s changes in the c o u n t r y ’s social fabric, 
both those ev o l v i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  and those i n s t i g a t e d  by
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the Russians, had led the nobility to a reassessment of its 
p o s i t i o n  and to incline i n c r e a s i n g l y  t o w a r d s  the violent 
overthrow of the regime.
c ) The Emergence of an Armenian Commercial Bourgeoisie
As stated above class antagonism between the peasantry 
and nobility had become an issue of importance well before 
the 17th century. As yet, though, rebe l l i o n s  wer e  l o c a l ­
ised, s p o n t a n e o u s  r e a c tions to the e xcesses of p a r t i c u l a r  
landlords, or combinations of factors like poor harvests and 
high m i l i t a r y  taxation. These early indicators of class 
struggle, however, were not confined to the country. In 
K'art’l-Kakhet1i's towns (as yet there was very little urban 
d e v e l o p m e n t  in West Georgia) the g r o w t h  of c o m m e r c e  was 
creating fresh areas of stress in the feudal structure.
G e o r g i a n  18th century t o w n s  were the p r o p e r t y  of the 
king or the t'avadebi to w h o m  the king had g r a n t e d  t h e m . ^  
By law all those who settled in the them, including foreign­
ers, b e c a m e  royal p r o p e r t y . ^  In this way, the s o - c a l l e d  
free producers (craftsmen, etc.) and merchants were effect­
ively little better off than serfs. In fact the vast 
m a j o r i t y  of the urban p o p u l a t i o n  were by the 1 780s, still 
f o r m a l l y  enserfed either to the king, the nobility, or the 
c h u r c h . ^  The l i m i t a t i o n s  on the f r e e d o m  of the m i d d l e  
category were compounded by the virtual monopoly of crown, 
church and n o b i l i t y  over the e x i s t i n g  means of p r o d u c t i o n  
and the caravanserai.^
W i t h i n  the urban p o p u l a t i o n  a divide had e m e r g e d  
between the wealthy merchants and the money-lenders and serf 
craftsmen and small-scale merchants. In the first category 
the most important were the m o k 1 alak1 eebi (literally meaning
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citizens), a status conferred only on royal serfs (state 
serfs after 1801) wealthy enough to pay the tax. correspond­
ing to their position. Despite still being serfs, by virtue 
of their wealth and prestige certain members of this group 
had influence not just within their own community but within 
governing and aristocratic circles as well. Some, benefit­
ing f r o m  the G e o r g i a n  f e u d a l  p r a c t i c e  of b e s t o w i n g  
privileges (shedsqaloba), had the right to own serfs, and a 
few were p r o m o t e d  to t ’a vadebi, and thus out of s e r f d o m . ^  
Nevertheless, as commercial production expanded and with it 
the d e m a n d  for money, so the king and the nobility turned to 
the richer m e r c h a n t s  as their chief means of supply. In 
this way these nouveaux riches, building their fortunes by 
exploiting their poor colleagues and the peasantry, were in 
t u r n  e x p l o i t e d  by the n o b i l i t y .  T a x a t i o n  of the 
m o k ’a l a k ’e ebi b e c a m e  one of the pri n c i p a l  sources of royal 
income. Coercion, too, was used against them by an often 
indolent a r i s t o c r a c y  d e s p e r a t e l y  se a r c h i n g  for means to 
finance its e x p ansive lifestyle. Backed by the s o c i e t y ’s 
extreme hierarchical structure, the nobility, and in parti­
cular its more important members, was able to exploit this 
emerging social class with virtual i m p u n i t y . ^  However, its 
growing wealth and influence undoubtedly posed a threat to 
the nobil i t y  and in particular to the a z n a u r n i , who t h ough 
often h aving very little land and few serfs n e v e r t h e l e s s  
felt obliged to live in a ma n n e r  c o m m e n s u r a t e  with their 
status. Many aznau r n i  fell into the debt of town m o n e y ­
lenders.
An a d d i t i o n a l  factor w h ich further c o m p l i c a t e d  the 
class dimension of this relationship, and which was to have 
an i m p o r t a n t  b e a r i n g  on the d e v e l o p m e n t  of n a t i o n a l
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r e l a t i o n s  and the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  in the lat e  19th 
century, was the predominance of Armenians among the urban 
m e r c h a n t s  and craftsmen. Although there were only 47,000 
A r m e n i a n s  in G e o r g i a ^ 0 at the turn of the cen t u r y  (six per 
cent of the total population), they made up 75 per cent of 
the population of T’bilisi.^1 Because K’art’1-Kakhet’i was 
a Georgian kingdom and offered some refuge from Turkish and 
Persian attack, and perhaps because national intolerance had 
little place in Georgian life, Armenians had for a long time 
e m i g r a t e d  into south and south-east Georgia. In the 18th 
century Erekle II, endeavouring to promote the interests of 
his Caucasian state, actively encouraged the settlement of 
A r m e n i a n s  in those parts of K ’art'li w h i c h  had suffe r e d  
particularly severely from the ravages of war. In this way 
he hoped to infuse the area with new vigour and develop 
commerce.
Although national in t o l e r a n c e  did not as yet exist 
a m o n g s t  the peasantry, there were signs as early as the 
17th century that the threat posed by the Armenian merchants 
to the nobility's hereditary domination of society was lead­
ing to the f o r m a t i o n  of an a n t i - A r m e n i a n  prejudice, as is 
illustrated by the following criticism of royal patronage of 
the Armenian merchants by Prince Lese Barat'ashvili:
G odless Armenians..., merchants, h u c k s t e r i n g  and 
because of the sins of our king, entrenching t h e m ­
selves in the palace...in defiance of the will of 
God t h e y  are m a d e  l o r d s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  and 
aznau r n i  in Georgia... This is only done b ecause 
of the impiety of kings, but look to the east, the 
west, south and north; where do Armenians possess 
nobility? They have been dispersed by God; is it 
in Man's power to unite them? 2
Thus ethnic differences exacerbated and complicated an 
a l r e a d y  b u r g e o n i n g  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e .  For the m o m e n t ,
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pro t e c t e d  by the feudal str u c t u r e  of society, the n o b i l i t y  
held the upper hand but even in these conditions the rising 
class could still challenge, encouraged, too, by the import­
ance Erekle II a ttached to the d e v e l o p m e n t  of c o m m e r c i a l  
relations.
Whilst the potential for serious conflict between the 
two most powerful elements in Georgian society was clearly 
apparent by the time of annexation, it was not until the 
1840s, wit h  the d e c i s i o n  of the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to 
grant offic i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  to the a m k frebi or guilds, that 
the conflict could develop freely. By then the tsarist 
authorities had undermined the nobility's hereditary d o m i n a ­
tion of the state.
The continuing development of this antagonism through­
out the latter half of the 19th century was to have an 
important bearing on the national question in Georgia, for 
a l t h o u g h  a national m o v e m e n t  had e m e r g e d  by the end of the 
c entury a m o n g  the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  (drawn largely from the 
aristocracy) and al t h o u g h  the population as a w h o l e  was 
b e c o m i n g  mor e  a w a r e  of its n ational identity, the t r a d i ­
tional bearers of the n ational idea and the m o t i v e  force 
behind many of the national movements elsewhere in Europe, 
the bourgeoisie, remained predominantly Armenian.
The growing political ambitions of the Armenian refu­
gees, p a r t i c u l a r l y  from the late 18th c entury o n w a r d s ,  
brought them into increasing conflict with the t 1avadaznau- 
roba and further exacerbated national relations. Whereas in 
the past their immigration into Georgia had been a spontan­
eous reaction to Muslim persecution, or at the invitation of 
the Georgian kingdoms, leading figures in the Armenian com-
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raunity in T r a n s c a u c a s i a  sought in the a f t e r m a t h  of the 
Persian invasion of 1795 to use Russian influence to coerce 
the Georgian government to grant them l a n d . ^  Despite the 
fact that this involved direct i n t e r f e r e n c e  in G e o r g i a n  
domestic affairs and was therefore in contravention of the 
treaty of 1783, the Russians c o m p l i e d  with the A r m e n i a n  
request. Erekle, who was in no position to dispute the 
issue, was forced to grant land to A r m e n i a n  re f u g e e s  in 
K a k h e t ’i and concede to their right to Russian protection. 
Other leaders of the Armenian community who had negotiated 
directly with the Georgian government, thus respecting its 
s o v e r e i g n t y  in K'art'l-Kakhet’i, were g r a n t e d  land in 
B o l n i s i . ^
This d e l i b e r a t e  d i s r egard for Ge o r g i a n  s o v e r e i g n t y  
caused many who had hitherto sympathised with the distress 
of a haras s e d  people now to feel thre a t e n e d  by A r m e n o -
A c
Russian collusion. J
1.3 Tsarist Policy in Georgia in the First Half of the
Nineteenth Century
The measures adopted by the tsarist authorities in the 
first decade of their rule made serious incursions into the 
power of the Georgian aristocracy. An immediate end was put 
to the hereditary allocation of ranks and offices. From now 
on, the mouravebi, officials appointed from within the ranks 
of the most im p o r t a n t  nobles, were g r a d u a l l y  r e p l a c e d  by 
Russian chinovniki.
Following the removal of the Georgian monarchy and the 
heavy blows dealt to the c o n f i d e n c e  of the t *avada z n a u r o b a  
in the early 19th century, there was a m a r k e d  rise in the 
pr o p o r t i o n  of free producers, m e r c h a n t s  and m o n e y - l e n d e r s
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a m o n g  the p o p u l a t i o n  of T ’bilisi. W h e r e a s  in 1782-3 they 
had only constituted 15.67 per cent of the city population, 
by 1807-8 their share had risen to 36.63 per c e n t . ^
It was not only in the towns that the authority of the 
G e o r g i a n  feudal elite was eroded. In the c ountry too key 
posts in the administration were assigned to Russians, caus­
ing the no b i l i t y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  loss of prestige. Some 
t 1 avadebi retained their station as m ourav e b i  but usually 
o n l y  in the m o r e  i n a c c e s s i b l e  r e g i o n s  l i k e  P s h a v i ,  
Khevsuret'i or T ’u s h e t ’i. In the more a c c e s s i b l e  central 
zones political p o wer was f i r m l y  in the hands of the 
Russians. In this way Russian policy sought to n e u t r a l i s e  
the authority of the t 1 avadebi and, in time, to render them 
dependent on the tsar.
M e a s u r e s  were also taken to try to a s s i m i l a t e  the 
Georgian nobility. This involved not just their reorienta­
tion t o w a r d s  a m o r e  Europ e a n  lifestyle and education, but 
also f u n d a m e n t a l  a l t e r a t i o n s  to the feudal s t r u c t u r e  to 
bring it into line with Russia’s.
A m a jor p r o b l e m  that had to be overcome, h owever, was 
that the desire to both neutralise and assimilate appeared, 
to begin with, m u t u a l l y  incompatible. By a t t a c k i n g  the 
p ol i t i c a l  p o w e r  base of the n o b i l i t y  the R ussians e x a c e r ­
bated the sense of insecurity of a class already threatened 
by social upheavals in the feudal order, and i m m e d i a t e l y  
gained its hostility. The likelihood of a smooth incorpora­
tion of the Georgian nobility into the ranks of the Russian 
dvoryanstro rapidly receded.
By the treaty of 1 783 Russia had a c k n o w l e d g e d  the 
parity in status of the Russian and G e o r g i a n  nobility, but
now that they had annexed K ’art'l-Kakhet1 i and were seeking
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to root out all independent authority within the ex-kingdom, 
this too presented a problem. It was not until Russian rule 
was well consolidated that formal recognition was given to 
the G e o r g i a n s ’ equal status. The greatest obsta c l e  to the 
t’avadaznauroba’s incorporation into the dvoryanstvo was the 
e x i s t e n c e  in the Ge o r g i a n  feudal s y s t e m  of a vassal r e l a ­
tionship b e t w e e n  upper (t *av a d e b i ) and l o w e r  a r i s t o c r a c y  
(aznaurni ), a distinction which, if the Georgian aristocracy 
was to merge wit h  its Rus s i a n  counterpart, w o u l d  have to 
end. This, in fact, gave the Russians an opportunity on the 
one hand to further w e a k e n  the aut h o r i t y  of the t ’a v a d e b i , 
and on the other to secure the loyalty of the a z n aurni_ by 
ridding them of their burdensome feudal obligations. In the 
course of bringing K’art' 1-Kakhet1i and later other parts of 
Georgia into line, the clergy were freed fro m  s e r f d o m  and 
all taxation and duties in 1808,^7 while in 1811 all nobles 
who had been dependent on the church were placed under state 
authority.^® In February 1827, c o n f i r m i n g  what had been 
agreed in 1783, the G e o r g i a n  nobility, w h e t h e r  in state 
service or not, was declared equal in p r i v i l e g e  and status 
to its Russian counterpart, and in July 1833 the i m p o r a n t  
d e c i s i o n  was taken to e l i m i n a t e  the category of vassal 
gentry in K ’a r t '1 - K a k h e t 'i^^ (Viceroy Vor o n t s o v  e x t e n d e d  
this ukaz to West Georgia in 1847).-^
However, w hilst this policy was to bear fruit in the 
1 84 0s and 1850s, it was the cause until then of m u c h  i n s e ­
curity not just among the t’avadebi, who had comparatively 
greater wealth to fall back on, but among the aznaurni, too. 
The ukazi of 1827 and 1833 did nothing to resolve the under­
lying issue of establishing who was actually entitled to the
rank of nobility. To this end the G e o r g i a n s  were made to 
form noble a s s e m b l i e s  (in T ’bilisi in 1819 and K'ut’aisi in 
1 840) w i t h  the task of de f i n i n g  m e m b e r s h i p .  The onus of 
proving one’s status fell on the individual aznaurni. In the 
frequent absence of d o c u m e n t a r y  records, they were forced 
into the h u m i l i a t i n g  posit i o n  of having to petition other 
nobles to testify on their behalf. By the law of 1833 those 
who failed to prove either their e n t i t l e m e n t  to land or 
noble status lost their property to their former lords, and 
became state s e r f s . I n  this way, the Russians ultimately 
a c q u i r e d  t h e m s e l v e s  new allies, but not w i t h o u t  c ausing 
needless hostility in the process. As Viceroy Vorontsov was 
to d e m o n s t r a t e  in West Geor g i a  in the 1840s, there wa s  a 
means available which the Georgians found acceptable. This 
came to light in 1844 w h e n  an i m p e r i a l  ukaz r e n d e r i n g  it 
more difficult to prove n o b i l i t y  led to a rash of forged 
d o c u m e n t s  from the p a n i c - s t r i c k e n  a z n a u r n i . It was then 
pointed out that at the time of the treaty of 1783 Erekle 
(who apparently knew all the t’avadaznauroba’s family names) 
had produced a comprehensive list of Georgian aristrocratic 
families.^2 It was suggested that Georgians should merely 
have to prove their membership of one of these families and 
that a c o m m i s s i o n  of nobles o versee the process. By 1859 
30,000 Georgians had established their aristocratic lineage 
and hence their right of access to state service.
The libe r a t i o n  or e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the a z n a u r n i  f r o m  
feudal service both reduced the income from taxation of the 
t’avadebi and contributed to the break up of their estates. 
Traditionally these were owned jointly by the members of the 
great clans of families, but even before Russian annexation
there had been a trend t o w a r d s  b r e a k i n g  these up into
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ind i v i d u a l l y  o w n e d  e s t a t e s . ^  V a k h t a n g  VI had, in fact, 
a t t e m p t e d  to prevent this process by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  an 
article into his legal code which required that one forfeit 
five per cent of a divided estate to the state as a penalty 
for i n d i v i d u a l i s i n g  c o 1 1 ectively-owned lands.^5 Since the 
R ussians were anxious to reduce the p o w e r  of the great 
nobility by all means available it suited them perfectly if 
as well as d e s t r o y i n g  their political p o w e r  they could 
w e a k e n  the t ’a vadebi fs e c o n o m i c  base by e n c o u r a g i n g  the 
b r e a k i n g  up of their estates. Thus in 1810, V a k h t a n g  Vi's 
law was rescinded. The break up of the large family-owned 
or £3a g v a r e u l o  e s t a t ’es and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of i n d i v i d u a l  
ownership acquired a mass character following the occupation 
by Russia.
With their hold on political p o w e r  rapidly receding, 
many t'avadebi tried to hang on to their estates, but with 
little success as the countless enactments relating to par- 
celisation of land in this period bear witness. From 1800- 
1825 the T s i t s i s h v i l i  estates, for instance, were parti-
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tioned 10 times and divided among 30 different owners. 1
In 1847 Giorgi M u k h r a n b a t o n  Bagrationi, h i m s e l f  a 
t'av a d i , w r ote a report to the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
entitled 'On the sit u a t i o n  of the rights of the d i f f e r e n t  
classes of the Georgian people* (K'ar t'veli k h a l k h i s  skhva- 
daskhva t s o d e b a t'a u p'lebrivi m d g o m a r e o b i s  shesakheb), in 
which he argued that the £agv_areu 1^ o s y s t e m  had been c o m ­
pletely destroyed. The £ ^ a r £ u 1_ o , or e x t e n d e d  fa m i l y
group, i n c r e a s i n g l y  tended t o w a r d s  divis i o n  into n u c l e a r  
f a m i l i e s  and the subse q u e n t  br e a k i n g  up of estates. This 
process had gone so far, he wrote, that in many cases the
size of these new holdings was scarcely s u f f i c i e n t  to
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support one family. W hilst he a d m i t t e d  that in terms of 
rights the nobility was still a priv i l e g e d  class, he felt 
that as far as property was c o n cerned this was often no 
longer true. Only 15 t’avadebi, he claimed, owned over 200 
serfs, and he went on to argue that to prevent further 
p a r c e l i s a t i o n  of land the nobility should be r equired to 
possess a minimum of 40 serfs.
Apart for the fact that such a m e a s u r e  would have found 
great difficulty in a c q u i r i n g  the support of the G e o r g i a n  
nobility itself, which clearly had decided to move away from 
the old system, the Russians had no reason for w i s h i n g  to 
prevent the further w i t h e r i n g  away of its e c o n o m i c  power. 
As a Russian official put it when commenting on the report:
W o uld this really be to the adv a n t a g e  of the a u t o ­
c r a c y ' s  p o l i c y ?  W h e n  the g r e a t e r  n o b i l i t y  
p o s s essed und i v i d e d  estates, as well as having 
material resources it meant that they had a voice 
w h e n  the g o v e r n m e n t  r e q u i r e d  only t h a t  they 
listen. ^
W h i l e  on the issue of state service and the nobil i t y  he 
wrote:
Any class which is in no way dependent on the 
government for its position represents a potential 
danger, and not without reason.
b ) Resistance to the Russian Administration
Although by the end of the first half of the 19th 
century the Russians had f irmly secured their p o s i t i o n  in 
Georgia, and ac q u i r e d  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  degree of a c c e p t a n c e  
a m o n g s t  the aznaurni_ in particular, their p o l i c i e s  had 
inevitably alienated significant sectors of the population 
as well. That the a n n e x a t i o n  more closely r e s e m b l e d  a 
m i l i t a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  and that the Russian chi_no_vn^iki. w e r e
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introduced to run the administration were factors that con­
trived to unite the Ge o r g i a n  a r i s t o c r a c y  w here all others 
had failed. Ivane Javakhishvili wrote:
Not three years had passed (since annexation) when 
those very people who had thanked fortune that the 
Russians were in Georgia now cursed their fate.
The chinovniki were unpopular in Russian itself, often 
being of n o n - a r i s t o c r a t i c  birth and cons i d e r e d  of lesser 
education. W orse still they re p r e s e n t e d  a threat to the 
political power of the aristocracy. In Georgia, ethnic and 
cultural d i f f e r e n c e s  i n f l a m e d  feelings a l r e a d y  a r o u s e d  by 
the incompetence and corruption of the new bureaucracy. As 
J a v a k h i s h v i l i  remarks, they w e r e  only in G e o r g i a  because 
they were no longer wanted in R u s s i a . ^  They knew no Geor­
gian and had no in c l i n a t i o n  t o w a r d s  a c q u i r i n g  it, and 
neither had they the faintest awareness of Georgian custom 
or law. This combination of ignorance and national arrog­
ance infuriated both aristocracy and peasantry.
The opening of a school for the nobility in T f bilisi in 
1804 (which was soon to be followed by more of the same) to 
some extent fulfilled its purpose of preparing Georgians for 
state service, but the harsh and stifling atmosphere of the
school and the humiliations suffered by the Georgian stud-
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ents hardened their opposition to Russian rule,^p while the 
edu c a t i o n  recei v e d  gave many the o p p o r t u n i t y  to p r o g r e s s  
to a higher e d u c a t i o n  in St. P e t e r s b u r g  and contact wit h  
W e s t e r n  thought and ideas and the Rus s i a n  inte l l i g e n t s i a .  
In..this wa y  the ground was prepa r e d  for the e m e r g e n c e  of a 
Georgian national intelligentsia in the 1820s.
The urgency with w h i c h  the Russians a t t a c k e d  the
n o b i l i t y  brought few if any benefits to the peasantry.
Rather, the presence of a large standing army as well as an 
alien administration placed additional pressure on a popula­
tion already pressed by a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of feudal dues and 
obligations. The size of the tsarist army in the C a u c a s u s  
had reached 52,000 by 1816, 30,000 of which were located in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan. This, of course, takes no account 
of the n u m e r o u s  off i c i a l s  injected into the a d m i n i s t r a -  
t ion.^
The Russian military presence brought greater but not
complete protection against foreign invasion. The Leks from
Dag h e s t a n  were still a p o w e r f u l  and d e s t r u c t i v e  force in 
East Georgia, while both Persia and the Ottoman Empire were 
still able to mount attacks. The rate of recovery f r o m  
po p u l a t i o n  losses s u s tained in the 1790s r e m a i n e d  slow. 
Ac c o r d i n g  to G e o r g i a n  d e m o g r a p h e r  Vakht a n g  Jaoshvili, the 
absolute increase in 1800-1832 was 107,000, of which 25 per
cent was due to A r m e n i a n  i m m i g r a t i o n  (and to a lesser e x ­
tent, Greek) from T u r k e y . ^  Natural increase was a low 0.41 
per cent a year. He comments:
The p o p u l a t i o n ’s rather low increase t e m p o  was 
determined by the existing military-political and 
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  c i r c u mstances. From 1811-1812 
black death, floods and f a m i n e  caused severe 
losses in Imeret'i. Large population losses were 
caused too by the Leks, the sale of prisoners, the 
l o w  l e v e l  of s a n i t a t i o n  and v a r i o u s  o t h e r  
analogous phenomena.
K.akhet'i suffered in muc h  the sam e  way. At first the 
p easantry had looked to the Russians for s y m p a t h y ,  h o p i n g  
that it might alleviate its position vis-a-vis the nobility. 
Javakhishvili refers to the comment of a Russian official on 
a letter he had received from a f e m a l e  serf of Prince 
Tsitsishvili,
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...that she, just like all the men, is devoted to 
the Russians and hates the princes and nobles.
The peasantry was quickly disabused of such illusions but, 
nevertheless, its readiness to turn to the Russians regard­
less of n a t i o n a l i t y  is indi c a t i o n  both of the social c h a s m  
d i v i d i n g  the G e o r g i a n  people and the lack of i m p o r t a n c e  
attached to ethnic solidarity by the majority of the popula­
tion. With their values, loyalties and aspirations encapsu­
lated within particular, narrow, feudal communities, their 
chief concerns were with the immediate necessities of life, 
and if the Russian administration were to weaken the nobil­
ity and ease their o b l i g a t i o n s  t o w a r d s  it, then they w o uld 
support the Russians.
G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  w r i t e r s  were later to take the 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of discontent with the policies of the 
Russian administration that were soon to erupt and carry on 
erupting throughout the 19th century as evidence of national 
indignation. But there is little to s u b s t a n t i a t e  their 
claim. Primarily the peasantry were protesting against the 
injustices of feudalism, and it mattered nothing whether the 
system was administered by Georgians or Russians. ^Uprisings 
were usually localised and when they did spread, they often 
included non-Georgian tribes or peoples. Examination of the 
first two large - s c a l e  r e b e l l i o n s  in the period of R u s s i a n  
rule, in Oset'i in 1804 and Kakhet'i in 1812, s h o w s  their 
root causes to have been not in national hatred but anger at 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  corruption, e c o n o m i c  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and the 
behaviour of the o c c u p y i n g  troops. In the case of O s e t ’i, 
the taking of food and fodder without payment, the c o m p u l ­
sion of local inhabitants to build roads and bridges across
the Caucasus in atrocious conditions, and the not infrequent 
rape of local w o m e n  created an a t m o s p h e r e  of constant 
tension to which a decision to conscript the male population
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into the army led to a r m e d  revolt. In the e n s u i n g  v i o l ­
ence the Russian g a r r i s o n  at Ananuri and a relief force of 
Cossacks were wiped out. Although some attempt was made to 
link up with Imeret’i, the uprising was in the main confined 
to the Georg i a n  m o u n t a i n  tribes and resolved around their 
particular grievances.
In K a k h e t ’i the p e a s a n t r y ’s f a i t h  in the R u s s i a n  
government in the Transcaucasus was quickly dissipated. In 
1812 the army carried out a particularly harsh food requisi­
tioning policy to provide for the ongoing campaigns against 
Persia and Turkey. Following immediately after two failed 
harvests, it brought the Kakhian peasantry close to starva­
tion. Patience, too, with Russian bureaucratic practice was 
stretched to the limit. The combination of the introduction 
of Russian criminal law to replace the laws of Vakhtang VI, 
the ig n o r a n c e  of the chi_no_vni_k_i of G e o r g i a n  custom, their 
use of Russian and their c o r r u p t i o n  had u n d e r m i n e d  any 
mutual understanding. Furthermore, whereas previously con­
scription had been accepted quite w i l l i n g l y , i n s t a n c e s  in 
w hich Russian c o m m a n d e r s  had appea r e d  to s a c r i f i c e  their 
G e o r g i a n  troops in battle had caused a change of heart. 
A t t e m p t s  to conscript in 1812 only s u c c e e d e d  in furt h e r  
agitating the population and a violent uprising broke out in 
which virtually the entire Russian force in K a k h e t ’i, as 
well as officials, were slaughtered. Count Paulovskii, the 
Russian commander-in-chief, threatened the insurgents with 
the wrath of God and of the tsar but without e f f e c t . T h e
reply, though, gives some insight into the p e a s a n t r y ’s
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thinking.
We lack e x p e r i e n c e  of letters and cannot u n d e r ­
stand what you have written. We do not deny 
Christ and we are not b e t r a y i n g  the tsar, but you 
have not carried out what the tsar c o m m a n d e d  in 
his manifesto. You have given us cause for action 
- murdering and hanging both the innocent and the 
guilty. Because of this we have lost patience. 
With bayonets you. have seized our last grain and 
told us that we should eat grass. Bec a u s e  of 
r e q u i s i t i o n s  we have no carts and no oxen; for 
every kod of wheat you gave us 1 ruble 26 kopecks, 
and to those who had none, you sold it for 4 
rubles. We made a request to you, but you didn't 
send it to the tsar. We can no longer meet you. 
As it is we a lready feel dead and are ready to 
d i e ! '
The Georgian Bolshevik P'. Makharadze, in a paper given 
at the All Union C o n f e r e n c e  of M a r x i s t  H i s t o r i a n s  held in 
Moscow from 1928-29 gave a fuller version of the letter with 
the peasants' c o m p l a i n t s  catal o g u e d  in g r e a t e r  d e tail and 
still more stress placed on loyalty to the tsar. Rather 
than challenging overall Russian authority the letter merely 
complained that the tsar's subordinates were out of line and 
acting against his will. In Makharadze's version the local­
ised nature of the revolt (though it did spread later) was 
e m p h a s i s e d  by its claim to speak not for G e o r g i a n  but for 
Kakhian peasants.^
That the exiled monarchy, the n o b i l i t y  and the upper 
echelons of the clergy tried to manipulate peasant unrest is 
clear. Prince Iulon and P'arnaoz tried to develop the 1804 
r e b e l l i o n  into a w i der u p r i s i n g ^  and Prince A l e k s a n d e r  
entertained plans of supporting the 1812 revolt with a force 
of P e r s i a n s . ^  However, whilst the p e a s a n t r y  had no great 
s y m p a t h y  for the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  n e i t h e r  was it 
en t h u s i a s t i c  about r e s u r r e c t i n g  the Bagra t i d  monarchy.
Aside from the fact that this w o u l d  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  have
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led to the r e i n f o r c e m e n t  of the old feudal order, it is 
unlikely that Georgia could have remained independent in an 
area vied for by three m a j o r  powers. I n d e p e n d e n c e  from 
Russia would in all likelihood have meant either dependence 
on Persia or Turkey, or still more likely, the redivision of 
the c o u n t r y ,  w i t h  East G e o r g i a  P e r s i a ' s  and the W e s t  
Turkey's. As a vassal of either of these M u s l i m  states 
G eorgia w ould have been required to pay taxes to their 
respective exchequers, and in the inevitable struggle that 
would have occurred between Russia and these Middle Eastern 
p o w e r s  for p r e d o m i n a n c e  in the area, Georgia's land and 
p o p u l a t i o n  would a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  have e ndured furt h e r  
devastat i o n .
On the other hand, the Russian m i l i t a r y  presence, 
whilst expensive to maintain, did at least offer a reassur­
ing b u l w a r k  against Persia and the O t t o m a n  Empire, and 
perhaps more importantly, Russia's determination to destroy 
the p o w e r  of the t'avadaznauroba brought side b e n e f i t s  to 
the serfs. Thus, as a means to cut the nobility's independ­
ent income, measures were taken to facilitate the process of 
s e c u r i n g  f r e e d o m  from serfdom. In 1824, it was made law 
that when a noble offered his lands for public sale his 
serfs could secure release from service to him by paying an 
appropriate sum of m o n e y . T h o s e  who managed to buy their 
freedom but had no land became state or treasury (sakhazino) 
peasants, while those with land became private owners.
In 1836 another law was intr o d u c e d  e n a b l i n g  serfs to
secure release from feudal service if their o w n e r  had no
7 7documents to prove ownership.'
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In this f ashion the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  con t r i v e d  
not just to inhibit the nobility but also to facilitate the 
e x p l o i t a t i o n  of the full range of state taxes from the 
peasantry on a regular basis. To this end they also showed 
particular concern to wipe out the slave trade that was rife 
in parts of West Georgia (Pot'i, Sokhumi, Akhaltsikhe)
The further depletion of an already decimated population in 
no way served the interests of the new regime. Whilst, of 
course, such m e a s u r e s  were taken w i t h  purely the g o v e r n ­
ment's interests at heart, the peasantry, nonetheless, bene­
fited.
Even the s u p p r e s s i o n  of the a u t o c e p h a l o u s  G e o r g i a n  
Church in 1811 failed to provoke a national r e a c t i o n  fro m  
the peasants, although it did widen the gulf between import­
ant elements in the Georgian elite and the Russians. Never­
theless, by attacking the church, they risked incurring the 
h o s t i l i t y  of a much broader section of the population, 
insofar as the church, for all its opulence (perhaps because 
of it) and c o r r u p t i o n  was held in great respect by and 
occupied a central place in the lives of the peasantry. To 
attack it, therefore, was more dan g e r o u s  than an a t t a c k  on 
the nobility. It was possible, too, that the G e o r g i a n  
Church might provide common ground for the two classes.
The replacement of the Georgian clerical heirarchy with 
Russians quickly gathered momentum and was accompanied by a 
policy of repression against all the national characteris­
tics of the church. Ge o r g i a n  icons and frescoes s u f f e r e d  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e v e r e  d a m a g e  in thi s  p e r i o d .  E x a r c h  
Theophilakt, new leader of the Georgian "flock", attempted 
w h e r e  possible, to replace the G e o r g i a n  l i t u r g y  w i t h
Slavonic forms, r e n d ering it i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e  to its
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a u d i e n c e . ^9 He, himself, knew no Georgian..
In 1817 he l i m i t e d  the use of G eorgian in the cathedral 
church of T'bilisi, Sioni, to three days a week, thus inter­
fering with the free practice of faith in the t o w n  for the 
first time in 1400 years. Not even the Arabs, the Mongols, 
the Turks or the Persians had denied that right.
The arrests of the archbishops of K ’ut’aisi and Gelat’i
in 1820 and their subsequent maltreatment provoked a popular
uprising in Imeret’i which soon spread throughout the whole
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of W e s t  G e o r g i a .  For a w h i l e  it s e e m e d  as if the
pea s a n t r y  and no b i l i t y  had found c o m m o n  cause, but by 1821 
the revolt had petered out. Religion was not enough to hold 
them together, and whilst the changes undoubtedly affected 
the higher ranks of the church, in the coun t r y  little was 
altered.
It is evident that at the time of the revolt in West 
G eorgia the peasantry in East G eorgia r e m a i n e d  unmoved. 
G i v e n  the i n f l u e n c e  of the l o w e r  c l e r g y ,  the v i l l a g e  
priests, among the peasants, a possible explanation for this 
contrast lies in the r e f o r m  of 1808 g r a n t i n g  the l o w e r  
clergy in East Geor g i a  release from serfdom. As a c o n s e ­
quence, they had some cause to be grateful to the Russians. 
In West Georgia, however, there had been no such reform.
Subs e q u e n t  to the s u p p r e s s i o n  of the revolt it is 
evident too that the R ussians c o n s i d e r e d  this a m a t t e r  of 
urgency, for from 1821 onwards measures were taken to extend 
the law into West Georgia, a l t h o u g h  it was not until the 
1840s that the process was completed.®^
By the 182 0s the a r i s t o c r a c y  had had tim e  to r e c o v e r
from the trauma of annexation and regroup. Better education
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and improved contact ^with Western thought- and developments, 
c o m b i n e d  wit h  the negat i v e  effects of R ussian policy on 
justice and religion, the offensive presence of the chinov- 
niki and the apparent slide towards Russification had pro­
voked a new awareness of nationality among certain members 
of the nobility. Time, moreover, had given those confu s e d  
in 1801 by the need for Russian protection and their desire 
for independence to regain their confidence and forget the 
chaos of the late 18th century.
The 1825 Decembrist uprising contributed to the revi­
val, not least because many of its participants, including 
two Georgians, A. G a m g e b l i d z e  and M. Barat'ashvili were 
exiled to Georgia. A consequence of this was the flOUriSh-
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ing of i n t e l l e c u t a l  life in T'bilisi. A new journal, 
T i f l i s s k i e  V e d o m o s t i , began p u b l i c a t i o n  in 1828 and was 
described by Pushkin as
...the only one in Russia w h ich has an o r i g i n a l  
colour and where one can find artic l e s  of real and 
European interest.
In 1832 a Georgian edition, Saliteraturo Natsilebi Tp'ilisis 
Utsqebat'an started u p . ^
Its c o n f i d e n c e  restored, the a r i s t o c r a c y  p l a n n e d  the 
o v e r t h r o w  of the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in 1832 and the 
restoration of the Georgian monarchy. But the conspirators 
were by no m e ans an h o m o g e n o u s  group. The m a j o r i t y  wer e  
m o n a r c h i s t s  wit h  som e  degree of c o m m i t m e n t  to a c o n s t i t u ­
tion, but some were liberal democrats who sought the crea­
tion of a republic and i n i t i a l l y  at least a r eturn to the 
treaty of 1783. This group i ncluded the l e a d i n g  lights in 
the awakening Georgian nationalist movement, men like Giorgi
Orbeliani, S i m o n  Dodashvili, Giorgi Erist'avi and Davit'
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Qipiani. They were inspired by the French r e v o l u t i o n  of 
July 1830 and the Polish revolt of 1830-31. They did, 
however, make it clear that they regarded Russian protection 
as ess e n t i a l  to Georgia's survival. S i m o n  Dodashvili, for 
instance, stated that "without the patronage of R u ssia her
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[Georgia's] existence is impossible".
It w o u l d  appear that the r e a c t i o n a r y  c h a r a c t e r  of the 
monarchist faction, which sought the restoration of the pre- 
1783 status quo, caused some w a v e r i n g  a m o n g s t  their more 
liberal colleagues. The plan to e x t e r m i n a t e  all leading 
m e m b e r s  of the R ussian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  proved the final 
straw, and Prince Iase P a l a v a n d a s h v i l  i felt c o m p e l l e d  to 
betray the plot.®^
Had it succeeded, apart from bringing an i n e v i t a b l e  
clash with the R ussian army, it seems very likely that it 
would have met with a negative response from the peasantry. 
Even if one a s s u m e s  that the G e o r g i a n  m o n a r c h y  c o uld have 
defended its sovereignty against the Persians and Russians, 
it is apparent that the p e a s a n t r y  was indifferent.
Ivane Javakhishvili wrote:
Now that we have the d o c u m e n t s  we can wit h  c o n ­
viction say that even w ithout the be t r a y a l  by 
P a l a v a n d a s h v i 1 i , the c o n s p i r a c y  had no c hance of 
success, and not because there was i n s u f f i c i e n t  
hostility and dissatisfaction in Georgian society 
with the regime introduced by the Russian govern­
ment, but because e xactly at that time there was 
strong agitation among the Georgian peasantry, and 
it w o uld not have sup p o r t e d  the nobility. The 
reason lies in the fact that in pre c i s e l y  those 
years when the plot was being hatched for the 
overthrow of Russian domination, a powerful m o v e ­
ment had r e - e m e r g e d  a m o n g s t  the p e a s a n t r y  for 
freedom from serfdom. 8
Reports made by the Russian administration give doc u ­
mentary evidence of the peasantry's increasing reluctance to
49
fulfil their obligations to their landlords, with rich pea­
sants offering particularly stubborn resistance.®^
Despite its failure, however, the conspiracy was s o m e ­
thing of a watershed in Georgian history. It marked the end 
of the B a g r a t i d  m o n a r c h y  once and for all, and saw the e m e r ­
gence of a Georgian nationalist intelligentsia, albeit very 
small, and r e s t r i c t e d  to the a r i s t o c r a c y , but a b e g i n n i n g  
nevertheless. They stand as the forer u n n e r s  of the more 
important national movement of the second half of the 1 9th 
century. In the immediate term, too, the plot brought home 
to the g o v e r n m e n t  the folly of a l i e n a t i n g  its greatest 
potential ally amongst the indigenous population, the Geor­
gian aristocracy. Aside from class sympathy, the Rus s i a n  
government was understandably reluctant to grant favours to 
the Georgian peasantry when their own peasants were making 
similar demands nearer to home. Beginning with a law intro­
duced in 1832 limiting the right to own serfs to the nobil-
q o
ity, and reinforcing the nobility’s power over their serfs 
and the lenient t r e a t m e n t  h anded out to the consp i r a t o r s ,  
the r e g i m e  set out to entice the G e o r g i a n  g e n t r y  into 
cooperation.
It had long been a c k n o w l e d g e d  in g o v e r n m e n t  circles 
that the Georgian administration was hopelessly inefficient 
and corrupt, but noth i n g  had been done about i t . ^ 1 H a v i n g  
observed the consequences of misgovernment and ignoring the 
nobility's interests, it was at last recognised that tsarist 
policy could best be served if loyal G e o r g i a n s  b e c a m e  
actively involved in the administration. The measures taken 
in K'art' 1-Kakhet1 i in 1837 and the 1840s in West Georgia to 
ease the posit i o n  of the az n a u r n i  (above), and the a b i l i t y  
of Viceroy Vorontsov (1845-54) to find common language with
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the Georgian nobles led to their transformation by the 1850s 
into a loyal arm of the tsarist government.
1 .4 The Growing Significance of the National Question
By the end of the first half of the c entury the four 
key actors in the future evolution of the national question, 
the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  the Ge o r g i a n  nobility, the 
A r m e n i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  and the pea s a n t r y  ( p r e p onderantly 
G e o r g i a n ) ,  had all m a d e  t h e i r  s y m p a t h i e s  clear. T h e  
Russians, despite o c c a s i o n a l  e c c entric d e v i a t i o n s  t o w a r d s  
the promotion of Georgia's socio-economic and cultural life 
as s o m e t h i n g  w o r t h y  in itself (notably under Vorontsov's 
influence), and in spite of the fact that by simply bringing 
a m e a s u r e  of security to the area they had c o n t r i b u t e d  to 
its progress, regarded Georgia very much as a colony, whose 
w e a l t h  should be exp l o i t e d  not for its own benefit but for 
that of the Russian heartland. The Russian M i n i s t e r  of 
Finance in 1827, Kankrin stated:
The T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  p r o v inces not w i t h o u t  reason 
could be t e r m e d  a colony of R’ussia w h i c h  should 
bring the state highly si g n i f i c a n t  p rofits from 
the products of southern c l i m e s . ^
His view was shared by General Paskevich, military comman- 
der-in-chief in Georgia, who in the same year enquired:
Should we not regard Geor g i a  as a c olony w h i c h  
could provide us with raw materials (silk, cotton, 
cloth, etc.) for our factories, in e x c h a n g e  for 
manufactured goods from R u s s i a ? ^
Whilst this inevitably hindered the economic progress 
and i n t e g r a t i o n  of Georgia, it must have given som e  s a t i s ­
faction to those Ge o r g i a n  aznau r n i  w h o  felt t h r e a t e n e d  by
the rising fortunes of the commercial bourgeoisie in urban
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centres like T ’bilisi, T’elavi, Gori and Akhaltsikhe.
C o m m e n t i n g  on the tariff imp o s e d  in 1831 on foreign
goods and measures taken to boost the performance of Russian 
manufacture, Kankrin noted:
...through the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of a n e w  s y s t e m  
of trade into the Transcaucasian district I don't 
so muc h  have in min d  m o r e  income, so muc h  as the
support of our native industry.
His policy proved a failure. The virtually tariff-free 
route through Transcaucasia had, while it lasted, attracted 
Persian, Turkish and E u r o p e a n  trade, but i m p o s i t i o n  of 
import controls led to increased Persian interest in 
European merchandise and to the redirection of the East-West 
trade route via Trebizond instead of T'bilisi. Protection­
ism did nothing, moreover, to increase Russian sales in the 
region, not least of the reasons for this being that the 
ma r k e t  was still very small, and altho u g h  m o n e y  was in 
increasing use in both the rural and urban economy, much of 
it was of n o n - R u s s i a n  d e n o m i n a t i o n ,  t e s t i f y i n g  to the 
p e r s i s t i n g  Persian and Turkish influence. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
Georgia was too far from the Russian manufacturing centres 
for the still rather weak bourgeoisie to achieve an effect­
ive e x p l o i t a t i o n , ^  an(j w i t h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  still p o orly 
developed, and the mountain tribes uncontrolled, the journey 
a c r o s s  the C a u c a s u s  r e m a i n e d  an e x t r e m e l y  h a z a r d o u s  
exercise.
In G e o r g i a  itself, the local e c o n o m y  was d o m i n a t e d  by 
the a m k'rebi or g u i l d s ,1 w h i c h  in their turn wer e  d o m i n a t e d  
by Armenians. Despite the backing of their g o v e r n m e n t  
Russian merchants had by the mid-19th century still failed
to put up an effective challenge. By 1854 n e a r l y  all
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government contracts were being handled by the Armenians. 
Russian rule, w h a t e v e r  its other faults, had at least p r o ­
v i d e d  a s t a b l e  c l i m a t e  for t r a d e  and e x p a n s i o n .  The 
Armenian merchants were already turning their attention to 
Europe, to the extent that between 1821 and 1864 imports of 
foreign goods into Transcaucasia rose n i n e f o l d . I n  recog­
nition of the role played by the T'bilisi merchants, and as 
part of his policy of i n t e g r a t i n g  the leading e l e m e n t s  of 
G e o r g i a n  society into a closer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  wit h  the 
empire, Viceroy Vorontsov declared the m ok'alak'eebi "here­
ditary eminent citizens of the empire". Thus included into 
the category of "honoured citizens" (££ £ h e t^ n ^ e _g r a^ h d a n e ) 
created by Nicho l a s  I in 1832,^® they wer e  freed fro m  
m i l i t a r y  r e c r u i t m e n t ,  the poll tax and c o r p o r a l  p u n i s h ­
ment .
The s u c c e s s f u l  i n t e g r a t i o n  of large secti o n s  of both 
the Georgian nobility and the Armenian bourgeoisie into the 
service of the Russian empire, the achievement of persuading 
b o t h  c l a s s e s  to i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  f u t u r e  p r o s p e r i t y  and 
security wit h  the m a i n t e n a n c e  of Russian rule was a c c o m ­
panied by a confrontation within Georgian society itself.
As changes in the country's social r e l a t i o n s  pl a c e d  
g r e a t e r  s t r e s s  on its a i l i n g  f e u d a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  c l a s s  
antagonism between the mainly rural-based nobility and the 
commercial bourgeoisie assumed new proportions. The growth 
in the use of money was u n d e r m i n i n g  the p o w e r  of the t ' a v a d - 
aiznaurn^, b a s e d  on a p r e s c r i p t i v e  r i g h t  to l a n d  and 
authority. However, with that right under i n c r e a s i n g  
challenge, and with their estates fragmenting, the desire of 
m a n y  a z n a u r n i  to lead a l i f e s t y l e  w h i c h  they d e e m e d
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commensurate with their station, and their ability to do so 
wer e  often poles apart. R e l u c t a n c e  to live wi t h i n  their 
me a n s  brought an every e x p a n d i n g  n u m b e r  to fall into the 
debt of the urban nouveaux riches, the Armenian bourgeoisie. 
This confusion of the class struggle with ethnic differences 
was later to have an important effect on the development of 
the national question in Georgia.
Russia's c o l o n i a l  t r e a t m e n t  of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  had 
its repercussions in the late 1850s with the emergence of a 
new Georgian intelligentsia, educated in the universities of 
Russia and Europe and strongly i n f l u e n c e d  by the Russian 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e m o c r a t i c  mo v e m e n t .  With its roots lying 
with the G e o r g i a n  liberal n a t i o n a l i s t s  of the 1830s, they 
took a strongly hostile view of tsarist rule and its effects 
on Georgian cultural and socio-economic life. Although the 
m e m b e r s  of this m o v e m e n t  met c o n s i d e r a b l e  h o s t i l i t y  fro m  
their own class, the nobility, they, nevertheless, emerged 
as the most c h a l l e n g i n g  i n t e l l e c t u a l  force in G e o r g i a n  
society. Their active support of agrarian reform and e m a n ­
c i p a t i o n  of the serfs plus their belief that the country's 
future s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  and cultu r a l  pros p e r i t y  d e p e n d e d  on 
the trans f e r  of land to the peasantry, the a b o l i t i o n  of 
privilege and the establishment of national autonomy, g a l ­
vanised a vigor o u s  m o v e m e n t  of o p p o s i t i o n  to the R u s s i a n  
administration. However, its call for national unity across 
class b o u n d a r i e s  was to s t u m b l e  not just on class a n t a ­
gonism, but on the fact that the bourgeoisie, so o f t e n  the 
b e a r e r s  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  i d e a ,  w e r e  A r m e n i a n  a n d  
uninterested.
The fourth and perhaps most important force in Georgian 
society was the peasantry. It continued to suffer from all
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sides of the social spectrum, and not least from the Russian 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Once the tsarist a u t h o r i t i e s  had secured 
the loyalty of the t 'avadaznaurni they felt confident enough 
to protect their interests, past mutual antipathy breaking 
down before a common desire to maintain their feudal d o m i n a ­
tion .
Whilst the peasantry continued to suffer from a variety 
of state taxes and labour d e m a n d s  the nobility, seeking 
c o m p e n s a t i o n  for the r e d u c t i o n  in the size of its estates, 
compounded the peasantry's misfortunes by intensifying its 
e x p l o i t a t i o n . 1^  For the m a j o r i t y  of the peasantry, too, 
the rise in the fortunes of the merchants and money-lenders 
became another source of despair, for although the exploita­
tion of the c o u n t r y s i d e  by the tow n  was not yet a m a jor 
factor, by the end of the c entury it had a s s u m e d  c r i t i c a l  
proportions.
D espite the fact that the key battles in the C r i m e a n  
War on 1853-6 were fought elsewhere, the Turks nonetheless 
c o m m i t t e d  l a r g e  f o r c e s  to the C a u c a s i a n  f r o n t ,  and 
Sameg r e l o ,  in particular, was the scene of heavy fighting. 
Consequently the peasantry were once again required to bear 
the brunt of g o v e r n m e n t  policy with lives, m a t e r i a l s  and 
supplies. The war, as in muc h  of Russia, had a c a t a l y t i c  
effect on peasant unrest. Thro u g h o u t  the 1840s and 1850s, 
peasant reaction had swollen, c u l m i n a t i n g  in a series of 
u p r i s i n g s  (notably in Guria) against the feudal s t r u c t u r e  
and landed interest.
Thus as Georgia moved into the second half of the 19th 
century and the process of modernisation gathered momentum, 
so the stresses and strains w i t h i n  the society's f eudal
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s t r a i g h t c o a t  r e a c h e d  b r e a k i n g  po i n t ,  and w h i l s t  the 
economy's c o n t i n u i n g  d e v e l o p m e n t  se e m e d  to indicate the 
closer integration of the country, social divisions appeared 
to threaten its fragmentation.
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Chapter Two
N a t i o n a l  I n t e g r a t i o n  in the P r e - R e f o r m  Pe r i o d  of the 19th
Century
2. 1 Russian Occupation and Social Change
The c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of R ussian p o w e r  in G e o r g i a  d uring
the first 30 years of the 19th c entury laid the basis for
the transformation of the country's social and economic life
both in the period p r e c e d i n g  the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the serfs
and in the years thereafter.
Although the victorious conclusion of the war against
Persia in 1829 did not bring an end to all h o s t i l i t i e s  in
1
the Transcaucasus it did eliminate the Persian challenge to
p
Georgia's survival once and for all and, in doing so, paved 
the w a y  for the e c o n o m i c  revival of East G e o r g i a  and, in 
particular, the rich a g r i c u l t u r a l  province of Kakhet'i. 
Able to live and produce in a relatively stable environment, 
Georgia began to evince all the characteristics of a society 
experiencing the effects of economic integration and m o u n t ­
ing social division.
B e t w e e n  the 1830s and the 1860s, the decade of the 
a b o l i t i o n  of s e r f d o m  or b a t o n q m oba in Georgia, the t r a d i ­
tional s t r u c t u r e s  of society wer e  placed under g r o w i n g  
pressure to change. The move away from the self-contained 
e x i s t e n c e  of c o m m u n i t i e s  that had changed l ittle over the 
previous 500 years was now prompted and made possible by the 
r e a s s u r i n g  p resence of the tsarist army. Not only did the 
Russian troops offer a reasonable safeguard against future 
invasion, they, and with them the imported bureaucracy, ex­
panded the market for the peasant economy and thus encour­
aged the development of commodity relations.
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However, whilst it is undoubtedly the case that it re­
quired the Russian political control of the Transcaucasus to 
release G e o r g i a  from c e n t u r i e s  of enforced lethargy, it 
would be w r o n g  to a s s u m e  that prior to this G e o r g i a  had 
sh o w n  no i n d i c a t i o n  of m a k i n g  progress on its own. As was 
sh o w n  in the previ o u s  chapter, the G e o r g i a n  kings of the 
late 1 7 th and 18th c e n t u r i e s  had mad e  r e p e a t e d  efforts to 
shake the coun t r y  fro m  stagnation, but had been largely 
f r u s t r a t e d  by the political, social, e c o n o m i c  and d e m o ­
grap h i c  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of the time. Under Er e k l e  II, East 
G e o r g i a  had s h o w n  signs of e c o n o m i c  recovery, only for the 
precarious nature of the kingdom’s existence to be brutally 
emphasised by the Persian invasion of 1795. Despite the in­
vasion, however, it is evident that granted a period of pro­
tracted t r a n q u i l i t y  the po t e n t i a l  for e c o n o m i c  and s ocial 
transformation of the area existed.
The geographical location of Georgia, its warm climate 
and fertile soil, e nabled its i n h a b i t a n t s  to r e c o v e r  r e l a ­
tively qui c k l y  from the t r a u m a s  they had faced.^ The 
variety of climatic conditions encountered in the different 
parts of the country, moreover, played a significant part in 
preserving a degree of economic unity at a time when politi­
cal unity was shattered. Dif f e r e n t  regions and d i s t r i c t s  
began to specialise in different areas of agricultural pro­
duction, so that the c u l t i v a t i o n  of cereals, wine, cotton, 
silk or the practice of animal husbandry and forestry became 
a s s o c i a t e d  wit h  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o v i n c e s  or districts. Thus, 
al t h o u g h  c o m m e r c e  r e m a i n e d  l i m i t e d  by the n a t u r e  of the 
e conomy, trade b e t w e e n  East and West Georgia, as w e l l  as 
inter-district exchange, was maintained.^ The infertility
of the m o u n t a i n  soil, too, c o m p e l l e d  the h i g h l a n d e r s  to 
trade reg u l a r l y  in the plains and valleys for essential 
items.^
D u r i n g  the 18th c entury the e m e r g e n c e  of a t hriving 
merchant industrial population, stimulated by the i m m i g r a ­
tion of Armenian refugees, accentuated the division between 
town and country, and while the number of urban inhabitants 
as a proportion of the total population remained very small, 
and although even these were engaged primarily in agricul­
tural pursuits, the n u m b e r s  of those occup i e d  solely as 
a r t i s a n s  or m e r c h a n t s  and usurers stead i l y  rose. By the 
m i d - 1 8 t h  century T'bilisi had b e c o m e  a m a j o r  m a r k e t  for 
consumer products.
Nevertheless, despite this and the b u r g e o n i n g  class
#
s t r u g g l e  d e s c r i b e d  in the first chapter, the c o n t i n u i n g  
domination of the country by the institution of batonqmoba, 
the pove r t y  and s h o r t a g e  of h u m a n  resources, the constant
threat of invasion from the Ottoman Empire and Persia, and 
d e b i l i t a t i n g  Lek raids on the c o u n t r y ’s i s o l a t e d  and u n ­
protected rural communities combined to deny the country the 
time and the peace in which to progress.
By the close of the 18th century, the f r a g i l i t y  of 
Erekle II's a c h i e v e m e n t s  was d e m o n s t r a t e d  first by the 
outflow of Armenian commercial capital to the safer centres 
of Moscow and Astrakhan,^ and later by the sack of T'bilisi 
by Agha Mohammed Khan.
Thro u g h  the p r o v i s i o n  of the secur i t y  and u n i t y  that 
Georgia had lacked in the 18th century, Russia at least r e ­
mo v e d  some of the obs t a c l e s  to its further e c o n o m i c  and 
social integration.
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By the 1 830s the eff e c t s  of the Russ i a n  p resence were 
b e g i n n i n g  to have an impact on life in the Transcaucasus. 
Stabilisation of the military situation had brought an end 
to the atmosphere of insecurity that had prevailed under the 
first 30 years of the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and w i t h  the 
monarchy now firmly suppressed, Georgian society had grown 
more a c c u s t o m e d  to the new regime. Whilst there ma y  have 
been some degree of ambivalence in its appreciation of for­
eign control there can be little doubt that for the m a j o r ­
ity, the new government had brought a welcome respite. The 
attitude of many Georgians is best summed up in the words of 
Ilia Tchavtchavadze, who was to emerge as one of the leading 
figures of the cultu r a l  and pol i t i c a l  r e n a i s s a n c e  in the 
last AO years of the century.
Peace settled on an e x h a u s t e d  country, w h i c h  for 
so long had been denied rest. She b e c a m e  calm 
after the destruction and the ravages, grew peace­
ful after the war and the struggle... a n e w  era 
was born in Georgia, a time of rest, a time when 
she could lead a life without fear.
At last g r a n t e d  the c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  thro u g h  her ow n  
meagre resources the country had vainly sought to achieve, 
G e o r g i a  began to show signs of recovery. The r ather low 
rate of natural increase sustained by the population during 
the first third of the century had begun to pick up; w h e r e ­
as b e t w e e n  1800 and 1832 there had been a n a t u r a l  i n c r e a s e  
of 0 . A 1 per cent per annum®, b e t w e e n  1832 and 1865 it 
a v e r a g e d  1.1 per cen t  per a n n u m . ^  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the 
1,351,000 people living in Georgia in 1865 was still a long 
way short of the 5 million recorded in the 13th century.
In the period between 1865 and 1873 (by which time the
serf e m a n c i p a t i o n  laws had been i n t r o d u c e d  t h r o u g h o u t
66
Georgia) natu r a l  increase c o n t i n u e d  at a rate of 0.85 per 
cen t  per a n n u m ,  r a i s i n g  the t o t a l  to 1 , 4 5 0 , 0 0 0  (see 
t a b l e ) . 10
Table Is Total Population of Georgia 1800-1873
1800 - 784,700
1832 - 892, 100
1865 - 1,351,000 
1873 - 1,450,000
The immediate impact of this relatively rapid rise in 
the birth rate was a d ecline in the a m o u n t  of land a v a i l a b l e  
to each i n d i v i d u a l  peasant, and a l t h o u g h  the c o n v e r s e  of 
this was that the same c o n d i t i o n s  m a k i n g  p o s s i b l e  the 
ups u r g e  in the p o p u l a t i o n  had also laid the basis for i n ­
creased a g r i c u l t u r a l  output, the m eans and mod e  of output 
was unable to cope with the increased pressure. The plight 
of the G e o r g i a n  p e a s a n t r y  was not helped, either, by the 
tsarist policy of settling Russian and European (predomin­
antly German) s e t t l e r s  on som e  of the best land available. 
Many of the new settlers in the second third of the century 
we r e  d e m o b i l i s e d  soldiers or r e l i g i o u s  gro u p s  like the
m o l o k a n y . By 1864, 19,000 Russians were living in the
11country.
C o n d i t i o n s  in the pro v i n c e s  of I m e r e t ’i and R a t c h a  in 
West Georgia were particularly bad, compelling the peasantry 
either to migrate or seek local employment as hired labour­
ers. As in muc h  of the rest of the country, the p e a s a n t r y  
had to make a living from plots of land that w e r e  not s i m p l y  
too small, but were also scattered and in some cases located
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up to s e v e n  k i l o m e t r e s  f r o m  t h e i r  v i l l a g e s . 12 T h e i r  
problems were compounded by the fact that not only was the 
population of West Georgia denser than that of the east, but 
was i n h abited by a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  gre a t e r  n u m b e r  of 
a z n a u r n i . Thus, a c c o r d i n g  to the figures issued by the 
Transcaucasian Statistical Committee in 1864, 9.9 per cent
of the p o p u l a t i o n  of K'ut’aisi Gu b e r n i a  belon g e d  to the 
nobility, whereas a survey carried out for 1865 showed that 
it only comprised 3.5 per cent of the population of T ’bilisi 
Gubernia. J The poverty, moreover, of some of these nobles, 
many of whom owned little land, few serfs and were heavily 
in debt to money-lenders, was such that they would attempt 
to maintain their standard of living by demanding not just 
their serfs' surplus production but also that part of their 
produce essential for their survival.
T hro u g h o u t  G e o r g i a  the corvee p e a santry wer e  mad e  to 
pay a var i e t y  of taxes, the most c o m m o n  being the k u l u k h  i or 
wine tax and the ghala or g r ain tax, both of w h i c h  w e r e  as 
yet paid in kind. In addition, they were duty bound to 
perform the service of begara - the provision of free labour 
on their owners' estates. There were, moreover, r e g i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  r e g a r d i n g  the p r o p o r t i o n  of the harv e s t  that 
should be ceded to the l a n d l o r d . T h e  t e m p t a t i o n  for the 
poorer nobility was to push it higher and higher, but whilst 
in the short term this a p p e a r e d  to solve the p r o b l e m  of 
their declining living standards, in the long term it merely 
served to exacerbate them, because not only did it drive the 
peasantry to overwork the soil and thus progressively reduce 
its f e r t i l i t y  and the size of the harvest, it also c a u s e d  
ever increasing numbers of serfs to seek escape by e m i g r a t ­
ing to East Geo r g i a  in the hope that they w o u l d  not be
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detected. This trend t o w a r d s  m i g r a t i o n  had the furt h e r  
effect of helping to accelerate the decline of the didi oja- 
khi or e x t e n d e d  family, w h i c h  at its peak c o n s i s t e d  of up to 
100 or more relatives living and working communally.1^ The 
a d v a n t a g e  to the l andlord of this i n s t i t u t i o n  was that it 
ens u r e d  that his serfs had the p r o d u c t i v e  capac i t y  to till 
the soil e f f i c i e n t l y 1^ and thus produce more, and that it 
p r o v i d e d  him wit h  a relia b l e  unit for taxation. Once the 
didi ojakhi began to decline, as it was doing in all but the 
most inaccessible parts of Georgia throughout the 19th cen­
tury, to be repla c e d  by nuclear f a m i l y  groups who o f ten
lacked their own means of production and had to either hire
1 ft
it, or work for someone else, ° then both the plight of the
p e a s a n t r y  and tha t  of the p o o r e r  n o b i l i t y  b e c a m e  far 
1 9w o r s e . y
The corruption, too, of the Russian chinovniki and the 
burden of state taxation further compounded the peasantry’s 
difficulties. In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s  the urge to m o v e  to 
T'bilisi to secure work as a hired labourer, a r t i s a n  or 
c r a ftsman's a p p r e n t i c e  a s s u m e d  c o u n t r y w i d e  p r o portions. 
Some even sought employment as agricultural workers in the 
vineyards of Kakhet'i.2^ Batonqmoba, however, continued to 
act as a break on socio-economic evolution.
A Ministry of Justice report filed in T'bilisi in 1836 
stated that
The general poverty of Imeret'i region in contrast 
with the abundance they [peasants emigrating from 
West Georgia] encountered in Georgia [East Geo r ­
gia], together with the sizeable demand for their 
labour, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the c u l t i v a t i o n  of the 
n u m e r o u s  v i n eyards of Kakhet'i, caused the m  to 
wish to prolong their residence here . 21
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Table 2:
The Rural and Urban Population of East Georgia 1835-186522
1835 1865
East Georgia Numbers % of Total Numbers % of Total
Urban
Population 40,000 10.8 99,687 15.3
Rural
Population 330,300 89.2 551,313 84.7
Total 370,300 100.0 651,000 100.0
The Rural and Urban Population of West Georgia 1835-1865
1835 1865
West G eorgia 1 Numbers % of Total Numbers % of Total
Urban
Population 14,058 2.7 30,470^ 4.4
Rural
Population 534,783 97.3 669,530 95.6
Total 548,841 100.0 700,000 100.0
1. Imeret'i, Ratcha, S a m e g r e l o  a n d . L e c h k h u m i ,  Svanet'i,
Guria, Ap'khazet'i, Meskhet'-Javakhet'i .
2. K'ut'aisi and Akhaltsikhe.
3. K'ut'aisi, Akhaltsikhe, A k h a l k 'a l a k 1i , Pot'i, Sokhumi.
Compelled by poverty and the difficulty of gaining per­
mission from landlords to seek temporary jobs in the towns,
the n u m b e r  of serfs fle e i n g  from their o w n e r s  to seek
? ftemployment became especially marked, J with the consequence 
that Paskevich, the Russian Governor General, responded to 
landlords' d e m a n d s  by i n t r o d u c i n g  a passport law in 1830
w h i c h  made it illegal to leave one's estate w i t h o u t  the
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issue of official documents.
The p a s s p o r t s  g r a n t e d  a m a x i m u m  leave of one year.2Z| 
Such wer e  the c o n d i t i o n s  of man y  of the estates, howev e r ,  
that administrative measures like these proved quite inade­
quate to the task of p r e v e n t i n g  the o u t f l o w  of labour to the 
towns.
Part of the d i f f i c u l t y  for the a u t h o r i t i e s  and for 
owners trying to secure the return of runaway serfs was that 
e m p l o y e r s  w ould rarely ask for the identity of their 
workers. Wit h  s e r f d o m  l i m i t i n g  their labour su p p l y  they 
stood to gain nothing from obliging the authorities. A dis­
proportionately large number of labourers in T ’bilisi, too, 
came fro m  West G e o r g i a  w h i c h  mad e  it i m p o r t a n t  that they 
should not cut t h e m s e l v e s  off from an i m p o r t a n t  supply. A 
contemporary observer describing the working population of 
T ’bilisi in 1846 wrote:
Examine the enormous mass of manual labourers in 
T'bilisi and other places. They are all Imerians 
and Osians... their m a i n  con c e r n  lies in a d esire 
to acquire money, and with it to pay the state 
tax, the landlord's ghala and to provide for their 
families. *
In the 1840s the scale of emigration from the country­
side had b e c o m e  so great that efforts were made to r e t u r n  
migrant workers regardless of whether or not they had pass­
ports.2 ^ It seems, h owever, that these e fforts met w i t h  
little success for the s t r e a m  of both legal and ill e g a l  
i m m i g r a n t s  to the t o w n s  c o n t i n u e d  to flow. In the e arly
1860s almost 3,000 passports were being issued annually in
27K'ut'aisi Gubernia. '
The stimulus to migrate came not just from the failure
of Georgian agriculture to support the rural population, but
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was s y m p t o m a t i c  of the g e n e r a l  m a l a i s e  o f bat onq m o b a . As 
the p o p u l a t i o n  moved to the towns, so the latters' role as 
both s u p p l i e r  and c o n s u m e r  of goods expanded. C o m m o d i t y  
r e l a t i o n s  began to replace the natural e c o n o m y  and the 
p e a s a n t r y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  produced for the market. In these 
conditions it was often the case that peasants who had been 
able to exploit the upturn in trade in the c o u n t r y  w e r e  able 
to buy their f r e e d o m  from o w n e r s  w h ose a c c u m u l a t i n g  debts 
had made t h e m  more a c c o m m o d a t i n g  to such requests. Count 
Vorontsov, Viceroy of the Caucasus, wrote of this emerging 
class of peasants:
One c o m e s  across such peasants, too, about w h o m  
one can freely say that they are w e a l t h i e r  than 
their owners. They pay tax in the form of one 
tenth of the win e  harvest, drink a l most half of it 
wit h  the hired w o r k e r s  who looked after their 
vin e y a r d s  and are able to take so much win e  to 
market and get so much money from its sale that... 
they often lend their owners money.
B e t w e e n  1850 and 1863, 1,314 cases wer e  passed in
K ’ut'aisi Gubernia alone acknowledging the right of certain 
peasant h o u s e h o l d s  to p urchase their freedom. As a c o n s e ­
quence, 7,250 men and women were liberated from serfdom, 4.5 
per cent of the total serf p o p u l a t i o n  of the g u b e r n i a .
? n
They paid their o w n e r s  201,54 4 rubles in c o m p e n s a t i o n .  
Strictly speaking, most of these peasants joined the state 
category, but insofar as restrictions on their movement were 
concerned, or their right to pursue i n d e p e n d e n t  e c o n o m i c  
activity, there were no obstacles.
The Russian administration made its own contribution to 
this process when as part of its s c h e m e  for r e d u c i n g  the i n ­
d e p e n d e n c e  of the G e o r g i a n  n o b i l i t y  and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
increasing its treasury income by expanding the category of
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state peasants, it i n t r o d u c e d  a law in 1836 (see Cha p t e r  
One) compelling the aznaurni either to produce documentation 
confirming their right to own serfs or to abandon that right 
altogether. The n u m b e r  of p easants who secured their 
liberty in this manner and the number of aznaurni who were 
affected was so great that the regime finally responded to 
the nobility's reque s t s  by chang i n g  the law in 1 8 4 9 . If 
serfs wanted to obtain release from their landlords the onus 
of proving that they were not his prope r t y  now rested 
entirely on them.
A l t h o u g h  the r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  degree of sc a r c i t y  in
West G e o r g i a  led a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  high p r o p o r t i o n  of its
i n h a b i t a n t s  to a b a n d o n  their villages, the same trend,
stimulated by the expansion of trade between the towns and
the c ountry and the g r o w t h  of the urban population, was
a p p a r e n t  in East Georgia, a fact born out by s t a t i s t i c a l
data a v a i l a b l e  for T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  in 1860 and 1861. At
this time 8,103 landless peasants were settled on landlords'
property as khiznebi, c whilst 1,830 corvee households, or
14 per cent of the total, either owned insufficient land for
3 3
their own needs or none at all. J Consequently, whilst the 
i ncre a s e  in the urban p o p u l a t i o n  in the first third of the 
c entury can be traced by and large to the i m m i g r a t i o n  of 
A r m enians, G reeks and G e r m a n s  (excluding R u s s i a n  m i l i t a r y  
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  personnel), a c o n s i d e r a b l e  part of the 
increase in the second third of the century was achieved at 
the expense of the rural population.
A census d e s c r i p t i o n  of T'bilisi carried out in 1866 
s h o w e d  that du r i n g  the 1850s and the first half of the 1 860s 
1,006 peasant h o u s e h o l d s  settled in the city fro m  East
Georgia alone. Of these by far the greater part were state
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peasants, a fact i n d i c a t i v e  of the o b s t a c l e  s e r f d o m  c o n ­
tinued to present to the m o b i l i t y  of the population. A 
further 650 h o u s e h o l d s  arrived from West Georgia, other 
parts of the Transc a u c a s u s ,  R u s s i a , P e r s i a  and Turkey. In 
all, these peasant i m m i g r a n t s  a c c o u n t e d  for 10 per cent of 
the city's inhabitants at this t i m e . ^
A s i m i l a r  p attern was evident in other East G e o r g i a n  
towns. In the same period, 1,255 peasant households settled 
in the t o w n s  of Gori, T'elavi, Sig h n a g h i  and Dushet'i. By 
1866 15.3 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n  of S i g h n a g h i  was c o m ­
prised of peasants who had settled there in the preceding 15 
35years. J
On the basis of the official statistics it emerges that 
w h e r e a s  the urban p o p u l a t i o n  of Geor g i a  stood at 54,058 in 
1835, or 5.1 per cent of the total population, by 1865 it 
had reached 130,157 or 9.8 per cent of the total. One 
difficulty with these figures, however, is their failure to 
include numerous categories of urban inhabitants. The n u m ­
ber of corvee peasants, for instance, is understated because 
a high p e r c e n t a g e  of these were escapees t r y i n g  to hide 
their identity. Seaso n a l  workers, moreover, w e r e  not i n ­
cluded. It is estimated that during the.summer about 20,000 
w o u l d  arrive from Persia alone, and that on this b asis the 
p o p u l a t i o n  of T'bilisi in the m i d - 1 8 6 0 s  was p r o b a b l y  in 
excess of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . ^  It is, therefore, likely that the 
urban p o p u l a t i o n  as a p r o p o r t i o n  of the w h o l e  was h i g h e r  
than the official data indicates.
The total figures do not, however, give a p i c t u r e  of 
the pattern of d e v e l o p m e n t  in the country as a whole. If 
one looks at the official s t a t i s t i c s  p r o v i n c e  by province,
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it b e c o m e s  appar e n t  that a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n  was e m e r g i n g  
b e t w e e n  East Georgia, in w h i c h  the capital, T ’bilisi, is 
located and West G e o r g i a  . In the f o r m e r  the o fficial 
figures show that 15.3 per cent of the population was urban
by 1865, w h e r e a s  in the latter the figure was only 4.4 per
, 3 8cent.
The more rapid u r b a n i s a t i o n  of Eastern G e o r g i a  to a 
large extent r e f l e c t e d  the g r o w t h  of T ’bilisi as the major 
commercial, industrial and political centre of the Transcau- 
casus, in which capacity it attracted a large proportion of 
the migrant rural population of Imeret’i, Ratcha, Samegrelo, 
Guria and Oset'i, as well as that of the east e r n  p r o v i n c e s  
of K ’art'l-Kakhet'i. A further factor inhibiting the devel­
opment of the towns and commercial activity in West Georgia 
was that such lines of communication as existed linking its 
mai n  t o w n s  with T'bilisi and with the rest of the e m p i r e  
were poor.
The p o p u l a t i o n  of K ’ut'aisi did expand rapidly, but 
fro m  a low base (see Table 4) and m u c h  of its d e v e l o p m e n t  
was due to its selection as the administrative centre of the 
newly created K'ut'aisi Gubernia. The other main West G e o r ­
gian town, Akhaltsikhe, did it is true, have a r e l a t i v e l y  
large population by contemporary standards, but it expanded 
very slowly having suffered considerable devastation during 
the Turko-Russian war of 1828-29. Because of this, and the 
s u b s e q u e n t  t e r m i n a t i o n  of the town's trade links w i t h  the 
Turkish towns of Artvin, Erzerum and Kars, the population of 
thpt town in 1865 (see Table 3) was still barely a quarter of 
the number who had lived there in the 1820s.^
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Table 3(i )
The Taxable Population of East Georgian Towns 1821-1865^°
Towns 1821 1835 1847 1865
T'bilisi 15,374 25,290 29,853 67,253
D ushet'i 1 , 143 1 ,700 1,800 2,525
Gor i 2,322 3,000 3,763 5,054
Sighnaghi 1 ,997 3,500 4,801 9,687
T 'elavi 1 ,677 2,680 4,000 7,300
Table 3 (id)
The Taxable Population of West Georgian Towns in
Towns 1825 1835 1.847
K'ut'aisi - 2,000 - 11,807
Akhalk'a l a k 'i - - 900 2,260
Akhaltsikhe 40,000 10,667 - 11,617
Pot'i - 1,309
Sokhumi - - - 1 , 6 1 2
When the railway linking the towns of West Georgia with 
T'bilisi and Baku was built d u r i n g  the 1860s and 1870s the 
rate of u r b a n i s a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  markedly. The Black Sea 
to w n s  of Pot'i, R e d u t '- K'ale, S o k h u m i  and Bat'umi, once it 
had been l i b e r a t e d  from the Turks, w e r e  the c h ief b e n e f i c ­
iaries of the i m p r o v e m e n t  in the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  n e t w o r k .  
For the meantime, however, the main towns such as Sighnaghi 
and T'elavi, both well placed to take a d v a n t a g e  of the e x ­
pansion of the wine market, were situated in the east.
The creat i o n  of two gubernii, T'bilisi and K'ut'aisi, 
to cover G e o r g i a  r e f l e c t e d  a d e l i b e r a t e  tsarist p o l i c y  to
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keep the coun t r y  divided, a policy that was to be retai n e d  
throughout the century, and which included referring only to 
the i n h a b i t a n t s  of K'art'l-Kakhet'i (predominantly T ’bilisi 
Gubernia) as Georgians; West Georgians were designated as 
I m e r i a n s  by the g o v e r n m e n t  and all o f f i c i a l  r e f e r e n c e s  of 
the 19th century to this area a t t e m p t e d  to prese r v e  this 
distinction. The division of the country in this way could, 
it is true, be said to have ref l e c t e d  the status quo prior 
to G e o r g i a ’s i n t e g r a t i o n  into the Russian empire. But as 
has been argued above the divis i o n  only a p p e a r e d  as the 
result of in v a s i o n  and s urvived p r i m a r i l y  because Pers i a n  
and Turkish f oreign policy dicta t e d  that it should do so. 
Desp i t e  the p o l i t i c a l  r upture Geor g i a  r e t a i n e d  its ethnic 
and linguistic unity throughout this period and contrived in 
the face of c o n s i d e r a b l e  ob s t a c l e s  and the t r a d i t i o n a l  
nature of the e c o n o m y  to preserve a m o d i c u m  of e c o n o m i c  
exchange. For the Russians, however, it mad e  p o l i t i c a l  
sense to resist Georgian aspirations for unity, and history 
had provided them with a convenient rationale for preserving 
the division.
Nevertheless, the process of urbanisation was playing a 
significant part in furthering the national integration of 
the country. The g r o w i n g  m i g r a t i o n  from rural to u r ban 
G e o r g i a  was b r e a k i n g  d o w n  the r e s i s t a n c e  of t r a d i t i o n a l  
society to change, prompting the disintegration of the ex­
tended f a m i l y  and forcing people to sell their labour to 
provide for their own and their dependents' existence.
The close-knit structure of the Georgian peasantry con­
sisted of communities that were formed primarily as exten­
sions of an or i g i n a l  didi ojakhi or exten d e d  family. B e ­
cause of the economic advantages that accrued to its members
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from keeping together - the family commune owned more land 
than the nucleated family and was thus better placed to pro­
vide for its m e m b e r s  and pay tax - as wel l  as the efforts of 
the nobility to prevent its disintegration,^1 the decision 
of c ertain m e m b e r s  of the f a m i l y  to break a w a y  did not 
necessarily conclude in the formation of nuclear groups, but 
often in the c r e a t i o n  of new f a m i l y  c o m m u n e s . B y  the 
mid-19th century, however, the small family was establishing 
i t s e l f  as the n o r m  in m o s t  p a r t s  of the G e o r g i a .  M. 
Kovalevski maintained that in certain areas, notably amongst 
the K h e v s u r s  and the T'ushs, G e o r g i a n  m o u n t a i n  peoples i n ­
habiting the north-east of the country, the didi ojakhi had 
ceased to exist by the beginning of the 19th c e n t u r y . B y  
the 1880s, by w h i c h  t i m e  it is true that e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the 
serfs had given further i m p e t u s  to its d i s i n t e g r a t i o n ,  
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  surveys carried out in the vari o u s  regions 
and districts of the country showed that in T ’elavi district 
in Kakhet'i the average size of Georgian rural families was 
only marginally above s i x , ^  that in T ’bilisi district their 
ave r a g e  size was 5 .2 1 , ^  and in. Shorapani district, in 
I meret *i , 7 . 0 2 . ^
In addition to the break-up of the extended family, an 
im p o r t a n t  f eature of the social s t r u c t u r e  of the G e o r g i a n  
p e a s a n t r y  f a c i l i t a t i n g  m o b i l i t y  was that in the m a i n  the 
basis of land tenure was not a c o m m u n a l  s y s t e m  s i m i l a r  to 
the Russian m i r , but the individual farmstead or k a r m i d a m o . 
Thus, a l t h o u g h  m e m b e r s  of a didi ojakhi shared c o m m u n a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and prope r t y  w i t h i n  the family, and a l ­
though their mobility was severely limited by the restric- 
tions of s e r f d o m  and p r e s u m a b l y  by feelings of a t t a c h m e n t
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and duty to the family, they wer e  not f ettered to the same 
extent as much of the Russian p e a s a n t r y  was by its social 
and economic obligations to the wider community or m i r .
Once the p e a s a n t r y  started to more a w a y  from the 
a c c u s t o m e d  vill a g e  e n v i r o n m e n t  they not only e x p a n d e d  the 
boundaries of their own experience, but also significantly 
increased their opportunities for communication with Georg­
ians from different parts of the country. In this respect, 
T ’bilisi, in spite of the m a n y  years of f r a g m e n t a t i o n  and 
the feudal parcelisation of the land, retained its place as 
the paramount town of the Transcaucasus. Now its status was 
e n h a n c e d  not just as an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  centre, but as the 
cultural, c o m m e r c i a l  and indu s t r i a l  centre of Georgia, in 
which capacity it played an important role in bringing to­
g e ther G e o r g i a n s  fro m  d i f ferent parts of the c o u n t r y  and 
making them aware of their shared attributes.
Once se p a r a t e d  from the f a m i l i a r  en v i r o n s  of their
v i l l a g e s  it was not s u r p r i s i n g  that the p e a s a n t r y  should 
seek new forms of group i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in the towns. For 
people whose lives had been acted out within the confines of 
a restricted rural neighbourhood, whose interests and con­
cerns reflected the relative certainties of their previous 
existence, and in particular, for those w h o  had lived as 
part of a c o m m u n a l  f a m i l y  wit h  a shared d w e l l i n g  place or 
darbazi p r o v i d i n g  for u p w a r d s  of 50 p e o p l e , a n d  used to 
the social and economic and emotional support of their c o m ­
munity, the experience of living in an unfamiliar environ­
ment, often s u r r o u n d e d  by people s p e a k i n g  l a n g u a g e s  they 
c o u l d  not u n d e r s t a n d  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  an a l i e n a t i n g  
experience.
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heterogeneity, the countryside was predominantly populated 
by Georgians, and even when other nationalities settled in 
villages they tended to set up their own communities. Near­
ly all the Armenians living in Kakhet'i, for instance, were 
concentrated in two of the province’s 58 villages.
The high c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  in 
the rural areas, combined with the proclivity of the A r m e n ­
ians t o w a r d s  jobs as m e r c h a n t s  or artisans, had p r o d u c e d  a 
s i t u a t i o n  in w hich the G e o r g i a n s  were a m i n o r i t y  w i t h i n  
their own towns.^^ In 1865 when they c o m p r i s e d  74.8 per 
cent of the total popula t i o n , ^ 0 they made up only 22.8 per 
cent of those living in T'bilisi. A r m enians, on the o t her 
hand, a c c o u n t e d  for only 10.2 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n  of 
Georgia but 42.6 per cent of that of T ' b i l i s i . i n  Sighna­
ghi, the fastest g r o w i n g  t o w n  in East Geor g i a  o u t s i d e  of 
T'bilisi, 1,102 of the town's 1,619 h o u s e h o l d s  in 1 863 wer e  
A r m e n i a n s . ^  In Akhaltsikhe, the second largest t o w n  in 
West Georgia, Armenians dominated commercial activity even 
though many of them had chosen to move to East G e o r g i a  in 
the 1830s and 1840s in search of a bigger market.
It seems conceivable, at least, that the Georgian peas­
antry, used to the homogeneous ethnic environment of their 
villages, may have come to experience a heightened awareness 
of their national identity through their realisation that in 
the towns they were a minority, an awareness, moreover, that 
may well have been s t r e n g t h e n e d  by the c o n f u s i o n  of class 
and nationality in T'bilisi, by the prevalence of Armenians 
in the bourgeoisie and Russians in the bureaucracy.
The sense of insecurity felt by G e o r g i a n s  in such an 
alien m i l i e u  is r e f l e c t e d  in the fact that like the o t her
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n a t i o n a l i t i e s  in T ’bilisi they tended to form g uilds along 
national lines. To some extent this may have been the con­
sequence of the nature of the crafts they were pursuing, and 
need not have indicated any sense of antipathy towards other 
na t i o n a l i t i e s ,  but it did n e v e r t h e l e s s  a c c e n t u a t e  ethnic 
division within the city and played a part in strengthening 
the significance attached by Georgians to national identity.
G e o r g i a n  e c o n o m i c  h i s t o r i a n  P. Gugushvili, c i t i n g  a 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  source, notes that fro m  the 1830s c r a f t s m e n  
belonging to certain professions were united into a number 
of a m k ’rebi or guilds. The existence, however, of t w o  or 
more independent a m k ’rebi representing the same profession 
w i t h i n  the same town was, as he notes, a d i v e r g e n c e  ’’fro m  
the g e n e r a l  prin c i p l e s  of the guild o r g a n i s a t i o n ” , and r e ­
flected conflicts of racial, religious and regional inter­
ests.-^
A c c o r d i n g  to r e p o r t s  on the g u i l d s  in 1855, for 
example, the T'bilisi wine merchants were divided into five 
a m k'rebi c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to five o u t l y i n g  d i s t r i c t s  of the 
city. T'bilisi's porters were formed into the following six 
a m k ’rebi: Georgian porters, Armenian porters, West Georgian
porters, f u r n i t u r e  porters, p orters w o r k i n g  for the win e  
merchants located on the m a i d a n , and porters working for the 
A v l a b a r ^  wine me r c h a n t s . ^
Aside from i l l u s t r a t i n g  the point that the w o r k i n g  
p o p u l a t i o n  of T ’bilisi tended t o w a r d s  o r g a n i s i n g  itself 
a l ong n a t i o n a l  or regio n a l  lines rather than p r o f e s s i o n a l  
lines, it is w o r t h  noting the p r e f e r e n c e  of West G e o r g i a n  
porters, at least, to form their own guilds, s e t t i n g  the m  
apart from East Georgians, a fact w h i c h  s u g g e s t s  p e r h a p s
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that as yet their regio n a l  a t t a c h m e n t s  r e m a i n e d  stron g e r  
than any sense of national identification.
Nevertheless, the national integration of the country 
continued to gather momentum. In addition to those settling 
on a more or less p e r m a n e n t  basis in the towns, there were 
t ho u s a n d s  more who t r a v e l l e d  to find s easonal wor k  during 
lulls in agricultural activity. A report filed by the head 
of T'elavi district in 1841 notes that the peasantry m o ved 
from place to place, and from the villages to the towns 
d uring the harvest, as wel l  as when food suppl i e s  and land 
were i n s u f f i c i e n t  for their needs, or when raids by the 
mountain tribes were becoming particularly t r o u b l e s o m e . ^
In this way, by e x t e n d i n g  the t e r r i t o r i a l  b o u n d a r i e s  
within which they lived and worked, and by gradually break­
ing free from the lethargy of the traditional rural environ­
ment, Georgia’s peasants, though still denied full mobility 
by the survival of batonqm ob a , began to expand the field of 
their activities and to identify not just with the immediate 
locality in w h i c h  they wer e  born, but to deve l o p  a w i d e r  
sense of allegiance as the barriers limiting greater social, 
economic and political communication between the different 
parts of the country were eroded.
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The National Composition of the Population of Georgia
1800-187357
Thousands Thousands Thousands
Nat ionalit ies 1800 % 1832 % 1875 %
Georgians 622.6 79.4 671.1 75.9 1049.1 72.4
Ap'khaz 52.0 6.6 56.6 6.3 60.0 4.2
Osians 29.3 3.7 32.3 3.6 55.9 3.8
Armenians 47.0 6.0 84.0 9.4 169.0 11.7
Russians - - 33.9 1 2.3
AzerisO 30.0 3.8 27.0 3.0 42.3 2.9
and Tatars
Jews 3.3 0.4 4.0 0.5 9.4 0.6
Greeks 0.5 0.1 7.0 0.8 17.9 1.2
Others - 4.1 0.5 13.5 0.9
Total 784.7 100.0 892. 1 100.0 1 , 450.0 100.0
1. Does not include military personnel
2. The term "Tatar" was often used indiscriminately by the 
Russian administration and many writers in the 19th and 
early 20th cen t u r i e s  to d e s c r i b e  Azeris, other Turkic 
peoples and Persians living within the Russian Empire. 
In fact, the vast m a j o r i t y  of Turkic people liv i n g  in 
G e o r g i a  wer e  and still are Azeri, al t h o u g h  there w e r e  
some Tatars. Whereas the Azeri language belongs to the 
s o u t h - e a s t e r n  branch of Tur k i s h  languages, the Tatar 
l a n g u a g e  b elongs to the Altaic branch. Except w h e n  in 
q u o t a t i o n  I have used "Azeri" w h e n  o f f i c i a l  or other 
contemporary sources have used "Tatar".
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Fig. 4 The national composition of the population of Georgia 1800 - 1873
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2.2 E c o n o m i c  I n t e g r a t i o n
The tsarist government’s policy, discussed in the pre­
vious chapter, of treating Georgia, and for that matter all 
the n o n - R u s s i a n  areas on the p e r i p h e r y  of the empire, as 
c o l o n i a l  d e p e n d e n c i e s  w hose chief purpose was to provide 
Russia with raw materials and a market for Russian manufac­
tured goods, undoubtedly slowed the pace of economic devel­
opment in Georgia and with it the pace of national integra­
tion.
A l t h o u g h  the i n c reased flo w  of R ussian products, and 
especially textiles, probably did inhibit the transformation 
of corresponding domestic industries into small-scale capit­
alist enterprises, Russian indus t r y  was not p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s u c c e s s f u l  in e x p l o i t i n g  the Ge o r g i a n  market. In fact, 
whereas about 1.25 million rubles of Russian goods were i m ­
ported into Georgia during the early 1840s, as opposed to a 
total of 809,542 rubles worth of goods from Europe and Asia, 
by 1857 1,086,816 rubles worth of goods were being imported 
fr o m  Europe and 934,063 rubles from Asia, w h i l s t  Russ i a n  
i m p o r t s  had scarcely grown, if at all, from their 1840s 
level. Because the tsarist a u t h o r i t i e s  did not issue 
figures specifically for Georgia, but rather for the whole 
of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , it is difficult to extract a c c u r a t e  
information. But it is at least clear that 718,528 rubles 
worth of goods were imported from Russia via the Black Sea 
port of Redut-kale, and that 1,306,268 rubles of R u s s i a n  
goods entered the Transcaucasus through Baku, some of which 
must have reached Georgia.
A rather more n egative aspect of tsarist e c o n o m i c  
policy, its refusal to tolerate the existence of industries 
in G e o r g i a  w h i c h  might d u p l i c a t e  and c o m p e t e  w i t h  those
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a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  in Russia, was easier to enforce and 
seriously inhibited local industrial development. The fol­
l o w i n g  e x a m p l e  d r a w n  from the 1850s is i n d i c a t i v e  of the 
sort of problem entrepreneurs of any nationality had to face 
when trying to start up enterprises in the Transcaucasus:
At the b e g i n n i n g  of the decade the V i c e - R e g e n t  to the 
T r a n s caucasus, Count Vorontsov, a ssisted a German, Karl 
Meitsner, to set up a cloth factory in the vill a g e  of Dre, 
just outs i d e  T'bilisi, in the belief that by so doing he 
would be able to supply the Transcaucasian army's cloth re­
q u i r e m e n t s  at a low cost. However, the a p p e a r a n c e  of the 
f a c t o r y  caused protest a m o n g s t  Russian cloth p r o d u c e r s  at 
whose request the Minister of Finance refused to allow state 
orders from the factory. Denied this outlet and faced with 
the refusal of the local population to buy its coarse, low-
quality cloth, the factory was forced to close d o w n . ^ 9  The
Minister of Finance explained:
I have gone to considerable trouble to explain to 
Prince V o r o n t s o v  that to grant the a d v a n t a g e s  
r e q u e s t e d  by him for the Dre factory w o u l d  aid the 
development of sheep-breeding and cloth-making in 
the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  area. But... that in my 
o pinion it w o u l d  not be right to a l l o w  the e n c o u r ­
agement of industry in the aforementioned area at
the expense of the industry of Inner Russia.
In a d d i t i o n  to these barri e r s  to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of 
successful businesses there remained the considerable obsta­
cle of serfdom, for although there was a significant m o v e ­
ment of the population, both legal and illegal, f r o m  the 
countryside to the towns, there is no doubt that the volume 
of migration was held down by the survival of feudal social 
rel a t i o n s  tying serfs to their o w n e r s  and to the land. In 
1830 the Russian administration added to the limitations on
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m o v e m e n t  w h e n  it i n t r o d u c e d  a passport s y s t e m  r e s t r i c t i n g
the f r e e d o m  of the p e a s a n t r y  to travel, or at least m a k i n g
it more d i f f icult to do so, b ecause in theory serfs could
not mov e  w i t h o u t  their o w n e r ’s p e r m i s s i o n  in any case.
Pa s s p o r t s  w o u l d  be issued for a period of one to six months,
so as to enable peasants to find temporary employment in the
towns or elsewhere. In special circumstances these would be
granted for one year. But in all circumstances the peasants
had to submit documentary evidence to the passport issuing
office that their services were not required on their land- 
fi 1lords' estates.
Thus the nature of Georgian society, held in place and 
even reinforced by the administration, deprived the nascent 
bourgeoisie of the manpower to develop industry. Manpower, 
m oreover, was not only limited, but also of poor quality. 
Such was the t r a d i t i o n a l  n ature of G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  that 
indigenous skilled labour outside of the handicraftsmen and
a r t i s a n s  was v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e  to find. As a c o n s e ­
quence, those who did succeed in establishing industries in 
Georgia were immediately confronted by the problem first of 
transporting the machinery from Europe or Russia, and then 
of finding workers with sufficient expertise to operate the 
machines. In som e  cases i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  a t t e m p t e d  to get 
around this problem by bringing their own skilled labourers 
with them.
A still gre a t e r  d i f f i c u l t y  was that bec a u s e  of the 
nature of communications between Georgia and the main indus­
trial centres, it was often impossible to provide factories 
w it h  a regular supply of spare parts, with the c o n s e q u e n c e  
that production was subject to frequent disruption.
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Even if one leaves these d i f f i c u l t i e s  aside, however, 
the i n f e a s i b i l i t y  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  a s u c c e s s f u l  e n t e r p r i s e  
was always in doubt given the limited capacity of the local 
m a r k e t  for a b s o r b i n g  indu s t r i a l  output. There were, it is 
true, m a r k e d  changes in G e o r g i a n  society b e t w e e n  1801 and 
the introduction of the peasants’ reforms of the 1860s, not 
least being the disintegration of the natural economy, and 
whilst there is some disagreement among Georgian economic 
h i s t o r i a n s  as to the extent of this process, all are at 
least agreed that it was assuming increasingly wider i mpor­
tance. This was of crucial significance to the economic and 
hence the g r e a t e r  national i n t e g r a t i o n  of the country, for 
until the self-sufficiency of the rural economy was broken 
down, until there was a d e v e l o p m e n t  and e x p a n s i o n  of the
d o m e s t i c  m arket and a spread of c o m m o d i t y  production, the 
extent of that integration would remain limited.
One of the factors r e f l e c t i n g  this change was the 
evolution of the fiscal system from one characterised by the 
collection of produce from the peasantry and the extraction 
of g r a t u i t o u s  labour, or b e g a r a , to one w h i c h  was i n c r e a s ­
ingly marked by the payment of money.
At the turn of the century the circulation of money in 
Georgia was very limited. The Russian administration, h o w ­
ever, with o u t  a c t u a l l y  c h a n g i n g  the d e n o m i n a t i o n  of the 
taxes that p r o l i f e r a t e d  across the country, d e t e r m i n e d  to 
t r a n s f o r m  the sy s t e m  so that the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  T r e a s u r y  
department would benefit from the inflow of cash. With this 
in mind, the then Gover n o r  of the Transc a u c a s u s ,  T s i t s i n a -  
shvili (Tsitsinov), revised a series of taxes p r e v i o u s l y  
paid by G e o r g i a n  c r o w n  serfs to the king, but who now, in 
their capac i t y  as state peasants (s a k h a z i n o ) paid the
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R u s s i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 62 These taxes, w h i c h  had e m e r g e d  
out of the feudal d e p e n d e n c y  of the peasants, were now to be 
paid w i t h  money. They wer e  the s a a g h d g o mo or Easter tax, 
the sasho b a o  or C h r i s t m a s  tax, the s a m a s p i n d z l o  w h i c h  had, 
its origin in the customary entertainment of the landlord by 
the peasants, but which later became payable with produce or 
money, the shevardeni which like the samaspindzlo origin­
ated as a duty p e r f o r m e d  by a serf for his master, but 
c o n s i s t e d  in p r o v i d i n g  him wit h  trained f a l c o n s , ^  the 
s a k v r i v o  paid by peasants to the state (or to l a n d l o r d s  in 
the case of corvee of sabatono peasants) for the right to 
marry a widow, J the sachekme paid by peasants on the m a r ­
riage of their daughters, 66 the dzghveni w h i c h  like the 
s a a g h d g o mo and the s a s h o b a o  o r i g i n a l l y  took the for m  of a
v o l u n t a r y  gift to the l a n d l o r d , 6 ^ but w h i c h  later e v o l v e d  
into a state tax, the nabadi,66 which started as the provi­
sion of felt shepherds' cloaks and the g a s a m qreli paid by 
6 Qdivorcees. 7
Later a t t e m p t s  w e r e  made - w i t h  m i x e d  r e s u l t s  - to 
extend p a y m e n t  by m o n e y  to the main taxes paid by state 
peasants: the k o d i s - p u r  i , a grain t a x j ®  the m akht a w h i c h
fell primarily on merchants and the tax-paying urban popula­
tion (but excluding sabatono p e a s a n t s ) , t h e  qalani which 
was limited, in the main, to the m o u n t a i n  a r e a s , ^ 2 the 
ghala, ^  the kulukhi, ^  a wine tax and the sabalakhe.^6 Who 
paid what taxes depended on the nature of the crop b e i n g  
cultivated, the location, and in the case of the sabalakhe, 
which was calculated on the number of sheep a peasant owned, 
on whether or not the individual was a livestock farmer.
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state tax, the sursat'i w hich fell on all c a t e g o r i e s  of 
peasant - state, church and sabat ono (corvee) - failed 
h o w e v e r . ^  The Transcaucasian administration had originally 
envisaged transforming its method of payment and, in fact, 
went as far as to grant peasants the right to pay the tax in 
rubles if they wished. This decis i o n  o c c a s i o n e d  a s u f f i ­
ciently enthusiastic response from the population as to give 
the g o v e r n m e n t  cause for thought. The s u r s a t 1i was G e o r ­
g i a ’s chief grain tax, and since the e n f o r c e d  U n i f i c a t i o n  
w i t h  Rus s i a  in 1801, had b e c o m e  one of the m a i n  means by 
which the tsarist authorities supplied the food requirements 
of the large Transcaucasian a r m y . ^  Such was the fall-off 
in the supply of grain to the state granaries brought about 
by the change that a l t h o u g h  the d o m e s t i c  mar k e t  m a y  wel l  
have stood to gain, the c o n s e q u e n c e s  for the p r o v i s i o n  of 
food to the R ussian troops wer e  serious. As a result, the
sursat'i tax, d espite a ppeals from the peasantry, r e v e r t e d  
to payment by produce. The impact of this decision, parti­
cularly on those peasants whose livelihood depended pri m a r i ­
ly on grain crops, was m a r k e d l y  to reduce the q u a n t i t y  of 
grain left to them for sale, and therefore to restrict their 
contacts with the market.
Such was the size of the arm y  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s ,  
moreover, that the administration discovered that the sur- 
sat'i alone was not sufficient to meet its requirements. To 
make up the shortfall a policy of compulsory grain requisi­
tions was introduced with the government buying at a price 
weil below the market level. While the market price of one 
kodi of grain ranged from between four and seven rubles and 
on occasions rose even higher, the state paid only one ruble
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20 kopecks, regardless of fluctuations in market prices.^®
Not only did this policy drive many peasants below the 
s u b s i s t e n c e  level and give cause for some of the u p r i s i n g s  
refer r e d  to in the previous chapter, it also i n h i b i t e d  the 
in c e n t i v e  for c u l t i v a t i n g  grain crops and may, therefore, 
have actually defeated the purpose of the administration’s 
policy. Furthermore, the seizure of the peasantry's surplus 
produce limited their capacity to act as consumers of town- 
produced goods and hence restricted the further integration 
of the country's e c o n o m i c  life. The c o n t r a c t i o n  of the 
rural m a r k e t  (comprising, of course, the vast m a j o r i t y  of 
the country's population) was a particularly serious blow to 
manufacturers in the towns, especially given the ban imposed 
by the tsarist g o v e r n m e n t  on their goods c o m p e t i n g  with 
Russian equivalents. It did nothing, either, to p r o m o t e  
another aspect of the regime's economic strategy, the import 
of Russian goods into the Transcaucasian market.
By the 1840s it appears that state peasants were still 
p aying the s u r s a t'i and k o djL^j-p u r_i in produce, and that 
w hilst a large n u m b e r  were r e g u larly paying £hala, sal.ani. 
and makhta with rubles, only the m ali (which merged with the 
makh_ta after 1845), kulukhi and s a b a lakhe wer e  paid by all 
state peasants in m o n e y . ^9
If one bears in mind that 41,3 97 of the country's 
113,810 peasant h o u s e h o l d s  belon g e d  to the s a b a t o n o  c a t e ­
gory, and that the vast m a j o r i t y  of their taxes w e r e  payed 
in produce, it b e c o m e s  clear that the n atural e c o n o m y  was 
far from finished in Georgia.
In a d d i t i o n  to the s t a t e  s u r s a t ' i , the s a b a t o n o  
peasants were obliged to pay a number of taxes, most notably
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g h a l a , which was traditionally imposed on corn, or kulukhi, 
as well as a variety of those e s t a b l i s h e d  by custom, such as 
the sashobao, sam aspindzlo and dzghveni referred to above, 
and to wor k  on their l a n d l o r d s 1 estates. P a y m e n t  of these 
taxes by money was also m a k i n g  inroads in this c ategory of 
peasant but was limited by the preference of most Georgian 
landlords for retaining the corvee system.®^
The majority of Georgian aznaurni owned very few serfs 
and were often themselves quite poor. According to census 
figures for 1861, 869 of the 1,751 t'avadni and a z n a u r n i  of 
T'bilisi Gubernia had less than 21 serfs and only two owned 
over a thousand, whilst on average each Georgian landowner 
had seven peasant h o u s e h o l d s  (koinl^i) on his p roperty .®2 
Despite their poverty, many retained a contempt for c o m m e r c ­
ial enterprise and active involvement in the management of 
their estates. They sought, instead, to cling to a m o d e  of 
existence that was long outdated. With their authority and 
security whittled away by the social, economic and political 
changes of the first half of the 19th century, they sought 
to perpetuate the idea of the expansive feudal lord through 
the maintenance of corvee and quit-rent. An article in the 
newspaper of the new generation of radical Georgians, Droeba 
(The Times), points to their profligate, s e l f - d e s t r u e t i v e  
lifestyle:
However much wine and grain you harvest, you still 
drink and eat it yourself; if you find you have 
too much for yourself then on Sundays and festival 
days you always arrange feasts, and with the help 
of your n e i g h b o u r s  and a c q u a i n t a n c e s  you sati a t e  
yourselves with red-wineskins... you always waste 
twice the amount you eat and drink... Besides all 
this there are weddings, services, c h r i s t e n i n g s ,  
wakes and a host of other things. At weddings you 
gather people together for three days and pile as 
much wine and food into them as you can... it's 
the s a m e  d uring wakes when you invite s e v e r a l
92
  q n   - —    -- -......— - — o w 1/ n ^  «j
drunk...
In spite of their distaste for c o m m e r c e  most were 
forced by the e x t e n s i o n  of c o m m o d i t y  relations into the 
rural e c o n o m y  to increase their sale of surplus produce. 
However, they sought in the main to achieve this end not by 
rationalising the management of their estates, but by m a x i ­
m i s i n g  the taxes and labour owe d  them by their serfs. The 
inevitably deleterious effect of increased time spent w o r k ­
ing the landlords' fields and vineyards on the agricultural 
p r o d u c t i v i t y  of the sabatono p e a s a n t r y  not only further 
exacerbated relations between themselves and the t'avadaz- 
naurni, but also still further depressed the ability of the 
rural p o p u l a t i o n  to act as a m arket for urban i n d u s t r i a l  
production, manufactured goods and crafts.
It has been argued by some Georgian historians that al­
though state and church peasants were still paying 54.6 per
cent of their taxes in produce up to the point of the finan­
cial r e f o r m s  of 1 843-45, the m a i n  reason for this was that 
the state was c o n t i n u i n g  to i mpose r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the 
payment of sursat'i with m o n e y . W h i l s t  it is very likely 
that this was the case and that had this i m p e d i m e n t  been r e ­
moved monetary taxation would have predominated, the fact of 
its preservation nevertheless continued to have an adverse 
effect on the country's industrial development.
The f i n ancial reforms, however, by t r a n s f o r m i n g  all 
state taxes into compulsory payment by cash and by reducing 
their numbers did much to further break the survival of the 
natural economy amongst all categories of peasants, although 
payment by produce continued to be the dominant form among 
sabatono peasants up to the 1860s reforms.®^
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In the raid- 1 860s, by w h i c h  time G e o r g i a ’s serfs were 
b e ing e m a n c i p a t e d ,  indu s t r i a l  production, such as it was, 
was c o n c e n t r a t e d  a l m o s t  e x c l u s i v e l y  in light and c o n s u m e r  
indu s t r i e s  and mining. Although the failure of Russian 
industry to meet the demand of the Georgian market provided 
an opportunity for some limited production of agricultural 
e q u ipment, the m a j o r  e n t e r p r i s e s  w e r e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in the 
semi-manufacture of silk, wool and cotton, and in the treat­
ment and working of leather and brick production.®® Of all 
the t o wns in Georgia, only T ’bilisi e m p l o y e d  a sizea b l e  
i n d u s t r i a l  labour force, and even there it r e m a i n e d  small. 
A c c o r d i n g  to the offic i a l  figures, there wer e  only 2,536 
w o r k e r s  e m p l o y e d  in i n d u strial e n t e r p r i s e s  in T'bilisi 
G u b e r n i a  in the mid- 1860s,®^ and whilst it is likely that 
this understates the real number because of the reticence of 
e n t e r p r i s e  o w n e r s  to d eclare peasants in their e m p l o y m e n t  
who were without passports, it is nevertheless the case that
these first representatives of the Georgian proletariat made 
up only a very small percentage of the total population.
In the main, Georgia's towns were centres of trade and 
s m a l l - s c a l e  c o m m o d i t y  production. It is e s t i m a t e d  that 
craftsmen (ostatebi) accounted for five to seven per cent of 
the urban population in 1865,®® and that 5,524 of them lived 
in the c a p i t a l . ®^ Since on average they e m p l o y e d  b e t w e e n  
one and two assistants or apprentices, it is clear that t o ­
gether with their families they represented a considerable 
proportion of the urban populat i o n . 90
The sales of Georgian handicrafts' producers rarely e x ­
ceeded 50 to 60 rubles per annum and, with the exception of 
T ' b i l i s i ,  w e r e  d i r e c t e d  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  at the l o c a l
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market.  ^  In fact, if one is to accept the f o l l o w i n g  
report, s u b m i t t e d  in 1863 on the East G e o r g i a n  town of 
T'elavi, it would appear that there, at least, c o m m e r c i a l  
a c t i v i t y  s carcely e xisted outside viticulture. The town 
governor, revealing his exasperation with the native popula­
tion, wrote:
The b u s i n e s s  u n d e r t a k i n g s  of the p e o p l e  of 
T'elavi, excepting a few Armenians, rarely extend 
beyond their native town. Occupied exclusively in 
v i t i c u l t u r e  and the purchase of wine in the d i s ­
trict, the local p o p u l a t i o n  acquires all the 
ne c e s s i t i e s  of life thr o u g h  it alone and c o n s e ­
que n t l y  regards all other branches of industry 
with characteristic Kakhian [native of Kakhet'i] 
apathy. W h e n  faced w i t h  shortages in the i m m e d ­
iate term they count, with inbred lack of concern, 
on a br i g h t e r  future so that, s trictly speaking, 
Georgians, who form the majority of the population 
in this region, are g e n e r a l l y  not invol v e d  in 
trade. This is the exclusive sphere of the A r m e n ­
ians who, in spite of the shortage of capitalists 
in the town, and the fact that its g e o g r a p h i c a l  
location places it far from the main trade points, 
supply T'bilisi, the G e o r g i a n  M i l i t a r y  Highway, 
Vladikavkaz, the w h o l e  of the C a u c a s i a n  line and 
even Temir-khan-Shura with the best wines culti­
vated in T'elavi and its surrounding area.^2
Despite the growing number of crafts operating outwith 
the g uilds (a m k ' r e b i ), the latter continued to m a i n t a i n  a 
fir m  grip on urban e c o n o m i c  life. Ale x a n d r e  Dumas, who 
t r a v e l l e d  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  in 1858, was w i t n e s s  to the 
extent of their influence in T'bilisi:
Around these c a r a v a n s e r a i  lies the c o m m e r c i a l  
quarter of the town, w h e r e  each street is c o n ­
cerned with one trade only. You would not find an 
a r m o u r e r ' s  s h o p  n e a r  a g o l d s m i t h ' s ,  n o r  a 
f u r r i e r ' s  n e a r  a f r u i t - s e l l e r ' s .  T h e r e  is a 
street of s h o e - m a k e r s ,  but I doubt w h e t h e r  you 
could buy boots of slippers there. These are 
different trades.
The m o n o p o l i s a t i o n  of b usiness and the d o m i n a t i o n  of 
trade exerted by the merchants’ corporation gradually induced
95
Hitherto, it had held the heads (ustabashebi) of the guilds 
responsible for tax collection and law and order among their 
members. But the a d v a n t a g e s  gained in this fashion were 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  p e r c eived to be o u t w e i g h e d  by the d i s a d v a n ­
tages. The a m k ’rebi were held particularly responsible for 
inhibiting the development of commercial a c t ivity.^
In spite of the s e c o n d a r y  role played by i n d u s t r i a l  
enterprises in the economic development of Georgia’s towns 
in the p r e - r e f o r m  period and the obstacle to the e x p a n s i o n  
of production, it is clear from the figures available on the 
n u m b e r  of e n t e r p r i s e s  and their output that progress was 
made prior to the reform and that from the 1840s onwards the 
pace of industrialisation accelerated.
Table 6s T ’bilisi Gubernia
Year No. of Enterprises Output in Rubles 
1852 154 211,820
1856 172 112,126
1857 195 157,529
1858 239 512,321
1860 306 387,058
1861 386 453,897
1862 378 707,360
1863 417 688,708
1864 479 819,913
1865 461 1 , 199,550
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Table 7: K'ut'aisi Gubernia
Year No. of Enterprises Output in Rubles
1847 12 6,735
1850 17 11,780
1855 22 21,540
1861 42 23,398
B e t w e e n  1835 and 1865 the n u m b e r  of i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r ­
prises inc r e a s e d  10 t i m e s  and the value of p r o d u c t i o n  30
their output was sold locally it is clear that the domestic 
market was expanding quite markedly.
Although, as the table for the output of leading enter­
prises in T’bilisi demonstrates, industrial production was 
on a l i m i t e d  scale even in the capital city, it is w o r t h  
n oting that at two rubles per head of the p o p u l a t i o n  the 
value of industrial production per person in T'bilisi G u ber­
nia in the 1860s was higher than most of the g u b e r n i i  of 
Inner Russia and that even when production for the far less 
developed K'ut'aisi Gubernia is included output per head was 
still on a par wit h  most. It is only when one c o n s i d e r s  
that p r o d u c t i o n  in Mos c o w ,  St. P e t e r s b u r g  and V l a d i m i r  
Guber n i i  ranged fom 20 to 50 rubles per head that it b e c o m e s  
clear just how undeveloped the Georgian economy w a s . ^
Despite the relative backwardness of Georgian industry, 
there is no doubt that the country's towns played an i m p o r t ­
ant part in f u r t h e r i n g  n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  d u r i n g  the 
m i d d l e  of the 19th century. The increase in the u r ban 
p o p u l a t i o n  pr o v i d e d  an e x p a n d i n g  m a r k e t  for a g r i c u l t u r a l
t i m e s . B y  1 865 there were about 500 such e n t e r p r i s e s  in
q  f .
the w h o l e  of G e o r g i a . S i n c e ,  too, the vast m a j o r i t y  of
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produce and hence encouragement for landowners and peasants 
to market their produce. Furthermore, the more the latter 
were compelled to pay their taxes in money, the more urgent 
it became for them to sell.
The initial spur to agricultural producers in the 19th 
century had been the arrival of the Russian Transcaucasian 
army and the tsarist bureaucratic apparatus. Although the 
fo r m e r  a c q u i r e d  a large part of its food r e q u i r e m e n t s  
t h r o u g h  t a x a t i o n  and r e q u i s i t i o n s ,  t h e i r  p r e s e n c e
Table 8 
The Number and Value of Output of T b i l i s i * s  Larger 
Enterprises in 1864
Nature of Number of Value of Output
Enterprises Enterprises in rubles p.a.
Bricks 93 370,000
Saw-Mi11s 33 49,000
Tiles 1 1 14,000
Tanneries 10 60,000
Cigarettes & Tobacco 8 24,000
Soap 8 17,000
Carriages 5 21,000
Beer 4 3,000
Candles 2 2,000
Facet production 1 12,000
Mechanised Metal 
Work 1 6,000
Copper Utensils 1 4,500
Bread and Macaroni 1 2,000
Total 178
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584,000
nevertheless stimulated demand. After the fiscal reforms of
1843-45, moreover, and the tr a n s f e r  of s u r s a t ’i to p ayment 
by cash, the i m p o r t a n c e  of the m i l i t a r y  m a r k e t  expanded, 
a l t h o u g h  f o l l o w i n g  the succ e s s f u l  c o n c l u s i o n  of the war 
against Shamil in the Caucasian mountains at the end of the 
1850s the m i l i t a r y  presence was scaled down. Just ho w  
i m p o r t a n t  the arm y  was to some parts of G e o r g i a  is mad e  
clear in the m e m o r a n d u m  sent in May 1864 by the m ok'a l a k 1- 
eebi of Gori to the Governor-General explaining the reasons 
for the d ecline of trade in the town. A m o n g  these they 
listed the departure of the Gori garrison:
Fro m  the day of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the R ussian 
G o v e r n m e n t  in G e o r g i a  until 1846 the C a u c a s i a n  
regiment was permanently stationed here - then the 
9th Eger and the Kherson were renamed the Georgian 
regiment. We tried as best we could to do every­
thing for the r e g i m e n t  so as to secure its p r e s ­
ence in our town. We constructed several barracks 
for it at our own e xpense and on land b e l o n g i n g  to
the town... Because the r e g i m e n t  a c c e p t e d  these 
s a c r i f i c e s  from us and as it had e v e r y t h i n g  it 
needed for its economic unit, we thought it would 
stay here forever and c o n s e q u e n t l y  our trade... 
w o u l d  flour i s h  mor e  and more... Therefore, many 
of us built stone houses in the town, to w h i c h  
many committed their entire capital. But we were 
very wrong in our assessments... the headquarters 
of the G e o r g i a n  r e g i m e n t  was t r a n s f e r r e d  to Bely 
K l y u c h  in 1 846. As a result of this our t o w n  has 
declined, we get a b s o l u t e l y  no in c o m e  f r o m  our 
municipal estate, the capital spent on it is lost, 
trade has fallen off completely and we are i m p o v ­
erished. many of our fellow mok'alak' eeb i , seeing
the sad plight of the town, have a b a n d o n e d  it and1 n ndeparted to various different places to trade.
Whilst the military presence in the Transcaucasus was 
significant in this respect, and in Gori apparently crucial, 
elsewhere there was not always the same pronounced depend­
ence on one or other factor. The g r o w t h  of the city of 
T'bilisi, for instance, owed itself to a variety of causes, 
a m o n g  them its t r a d i t i o n a l  role as the p o l i t i c a l  and
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e c o n o m i c  centre of G e o r g i a  and its location at the hub of 
c o m m e r c i a l  traffic through the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  to Europe, 
Russia, and Asia, whilst certain other towns like Sighnaghi 
were, in large measure, satellites of T'bilisi, owing their 
own economic success to the rise in consumer demand in the 
capital and their location in rich agricultural areas. C o m ­
merce in Sighnaghi also benefited from the settlement of a 
large A r m e n i a n  c o m m u n i t y  in the area early in the 19th 
century.
By the 1850s and early 1860s there were a n u m b e r  of 
p e r m a n e n t  m a r k e t s  o p e r a t i n g  in T'bilisi w h i c h  not only 
attracted merchants from all over Georgia and the Caucasus, 
but also from Persia, Turkey, Russia and Europe. The 
T'bilisi bazaars, the T'at'ar, Seid-Abadi, A v l a b a r  and 
Erevan square, acted as a focal point for commercial activ­
ity in the country. Merchants from the smaller towns, from 
A k h a l t s i k h e  in the West to T'elavi in the East, brought 
local produce and crafts to the centre and r e t u r n e d  to the 
provincial towns with Russian, European and locally m anufac­
tured goods. In turn these t o w n s  dre w  their s u r r o u n d i n g  
p o p u l a t i o n s  to their markets. Akhaltsikhe, until it was 
supplanted by K'ut'aisi and other towns benefiting from the 
construction of the Transcaucasian railway, became the main 
market town in West Georgia. Small-scale traders from all 
over Imeret'i and N o r th-East Turkey bought in A k h a l t s i k h e  
and then sold at a profit in the villages.101
From the 1840s the volume of marketings rose d r a m a t i c ­
ally. In 1845 1,763,450 rubles of agricultural produce and 
crafts were sold in the wh ole of Georgia, over half of w h i c h  
came from the sale of wine and silk. In 1858, according to
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the s o m e w h a t  d ubious c laim of the g o v e r n o r  of S i g h n a g h i  
district (m a z r a ), 3,583,350 rubles of agricultural produce
and crafts were sold there alone. Even a l l o w i n g  for e x a g ­
geration, it is still indic a t i v e  of the change that had 
o c c u r r e d  since 1845. 1,530,000 rubles of this figure came
from w i n e  and brandy, 1,930,000 from livestock, and only
290,000 from grain, a figure w h i c h  says a lot about the 
relative importance of the various crops in East Georgia.102
The fig u r e s  a v a i l a b l e  on the p r o p o r t i o n  of crops m a r ­
keted d u ring this period are very patchy, r a rely g i v i n g  a 
complete picture. Nevertheless, they are sufficient to give 
an overall impression of the basic trends. In East Georgia, 
the main occupation of the rural population was viticulture, 
one of the chief a t t r a c t i o n s  of w h i c h  was that v i n e y a r d s  
r equi r e d  far less space than g r a i n  crops. It is also the 
case, however, that they required almost constant attention 
throughout the year, thus l i m i t i n g  the time a v a i l a b l e  for 
growing other produce for personal subsistence. This may go 
some way, therefore, to e x p l a i n i n g  the high p r o p o r t i o n  of 
wine sold by the main K akhian win e  p r o d u c i n g  d i s t r i c t s  as 
early as the 1830s. A c c o r d i n g  to a report filed by the 
Russian administration for T’elavi district (m a z r a ) in 1836, 
66 per cent of the win e  m a d e  that year was sent to T'bilisi 
for sale.10^ Marketings, however, fluctuated considerably 
from year to year and were m u c h  l o w e r  in West G e o r g i a  than 
in the east.10^ The further commercialisation of the wine 
trade was i m p e d e d  too by the lack of storage f a c i l i t i e s  in 
the towns, by the poor quality of the roads, the primitive­
ness of the techniques used and the size of the Transcauca­
sian market.
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F o l l o w i n g  the decis i o n  to change the sursat'i to a 
m o n e y  tax in the fiscal r e f o r m s  of 1843-45, and the boost to 
Georgian wheat and corn exports prompted by the Irish famine 
of the 1840s, both the n o b i l i t y  and serfs increased their 
sales. D u ring the 1840s, not only was 25 per cent of the 
crop sold every year but the quantities harvested increased 
t o o . 1°5 Fro m  1850-57, the a m o u n t  of land sown to w i n t e r  
cereals on sabat o n o  estates rose by 83.1 per cent and to 
spring cereals by 132.9 per c e n t . 10^ From 1807-50, the 
quantity of cereals collected annually in T'bilisi Gubernia 
jumped from 398,254 chetverts to 2,054,000, whilst in K'ut'- 
aisi Gubernia annual harvestings rose from 865,436 chetverts 
in 1847 to 2,157,239 in 1853.^®^ By the 1860s over one 
million puds of corn were being shipped to Europe annually, 
most of it to Scotland and Ireland.
Over the same period sericulture, one of the tradition­
al Georgian industries, witnessed a similar transformation. 
By the 1860s, 60 to 70 per cent of the 30,000 puds p r o d u c e d  
every year in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  (mostly in West Georgia) 
were e ither expor t e d  or sold locally. A s i m i l a r  patt e r n  
e m e r g e d  wit h  cotton, fruit and vegetables, and dairy and 
livestock farming, while new crops like tobacco were quickly 
orientated towards the market.10^
It was T'bilisi with its population of 100,000 that was 
the main consumer of agricultural produce and crafts. Its 
significance to the Georgian rural economy is demonstrated 
by the annual sale figures for the city markets. The 
importance too of the capital to East Georgia, where a high 
p e r c e n t a g e  of the p o p u l a t i o n  was eng a g e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  in 
viticulture, is apparent fro m  the fact that in the early
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1860s its p o p u l a t i o n  bought 500,000 or 10>50 0,00 0
pints of Kakh i a n  wine every year from these four m a r k e t s  
a l o n e .
Annual sales of agricultural produce in T ’bilisi in the 
years i m m e d i a t e l y  p r e c e d i n g  the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of Georgia's 
serfs varied between 3,500,000 to 5,000,000 r u b l e s . 111
The a b o l i t i o n  of feudal c u s t o m  barriers, the d e v e l o p ­
ment of c o m m o d i t y  r e l a t i o n s  and the i m p r o v e m e n t  of trade 
routes in G eorgia not only s t i m u l a t e d  g reater c o m m e r c i a l  
i n t e r c o u r s e  b e t w e e n  town and c o u n t r y , b u t  also n o t i c e a b l y  
increased inter-district and inter-regional exchange. The 
scope of the individual peasant's activities was now extend­
ing beyond the boundaries of his immediate environment and 
taking him to what had hitherto often been barely familiar
Table 9s Annual Sales at T'bilisi's Markets in Late 1850s-1860s
Product Quantity Sold 
(p u d s )
Value of Sales 
(rubles )
Grain Flour 
Kakhian Wine 
Spirits 
Meat
Fish and Caviar 
Oil
Clarified Butter/ 
Butter
Vegetables, Fruit, 
Milk
Barley
Hay
Firewood
400.000
500.000 vedros
50.000 vedros.
300.000
25.000
50.000
40,000
150.000
350.000
40,000
240
100
150
450
125
300
320.000
500.000 
200,000
540.000
200.000
400,000
240 - 320,000
200,000
450.000
50,0 00
600.000
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parts of the country. The T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a  ac c o u n t s  for 
1857 note that:
D o m e s t i c  trade is in good shape. The one part of 
the g u b e r n i a  is in constant exchange wit h  the 
other for its goods and products.112
To some extent this process was already emerging in the 
18th century, but had been inhibited by the i n s t a b i l i t y  of 
G e o r g i a ' s  p o l i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c  and m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s .  
However, the security brought by Russia's military presence 
and the defeat of the Turks and Persians stimulated economic 
activity. Fro m  the 1830s o n w a r d s  the t e n d e n c y  of the 
peasantry to become occupied exclusively in the cultivation 
of one particular crop and, in fact, for whole districts or 
regions to s p e c i a l i s e  in this way b e c a m e  more pronounced. 
When this happened, it naturally followed that the need for 
exchange with other parts of the country became more press­
ing and that the t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s u l a r i t y  of peasant life 
should reveal signs of collapse.
The predominance of Armenians in commerce is a peculiar 
feature of Georgia's socio-economic development in the 19th 
century, w h i c h  can at least in part be e x p l a i n e d  by the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  belief, held by West G e o r g i a n s  in p a r ticular, 
that i n v o l v e m e n t  in trade was in some sense shameful. A 
report on the situation in Imeret'i in 1837 notes that:
H o w e v e r  poor an I m e r i a n  is, he con s i d e r s  trade 
beneath his dignity. When a peasant's wife takes 
a s u c k l i n g  pig or a c h i c k e n  for s a l e  at the 
market, she covers her face like a Tatar (sic) 
woman because of her involvement in such shameful 
activity.
But despite their traditional reticence towards trade, 
it is clear that in both e a s t e r n  and w e s t e r n  parts of the
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c ountry the pea s a n t r y  were shedding their inhibitions. A 
merchant class had even emerged in Svanet'i, one of the most 
r e m o t e  and i n a c c e s s i b l e  parts of Georgia. Some villages 
specialising in one or another product had reached the point 
w h e r e  like the tobacco g r o w i n g  village of Khoni in West 
Georgia, they marketed virtually their entire c r op.11Zf
By the 1830s, w e e k e n d  rural markets, the nodal points 
of the country's economic integration, were a common feature 
of G e o r g i a n  life. K'ut'aisi mar k e t  a t t r a c t e d  traders from 
all over West Georgia, fro m  Ratcha, Svanet'i, Samegrelo, 
Guria and the villages and settlements of Imeret'i. Similar 
m a r k e t s  d e a l i n g  p r i m a r i l y  in a g r i c u l t u r a l  produce, h a n d i ­
crafts and d o m e s t i c  indu s t r i a l  goods, and held on a w e e k l y  
or m o n t h l y  basis existed in n u m e r o u s  t o w n s  and villa g e s  
scattered across the country.
Aside from these, there were annual m a r k e t s  at w h i c h  
local output was s u p p l e m e n t e d  wit h  goods from Russia and 
Europe. Only the trade fairs or yarmarki, a Russian system 
imported into Georgia with the arrival of the Russian a d m i n ­
istration, failed to find a secure footing and by the middle 
of the century were already showing signs of fading out. In 
the 1860s w h e n  goods valued at 5 m i l l i o n  rubles w e r e  b e i n g  
sold annually at T'bilisi's markets alone, the yarmarki only 
managed a turnover of approximately 250,000 rubles per annum 
for the whole of Georgia.11^
The d e v e l o p m e n t  of c o m m o d i t y  relations gave g r e a t e r  
impetus to the emerging commercial bourgeoisie of merchants 
(vatchrebi) and money lenders (mevakhsheebi). Aided by the 
g r o w t h  of G e o r g i a ' s  f o r e i g n  and d o m e s t i c  t r a d e ,  the 
c o u n t r y ' s  l e a d i n g  m e r c h a n t s  s u c c e e d e d  in b u i l d i n g  up
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c o n s i d e r a b l e  capital assets. In 1862, of T'bilisi's 3,000 
or so merchants, the leading 122 owned capi t a l  worth 
1,988,200 rubles and five or six each had over 1 00 ,000 
rubles.11^ Elsewhere in the country business was conducted 
on a s m a l l e r  scale but the same process was taking place. 
In Gori, despite the d e p a r t u r e  of the G e o r g i a n  r e g i m e n t  
(above), the leading 65 merchants had an annual turnover of
250,000 rubles and 10 of them t r a v elled r e g u l a r l y  to L e i p ­
zig, London and Constantinople.11"^ In Sighnaghi there were 
239 local and 25 foreign m e r c h a n t s  at the b e g i n n i n g  of the
11ft
1850s, f o u r  of w h o m  o w n e d  c a p i t a l  of o v e r  100 , 0 0 0  
rubles. 11^
An e x a m i n a t i o n  of the census data and g o v e r n m e n t  
reports on the urban population of Georgia gives a clear in­
dication of the extent to which Armenians monopolised this 
g r o w i n g  class. In 1863, all of T'bilisi's 466 hereditary, 
honorary mok'alak'eebi were Armenian, as were 75 per cent of 
the city's 18,145 m e r c h a n t s  and ordinary m o k ' alak'eebi. 
Conversely, 90 per cent of the h e r e d i t a r y  n o b i l i t y  and the 
vast majority of household servants and peasants living in 
the capital w e r e  Georgian. A s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l e d  
e l s e w h e r e . 1^  Thus n early all the m e r c h a n t s  in T'elavi, 
S i g h n a g h i 121 and A k h a l t s i k h e  w e r e  A r m e n i a n . 122 Only in
K'ut'aisi, where Armenian settlements were few and far he­
lp 3tween, was there a sizeable indigenous merchant stratum.
Man y  of these A r m e n i a n s  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  the m ev a k h -  
sheebi a m o n g  them, made their f ortunes by e x p l o i t i n g  not 
just the p overty of the peasantry, but that of the poorer 
aznaurni. The failure of the latter to adjust to the times 
f r e q u e n t l y  led to their se c u r i n g  loans at high interest 
rates (unless they were granted terms by the T'bilisi
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Gubernia public trustees), bankruptcy and the mortgaging of 
estates. Among the richer merchants, moreover, there was a 
t e n d e n c y  to i n v e s t  m o n e y  in r e a l  e s t a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  
industry, perhaps because of the o b s t acles i m p o s e d  on the 
latter by the tsarist g o v e r n m e n t . 12^ But as most of their 
ventures into land ownership were made at the expense of i m ­
p o v e r i s h e d  az n a u r n i  this tended to further e x a c e r b a t e  an 
already strained relationship between these two classes.
To the t'av a d a z n a u r o b a , already de p r i v e d  of p o l i t i c a l  
power by the Russians, anger and frustration at the erosion 
of their economic and social standing was compounded by the 
ethnic composition of the commercial bourgeoisie. Such was 
the coincidence of class and nationality in Georgia that the 
strug g l e  for s u p r e m a c y  b e t w e e n  these two cla s s e s  was 
rendered still more acute by an element of ethnic antagon­
ism. Oliver Wardrop, a British traveller in Georgia, albeit 
in the 1880s, noted this feeling when he wrote:
Only those who have lived the life of the people 
in T r a n s - C a u c a s i a  kno w  what a terrible curse the 
m o n e y - l e n d i n g  c o m m u n i t y  are. A local prov e r b  
says, 'A Greek will cheat three Jews, but an 
A r m e n i a n  w i l l  c h e a t  t h r e e  G r e e k s , 1 an d  the 
Georgian, straightforward, honest fellow, is but 
too often cruelly swindled by the artful children 
of Haik. W h e n  the fraud is very apparent the 
A r m e n i a n  often pays for his greed with all the 
blood that can be e x t r a c t e d  from his jugular 
v e i n . 125
However, whilst its predicament may have stirred much 
of the nobility to nationalistic outbursts directed in large 
part against Armenians, it met wit h  little s y m p a t h y  a m o n g  
the peasantry. In som e  cas.es, in fact, the plight of the 
aznaurni was cause for peasant celebration because merchants 
purchasing estates were barred from owning serfs. In such
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circumstances they could eitner buy their liberty or become 
state serfs.
Not, of course, that the p e a s a n t r y  did not suffer as 
muc h  if not mor e  than the petty nobility, b ecause a l t h o u g h  
their contacts with the market were becoming more frequent 
they were usually reliant on middle-men (shemsqidvelebi) to 
market their produce. This was often because they only 
wished or were only able to sell in small quantities. Addi­
tionally, the road n e t w o r k  was so l i m i t e d  and the m a r k e t s  
often so distant that peasants living a marginal existence 
could nei t h e r  afford the cost of the journey, nor the time 
spent m a k i n g  i t .1 ^  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  those that p e r s e v e r e d  
found themselves in an alien environment and vulnerable to 
the sharp p r a ctices e m p l o y e d  to buy produce cheaply. The 
T'bilisi m e r c h a n t s ’ a m k ’ari c o n t r o l l e d  the roads into the 
capital so that its m e m b e r s  could prevent p e a s a n t s  f r o m  
r e a c h i n g  the m arket and e s t a b l i s h i n g  the g o i n g  p r i c e s . 12^ 
In 1893 the n e w s p a p e r  Iveria d e s c r i b e d  the s a m e  practice, 
unchanged since pre-reform days:
Merchant-speculators confront the villagers on the 
a p p r o a c h  roads and p r a c t i c a l l y  take their goods 
from the m  by force before selling the m  at the 
bazaar at three times the amount. °
Peasants engaged in v i t i c u l t u r e  in East G e o r g i a  w e r e  
subject to the attentions of a particular type of middle-man 
called a siraji (chalandari in West Georgia) who came out to 
the villa g e s  from T'bilisi and T'elavi and r e t u r n e d  w i t h  
carts laden wit h  w i n e . 12^ The p e c u l i a r i t y  of the siraj i 
c o n s i s t e d  in the fact that he a c t e d  as m o n e y - l e n d e r ,  
s u p p l i e r  and seller as well as purchaser. The j ournal 
Gut'nis Deda (The Ploughman) said of the siraji that he has,
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...a perfect k n o w l e d g e  of the posit i o n  of the 
seller, k nows to w h o m  and at what tim e  to go to 
s a m p l e  wine, w h e r e  and for what reason to reject 
wine, when to offer a price and when to keep quiet 
... he knows whether or not the owner of the vine­
yard needs m o n e y  to pay the charity's office, to 
pay taxes, to purch a s e  bread or other h o u s e h o l d  
needs.130
Furthermore, the Armenian sirajebi of T ’bilisi operated 
in unison, a s s i g n i n g  each other spheres of i n f l u e n c e . 131 
Among the Kakhian peasantry only the rich and the relatively 
rich (s h e d z l e b u l i ) were able to avoid fall i n g  into their 
debt.
The g r a i n  t r a d e  w a s  a l s o  d o m i n a t e d  by A r m e n i a n  
m e r c h a n t s  w h o s e  practice was to purchase whe n  prices were 
low and to store the grain until prices rose. A contempor­
ary journal appearing in 1862 commented,
The grain trade o utside Tiflis (T’bilisi) has an 
e n o r m o u s  n u m b e r  of repres e n t a t i v e s ,  who one can
put into two main categories: merchants ex pro-
fessio, state purveyors with a lot of capital and 
s p e c i a l i s i n g  in the purch a s e  of grain, and petty 
traders who suck the blood from the veins of the 
unfortunate peasantry and use its labour and pro­
perty as if it were their own.
Since most peasa n t s  did not p roduce enough to keep
stocks for themselves, they lived in constant fear of a poor
harvest. The m i d d l e - m e n  w o u l d  buy the m e a g r e  crop at low
cost to t h e m s e l v e s  and then wait till the ma r k e t  price
peaked. They could then return to the villages, o f fer the
st a r v i n g  peasants loans with e x a c t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  and then
sell them back the same grain at a price far in excess of
what they had paid for it. The p e a s a n t r y  wer e  thus caught
in a v icious circle from w h i c h  even a good h arvest was no 
134escape.
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it is, tnereiure, equaixy tne case m a t  tney naa amp xe 
cause for h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  the c o m m e r c i a l  bourgeoisie. 
However, whilst there can be no doubting their anger, it did 
not take n a t i o n a l i s t  form. It seems quite likely that the 
ethnic origin of their o p p r e s s o r s  was a m a t t e r  of little 
concern to the peasantry. They had been, and in some cases 
still were, just as oppressed by Georgian aznaurni, Russian 
officials, and Russian, Persian and Turkish soldiers. What 
was required, therefore, was not a change in the nationality 
of the oppressor, but a change in their economic and social 
status. Na t i o n a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  was not yet so d e v e l o p e d  
among Georgian peasants that they could transcend the class 
barrier and find c o m m o n  cause with the t ' a v a daznauroba 
against the Armenians. In fact, one could a r g u e  that the 
c o n tinued class a n t a g o n i s m  b e t w e e n  the n o b i l i t y  and the 
p e a s a n t r y  was one of the main reasons why n a t i o n a l i s m  had 
such little popular appeal after the peasant reforms. N a t ­
ional unity could not exist whilst such a divide persisted.
It should also be noted that the a t t i t u d e  of the 
Georgian peasantry was complicated by the social divisions 
that were quickly emerging within its own ranks. There was, 
therefore, no peasant solidarity against the merchants and 
money-lenders. The richer peasants were often as guilty of 
exploiting the poorer peasants as the sirajebi.
In T’elavi district not only did the well-off peasants 
have more land than the rest, they also o w n e d  m o r e  cattle. 
17.9 per cent of the p e a s antry o w n e d  60 per cent of the 
livestock.1^5 jn sighnaghi district, where animal husbandry 
played an important part in the local economy, 17.2 per cent 
of the peasantry owned seven per cent of the cattle and 49.4
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per cent had none at a l l . 1^  That the G e o r g i a n  plough 
required eight buffalo to drag it gives some impression of 
how dependent the poor must have been on the rich.
In the Kak h i a n  v illages of Shilda, Shak'riani, Zemo 
K hodasheni, Eniseli, Qvareli, U r i a t u b a n i  and Shalauri, 46 
per cent of the land and 49 per cent of the w i n e  produced 
from it were owned by rich or shedzlebuli peasants.1 The 
scale of the farming enterprises operated by some peasants 
was such that even if they belonged to a didi ojakhi they
1 T O
still needed to hire labourers, ° although hindered by the 
survival of serfdom.
Thus in the G e o r g i a  of the early 1860s it is evident 
that national integration was rapidly gaining m omentum and 
that this process, together with the confusion of class and 
ethnicity, was playing a part in stimulating national con­
sciousness. However, whilst nationalist sentiment may have 
been prevalent in certain sectors of the nobility, it had 
not yet found a footing in the peasantry.
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Chapter Three
The Peasant R e f o r m s  of 1864-71 and their I m p a c t  on the
Process of Integration
Altho u g h  the t r a d i t i o n a l  p atterns of life in G e o r g i a  
evinced clear signs of change in the first 60 years of the 
19th century after several hundred years of imposed torpor, 
it nevertheless remained the case, as in Russia itself, that 
the survival of serf r e l a t i o n s  was i m p e d i n g  the further 
social and economic development of the country. As has been 
ind i c a t e d  in the previous chapter, the expan d e d  role of 
commerce in the country’s economic life and the reduction in 
the p o w e r  of the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a  since Russia a n n e x e d  
K ’art'l-Kakhet'i in 1801 h a d a l r e a d y  done muc h  to inject a 
degree of social fluid i t y  into G e o r g i a n  society: the
a r i s t o c r a c y  f o u n d  i t s e l f  i n c r e a s i n g l y  in the d e b t  of 
m e r c h a n t s  and m o n e y - l e n d e r s  and forced to m o r t g a g e  its 
properties, a new r e l a t i v e l y  rich group of p e a s a n t s  was 
emerging, and as the d e m a n d  for labour g r e w  f r o m  G e o r g i a ’s 
fledgling industry so the country's urban population began 
to swell to the rural's expense and the barriers to national 
i n t e g r a t i o n  pr e s e n t e d  by a self - c o n t a i n e d ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  
society, s h o w e d  signs of erosion. While, howev e r ,  b aton- 
q m oba con t i n u e d  to have the s a n c t i o n  of law and a l m o s t  a 
third of the country's in h a b i t a n t s  r e m a i n e d  tied to the 
estates of an often impoverished nobility, it was clear that 
the pace of progress would be impeded.
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3.1 The E m a n c i p a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  P e a s a n t r y
The defeat of the I m p e r i a l  a r m i e s  in the C r i m e a n  War, 
internal c r i t i c i s m  and the m o u n t i n g  f r e q u e n c y  of peasant 
r e b e l l i o n s  w i t h i n  Europ e a n  Russia were sufficient to c o n ­
vince the n e w l y  c r o w n e d  tsar, A l e x a n d e r  II, that if Russia 
was to a s s u m e  a p o s i t i o n  of p r e d o m i n a n c e  in the world, 
changes w o uld have to be mad e  to the s t r u c t u r e  of society. 
As the tsar recognised, the price for fail i n g  to i n s tigate 
r e f o r m  could lead not just to Russia's fall fro m  the f o r e ­
front of E uropean states, but might also p r e c i p i t a t e  a 
social upheaval that could topple the Romanov dynasty from 
power.
Reform, therefore, had not only become a necessity for 
appeasing the opinion of a disenchanted intelligentsia, but 
also for s o o t h i n g  internal dissent and paving the w a y  for 
economic advance.
Whilst the threat of rural revolution never reached the 
same p r o p o r t i o n s  in Geor g i a  as it did in m a n y  parts of 
Russia, the level and f r e q u e n c y  of o u t b r e a k s  of v i o l e n c e  
b e t w e e n  the p e a s a n t r y  and the t'avadaz n a u r o b a  i n t e n s i f i e d  
during the 1850s, culminating in the period during and after 
the C r i m e a n  War, when the onus on the p e a s a n t r y  to p r o v i d e  
both men and supplies for the f i g h t i n g  edged them f u r t h e r  
towards confrontation with the regime. According to Soviet 
sources, which unfortunately do not define what constitutes 
a disturbance or an uprising, whereas between 1825 and 1854 
the i n c idence of peasant d i s t u r b a n c e s  a v e r a g e d  24 a year, 
between 1855 and 1861 the number rose considerably, averag- 
ing 79 a year. West Georgia, as one of the mai n  f r onts of 
the war, s u f f e r e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  severely and pea s a n t  and
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t ’avadi alike wer e  forced to aban d o n  their lands to be 
d e v a s t a t e d  by the a d v a n c i n g  Turkish forces. On returning, 
however, the I m e r i a n  and M e g r e l i a n  n o b i l i t y  a t t e m p t e d  to 
recoup their losses at the p e a s a n t r y ’s expense. Initial 
protest from the p e a s a n t r y  took the form of petitions, but 
as it became aware of the ineffectiveness of this approach, 
it turned increasingly to violence. A spate of incidents in 
Samegrelo in 1856 and 1857 climaxed in May of that year with 
the occupation of Zugdidi, the capital of the principality, 
by a force of s o m e  20, 000 peasants. Perhaps of mor e  c o n ­
cern to the t'avadaznauroba than the action itself, however, 
were the eight demands presented by the leader of the upris­
ing, Ut'u Mik'ava, a b l a c k s m i t h ,  to the G o v e r n o r  G e n e r a l  of 
K 'ut'aisi Gubernia, Kolubikin, in,wh i c h  he ca l l e d  for an
end to the o w n e r s h i p  of man by man, an end to the slave 
trade, an end to indiv i d u a l  increases in taxation, the
granting of individual rights to peasants, the establishment 
of a rural administration based on a system of laws and not 
the whim of landlords, the abolition of torture, the legal­
isation of peasant ownership of land and for greater respect 
to be s h o w n  to the c u s t o m s  of the p e o p l e . ^ Peasant v i o l ­
ence, though still u n o r g a n i s e d  and s p o n t a n e o u s  in nature, 
was now b e g i n n i n g  to give rise to the a r t i c u l a t i o n  of d e ­
mands which specifically called for an end to b a t onqmoba.
Although conditions in Samegrelo were undoubtedly worse 
than in most parts of the cou n t r y  at the end of the 1 85 0s, 
where torture and the slave trade did not feature among the 
complaints of the peasantry, uprisings were by no means co n ­
fined to this part of West Georgia. In Gori d i s t r i c t  
virtually every landlord encountered acts of resistance from
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their serfs and in 1860 Prince Machabeli was confronted by 
the combined action of 60 villages.^
Thus, wh i l s t  it is clear that the a g r a r i a n  r e f o r m  in 
Georgia only came about as a consequence of the wider reform 
in E u r o p e a n  Russia, it is equ a l l y  the case that c o n d i t i o n s  
in the Transcaucasus and, in particular, Georgia were giving 
the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  cause for serious concern. A 
major factor in the r e gime’s anxiety was Georgia's strategic 
position, the importance of which was emphasised during the 
Crimean War, when in 1855, the Turkish General, Omar Pasha, 
invaded West Georgia and succeeded in winning the support of 
many peasants by promising an early end to serfdom.^
Unable to ignore the p ossible c o n s e q u e n c e s  of f u r t h e r  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in both its own and the G e o r g i a n  nobility's 
relations with the Georgian peasantry, and sensitive to the 
dangers inherent in persistent armed suppression of the pop­
ulation, the g o v e r n m e n t  resolved to extend its p l a n n e d  
peasant reforms to the Transcaucasus. In 1857, the Georgian 
n o b i l i t y  was given its first w a r n i n g  of what was to come 
w i t h  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of an o f f i c i a l  c i r c u l a r  on the 
subject, and a request that Prince Bariatinskii, the current 
Vice-Regent, and two leading Georgian public figures, Prince 
Gr. O r b e l i a n i  and D m i t r i  Qipiani, draw up a report on the 
s i t u a t i o n  in the Transcaucasus. It was not until April 
1862, however, wit h  the c o n v o c a t i o n  of a c o n g r e s s  of the 
t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a  of T'bilisi Gubernia, that p r e p a r a t i o n s  
began in earnest.^ j n the m e a n t i m e ,  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the 
peasants had continued to deteriorate as the Georgian n obil­
ity sought to salvage as much as possible from the impending 
reform. W r i t i n g  to Tsar A l e x a n d e r  II in July 1863, the
latest T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  Vice-Regent, Grand Duke M i k h a i l
N i k o l a e v i c h ,  o b s e r v e d  of the p e a s a n t  q u e s t i o n  that,
...its s e t t l e m e n t  has to be a c h i e v e d  w i t h o u t  
delay, because relations between the peasantry and 
the l a n d o w n e r s  are e x c e p t i o n a l l y  bad throughout 
the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  region. This is e s p e c i a l l y  
felt here (Akhaltsikhe district) and in Gori dis­
trict, and we have been c o m p e l l e d  to send out 
punitive expeditions. Very often the peasants 
refuse to pay the taxes which, in accordance with 
custom, their fathers and f o r e f a t h e r s  have paid 
since ancient times. In a n t i c i p a t i o n  of e m a n c i ­
pation the peasants have been c o m m i t t i n g  acts of 
d i s o b e d i e n c e  ... and together w i t h  this, there 
have been occasions, and by no means rare o c c a ­
sions, when the landlords, seeing that the moment 
of the resolution of the peasant question is d r a w ­
ing near, a t t e m p t  to use the r e m a i n i n g  time to 
take f r o m  the pe a s a n t s  as muc h  as they can and to 
squeeze the last drop of juice from them.^
Despite undoubted sympathy for the peasants among much
of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  and no doubt in c ertain g o v e r n m e n t
circles too, the administration's concern for the economic
posit i o n  of the p e a s a n t r y  was born not of any a l t r u i s t i c  
desire to ameliorate its living standards, but primarily to 
provide the peasants wit h  suff i c i e n t  m e ans to s atisfy the
state's tax requirements and prevent the transformation of a 
large s ection of the rural p o p u l a t i o n  into l a n d l e s s  w a g e  
labourers. Fear of this arising stemmed in large part from 
the e x p e r i e n c e  of the land r e f o r m s  in the Baltic p r o v i n c e s  
between 1816 and 1819, which granted peasants personal free­
dom w i t h o u t  land. I n t r o d u c e d  in the hope that the area 
might emulate the agricultural achievements of England, the 
r e f o r m s  suc c e e d e d  only in c r e a t i n g  a landless and often 
impoverished peasantry, scarcely able to pay its taxes. It 
may have been the case too that man y  of those d r a w i n g  up the 
reforms opposed land reform along the English and Prussian 
lines on ideol o g i c a l  grounds, b e l i e v i n g  that the fu t u r e  of 
the Russ i a n  nation lay in the p r e s e r v a t i o n ' o f  the mi r an-d.
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the people's intimate relationship with the soil. Addition­
ally, a d v o c a t i o n  of e m a n c i p a t i o n  with land provided the 
r e g i m e  w i t h  a c o n v e n i e n t  sop to offer in the d i r e c t i o n  of 
the conscience-stricken intelligentsia.
On the other hand, however, the int e n t i o n  of the 
g o v e r n m e n t  to prevent the f o r m a t i o n  of a class of rural 
wage-labourers by granting the right to the perpetual use of 
the land was a source of great concern to the G e o r g i a n  
nobility. The problem, even more so than in Russia, was 
that the greater part of the Georgian nobility, in this case 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y  the aznaurni_, was c o m p r i s e d  of s m a l l - s c a l e  
landowners who owned very few serfs. Even after the reforms 
had increased the size of their estates, the average area of 
land owned by T'bilisi Gubernia's t'avadaznaurni was only 54 
» anci those living in K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i i  even
Q
less at 16 desyatiny. In fact these figures exaggerate the 
size of the estates o w n e d  by most aznau r n i  since they i n ­
clude the estates of the wealthiest owners. 53.55 per cent 
of the t'av a d a z n a u r n i  of T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  p o s s e s s e d  less 
than 2 5 de£y_at_i_ny_ of land and only 21.12 per cent had over 
100 desy at iny. The situation was rather worse in K'ut'aisi 
Guber n i a  w here 89.78 per cent o w n e d  less than 25 d e£y_a t_i_ny_ 
and only 2.9 per cent had over 100 desyat iny.9
The position r e g a r d i n g  o w n e r s h i p  of serfs was little 
different. According to census investigations carried out 
in 1860 and 1861, there were 1,751 t'avadaznauri families in 
T'bilisi Gubernia, of w h o m  1,537 owned' peasa n t s  w i t h  land 
and 214 o wned peasants without. Of these, 869 or 49.6 per 
cent of the total o w n e d  less than 22 male serfs and a 
further 41.6 per cent had b e t w e e n  22 and 100. Only two
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landowners owned more than 1,000 male serfs. u In K ’ut'aisi 
Gubernia, where 4,785 t'avadaznaurni owned 7,896 estates and 
24,136 peasant households, 78.9 per cent owned less than 22 
male serfs and a f urther 17.4 per cent had b e t w e e n  22 and 
1 0 0 .
Their estates reduced by f a m i l y  d i v i s i o n s  in the 19th 
cent u r y  and s q u a n d e r e d  thro u g h  debt, the vast m a j o r i t y  of 
these s m a l l - h o l d i n g  a z n a u r n i  depen d e d  largely on the tax 
d erived from their peasants for a living. It was this 
section of the G e o r g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  w h i c h  put up the most 
s t u b b o r n  r e s i s t a n c e  to the reform. The p r o b l e m  for the 
government was that having expended so much time and effort 
to transform the t'avadaznaurni into loyal executives of the 
tsarist will and a pool for r e c r u i t m e n t  into the s e r v i c e  
bureaucracy, there was now a real danger of alienating them 
once more by providing the peasanty with an adequate basis 
for maintaining itself from the land. Attempting to resolve 
this d i l e m m a ,  the g o v e r n m e n t  asked the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of
the T'bilisi and K'ut'aisi Guber n i i  t'avadaznaurni to d r a w  
up projects for the reform.
The f i r s t  m e e t i n g  of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the 
t'avadaznaurni of T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  to discuss the r e f o r m  
met in April 1862 with clear instructions from the govern­
ment to prepare a project o u t l i n i n g  their ideas on the 
forthcoming emancipation of the sabatono peasants. The vast 
majority of the delegates, reflecting the mood of the small 
and middle level Georgian nobility, approached the meeting 
in a mood of begrudging resignation, but not before they had 
sent a petition to the government which went straight to the 
roots of their concern:
families will immediately be placed in an impover­
ished condition. We will have to sit sadly in the 
courtyards and beg for alms. We will have neither 
servants nor workers for the fields and vineyards, 
n eit h e r  s h e p h e r d s  for the l i v e stock nor g o v e r n ­
esses to bring up our children.1^
Now, however, under threat from the government that the
reform would go ahead with or without their participation,
they c a m e  to the m e e t i n g  d e t e r m i n e d  to salvage what they
could of their position. H aving dis c u s s e d  the issue for
1 ^five days the t'avadaznaurni mandated Dimitri Qipiani to 
draw up a project r e f l e c t i n g  their views. A d d r e s s i n g  the 
assembly, Qipiani made it quite clear that his own opinions 
closely reflected the mainstream of the nobility's thought 
on the reform:
Our gen e r a l  w i l l  [he declared] is that the serfs
should be given their freedom, that we should be
given m o n e y  in e x c h a n g e  and that the land r e m a i n  
ours . 1 4
Qipiani went on to place considerable emphasis on the role 
batonqmoba played in society:
The relationship which has been established since 
ancient t i mes b e t w e e n  o u r s e l v e s  and our serfs 
g r e a t l y  r e s e m b l e s  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the 
members of one family, between the children of one 
house. We have never regarded our serfs as slaves 
or prisoners, but have a l w a y s  c o n s i d e r e d  the m  as 
our colleagues, as the c o - c r e a t o r s  of a c o m m o n  
enterprise. Neither have they seen us as tyrants 
and oppressors: they have regar d e d  us as their
p rot e c t o r s  and as the m a n a g e r s  of the g e n e r a l  
domestic economy.
In this way he hoped to d e m o n s t r a t e  to the tsa r i s t  
g o v e r n m e n t  that b a t o n q m oba was a form of c o n t r a c t  a g r e e d  
upon under equal c o n d i t i o n s  by landlord and p easant alike. 
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  if the p e a s a n t  w a s  to be p e r m i t t e d  to
t e r m i n a t e  his side of the contract, justice d e m a n d e d  that
the landl o r d  be a l l o w e d  to a b a n d o n  any r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
including the provision of land, that he had had towards the 
peasants.
W h e t h e r  or not bat onq m oba ever did a ttain the ideal 
form described by Qipiani, it is clear first of all that the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was never an equal one, and se c o n d l y  that by 
the m i d - 1 9 t h  cent u r y  the i n t r u s i o n  of Russian law and the 
grad u a l  e v o l u t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  society itself had a l r e a d y  
done much to destroy the fine balance of custom and written 
law upon w h i c h  bat onq m oba was based. As a c o n t e m p o r a r y  
writer, by no means unsympathetic to this institution, wrote 
in 1884:
Following the arrival of the Russians, a complete­
ly n e w  life began in G e o r g i a  and b a t o n q m o b a , as 
the fruit of a long h i s t o r i c a l  process, clea r l y  
had to c o l l a p s e  u n d e r  the i n f l u e n c e  of v e r y  
different circumstances and conditions...1°
Qipiani's project was pre s e n t e d  in April 18 63 to a 
second meeting of the representatives of the t'avadaznaurni 
of T'bilisi Gubernia. The mai n  burden of it a d d r e s s e d  the 
issue of most concern to the landlords - land; and on this 
the majority of landlords, whose views found their clearest 
e x p r e s s i o n  in Qipiani's report, w o u l d  concede nothing. 
B a sing themse l v e s ,  h o w e v e r  fallaciously, on a m i x t u r e  of 
w r i t t e n  and u n w r i t t e n  G e o r g i a n  law, the T'bilisi n o b i l i t y  
refused to countenance granting the peasantry personal fre e ­
dom and land. In this they received the support of most of 
the other projects w r i t t e n  in the period b e t w e e n  the two 
meetings. The so-called minority project, which reflected 
the v i e w s  of 14 of the 240 t'avadaznaurni r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
differed only insofar as it suggested that the reform should
he had c reated w i t h  his own labour. Thus the vines in a 
v i n e y a r d  w o u l d  belong to the peasant who had cult i v a t e d  
them, but not the land itself. Another project presented by 
one of the largest l a n d o w n e r s  in Georgia, Prince M u k h r a n -  
Batoni, also r e m i n d e d  the g o v e r n m e n t  of the histo r i c  role 
batonqmoba had played in Georgian society and proposed that 
if, as s e e m e d  inevitable, the peasants had to be e m a n c i ­
pated, they should be freed w i t h o u t  land and be free to 
enter into new contracts with their previous or other land­
lords as tenants (moijaradreebi).1^
It was the issue of land that brought into q u e s t i o n  the 
nature and depth of the t ’avadazna u r o b a ' s  c o n c e p t i o n  of 
p at e r n a l i s m .  Q i p i a n i ’s project a d v o c a t e d  that l i b e rated 
s a b a t o n o  p e a s a n t s  should acqu i r e  the status of k h i z n e b i , a 
c a t e g o r y  of peasant that had e xisted since the M i d d l e  Ages 
in Georgia, but which had become particularly common during 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries as landlords' estates 
split up. Essentially, the term khizani described two types 
of peasants: free peasants who rented land from landowners,
but had the right to use it in p e r p e t u i t y  so long as they 
paid their rent and dues, and the so-called qma-khizani, who 
belonged to one landlord but because, for instance, of land 
s h o r t a g e  was c o m p e l l e d  to seek land on a n o t h e r  landlord's 
e s t a t e . 1® C e r t a i n l y  the f a m i l i a r i t y  of the G e o r g i a n  
peasantry with the concept of khiznoba was an advantage, but 
it could not disguise the fact that it meant freedom without 
land, a fact w h i c h  c o n t r a d i c t e d  the basic p r e m i s e s  of the 
emancipation reform.1^ The peasantry would, in effect, be 
at the mercy of whatever terms the nobility dictated.
final analysis, to have a m o u n t e d  to little m o r e  than the
protection of the nobility's interests, often at the expense
of the peasantry's. Thus, des p i t e  the fact that V a k h t a n g  
? nVi's laws u exp r e s s l y  provi d e d  for free access for the 
peasantry to all forest land and unencumbered use of rivers, 
s t r e a m s  and springs, and that the same c u s t o m a r y  law upon 
which he based the nobility's land claims also demanded that 
"the lord should not deprive him [the serf] of his land 
without reason", and despite the peasantry's customary right 
to the h e r e d i t a r y  use of the land it w o r k e d , 21 the project 
envisaged depriving the peasantry of these rights.
In defence, D i m i t r i  Qip i a n i  a rgued that the n o b i l i t y  
was dependent on taxes for its existence and that in certain 
cases nobles' entire estates were farmed by peasant house­
holds, so that if f r e e d o m  was gran t e d  wit h  land s o m e  
a z n a u r n i  w o uld be left c o m p l e t e l y  destitute. Besides, he 
pleaded, the G e o r g i a n  n o b i l i t y  was not suited to any other
kind of existence. Of trade he wrote,
...our hereditary and historically formed charac­
ter has until now stubbornly opposed involvement 
in commercial activity and one has to confess that 
we have not yet revealed any abi l i t y  in this 
direction.
Neit h e r  did they have the f i n a n c i a l  means, k n o w l e d g e  or 
experience to live from industry, and as for agriculture,
...until we stop s eizing prope r t y  and land from 
each other, until we find t i m e  to live on our 
estates and acquire knowledge and experience for 
the improvement of agriculture, until we attract 
voluntary, hired labour as oppposed to compulsory, 
until we have means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  and on top 
of all that, until we are able to breath somewhat 
more freely fro m  the debts o p p r e s s i n g  us - who 
a m o n g s t  us w i l l  be in a p o s i t i o n  to base his hopes 
for existence on agriculture?!
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In short, Q ipiani a rgued that the t 1a v a d a z n a u r n i  had 
only two realistic means of support: the peasantry and the
land. But, in truth, the debates within the t !avadaznauroba 
of T ’bilisi Gubernia, and a year later of K'ut'aisi G u b e r ­
nia, were a r e f l e c t i o n  of the gulf that more than ever 
before divided ethnic Georgian society. Under the stress of 
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  changes, an e x p a n d i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  and land 
shortage, the family relationship to which Qipiani referred, 
if it had ever existed at all, had all but disappeared. 
There was an air of d e s p e r a t i o n  in the efforts of the n o b i l ­
ity to stave off reform, or, at the very least, to mak e  it 
tolerable.
As the n o b i l i t y  on the one hand b e c a m e  m o r e  a s s e r t i v e  
of its claims, on the other, the peasantry, a w a r e  that the 
reform had already been enacted in Russia and suspicious of 
the intentions of the landlords, became more aggressive in 
the defence of what it increasingly perceived as a f u n d a m e n ­
tal right - the right to own the land it worked. In this 
way, the build-up to the r e f o r m  i n t e n s i f i e d  the t e n d e n c y  
e x a m i n e d  in the p r e v i o u s  c hapter for social r e l a t i o n s  b e ­
tween the two Georgian class elements in Georgian society, 
the p e a s a n t r y  and the t ' a v a d a z n a u r o b a , to b e c o m e  s h a r p e r  
just at the m o m e n t  whe n  in other respe c t s  the p a t t e r n  of the 
country's d e v e l o p m e n t  w a s  l e a d i n g  it f u r t h e r  t o w a r d s  
national integration.
But if the gulf b e t w e e n  these classes w i d e n e d  d u r i n g  
the 1860s, this was also a period in w h i c h  p eople of both 
sides of the g r o w i n g  class divide d e v e l o p e d  a g r e a t e r  c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s  of their c o r p o r a t e  identity. To a large extent 
the government was the unwitting sponsor of this development
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w h e n  it e n c o u r a g e d  the t 1a v a d a z n a u r i  c o n g r e s s e s  of 1862,
1863 and 1864 for the discussion of the peasant reform. For
the first time since R ussian rule had been imposed, the
small and m i d d l e  nobil i t y  were pre s e n t e d  wit h  a f o r u m  for
expressing and sharing their views. Isolated and insecure,
the aznaurni unexpectedly broke with tradition in late 1863
by e l e c t i n g  Qipi a n i  as M a r s h a l  of the n o b i l i t y  of T'bilisi
Gubernia, instead, as was customary, of l i m i t i n g  their
choice to one of the more i l l u s t r i o u s  t'avadi f a m i l i e s . ^
Until that point, the differences that existed between the
lesser and the g r e a t e r  n o b i l i t y  had been largely unstated.
The debate on the reform, however, brought their differences
acutely into focus. The largest l a n d o w n e r s  wer e  a l m o s t
w h o l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  into the tsarist r e g i m e  and wer e  the
greatest beneficiaries of Russian rule. Wealthy and secure, 
most of them were not unduly per t u r b e d  by the i m p e n d i n g
r e f o r m  and indeed saw it as an o p p o r t u n i t y  for g r e a t e r
agricultural efficiency.2^ They did not share the anxieties
of the aznaurni and in most respects were greater removed in
social terms from the lesser nobility than the latter were
from their serfs.
Thus, as the m a j o r i t y  of del e g a t e s  d i s c o v e r e d  their 
shared fears and concerns for the future, so they b e c a m e  
conscious of the distance separating them from the w e a l t h ­
iest and most influential of their number. Convinced that 
their best interests could no longer be d e f e n d e d  by an 
Orbeliani or a Mukhran-Batoni, the nobility invited Qipiani 
to stand as can d i d a t e  for the office of Marshal. D e s p i t e  
official opposition and the anger of the grandest aristocratic 
families, Q ipiani went ahead and in F e b r u a r y  1864 was
2 6
elected by 273 votes to 4 with 35 abstentions.
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ities, because in r e j e c t i n g  their advice and c h o o s i n g  
Qipiani, the nobility made clear its firm opposition to the 
government's recommendations for the reform. Furthermore, 
whi l s t  their n e w - f o u n d  s o l i d a r i t y  was not much of an 
o b s t a c l e  to the passage of reform, it did r e p r e s e n t  a far 
gre a t e r  threat to the governm e n t ' s  desire c o m p l e t e l y  to 
assimilate the Georgian nobility into the dvoryanstvo. More 
aware now of its corporate class and national identity, the 
t'avadaznauroba increasingly became a source of opposition 
to Russian rule in the Transcaucasus.
Despite the opposition encountered from the nobility, 
the R ussian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e m a i n e d  resol v e d  to effect 
r e f o r m s  based on those i n t r o d u c e d  to Russia in 1861. Its 
prime concern was that Transcaucasia fulfil its potential as 
a colonial dependency of the empire, and in this respect the 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the p e a s a n t r y  and 
n o b i l i t y  was an i m p e d i m e n t  that requi r e d  removal. Thus, 
a l t h o u g h  the g o v e r n m e n t  may have s y m p a t h i s e d  w i t h  the 
t'avadaznauroba, its priorities lay in producing the optimal 
conditions for the exploitation of the Caucasus.
As has been stated above, this, in the administration's 
view, meant providing the peasantry with some claim to the 
land and the promise, at least, of purchasing some of it in 
the f u t u r e .  As a g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e ,  the 1861 r e f o r m  
a t t e m p t e d  to ensure that peasant plots be s u f f i c i e n t  "to 
assure their livel i h o o d  and the f u l f i l m e n t  of all their 
obligations to the government and the l a n d l o r d " . I n  this 
way, so it was argued, the peasantry could be prevented from 
f o r m i n g  a rural p r o l e t a r i a t  and w o uld at the sam e  t i m e  be
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The law abolishing serfdom was introduced into T’bilisi 
Gubernia on 13th October 1864, and was followed, with some 
changes to suit local conditions, on 13th O c t o b e r  1865 in 
K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  (Imeret'i, Guria and Ratcha), on 1st 
D e c e m b e r  1866 in S a m e g r e l o ,  on 8th N o v e m b e r  1870 in 
Ap'khazet'i, and on 8th O c t o b e r  1871 in S v a n e t ’i.2 ® On the 
basis of these laws the p easants of G e o r g i a  a c q u i r e d  their 
personal freedom, exemption from paying personal tax to the 
nobility, the right of ownership of real estate constructed 
by t h e m s e l v e s  on the land they used, and the right to the 
constant use of the land they had wo r k e d  prior to the 
reform. This land was not yet, however, recognised as their 
private property. It remained the inalienable property of 
the n o b i l i t y  and a l t h o u g h  on the basis of a r t i c l e  9 of the 
A d d i t i o n a l  Rules C o n c e r n i n g  the E m a n c i p a t i o n  of S a b a t o n o  
Peasants, a peasant was granted the right to redeem his plot 
either in part or in whole, he could only do so w i t h  his 
l a n d l o r d ’s c o n s e n t . U n t i l  such time as the peasant was 
able to buy the land he w o r k e d  and his landl o r d  was p r e p a r e d  
to sell it, the former remained "temporarily obligated" to 
pay tax for the use of the land.
These rights were, however, tightly circumscribed by a 
number of restrictions which further weighted the balance of 
the reform in the favour of the t'avadaznauroba. Thus free­
dom of movement was limited by an article which forbade the 
peasant to leave his plot for a period of nine years, and 
even t h e r e a f t e r  the right of m o v e m e n t  was frau g h t  w i t h  
difficult ies.
The size of the plot a lloted to the peasant by the 
landlord was in theory to be determined by mutual agreement. 
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They were given two years in which to draw up the documents 
(ustavnye g r a m o t y ) detailing their new r e l a t i o n s h i p . ^ 1 In 
the event of their failure to agree the peasant was to keep 
what land he had used before the r e f o r m  and the case to be 
presented for examination by an arbitrator (m irovoi posred- 
nik) . As t h e i r  t i t l e  s u g g e s t s ,  the a r b i t r a t o r s  w e r e  
supposedly intended to seek a neutral and just resolution of 
the rival claims. Leaving aside the issue of the neutral­
ity of the £ i £ £ £ ^ £ _ £ £ s r  edn^kji, r e m a i n s  the case that in 
practice the reform was weighted against the peasantry.
As in Russia, m a x i m u m  land plots were e s t a b l i s h e d  
which, because of the varied nature of the c l i m a t e  and 
e n v i r o n m e n t  in Georgia, varied from region to region. 
Broadly, how ever, it was laid d o w n  that the m a x i m u m  size 
plot for a h o u s e h o l d  in East G e o r g i a  s h o u l d  be f i v e  
desyatiny if irrigated and 10 if n o t , ^  and that the maximum 
for West Geor g i a  should be 4.5 d ^ ^  P e a s a n t s  who 
had had more than this prior to the r e f o r m  could be d e p r i v e d  
of the surplus if the o w n e r  wished. In fact, the r e f o r m  was 
more flexible than this insofar as the landlord was able to 
treat all the peasant households on his estate as a collec­
tive unit. Thus, if on ave r a g e  the size of their plots 
exceeded five desy at iny , he could reduce the area available 
to them. The r e f o r m  further a l l o w e d  that the larg e s t  p e a ­
sant household could be three times the size of the average 
ma ximum plot of five desyat iny if the landlord permitted it. 
Since this reduced the area of land available to the r e m a i n ­
ing peasant families, it could quite ''clearly b e c o m e  a 
measure that benefitted the richer peasants at the expense 
of the p o o r . ^
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A series of other clauses cut further into the land
p r e v i o u s l y  used by the s a b a t o n o  peasants. L a n dlords wer e
en t i t l e d  to keep up to 50 per cent of their estates for
themselves, a rule which often seriously restricted the area
of land available to the peasantry. Furthermore, the t’ava-
w e r e  e m p o w e r e d  to k e e p  at l e a s t  60 k 1 t s e v a
( a p p r o x i m a t e l y  30 d e s y a t i n y ) of land, an expanse which,
given the size of nobility estates in Georgia, was often in
excess of 50 per cent of their estates.36 In West Georgia,
where land was scarcer, the nobility was entitled to keep at
least 22.5 k ft s e v a . L a n d o w n e r s  in T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a  w i t h
less than 60 k't se va and in K'ut'ais i G u b e r n i a  w i t h  less
3 8than 22.5 were not obliged to provide any land at all.
Unlike in Russia where, in a c c o r d a n c e  wit h  the stated 
int e n t i o n  of the r e f o r m  to pro v i d e  the p e a s a n t r y  w i t h  the 
means to live and pay its taxes, the landlords were expected 
to provide the p e a s a n t r y  with a m i n i m u m  area of land, no 
such o b l i g a t i o n s  faced the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a . Basic plot 
sizes a m o u n t i n g  to half the m a x i m u m  plot size w e r e  e s t a b ­
lished, but landlords were not required to pay heed to them. 
Thus peasa n t s  w i t h  less than 2.5 d e s y a t i n y  in East G e o r g i a  
and less than 1.5 desya t iny in West G e o r g i a  r e m a i n e d  that 
w a y .3 9
Landlords were now entitled to tax peasants for the use 
of forests and water located on their properties. As stated 
above, the G e o r g i a n  pea s a n t r y  had t r a d i t i o n a l l y  had free 
access to forests and w a t e r  and both played an i m p o r t a n t  
part in the peasant economy. The deprivation of this right 
further drained their stretched resources.
It w o u l d  appear, therefore, that in its a t t e m p t  to
resolve the peasant question in Georgia, the administration
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sought to both a ppease the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a  through the 
introduction of the concessions described above, and ensure 
that the peasantry was capable of fulfilling its obligations 
to the l a n dlords and state. U l t i m a t e l y ,  by trying to 
achieve both ends at once, it failed to secure either.
Conscious of the small scale of most of the nobility’s 
estates, the government went out of its way to protect them 
from s u f f e r i n g  losses from the reform. In ad d i t i o n  to the 
measures already described, they also received 25 rubles per 
male serf and 50 rubles if they had less than 21 male 
serfs.
Rather foolishly, gi ven the aims of the reform, less 
attention was devoted to ensuring that the peasantry would 
be capable of f u l f i l l i n g  its env i s a g e d  role. Even in the 
rich black earth areas of Russia, it was e s t i m a t e d  that a 
peasant family required at least five desyatiny of land per 
male member to meet its minimum requirements. In Georgia, 
however, so much was done to ensure the l i v e l i h o o d s  of the 
t’avadaznauroba that the peasant families' minimum require­
m e nts wer e  m e a s u r e d  not in terms of des y a t i n y  per m a l e  
m e m b e r  of the family, but in d e s y a t i n y  per h o u s e h o l d  or 
kom 1 i. 2.5 de s y a t i n y  was r e c o g n i s e d  as a basic, but not a
legal requirement for ex-sabatono peasant families in East 
G e o r g i a / 1 From this, w h i c h  included their f a r m s t e a d s ,  
fields and vineyards, the peasantry was both to feed itself 
and fulfil its fiscal duties.
3.2 Deteriorating Social Relations
It is one of the ironies of the r e f o r m  that the means 
by which the Transcaucasian administration had hoped to lay 
the basis for more harmonious peasant relations, and hence a 
more stable environment for the economic exploitation of the 
region, should have been t r a n s f o r m e d  into one of the focal 
points of a class c o n f r o n t a t i o n  that the r e f o r m  had s u p ­
posedly been intended to avoid. It had been envisaged that 
the process of drawing up the title deeds (ustavnye g r a m o t y ) 
w o u l d  be c o m p l e t e  w i t h i n  two years of the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of 
the reform but, in fact, the peasantry offered such resist­
ance to the t e r m s  it was being asked to accept, that in man y  
cases the process dragged on far longer than anticipated.
The peasants of Nak h i d a  in Gori district i n f o r m e d  the 
local mirovoi posrednik that, following the announcement of 
the Supreme Manifesto, they no longer considered themselves 
o bl i g a t e d  to pay taxes to their o w n e r s , ^  and in K'ut'aisi 
G u b e r n i a  refusal to sign the deeds b e c a m e  one of the main 
f orms of r e s i s t a n c e  a m o n g  the p e a s a n t r y . ^  M o r eover, 
s e t t l e m e n t s  w e r e  not only del a y e d  by d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  the 
peasants and the landowners, but also among the landowners 
themselves. Whilst they could not agree over the p recise 
location of estate boundaries, work could not even commence 
on the allocation of land to the peasantry.^
The initial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for d r a w i n g  up the title 
deeds rested on the t1 avadaznaurni, who then forwarded them 
to the state arbitrator or mirovoi posrednik for inspection,
(the m i r ovoi p o s rednik was elected fro m  a m o n g  the local
nobility).  ^  Upon his appro v a l  they w o uld be p r e s e n t e d  to 
the peasant families concerned. If they refused to sign the 
c a s e  w o u l d  be r e f e r r e d  to the g u b e r n i a  o f f i c e  an d  a
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temporary deputy would be sent to arbitrate. His decision 
was final and the peasantry had no means of a p p e a l . ^
The deeds d e t e r m i n e d  the size of the a l l o t m e n t  to be 
g r a n t e d  to the t e m p o r a r i l y  o b l i g a t e d  pea s a n t r y  and listed 
the taxes to be paid for different types of, land. The size 
of the gha_la and kuI.ukh_i was set at 25 per cent by the 
reform and the sabalakhe or hay tax at 33 per cent, but the 
method of payment and the size of the duty on fruit and nut 
or c h a r d s  was to be n e g o t i a t e d  b e t w e e n  the la n d l o r d s  and 
p e a s a n t s . ^  The conte n t s  of these title deeds were to set 
the tone of. the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the e x - s a b a t o n o  
peasants and the nobility until the institution of temporar­
ily obligated peasants disappeared.
P r e d i c t a b l y ,  land e m e r g e d  as the m a i n  s o u r c e  of 
contention from the reform and the title deeds process. The 
measures designed to protect the small-holding t'avadaznaur- 
ni resulted in a considerable reduction of the area used by 
the sabat o n o  peasants prior to the reform, l e a v i n g  most 
still more vulnerable to economic exploitation than before. 
This is not to say, however, that the peasantry suffered in 
all cases. Indeed, there were occasions when the landlords 
did mak e  gifts of land to their p e a s a n t s / ®  and there was 
probably enough truth in the predominantly mythical accounts 
of familial serf-owner relations to have ameliorated the lot 
of some peas ant households. By and large, h o w e v e r ,  it 
appears that l a n d o w n e r s  made the most of the r e f o r m  to 
bolster their own position,at the peasantry’s expense.
Detailed figures p u b l i s h e d  by the T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a  
office d uring the 1870s indicate that w h ile the p e a s a n t r y  
suffered no losses to their farmstead plots, vineyards and
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orchards, their arable and m e a d o w  lands were d r a m a t i c a l l y  
reduced. Thus, of the 77,643.5 desyat iny of field lands 
used by the sa b a t o n o  peasa n t s  previous to the r e f o r m  only
48.223.5 d e s y a t i n y  remained, a r e d u c t i o n  of 37.8 per cent. 
The t o t a l  a r e a  g r a n t e d  to the t e m p o r a r i l y  o b l i g a t e d  
peasantry now amounted to 55,265 desyatiny. /*9
W h e r e a s  the a v e r a g e  h o u s e h o l d  plot had b e e n  5.9
d e s y a t i n y  in p r e - r e f o r m  T'bilisi Gubernia, it n o w  fell to
3.9 desyat i n y . 5° in West G e o r g i a  the ave r a g e  size fell to 
5 12.5 desyat i n y .
Table 10: The Average Size of Land Plots Used by
Temporarily Obligated Peasants in T'bilisi Gubernia
Area of Land in Desyat iny
Per Household Per Male
Districts Up to the After the Up to t he After the
Reform Reform Reform Reform
All Field All Field All Field All Fieli
Types Land Types Land Types Land Types Land
T 'bilisi 9.26 8.89 4.73 4.36 2.43 2.34 1 .24 1.15
D u shet1i 5.07 4.83 3.96 3.72 1 .26 1 .20 0.99 0.93
Gori 5.62 5.26 3.25 2.88 1 .30 1.2 1 0.75 0.66
Sighnaghi 4.27 3.64 2.94 2.32 1 .09 0.93 0.75 0.59
T 'elavi 5.59 4.50 5.24 4.15 1 .44 1.15 1 .34 1 .06
As is evident from the table the land a l l o c a t e d  to 
sabat o n o  f a m i l i e s  in T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  was in e v e r y  case 
below the minimum considered necessary for the needs of one 
male living in the black earth region of Russia.53
It is e s t i m a t e d  that 75 per cent of the losses s u f f e r e d  
by the p e a s a n t r y  were due to the clauses in the r e f o r m
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p r o t e c t i n g  tne noDinty,-' ■ Dut tnere was aiso a te n d e n c y  
a m o n g  the t 'avadaznaurni to count u n i r r i g a t e d  land as 
irrigated, thus cutting the amount due to the peasantry, and 
for them to expropriate plots which the peasantry claimed as 
private property through transactions completed before the 
r e f o r m  and o c c a s i o n a l l y  even before the adve nt of Russian 
rule. The acrimonious nature of the argument was fuelled by 
the fact that such t r a n s a c t i o n s  had often been c o m p l e t e d  
without documentary evidence, or, if there had been papers, 
they we re no w  lost. Thus, the G e o r g i a n  peasantry, used to 
deal i n g  wit h  c u s t o m a r y  practice, b e c a m e  the v i c t i m  of the 
Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s p r e d i l e c t i o n  for judging cases 
through its own legal f r a m e w o r k .  As noted above, the same 
problem was plaguing the attempts of the nobility to settle 
the boundaries of its estates.
A l t h o u g h  the r e f o r m  did at least offer the G e o r g i a n  
p e a s a n t r y  the prospect of being able to p u r c h a s e  its ow n 
land, the t e rms upon w h i c h  it could do so were e x t r e m e l y  
disadvantageous. The government was prepared to grant the 
p e a s a n t r y  state loans to be repaid over a period of 49 
years, but w h e r e a s  in Russia these covered 80 per cent of 
the costs, in G eorgia a m a x i m u m  loan of 350 r ubles was 
established. Because of the high cost of land, this rarely 
covered more than 50 per cent of the value of the property. 
In f a c t ,  t h i s  r a t h e r  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  p e a s a n t r y ’s 
predicament, because government loans could not be extended 
to vineyards, orchards or pastures at all. These, like the 
rest of the allotment., could only be p u r c h a s e d  w i t h  the 
l a n d l o r d s ’ a g r e e m e n t  and had to be paid to h i m  in full by 
the peasant.^5 The scale of the repayment t e r m s , ^  shortage 
of m o n e y  and a g eneral lack of c o m p r e h e n s i o n  of the loan
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system were further disincentives to the peasantry.
Such was the weight of the tax burden, moreover, that 
many who m ight have des i r e d  to make use of the loans were 
unable to. Ghala and kulukhi , for instance, which had never 
been set above 10-20 per cent of the harvest in K'ut'aisi 
Gubernia, were n o w  set at 25 per cent by the g o v e r n m e n t ’s
c n
decree, ' while the sakarm idamo (farmstead) tax was exacted 
at an a verage rate of 12 rubles p.a. The d i f f i c u l t i e s  of 
the peasantry were further compounded by the t’avadaznaur- 
o b a 1 s p r e f e r e n c e  for r e c e i v i n g  the tax in the f o r m  of p r o ­
duce. The peasantry felt that m o n e t a r y  tax w o r k e d  out 
cheaper and that as it was not subject to an n u a l  f l u c t u a ­
tions, provided greater incentive to work. Moreover, it was 
of obvi ous benefit to those peasants able to take their 
produce to local m a r k e t s  and to those e m p l o y e d  as wage 
l a b o u r e r s . Precisely because it worked out cheaper, h o w ­
ever, many landlords preferred to keep things as they were.
Although the n e w  tax rates e s t a b l i s h e d  by the r e f o r m  
we re a source of conflict b e t w e e n  the pea s a n t r y  and the 
nobility, the g r e a t e s t  r e s e n t m e n t  r e v o l v e d  ar o u n d  the 
charges now established for the use of forest areas and the 
rent charged for the use of land that had p r e v i o u s l y  been 
part of the peasant allotments. Thus the post-reform data 
indicates that the temporarily obligated peasantry continued 
to use virtually the same quantity of land after the reform 
as before, but that for the land rented fro m  the l a n d l o r d s  
they had to pay up to 66 per c e n t |o f the h a r v e s t . ^  Such 
was the extent of land short a g e  that 42 per cent of the ex-
£abat_ono peasants of T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a  had b e c o m e  tenant
! 5 0
farmers by the 1880s and over 60 per cent in West Georgia.
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A c c o r d i n g  to tne n e w s p a p e r ’ is. vai 1 line r u r r o w ^ - ou per- eenu 
of all peasants in Guria were forced to work other people's 
land, m u c h  of w h i c h  was situa t e d  far from their own. A n ­
other paper, S h r o ma (Labour), d e s c r i b e d  the s i t u a t i o n  in 
Guria as follows:
It is rare to find a peasant who has e nough land 
to keep hi m w o r k i n g  for a year and to prov i d e  for 
his family. The great m a j o r i t y  of the p e a s a n t r y  
wo r k s  on other people's land for a share of the 
crops; in other words, under conditions where he 
has to give half the results of his labour to the 
land's owner.
On top of this peasa n t s  had to pay their state taxes 
and to p e r f o r m  the b egara (labour) duty for the landlord, 
the state and the local community. This involved repairing 
roads and bridges and p r o v i d i n g  one's own horses, b u f f a l o s  
and carts as means of transport. In itself a heavy burden, 
it was often made doubly so by its coincidence with the most 
intensive periods in the agricultural calendar.
Under these c o n d i t i o n s  it is s c a r c e l y  s u r p r i s i n g  that 
relations between the peasantry and the nobility, which the 
reform had supposedly been intended to settle, should have 
taken a turn for the worse. Once the euphoria had worn off 
and the reality of the r e f o r m s  sunk in, the moo d  in the 
vi l l a g e s  began to change. A g i t a t o r s  for a d e s t r u c t i v e  
campaign against the title deeds became increasingly common 
and the G e o r g i a n  e q u i v a l e n t  of the £ £ £  £  d_ ri i^ k i_, the 
, b e g a n  to a c q u i r e  a s t r o n g e r  f o o t h o l d .  
O u t b r e a k s  of viole n c e  over land disputes, a l t h o u g h  not 
expanding into a widespread rebellion until the beginning of 
the 20th century, b e c a m e  an a l m o s t  p e r m a n e n t  f e a t u r e  of 
rural l i f e . ^  Between 1865 and 1870 28,012 complaints were 
r e g i s t e r e d  by peasants and lan d l o r d s  on over 40 d i f f e r e n t
144
65issues. J
This in large part expla i n s  the slow pace at w h i c h  
r e d e m p t i o n  p a y m e n t s  we re c o n c l u d e d  in Georgia. But other 
important factors impinged as well. Of considerable signi­
ficance was the relatively parlous state of the t'avadaznau­
roba itself, for the nobility was forbidden to sell property 
that was mo rtgaged. Given the very high p e r c e n t a g e  of 
G e o r g i a n  a z n a u r n i  who found t h e m s e l v e s  in a state of debt 
one can a s s u m e  that this d i s q u a l i f i e d  a large n u m b e r  of 
peasants from escaping from temporarily obligated status.
Another factor of particular importance in Georgia was 
the absence of the mir to mediate between the peasantry and 
the state. In Georgia communal ownership of land was rare 
and b e c o m i n g  mor e  so, and the peasantry, unlike in most 
parts of Russia w h e r e  the mir boug ht the land on its behalf, 
acted as separate individuals. W i t h o u t  the support of the 
community or village of which he was a part, it was clearly 
more difficult for a peasant to redeem his lands.
In Russia only 14 per cent of e x - c o r v e e  serfs were 
still temporarily obligated by 1879 and in 1881 the category 
was completely abolished. This piece of legislation was not 
extended to the Transcaucasus, however, and it remained the 
case that even by 1904 only 47.6 per cent of e x - s a b a t o n o  
peasants in ‘Georgia had succeeded in purchasing land.^6 In 
the m e a n w h i l e ,  the g r o w t h  of the p o p u l a t i o n  and m o u n t i n g  
debts had reduced the q u a n t i t y  of land a v a i l a b l e  to each 
household. Thus, whereas in 1865 the average allotment had 
been between 3.7 and 3.9 desyat iny, by 1 903 it had fallen to
1.7 desyatiny per household.^ In these circumstances large 
n u m b e r s  of t e m p o r a r i l y  o b l i g a t e d  peasants wer e  f o r c e d  to 
a b a n d o n  their land and seek e m p l o y m e n t  as wag e  l a b o u r e r s
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eisewnerc. jliiuo, iiiauvci'uciiuiy ^  u u c  a u o u u i x o x c o  x u i, u t
Tran sc auc a su s had achie v e d  what they had set out to avoid: 
a rural proletariat.
The 1860s r e f o r m s  in Georgia were d e s c r i b e d  by 34 
members of the State Duma in 1908 as,
... the greatest act of expropriation of land from 
the people by the ruling class in the social 
history of the Caucasus. 8
By its actions the G e o r g i a n  nobility did muc h  to d e ­
stroy the lingering possibility that the two largest ethnic
Georgian social groups in the country could find a basis for
6 Qfuture common action. 7
3.3 The I m p act of the Peasant Reform s on Econom ic Integra­
tion
The r e f o r m s  of 1864-71 did little to bring about an 
immediate shift in the balance of power in the countryside. 
The land became still more concentrated in the hands of the 
t'avadaznauroba, whilst for the majority of peasants there 
was little cause for o p t i m i s m  in the p r o v i s i o n s  for land 
purchase. Nevertheless, through the a b o l i t i o n  of the p e r ­
sonal d e p e n d e n c e  of som e 70,000 peas ant h o u s e h o l d s ^  on 
their landlords and the concession of the legal right to buy 
the plot of land they worked, the r e f o r m s  p rised open the 
grasp of batonqm oba on Georgian society sufficient to a c cel­
erate the process of economic and national integration.
As has been ind i c a t e d  above, the r e f o r m s  e x a c e r b a t e d  
the e c o n o m i c  position of the m a j o r i t y  of e x - s a b a t o n o  
peasa n t s  by r e d u c i n g  the size of their plots, r a i s i n g  the 
taxes to be paid for them and by i n c r e a s i n g  their need to 
rent land. The nobility, on the other hand, now that it had
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been d e p r i v e d  of the g r a t u i t o u s  labour that had been the 
mainstay of its existence in the past, inclined increasingly 
t o w a r d s  l e a s i n g  its land in r eturn for 50 per cent or mor e  
of the p roduce derived fro m  it.^*1 Under these c o n d i t i o n s  
the peasantry found itself squeezed more than ever before.
The requirement to market produce to acquire the money 
needed to pay state taxes now found positive encouragement 
wit h  the prospect, h o w e v e r  unreal for most, of p u r c h a s i n g  
their own land. This, in turn, c o m p e l l e d  the p e a s a n t r y  to 
strengthen its ties with the market and led towards further 
regional agricultural specialisation as it sought to exploit 
the varied natural conditions of the country to best advant­
age. As this tendency to specialisation, already present in 
the p r e - r e f o r m  period, a c q u i r e d  deeper roots, so d o m e s t i c  
trade expanded and market towns became the focal points of 
economic life in the districts and regions. The interdepen­
dence of the dif f e r e n t  parts of G e o r g i a  g r e w  d eeper as the 
p e a s a n t s  c a m e  to rely on produce fro m  the vari o u s  parts of 
the c ountry to meet their basic r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Thus the 
m o u n t a i n  regions c a m e  to deal p r i m a r i l y  in l i v e s t o c k  and 
dairy produce, K a k h e t ’i in wine, K 'art’li in cereals, fruit 
and vegetables, I m e r e t ’i in win e  and silk, Guria and S a m e -  
grelo in corn, silk and poultry, and Ap'khazet'i in t o b a c c o  
and c o r n J 2 Rather later, as their commercial significance 
b e c o m e  mor e  apparent, more people took to g r o w i n g  tea and 
citrus fruit. However, in the last decades of the 19th 
century more traditional crops predominated. Writing to the 
tsar in 1891 the V iceroy of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s ,  D o n d u k o v -  
Korsakov, noted of Kakhet'i that,
In recent t i m e s  v i t i c u l t u r e  has had the most
s t r i k i ng success. In Kakhetii-i a-r-a-b-l^ e— 1-a-n-d— i-s-------
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gradually being transformed into vineyards so that 
in the wealthy district of T'elavi the inhabitants 
have already been forced to buy bread elsewhere in 
order to feed themselves... the wine centre is 
Ka k h e t ' i . ^
A l t h o u g h  w r i t t e n  s o m e  20 y e a r s  a f t e r  the r e f o r m  the 
Viceroy’s report is still a reflection of the trends already 
taking place in the Georgian village of the 1870s.
A m o n g  state peasants, or course, all taxes, e x c l u d i n g  
the provision of labour for the repair of roads and bridges 
and such like, had been paid wit h  m o n e y  since the fiscal 
r e f o r m  of 1845 refer r e d  to in the p revious chapter. C o n ­
sequently, a l t h o u g h  G e o r g i a n  state peasa n t s  wer e  not e n ­
titled to purch a s e  their plots from the state as their 
Russian counterparts w e r e , ^  they already had firmly estab­
lished links with the market.
The i m p e t u s  gi ven to the d e v e l o p m e n t  of c o m m o d i t y  
r e l a t i o n s  in the c o u n t r y s i d e  b e c a m e  further a p p a r e n t  with 
the growing social differentiation of the peasantry. As the 
small-holding peasants fell victim to the money-lenders and 
m e r c hants, they i n c r e a s i n g l y  s u r r e n d e r e d  their c l a i m s  to 
their plots to w e a l t h i e r  peasa n t s  and to urban m e r c h a n t s  
anxious to invest their commercial capital in agriculture. 
G r a d u a l l y  land c o n c e n t r a t e d  in the hands of a r e l a t i v e l y  
s m all group of rich peasants, l eaving man y  w i t h  e i ther 
n o t h i n g  at all, or w i t h  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to pay taxes and p r o ­
vide for their households' basic r e q u i r e m e n t s .  In such
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  it b e c a m e  i n c u m b e n t  upon the m e m b e r s  of the
/•
f a m i l y  to s u p p l e m e n t  any i n c o m e  der i v e d  from the land by 
selling their labour. A consequence of this process, which 
affected state and ex-sabatono peasants alike, was the e m e r ­
gence of peasant consumers who, unable to produce enough for
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themselves, were more or less wholly reliant on the market 
for survival. Thus, t hrough their mi s f o r t u n e ,  the rural 
poor made their own contribution to the further integration 
of the national economy.
The g o v e r n m e n t  did, in fact, try to prevent this
happening among state peasants by attempting the artificial
transplantation of the customs and practices of the Russian
obshchina or commune into the Transcaucasus. For example,
it hoped that by enforcing the periodical redistribution of
land, a practice familiar to many Russian peasants, it could
prevent the process of social differentiation.^ However,
wh i l s t  the poli cy met with s o m e  success in th ose parts of
Georgia where communal or t1emobrivi ownership had not yet
died out, it appears, in the main, to have failed. Even
writers like A.M. Argut inskii and S.V. Machabeli who helped
compile the government report on the Georgian state peasants
in the mid - 1880s and w h o  upheld the view that c o m m u n a l
o w n e r s h i p  was p r e d o m i n a n t  in East G eorgia at least, were
forced to co n c l u d e  that it was in decay even here. Thus,
A r g u t i n s k i i  conce d e s  that there wer e  s o m e  v i l l a g e s  w h e r e
there was no r e a l l o t m e n t  at all,^6 and that even w h e r e  it
did exist the incidence of repartition was d e c l i n i n g . ^  He
concluded that in practice communal land ownership was being
de s t r o y e d  by the success of the rich peasants, or k u l a k s  as
he c a l l e d  t h e m ,  in a c c u m u l a t i n g  l a n d  at the p o o r ' s  
78expense.
It would appear, however, that the authors of this work 
exaggerated the role of the commune in Georgia during this 
period. Ce rtainly, they failed to discuss the role of the 
state in imposing and maintaining communal forms of a d m i n i s ­
tration derived from a completely alien environment. Even
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nmii c Kuci c mo) nave ueeu survivals oi communal ownership in 
Georgia, the imposition of Russian practice was often quite 
u n s u i t e d  to the r e q u i r e m e n t s  of G e o r g i a n  peasants. An e x ­
a m p l e  from S.V. Machabeli's c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the survey is 
indicative of the sort of problem that arose from arbitrary 
attempts to implant Russian methods into foreign conditions. 
In this case, the d e c i s i o n  to int r o d u c e  the p r i n c i p l e  of 
even r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of land into a v illage in T'bilisi 
district left poor families with relatively large plots, but 
without the bullocks or men to work them. Despite the fact 
that they w e r e  unable to use a large part of the land g iven 
them, they were, nevertheless, taxed for the whole of i t . ^  
Other contemporary observers emphasised the weakness of 
the commune, or t'emi, in Georgia. Thus M.M. Kovalevskii, a 
leading contemporary authority on comparative studies of the 
commune, wrote that,
The structure of the commune in Georgia appears in 
g r e a t  c o n t r a s t  to the A r m e n i a n  s y s t e m .  The 
unimpeded movement of peasants from the property 
of one l a n d l o r d  to a n o t h e r ,  the w i d e s p r e a d  
pract i c e  of l i b e r a t i n g  p e a s a n t s  and the s y s t e m  
whereby the peasants inherited a perpetual lease 
on the land they w o r k e d  m akes it clear to us that 
the p e a s a n t  c o m m u n e  w a s  far f r o m  b e i n g  the 
dominant form of rural settlement -here.^^
N.L. Abazadze e m p h a s i s e d  the i mpact of the p r o c e s s  of 
economic integration and the gradual collapse of the self- 
s u f f i c i e n c y  of f a m i l i e s  and v illages on c o m m u n a l  f o r m s  of 
ownership.
Far f r o m  the h i g h w a y s  and railways, far f r o m  the 
trad i n g  posts, in the d e s e r t e d  corn ers of the 
Caucasian mountains - that is where even today one 
may c o m e  across v illages wit h  f a m i l y  c o m m u n e s .  
But here too this type of c o m m u n a l  e x i s t e n c e  
a ppears only in the form of a relic f r o m  the 
past.®1
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It is clear even from the g o v e r n m e n t  report of the 
1880s that c o m m u n a l  o w n e r s h i p  had ceased to exist in West 
Georgia with the virtual exception of Ratcha province,®2 and 
that w h i l e  in East G e o r g i a  it con t i n u e d  to exist it did so 
in red u c e d  form. All the a v a i l a b l e  evidence points to the 
gradual disappearance of the t’emi amongst all categories of 
peasant and to its almost complete disappearance among ex- 
sabatono peasants, a fact which further underlines the role 
of the g o v e r n m e n t  in m a i n t a i n i n g  the c o m m u n e  a m o n g  state 
peasants. It was also p r e d o m i n a n t l y  the case that even in 
T'bilisi Gubernia farmstead land, vineyards, orchards, vege­
table g a r d e n s  and much of the best and closest a rable land
was not subject to redistribution but remained the inherit­
ed O
ance of individual households. J Only the more distant land 
and often less fertile arable land r e m a i n e d  c o m m u n a l  pro-
Q A
perty. Pastures and woodlands, as among the ex-sabatono 
peasants, also remained in communal ownership but were not 
subject to redivision. Ilia T c h a v t c h a v a d z e ,  one of the 
leading lights of the Georgian radical intelligentsia in the 
late 19th and early 20th cen t u r i e s  and the a uthor of a 
number of writings on Georgian ethnography, observed that,
In the eyes of the p e a s a n t r y  there is no way and 
no i n d i cator by which... these lands can be d i s ­
tinguished from private property, although if you 
wer e  to ask a peasant he w o u l d  tell you that they 
are state or t r e a s u r y - o w n e d .  Such lands are 
i n h e r i t e d  f r o m  one p e r s o n  to the next; the 
peasants, as g u a r d i a n s  of the land, m o r t g a g e  and 
sel l  it to e a c h  o t h e r  f r e e l y  and w i t h o u t  
hindrance.
There were, moreover, a number of practical difficul­
ties facing the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  a t t e m p t  to s t a n d a r d i s e
Georgia's state p easants along R u s s i a n  lines. U n l i k e  in.
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Russia, for instance, it was extremely common for villages 
to consist not just of one c a t e g o r y  of peasant, but of 
private l a n d - o w n i n g  peasants, temporarily-obligated peas­
ants, khiznebi and state peasants. Consequently, it was no 
s i m p l e  m a t t e r  to or g a n i s e  village affairs on a c o m m u n a l  
basis. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the i n t e nsive nature of viticulture, 
w h i c h  was the p r e d o m i n a n t  branch of a g r i c u l t u r e  in East 
Georgia, and the tim e  r equired to cu l t i v a t e  and care for a 
v i n e y a r d  wer e  all factors that d i s c o u r a g e d  all but the 
poorest peasants from demanding frequent repartitions of the 
land.86
F o l l o w i n g  the r e f o r m  it is apparent that c o m m e r c e  
developed rather faster in the villages of West Georgia than 
it did in the east, despite the fact that T'bilisi continued 
to dominate the economic development of the Transcaucasus, 
and that an undoubted factor in this was the virtual absence 
of the c o m m u n e  in this part of the country, either a m o n g s t  
e x - sabatono or state peasants. Thus, rich p e a s a n t s  w e r e  
a b l e  to a c c u m u l a t e  l a n d  u n i n h i b i t e d  by the t h r e a t  of 
redi s t r i b u t i o n ,  and g r o w i n g  n u m b e r s  of poor p e a s a n t s  w e r e  
forced to supplement their income from the land by seeking 
employment as hired labourers.
There were, or course, a n u m b e r  of other factors, not 
least being the fact that land shortage, despite the greater 
fertility of the soil in the area west of the Surami range, 
compelled a relatively higher proportion of the peasantry to 
seek wage labour than ip the east. By 1903 the average area 
of c u l t i v a t a b l e  land used by all c a t e g o r i e s  of p e a s a n t  in 
K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  was only 2.69 desyat iny per h o u sehold, 
w h e r e a s  in T ' b i l i s i  G u b e r n i a  the a v e r a g e  w a s  8.18
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desyatiny.8  ^ However, perhaps the most crucial developments 
in the p o s t - r e f o r m  period were the r e u n i f i c a t i o n  of the 
Black Sea port of Bat'umi to G e o r g i a  in 1878 f o l l o w i n g  
Turkey's defeat in the Russo-Turkish War, and the completion 
of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  r a i l w a y  line b e t w e e n  Baku on the 
Caspian, T'bilisi and Bat'umi in 1883. These were to play a 
considerable role in furthering the economic integration of 
this part of the country.
Discussion of the idea of building the railway began in 
the 1850s, as the government examined the different means by 
w h i c h  it could o p t i m i s e  the e c o n o m i c  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of the 
Tr a n s c a u c a s u s ,  but wor k  did not a c t u a l l y  c o m m e n c e  until 
1865. Under the d i r e c t i o n  of Engl i s h  engineers, the first 
stretch of the T'bilisi-P'ot'i line between the capital and 
Zestap'oni was c o m p l e t e d  in 1871, w h i l e  the r e m a i n i n g  
stretch to the port of P ’ot'i c a m e  into o p e r a t i o n  the f o l ­
lowing October.88
Britain actually maintained an isolated and apparently 
d e p r e s s e d  V i c e -C o n s u l a t e  in P'ot'i for muc h  of the latter 
half of the 19th century, thanks to w h i c h  there is some 
f i r s t - h a n d  info r m a t i o n ,  albe it scanty, in E n g l i s h  on the 
state of trade in the town. A report s u b m i t t e d  to Lord 
Granville by Vice-Consul Wilkinson, dated 1 July 1872, notes 
that,
The Vice-Consulate of Poti is more commercial than 
political; there is no kind of industry, except 
two s a w m i l l s ;  the p roduce of this d istrict is 
c h i e f l y  I n d i a n  corn, and t i m b e r ,  but l a r g e  
quantities of boxwood and walnut wood come to this 
place from the interior of the country. y
Commenting on the state of commerce, Wilkinson pointed 
to the b o o s t  a n t i c i p a t e d  f r o m  the c o m p leti QJ3— o^ C— t h e
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T ' b i1 i s i -P 'o t 1i railway,
The a m o u n t  of busin e s s  began to increase in 1868 
on account of a few British vessels that arri v e d  
at Poti, and British workmen for the railway, but 
there is no doubt that b u s i n e s s  will i ncrease 
after the o p e n i n g  of the r a i l w a y  from Poti to 
T i f 1 is. w h i c h  will take place by the end of August 
n e x t .90
Business did increase as expected, but P'ot'i's days as 
the mai n  G e o r g i a n  Black Sea port were num b e r e d ,  for the 
reunification of Bat’umi with Georgia in 1878 provided the 
government with port facilities and a location far superior 
to t h o s e  of P'ot'i. On the l i n k - u p  of B a t ' u m i  w i t h  
S a m t r e d i a  on the T ’ bi 1 i s i - P ’ o t 1 i line in 1 883 and the c o m ­
pletion of the T 1 b i 1 i s i-Baku line the same year, P'ot'i was 
d o o m e d  to a p o s i t i o n  of s e c o n d a r y  importance, b e c o m i n g  a 
railway transit point and retaining just enough of Georgia's 
fore i g n  trade to keep its t o w n  status. Bat'umi, ho w e v e r ,  
flourished. A dilapidated garrison town of some 3,000 or so 
inhabitants in 1 8 7 8 , it began to expand rapidly as a port 
and industrial and commercial centre. By 1886 the popula­
tion had risen to 1 4,803 and by the tim e  of the 1896 All- 
R ussian cens us to 2 8,508.^ 2 The fate of P'ot'i was not 
unusual in this period and it had itself been the cause of 
the decline of another Black Sea town, Qulevi.
As the v o l u m e  of goods t r a n s p o r t e d  along the r a i l w a y  
grew, a n u m b e r  of new t o w n s  and t r a d i n g  cent r e s  s p r a n g  up 
involving the interior deeper in the country's domestic and 
f o r e i g n  tr a d e .  O t h e r s  that had p r e v i o u s l y  o c c u p i e d  
p r o m i n e n t  p o s i tions along the old caravan r outes found 
t h e m s e l v e s  b y - p a s s e d  or c o m p l e t e l y  isolated and wen t  into 
d e c l i n e .  T o w n s  and v i l l a g e s  l i k e  Z u g d i d i ,  Q v i r i l a ,
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Samtr e d i a ,  Zestap'oni, and Khashuri ben e f i t e d  from their 
p r o x i m i t y  to the line, but for small s e t t l e m e n t s  like 
Orpiri, Dzveli Senaki, Qulevi and Tseva it soun d e d  the 
death-knell. Even as prominent a town as Akhaltsikhe found
q r>
that some of its trade was drawn off.
The i m p o r t a n c e  of the r a i l w a y  was r e f l e c t e d  in the 
f l u c t u a t i n g  fortunes of the guber n i a  town of K'ut'aisi, 
which prior to the construction of the railway had witnessed 
a period of steady if not spectacular growth. The T'bilisi- 
P'ot'i line, h o w e v e r ,  m i s s e d  K ’u t ' a i s i  by s o m e  e i g h t  
k i l o m e t r e s  and the town began to face c o m p e t i t i o n  fro m  a 
number of smaller settlements located nearer to the railway. 
Trade fell off, the population grew smaller and the value of 
property dropped by 200-300 per cent. Sergi Meskhi, one of 
the outstanding figures of the new intelligentsia, described 
its decline. What is p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  is that his 
d e s c r i p t i o n  was w r i t t e n  in early 1872, just b e fore the 
r a i l w a y  link up with' P'ot'i had been completed, s u g g e s t i n g  
that the i mpact of the r a i l w a y  must have been a l m o s t  
immediate. He writes:
...K'ut’aisi's streets seem somehow to have a lost 
and a b a n d o n e d  air about them: people are hardly
to be seen, there is no traffic, and none of the 
life without which it is impossible to imagine an 
Imerian. There is quiet along the boulevards, 
quiet in the streets and quiet in the bazaar... 
everyone is quarrelling over one thing or another 
and words of kindness, c o m f o r t  or hope are to be 
heard from very few. The merchants complain that 
there is no trade, h o u s e o w n e r s  are s e a r c h i n g  for 
tenants and can find them nowhere; nob o d y  is 
building new houses: it’s hard enough renting out
the old ones, never mind building new ones! O w n ­
ers of land are selling it at half its value, 
r o oms are empty in the hotels... Is it p o s s i b l e  
that the railway's b y - p a s s i n g  K'ut'aisi is alone 
re s p o n s i b l e  for having such an impact on the 
K'ut'aisians material and moral well-being?
 _____________________________ 15-5-------------------------
On the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a c o n n e c t i n g  line in 1 877, 
however, the town's fortunes began to revive sufficiently to 
recover its former status.95
In the i m m e d i a t e  p o s t - r e f o r m  p e r i o d  c e r e a l  cro p  
cultivation was the predominant form of farming in Georgia, 
and up to the 1890s the area of land sown to grain crops 
increased significantly. Whilst 377,686 chetverts of wheat 
w e r e  s o w n  in East G e o r g i a  in 1862 and 1,391,063 c h e t v e r t s  
h a r v e s t e d ,  5 4 8 , 4 2 3  £  h.£ rj  ^v_e _r t_ s^ w e r e  s o w n  in 1887 and 
2 , 8 4 9 , 9 1 1  h a r v e s t e d  so that a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w a s  no 
d r a m a t i c  rise in p r o d u c t i v i t y  and p r o b a b l y  even a fall in 
p r o d u c t i v i t y  per m a n  if one c o n s i d e r s  the r i s e  in 
population, there was, nevertheless, a considerable increase 
in the total, a c h i e v e d  largely t hrough the c u l t i v a t i o n  of 
virgin lands.
P r o d u c t i v i t y  c o n t i n u e d  to be the v i c t i m  of o b s o l e t e
farming practices and equipment, methods of land tenure and
o v e r - i n t ensive c u l t i v a t i o n  of the soil, but the rise in
o u t p u t  w a s  s u s t a i n e d  up to the end of the c e n t u r y .
Georgia's total grain harvest in 1 874 was 25 m i l l i o n  puds,
Q 7but by the 1890s was averaging 40 million puds per annum. 1 
An i n c r e a s i n g  share of this was marketed, w i t h  the result 
that d uring the mid- 1890s 15-20 per cent of East Georgia's 
cereals was sold in T'bilisi Gubern ia's t o w n s  and s e t t l e ­
ments a n n u a l l y , and more was either exported to Russia and 
W e s t e r n  Europe or sold in the m a r k e t s  of K'ut'aisi G u b e r ­
n i a . ^  Whi l s t  the p e r c e n t a g e  of grain m a r k e t e d  in East 
G eo r g i a  was not p a r t i c u l a r l y  high, it is w o r t h  n o t i n g  that 
the main commercial crops in T'bilisi Gubernia were vines,
fruit and vegetables and that by the 1890s grain production
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had suffered something of a depression because of c ompeti­
tion from America and Russia.
In We st Georgia, however, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the 
p r o v i n c e s  of Guria and Same g r e l o ,  the c u l t i v a t i o n  of corn 
was so e x t e n s i v e  that it verged on being the sole crop. 
Specialisation to this degree inevitably brought close ties 
wi th the market. In the early 1860s annual exports had 
a v e r a g e d  about one m i l l i o n  puds, but by the mid- 1 8 8 0 s ,  
stimulated by the advent of rail transport linking the main 
grain areas to the Black Sea ports, exports amounted to 30- 
35 per cent of the crop, or 5-6 m i l l i o n  puds per a n n u m . 1® 0 
More was bought at the local m a r k e t s  by h i g h l a n d e r s  and by 
merchants from the major towns and settlements sprouting up 
in the path of the railway. T ’bilisi, as the u n c h a l l e n g e d  
nodal point of the e c o n o m i c  and p o l i t i c a l  life of Georgia, 
was also the grain centre of the Trans Caucasus and m u c h  of 
West G e o r g i a ’s corn found its wa y  by road or rail to the 
T’bilisi bazaars. As in the past, however, the bulk of this 
trade was concentrated in the hands of merchants and m o n e y ­
lenders and the few landlords and peasants wealthy enough to 
be able to market their own produce.
Little i n f o r m a t i o n  is a v a i l a b l e  on i n t e r - g u b e r n i a
trade, but it is clear that the emphasis on the cultivation
of Indian corn in K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  led to a s t e a d y  d e m a n d
for wheat and other crops from the east of the country.
Statistics are at least available for railway transportation
of goods and it appears that 100-300,000 puds of wheat were
t r a n s p o r t e d  to West G e o r g i a  from T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  per 
10 1a n n u m . ' u 1
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The growing debt of impoverished peasants and aznaurni 
to the commercial bourgeoisie was also contributing to the 
further cultivation of crops for purely commercial purposes, 
but even by the end of the century small and medium-holding 
peasants continued to be the main producers of grain.
Table 11: The Quantity of Corn Marketed in West 1 n p Georgia u
Districts
and
Regions
Corn
Marketed by 
Peasantry 
(in Puds)
Corn
Marketed by 
Land Owners 
(in Puds )
Corn
Marketed by 
Shemsq id- 
velebi*
(in P u d s )
Total 
Commodity 
Corn in 
Puds
K ' u t 1aisi 514,000 84,000 28,000 626,000
Ozurget1i 400,000 500,000 - 900,000
Zugdidi 400,000 400,000 200,000 1 ,000,000
Shorapani NO CORN WAS MARKETED
Senaki 1,500,000 500 , 000 50,000 2,050,000
Rat cha NO CORN WAS MARKETED
Lechkhumi 8 , 000 4,000 - 12,000
B a t f umi 60,000 - 10,000 70 , 000
Sokhumi 1,000 ,000 500 ,000 - 1 ,500 , 000
Total for 3,882,000 1 ,988,000 288,000 6, 158,000
West
Georgia
* Shemsqidveli - This term refers to those individuals who 
toured the v i l l a g e s  b u y i n g - u p  grain fro m  the p e a santry, 
usually at we ll b e l o w  the m a r k e t  value, to sell in the 
towns and elsewhere.
The relatively high price offered for corn in the late 
1880s provided peasants with the incentive to continue in­
vesting in its cultivation, but in the 1890s American c o m p e ­
tition and i m p r o v e d  harve s t s  in Russia caused a s l u m p  in 
demand for Georgian grain and for corn in particular. From
158
the peak of the late 1880s and early 1890s exports plummeted 
to 75,800 puds in 1895 before sustaining a gradual recovery 
thereafter. 1
Although the profitability of corn undoubtedly suffered 
in this period, some compensation was found in the expansion 
of demand from the domestic market. Again, fully accurate 
a c c o u n t s  of the state of internal sales of g r ain are i m ­
possible because of the absence of records, but the figures 
d e t a i l i n g  the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of grain by rail over the 
period 1885 to 1894 give some indication.
Table 12
Crop 1885-89 1890-94 104
Corn 613,000 puds 1,719,000 puds
Wheat 3,187,000 puds 5,258,000 puds
Barley 4,079,000 puds 4,595,000 puds
Falling profits in this sphere provided the rural po p ­
ulation with e n c o u r a g e m e n t ,  albeit of a n e g a t i v e  kind, to 
turn to the c u l t i v a t i o n  of other crops, so me of w h i c h  w e r e  
already being sold in the towns and villages on a consider­
able scale. Viticulture was the second most extensive form 
of agriculture in Georgia and, as was noted in the previous 
chapter, had a l r e a d y  a c q u i r e d - f i r m  links wit h  the m a r k e t  
well in adva n c e  of the reform. Subse q u e n t l y ,  these links 
grew considerably stronger.
W h e r e a s  prior to the 1860s som e  30-40 per cent of 
G e o r g i a n  wine was m a r k e t e d  every year, by the 1870s and 
1880s, 55 to 60 per cent was being s o l d , 11^  the bulk of
which was consumed within the country. In 1870 Georgia p r o ­
duced 82,173,520 litres of wine, 43.61 per cent of the total
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produced in the Russian empire and two-thirds of that made 
in the Transcaucasus. By 1894, h owever, output in East 
G e o r g i a  alone r eached 69,640,718 litres, 52.8 per cent of 
w hich was sold in Georgia, wh i l s t  West G e o r g i a  produced 
57,264,000 litres, 49.2 per cent of w h ich was m a r k e t e d  
w i t h i n  the country. By the end of the cent u r y  the main
wine province, Kakhet’ij was selling some 23,860,000 litres 
per annum. P r o d u c t i o n  of spirits, moreover, which in 
Georgia was largely an offshoot of viticulture, was almost 
entirely for the market.
In a country where the vast majority of the population 
held so little land, viticulture was a particularly appeal­
ing branch of agriculture. Requiring relatively little land 
to achieve profitability, it afforded the producer an income 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y  higher per desyat ina than most other crops. 
It was in part because of this, but also because most Geo r ­
gian landowners chose to lease their land rather than farm 
it thems e l v e s ,  that 76.2 per cent of the area of land un der 
vines in the 1 870s was o w n e d  by p e a s a n t s . j n T'elavi 
district 86 per cent of the v i n e yards were less than one 
desyatina and in Sighnaghi district 89 per cent. According 
to one c o r r e s p o n d e n t  of the journal K a v k a z s k o e  Sel'skoe 
Khozyaistvo (Caucasian Agriculture) writing in 1899,
With the ex c e p t i o n  of a l i m i t e d  n u m b e r  of cases
the v i n e yards of Kakhet'i and K ’iziqi, the main
viticultural centres of the Transcaucasus, belong
to state peasants, whilst the average area of land
used by each viticulturalist does not exceed half 
10fta desyat ina.
In West Georgia, where land s hortage was an even 
g reater problem, the average size of a v i n e y a r d  did not 
exceed one k 11 s e v a , rather less than half a desyat i n a . 1 09
160
The i m p r o v e m e n t s  m a d e  to Kakhet'i's roads achie v e d  
through the use of g r a t u i t o u s  peasant l a b o u r , 110 and the 
completion of a pass over the Tsivi-Gombori range bisecting 
the most dire ct route b e t w e e n  T'bilisi and K a k h e t ’i, p r o ­
vided a fresh impetus to viticulture and further encourage­
ment for peasants to convert arable land into vineyards. 
According to a report in Kavkazskii Kalendar (The Caucasian 
Calendar), the 1870s witnessed a growth of 8-10 per cent in 
the area of land under vines.111
In West Georgia there were similar developments and in 
all probability still more emphasis would have been placed 
on viticulture had not Imeret’i in particular, but also the 
rest of K ’u t ’aisi Gubernia, not been badly a f f e c t e d  by vine 
diseases that resulted from a largely misguided government 
decision to import European vines for experimentation. As a 
consequence, many indigenous vines were brought to the verge 
of extinction.112 Many simply abandoned viticulture alt o ­
gether and turned to g r o w i n g  cereal crops. An att a c k  of 
phylloxera in the 1880s wreaked still more damage and output 
in K ’ut’aisi Gubernia plummeted from 5 million puds in 1885 
to 1,500,000 in 1895.112 The c o m p l e t i o n  of the ra i l w a y ,  
however, provided a considerable boost to the development of 
c o m m e r c i a l  v i t i c u l t u r e  in spite of the disease. T aking 
advantage of the fact that the Baku-T’bilisi line missed out 
Kakhet’i, West Georgian wines began to challenge the d o m i n ­
ance of K akhian wine in the main urban centres, b e c a u s e  
d espite the i m p r o v e m e n t s  made to their roads the K a k h i a n  
p easants were not able to t r a n sport their wine e ither as 
c heaply or as qui c k l y  as their West G e o r g i a n  count e r p a r t s .  
In Rateha province, the site of the most acute land shortage
in the country, the p e a s a n t r y  had made wi ne pu r e l y  for
pe r s o n a l  c o n s u m p t i o n  d u r i n g  the 1870s, but in the 1880s, 
benefiting from the railway and the fact that the nature of 
their vines and- the c l i m a t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  of the p r o v i n c e  
enabled them to escape the worst effe cts of the disease, 
they c o n c e n t r a t e d  a l m o s t  e x c l u s i v e l y  on v i t i c u l t u r e  and 
ta king a d v a n t a g e  of the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of wine and spirits 
production, marketed a steadily growing proportion of their 
output. Peasants had even begun to clear strips of forest 
up to 12 miles from their farmsteads to plant vineyar d s . ^ ^  
Bec a u s e  too of the level of crop s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  in 
K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  wine, like many other crops, b e c a m e  a 
c o m m o d i t y  in c o n s i d e r a b l e  demand. Thus, a l t h o u g h  the 
railway now made the transportation of West Georgian wine to 
T'bilisi a relatively simple exercise, only 12.9 per cent of 
the wine t r a n s p o r t e d  in this wa y  was a c t u a l l y  sold in the 
capital city: eight per cent went to K ’u t ’aisi, a furt h e r
11.7 per cent to the t o w n s  of K h a s h u r i  and Sura m i ,  and 32 
per cent to villages in Samegrelo and Guria: 36.4 per cent,
it is true, went to the ports of Bat'umi and P'ot'i, but 
much of this was for export to Russia.1^
By no m e a n s  all win e  was t r a n s p o r t e d  by rail however. 
Considerable quantities were moved by carts and pack animals 
along the roads t hrough the m o u n t a i n  passes f r o m  R a t c h a -  
Lechkhumi and the north-eastern parts of Shorapani district 
to Surami to meet the requirements of the local population 
and the m i l i t a r y  g a r r i s o n .  K ’u t ' a i s i  d i s t r i c t  too 
maintained a steady trade with Akhaltsikhe across the Zekari 
pass. But the main buyers were the o w n e r s  of w i n e  s tores 
and shops in the towns and localities and the indigent wine 
merchants and speculators, who continued to tour the country
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buying up wine at depressed rates from indebted peasants in 
urgent need of money. In K'ut’aisi Gubernia, the arrival of 
the railway enabled many peasants to avoid having contacts 
with the c h a l a n d a r e b i , as they were k n o w n  in this part of 
the country, but in East Georgia, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
Kakhet'i, the sirajebi c o n t i n u e d  to s t r e n g t h e n  their hold 
over the wine trade.
As noted above, the railway missed out Kakhet'i and in 
so doing opened the way for competition from other parts of 
the Transcaucasus. Most notably, there was a big i n c r e a s e  
in the quantity of poor quality but cheap Azeri wine on the 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  market. Unable to rely on the d i s c e r n i n g  
palates of the local p o p u l a t i o n  the K a k h i a n  w i n e  i n d u s t r y  
suffered considerable damage. Despite the capacity of the 
p o p u l a t i o n  for c o n s u m p t i o n ,  the r e s u l t i n g  glut on the 
T'bilisi m a r k e t  caused a m a r k e d  fall in prices and ra i s e d  
the urgency of Georgian wine finding a wider export market.
Aided by the appearance of a number of large-scale wine 
enterprises using modern techniques owned by rich merchants 
and leading members of the Georgian aristocracy, as well as 
by the r a i l w a y , t h e  q u a n t i t y  of G e o r g i a n  w i n e  e x p o r t e d  
increased steadily, although the bulk of output continued to 
be c o n s u m e d  locally. Thus, b e t w e e n  1876 and 1880, 195,932 
puds of wine were taken by rail to Russia, whilst from 1891 
to 1894, 1,036,574 puds were exported, primarily to Moscow,
St. Petersburg, Stavropol, V l a d i k a v k a z  and O d e s s a . 1 By 
the end of the first decade of the 2 0 th century, by w h i c h  
time trade with Russia had been facilitated by the link-up 
of the Transcaucasian railway with the Russian network, over 
two m i l l i o n  puds of wine wer e  e x p o r t e d  to R u s s i a  every
Although it can be argued that the commercialisation of 
viticulture in Georgia worked primarily to the advantage of 
the larger producers, in that they were able to exploit the 
p o v e r t y  and land shortage of the peasantry, there can be 
little doubt that it also played an influential part in pr o­
m o t i n g  the e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  of the country. Not only 
were peasants increasingly reliant on the towns and various 
s c a t t e r e d  regions of Georgia, they were also d e v e l o p i n g  
closer ties with the Russian market.
O u t s i d e  of w i n e  and c e r e a l s  p r o d u c t i o n ,  the t w o  
foremost branches of Georgian agriculture in the late 19th 
century, there were c hanges in all other l eading areas. 
Thus, after the reform, livestock rearing showed a tendency 
to decline in areas where it was auxiliary to the main form 
of farming and to increase in areas where it already p r e d o m ­
inated. As a consequence, the e x i s t i n g  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  of 
Georgia's m o u n t a i n  regions and its plains and val l e y s  was 
further em p h a s i s e d ,  and the n u m e r o u s  district m a r k e t s  and 
stores assumed greater significance in the economic life of 
the rural population. Urban g r o w t h  expan d e d  d e m a n d  and 
T'bilisi alone was c o n s u m i n g  300,000 to 350,000 head of 
cattle per a n n u m  by the 1 8 8 0 s . I n  muc h  of West G e o r g i a  
the scarcity of livestock left the inhabitants almost wholly 
reliant on producers from the North Caucasus and from Akh-
i on
altsikhe and Akhalk'alak'i districts. w
Of the other t r a d i t i o n a l  o c c u p a t i o n s  s e r i c u l t u r e ,  
despite European competition, became amost entirely orien­
tated t o w a r d s  the market. In the 1880s 14,000 G e o r g i a n
peasant households were engaged in rearing silk cocoons and 
in the 1890s they marketed 40-60,000 puds of cocoons, their
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iny_ of 1 a n d , 1 ^  s o m e  60 per cent of the produce of w h i c h  was 
marketed, virtually all locally, whilst cotton, which for a 
while benefited from the effects of the American Civil War 
on U.S. output, declined when American competition revived 
in the 1880s.
The blow suffered by Georgian corn farmers in the last 
decade of the century proved to be not without its benefits, 
for as a consequence, m e a s u r e s  were u n d e r t a k e n  to d evelop 
crops for the most part unavailable elsewhere in the empire. 
Hence this period saw the b e g i n n i n g s  of the G e o r g i a n  tea 
industry and the first citrus fruit p l a n t a t i o n  in Atch a r a  
and Ap'khazet'i. Although their contribution to the economy 
was as yet small, they a t t r a c t e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n v e s t m e n t  
from the w e a l t h i e r  of Georgia's t'av a d a z n a u r e b i  and b o u r ­
geoisie.
Tobacco, already a l eading c o m m e r c i a l  crop in p r e ­
reform Georgia, was given a fillip by the establishment of a 
14 ruble per pud tariff on imported tobacco in 1877 and was 
producing four million rubles worth of produce by the turn
1 O  ”3
of the century. J
By 1900 annual income from agriculture had reached 75- 
80 m i l l i o n  rubles, by far the great e s t  part of w h i c h  was 
still produced by the peasantry using traditional equipment 
and methods, and plots so small and scattered that they were 
far from c o n d u c i v e  to the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of mor e  e f f i c i e n t  
t e c h n i q u e s . 70 per cent of the sown crops in Georgia was 
g r o w n  by peasants, 7 0 per cent of the fruit and w i n e  and 50 
per cent of the tobacco and cotton, whilst 80 per cent of 
the country's l i v estock was o w n e d  by p e a s a n t s . 125 Thus,
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although the traditional barriers to the integration of the 
country were being r apidly eroded, it is a pparent that the 
country still remained largely dependent on an impoverished 
peasantry using out-dated techniques for its food supply. A 
major factor in this, alluded to above, was that the reform 
left the vast bulk of the land in the hands of the t'avadaz- 
nauroba and the state. Under conditions in which there was
a heavy d e m a n d  for land, its price b e c a m e  so high that it 
b e c a m e  more p r o f i t a b l e  for the n o b i l i t y  to rent it out 
rather than attempt to farm it themselves and introduce more 
r ational methods. As a result, the peasantry, e x c l u d i n g  
rich peasants, was responsible for 65 per cent of the income
1 Of.
derived from a g r i c u l t u r e  in Georgia. A l t h o u g h  only 45
per cent of this was actually retained by the peasantry , 1 ^  
it is nevertheless a reflection of the degree of c o m m e r c i a l ­
isation of agriculture in West Georgia at least, that there, 
by 1904, 33,597 e x - sabatono households, or 58.8 per cent of 
the total, had m a n a g e d  to b e c o m e  private o w n e r s  of land 
without borrowing from the state.
Despite the backwardness of Georgian agriculture, the 
process of i n t e g r a t i o n  had by the end of the c e n t u r y  p r o ­
gressed to the point where the economic interdependence of 
the different parts of the country was virtually complete. 
Throughout Georgia towns were emerging as the focal points 
of local trade and industry, and coordinating district e c o n ­
omic activity. T'bilisi was the undisputed centre not just 
of G e o r g i a  but of the Transcaucasus. Besi d e s  T'bilisi, 
however, other towns like Bat'umi and K'ut'aisi were begin­
ning to assume the importance to the development of the West 
G e o r g i a n  e c o n o m y  that T'bilisi had had to East Ge orgia's
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both before and after the reforms. Once K ’u t ’aisi had been 
joined up to the r a i l w a y  in 1877, it began to justify its 
status as the gubernia centre. The roads emanating from the 
town wer e  all i m p r o v e d  and linked up to the main trading 
centres like Khoni, Oni, Lailashi, Chkhavi, Senaki and Bagh­
dadi, moulding West Georgia’s provinces into a close ec o n o m ­
ic unity of which it was the centre. Aside from these, the 
r a i l w a y  and a n u m b e r  of h i g h w a y s  e xtended e a s t w a r d s  to 
S u r a m i  and o n w a r d s  to Gori and T ’bilisi, and w e s t w a r d  to 
Samtredia, Bat'umi, Zugdidi and Sokhumi, whilst roads linked 
the gubernia town to Ratcha-Lechkhumi in the north, and via 
the Z e k a r i  pass, to A k h a l t s i k h e  in the s outh. O n l y  
Svanet'i, i solated in the most i n a c c e s s i b l e  part of the 
Caucasian mountains, remained out of reach for much of the 
year.
The K'ut'aisi bazaar is c r o w d e d  with people who 
cond uct their trade with goods brou ght in from 
villages hereabouts,
wrote a correspondent for the journal Kavkaz (The Caucasus)
in 1 8 6 0 . 3  ^ the end of the decade, as the status of the
t o w n ’s market grew, its annual trade turnover was exceeding
2.5 m i l l i o n  rubles and it was s e l l i n g  goods fro m  Europe,
1 3 nRussia and Turkey, as well as from all over Georgia. By
the 1 8 7 0 s 1 0 , 0 0 0  rubles worth of go ods we re being sold at
the bazaar and in the streets leading dow n  to the Ri ver
Rioni every d a y , 1 ^ 1 and by the turn of the century, 11
million rubles of cereals, wine, silk and tobacco goods were
13 2being brought every year to the K ’u t ’aisi market alone.
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Despite the peasant reforms, the overwhelming majority 
of usable land in G e o r g i a  r e m a i n e d  in the o w n e r s h i p  of 
either the t’avadaznauroba or the state treasury department. 
In 1883 the latter alone held 48.3 per cent of the available 
land in T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a  and 43.2 per cent in K ’u t ’aisi 
G u b e r n i a , 1^  w hilst in the 1890s 73.1 per cent of land in 
T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  and 86.3 per cent in K ’ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  
was used e ither by the state or the nobility. 1 ^  4 However, 
the area left to e x - s a b a t o n o  peasants, as was noted above, 
was reduced.
Wh i l s t  little new land was made a v a i l a b l e  to the 
p e a s a n t r y  d uring the last 30 years of the 19th century, 
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  c o n t i n u e d  to benefit from the r e l a t i v e  
stability brought to the Transcaucasus by Russian rule, with 
the total p o p u l a t i o n  of Geo r g i a  rising fro m 1,351,000 in 
1865 to almost two million in 1897, and over two million if 
one w a s  to i n c l u d e  the d i s t r i c t s  of Z a k ' a t ' a l a  and 
Artvin,1^^ an increase of 38.5 per cent.1^
Table 13: The Population of Georgia 1865-1897
1865
1886
1897
East Georgia
651,000 
808, 143 
966,808
West Georgia
700,000 
870,872 
1 ,0 0 2 , 101
Total 
1,351 , 0 0 0  
1 ,679,015137 
1 ,968, 909
As a direct consequence, the a verage q u a n t i t y  of land 
ava i l a b l e  to each peasant h o u s e h o l d  g r a d u a l l y  sh r a n k  and 
competition to acquire it rose substantially. But the pres­
sure of the p o p u l a t i o n  on the land, p a r t i c u l a r l y  acute in 
K'ut’aisi Gubernia, where mountainous terrain made much of
the t e r ritory unfit for f a r m i n g  of any sort, was by no m e a n s  
the only problem facing the peasantry. Although the average 
area of land a f f o r d e d  to state p e a s a n t s  in Geo r g i a  in 1884 
was at 4.3 desyatiny per household in K'ut'aisi Gubernia and 
17.67 d e ^ a  ;t i_n y per h o u s e h o l d  in T ’bilisi Gubernia, 
rather hi g h e r  than a m o n g  t e m p o r a r i l y  o b l i g a t e d  peasants, 
much of this was in fact unusable. It included not just 
o r c h a r d s  and arable land, but pastures, forests, s h r u b l a n d  
and even outcrops of rock. If one takes into account arable 
and o rchard land alone, the a v e r a g e  per h o u s e h o l d  was 2 . 2 7  
d e s y_a t^ny in K ’u t ’aisi Gu b e r n i a  and 5.66 d e£y_a_t _i ny i n 
T ’bilisi G u b e r n i a ,1^  still more than that of e x - s a b a t o n o  
peasants but rather less impressive than the overall figures 
w o u l d  suggest. Moreover, the e q u i v a l e n t  figures for 1903 
i n d i c a t e  tha t  the s i t u a t i o n  w a s  b e c o m i n g  w o r s e .  In 
K'ut'aisi G u b e r n i a  the average area of arable land per 
h o u s e h o l d  had fallen to 1.90 d e £y_a t_ i^ n y_, and in T'bilisi 
Guber n i a  to 10.92 d e £ y_a t. in y . 1 ** 0 More important, h o w e v e r ,  
was the distribution of land among the peasantry.
After the peasant r e f o r m s  of 1864-71 ex-
,sabat_ono and s t a t e  p e a s a n t s  a l i k e ,  f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  
in c r e a s i n g l y  d e p e n d e n t  on the s i^ r a j_£b ^ , £ £ £ h £ h £ £ b
(usurers) and merchants as the need to market their produce 
a c q u i r e d  g r e a t e r  urgency. Equally, the m a j o r i t y  of them, 
barely able to survive even after a good harv est once they 
had paid their taxes and covered their costs, found that in 
the event of a poor harvest they had no one else to turn to 
for financial assistance. The liberal intelligentsia, it is 
true, did succeed in i n t r o d u c i n g  a n u m b e r  of c o m m e r c i a l  
societies and savings cooperatives designed to protect the
peasants' interests and e n c o u r a g e d  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of
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publ ic g r a i n  stores in the villa g e s  to a l l e v i a t e  the worst 
effects of bad harvest y e a r s , b u t  were unable to do more 
than s c r a t c h  at the s urface of the problem. In S i g h n a g h i  
and T'elavi districts, where d uring the 1890s over one 
million rubles of loans were given to the peasantry by money 
lenders, one observer, c o n d u c t i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  s p o n s o r e d  
research in the area, wrote that,
Among the peasants, selling one's entire property 
to meet a debt, or g i v i n g  a w a y  one's c h i l d r e n  to 
m evakhsheebi as domestic servants in order to pay 
off one's debts... h a v e  b e c o m e  s u c h  e v e r y d a y  
events that no one here pays any a t t e n t i o n  any- 
m o r e . 143 •
In these circumstances the bulk of the peasants, w h a t ­
ever category they belonged to, found themselves increasing­
ly impoverished, whilst the richer peasants, who frequently 
included money-lending among their activities, were able to 
a c c u m u l a t e  land. Unable to secure credit fro m  any other 
source, it appears that the poorer peasants were prepared to
accept interest rates fr om 80 to 1 2 0 per cent, wit h  the
inevitable result that they found themselves ensnared in a 
state of permanent debt. Unable to escape they were forced 
to sell their land at l u d i c r o u s l y  low prices. Thus A. 
Argutinskii, d e s c r i b i n g  the e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n  of st ate 
peasants in the K akhian village of Akhasheni, n o t e d  that 
land valued at 600 rubles per desjat ina was being sold for 
a n y t h i n g  b e t w e e n  40 and 80 rubles A w r i t e r  for the
a g r i c u l t u r a l  journal MosavajLi (The Harvest) d e s c r i b e d  the 
modus operandi of the money-lender as follows:
Poverty and need visit us all at one time or
another, but call rather mor e  f r e q u e n t l y  on the
village peasant. We can boldly state that 95 out 
of every 100 faces difficulties. Unable to help
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himself, he turns r e l u c t a n t l y  to the vill age 
money-lender. Now what kind of money-lender would 
the latter be if he didn't make the most of his 
oppor tunity. At first he d e l i b e r a t e l y  refuses, 
c l a i m i n g  that he has no money. He prete n d s  to 
s y m p a t h i s e ,  but offers no assistance. However, 
once the applicant has pleaded enough and promises 
to pay good interest, the m o n e y - l e n d e r  s uddenly 
softens and g ives him a loan at an e x h o r b i t a n t  
r a t e . 145
Because of the short a g e  of land and the fact that so 
few o w n e d  any cattle, the m a j o r i t y  found t h e m s e l v e s
dependent on a few wealthy individuals. Moreover, with land 
in such demand, those f o r t u n a t e  enough to have a surplus 
were able to lease both it and their wor k  a n i m a l s  at great 
p r o f i t . 1^  Even in T'bilisi Gu bernia, w h e r e  the p r i n c i p l e  
of periodical redistribution of the land was supposedly at 
its strongest, particularly among state peasants, it emerges 
that not only was there i n e q u a l i t y  w i t h i n  v i l l a g e s  w h e r e  
s t a t e  p e a s a n t s  w e r e  s e t t l e d ,  but a l s o  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  
villages. Thus w h i l s t  11 had no land at all, 120 had over
I  A Q
50 desyatiny per household.
Table 14: The Distribution of Land Among Villages Inhabited
by State Peasants in T*bilisi Gubernia *
Total No. Villages Without Villages Possessing Plots 
of Villages Land-Plots of Land
Up to 5-10 10-16 16-25 25-50 Over 
5 des des des des des 50 des
11 213 193 123 120 152 120
1.18 22.85 20.70 13.19 12.87 16.30 12.87
932
N o . of 
Villages
% of
Villages
A c c o r d i n g  to A rgu t i n sk i i' s report of 1 8 8 6  mos t state 
peasant h o u s e h o l d s  in Kakhet'i had only three desyat iny of 
o r c h a r d s  and arable land which, since one third of it lay
f a l l o w  at any one time, was i n s u f f i c i e n t  to pro v i d e  for a 
household's n e e d s . In Akhalk'alak'i district, the situa­
tion of the p e a s a n t r y  in 1 895 was such that of the 11 state 
v i l l a g e  c o m m u n i t i e s  c o m p r i s i n g  the district, only one was 
not in debt and it was c o m p o s e d  of colonists. On a verage 
each h o u s e h o l d  owe d  170 rubles, for wh ich they paid 34  
rubles interest per annum, or 1 5 0 per cent of the c o m b i n e d  
total of state saerobo (rural government) and sat’emo (com­
munity) taxes . 1 ^ 1 (See Table on page 173.)
Migration in search of employment or land had become a 
popular s o l u t i o n  to land s h o r t a g e  prior to the 1860s, but 
now, as a consequence of the concentration of land in fewer 
and fewer hands, the growing number of landless peasants and 
mounting debts, it acquired an unprecedented urgency. M o r e ­
over, since e x - sabatono peasa n t s  had now a c q u i r e d  their 
personal freedom, the obstacles to movement were no longer 
so great. For many, though, the greatest stimulus to m i g r a ­
tion was the advent of rail travel, a development which not 
only furthered the economic expansion of Georgia, but also 
contributed to bringing the country closer together insofar 
as even those living at o p p o s i t e  e x t r e m e s  of the c o u n t r y  
were now hardly more than a day's journey apart. T'bilisi, 
the hub of the nation, b e c a m e  sudde n l y  m o r e  a c c e s s i b l e  and 
more real for the more dist ant m e m b e r s  of the p o p ulation, 
w h ile in the o u t l y i n g  d i s t r i c t s  even the s p e c t a c l e  of the 
train d i s a p p e a r i n g  and r e t u r n i n g  along the line was a c o n ­
stant reminder of a wo.rld outside the villager's immediate 
experience. In his mind, it n o w  b e c a m e  a little e a s i e r  to 
conceptualise the country of which he was an inhabitant.
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Table 15:
The Area of Land in Use by State P e a s a n t s  in K'ut'aisi 
Gubernia in the m i d - 1 8 8 0 s 1^2
Number of Peasant 
Households
Percentage of 
Peasant Households
Landless
Up to one desyat ina 
1 - 2  desyatiny
2-3 desyat iny
3-4 desyatiny
4-5 desyatiny
5 - 6  desyatiny
6-7 desyat iny
7 - 8  desyatiny
8-9 desyat iny
9 - 1 0  desyatiny
1 0 - 2 0  desyat iny
20-154.50 
desyatiny
398
2142
4427
4016
3368
1955
1441
865
602
445
283
834
221
1 .90 
1 0 . 20 
21.09 
1 9 . 1 2  
16.04 
9.31 
6.86
4.12 
2.87
2 . 1 2  
1.35 
3.97
1 .05
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A l t h o u g h  the peasant r e f o r m s  relea s e d  the flow of 
labour required by the country's still nascent industry for 
its expansion, the period up to the middle of the 1880s did 
not witness any dramatic increase in the urban population at 
the expense of the rural. In East Georgia, Gori and T'elavi 
recorded notable percentage increases, but from relatively 
low n u m e r i c a l  bases, w h i l e  T'bilisi's p o p u l a t i o n  r e a c h e d  
78,445 in 1886, only 15.7 per cent up on its 1865 level (see 
table on page 175). In West Georgia the picture was rather 
different. Here the i mpact of the r a i l w a y  on the econo m y ,  
the e m e r g e n c e  of Bat'umi as the country's most i m p o r t a n t  
port and K'ut'aisi's growing stature as the Gubernia centre 
were all important factors in the 206.7 per cent increase in 
the urban population, However, i m p r e s s i v e  t hough this 
figure may be, it conceals the fact that even m o r e  than in 
East Georgia, the urban population was starting from a very 
low base.
In East Georgia the rural population actually increased 
marginally faster at 23 per cent than did the urban popula­
tion, and although in West Georgia urban growth was b e gin­
ning to draw the peasantry from the villages, the rural po p ­
ulation still increased by 23.3 per cent in this period.
At this stage in their d e v e l o p m e n t ,  it a p p e a r s  that 
Georgia's t o w n s  were not able to a bsorb the l abour n o w  at 
their disposal. Short of c apital and depri v e d  of a s u f f i ­
ciently large workforce before the reforms, industry, even 
in T'bilisi, was not able to change gear overnight. Crafts 
manufacture and small-scale enterprises, which rarely e m ­
ployed more than 10 workers, continued to predominate up to 
the mid-1880s. T'elavi, East Georgia's third t o w n  a f t e r
T'bilisi and Akhaltsikhe, was a typical case. A l t h o u g h  it
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was e x p a n d i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  rapidly thanks to its f a v o u r a b l e  
location as a trading centre in the country’s foremost viti- 
cultural area, it was not until 1 9 0 0 that the first indust­
rial factory o r g a n i s e d  along c a p i t a l i s t  lines was e s t a b ­
lished in the town.1^
Perhaps of equal significance, however, was that as 
yet, in the a f t e r m a t h  of the reforms, most peasants still 
clung to the hope of p u r c h a s i n g  their own land. Thus, 
w h ilst many might have been prepa r e d  to seek s e a s o n a l  
labour, few were ready to sever links with the country 
entirely.
Table 16: The Population of Georgian Towns 1886- 18971^5
T 'bilisi Town Percentage Town Percentage
Gubernia Population 
in 1886
Growth 
Since 1865
Population 
in 1897
Growth 
Since 1886
T ' bilisi 78,445 15.7 159,590 1 03
A k halk’a l a k 'i 4,303 89.0 5,440 25.5
Akhalksikhe 16,116 38.8 15,357 -
D ushet1i 2,027 - 2,566 27
Gori 7,243 43.8 10,269 42
Shulaveri - - 4,553 -
Sighnaghi 10,604 9.4 8,994 -
T 1 elavi 11,214 53.6 13,929 24.6
TOTAL 129,952 22.4 220,698 69.8
K ’u t ’aisi Town Percentage Town Percentage
Gubernia Population 
in 1886
Growt h 
Since 1865
Population 
in 1897
Growth 
Since 1886
K ’u t 'aisi 22,643 91.8 32,476 43.5
Akhali Senaki - - 1 ,248 -
B a t ’umi 14,803 - 28,508 92.5
Oni - - 1 ,255 -
Ozur g e t ’i 1 ,472 - 4,710 215.8
P 'o t 'i 4,709 261.5 7,346 56. 1
Qv irila - - 2 , 0 1 0 -
Sokhumi 412 - 7,998 1839.0
Zugdidi 1 ,078 - 3,407 232. 9
TOTAL 45,117 206.7 88,958 97.2
ALL GEORGIA 175,069 44.7 309,656 76.8
Nevertheless, although lew peasants settled permanently 
awa y  f r o m  their h o m e s  the e c o n o m i c  i m p e r a t i v e  of poverty 
gradually forced them to accept the need for mobility. This 
did not n e c e s s a r i l y  mean m o v i n g  to a town. Such was the 
c o m p e t i t i o n  for land that m a n y  peasants wer e  c o m p e l l e d  to 
rent it from a n u m b e r  of dif f e r e n t  sources and to accept 
plots that could be located well a w a y  from their villages. 
Bakhtadze, describing the economic life of state peasants in 
Shorapani distr i c t  in the m i d -1880s, noted that man y  had 
taken to renting land in the relatively uncrowded district 
of Gori, some 35 m i les a w a y . 1^  F a m i l i e s  who w e r e  able to 
would send one of their n u m b e r  a w a y  to wor k the land, but 
when, as was often the case, there were not e n ough adult 
males in the family, the entire household would move. M i ­
gration of this sort was particularly common among Osian and 
Ge o r g i a n  h i g h l a n d e r s  fro m  P 1s h a v - T 'u s h e t !i, many of w h o m  
sought to rent land as khiznebi in Gori district. Initial­
ly, landlords in the area were happy to accept them on this 
basis, but as the competition for land in surrounding parts 
of the country spilled over into the district, m a n y  sought 
to revoke their a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  the peasa n t s  and to force 
the acceptance of short-term contracts.^ 7  inevitably this 
both further soured peasant-aznauroba relations and exacer­
bated the economic position of the peasantry.
How ever, wh i l s t  the first 20 years af ter the r e f o r m s  
emerge as a period of undramatic change and development, the 
1 890s stand out as a decade in w h i c h  a n u m b e r  of p r o c e s s e s  
a l r e a d y  present in the p r e c e d i n g  period s u d d e n l y  i n t e n s i ­
fied, and as a period in w h i c h  the i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  of t o w n  
and country, district and district b e c a m e  f i r m l y  e s t a b ­
lished.
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last years of the 19th century was the sudden growth in the 
urban population, most particularly in East Georgia, where 
by 1897 159,590 people lived in T ’bilisi alone, a l m o s t
double the n u m b e r  in 1 8 8 6 . In large part due to the 
dominant role played by the capital city in the economic and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  life of the gubernia, 2 2 . 8  per cent of its 
population was urban by 1897.
In We st G e o r g i a  the picture was s o m e w h a t  different,
for, despite the development of K'ut’aisi and Bat'umi, only
8 . 8  per cen t  of the p o p u l a t i o n  c o u l d  be d e s c r i b e d  as
u r b a n 1 ^ 0 and 1 1 . 7  per cent of these lived in v i l l a g e s  of
1^1
under 5,000 inhabitants. However, if one takes the
p o p u l a t i o n  of Geo r g i a  at this t i m e  as a whole, it e m e r g e s
that 1 5 . 7 2  per cent of it was urbanised, rather higher, in
fact, than the a verage for the Empire's Russian gubernii,
1 p
which stood at 12.76 per cent at the time of the census.
Although immigration from outwith Georgia and natural 
incre a s e  w i t h i n  the t o w n s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  fac t o r s  in the
71.7 per cent increase in the urban p o p u l a t i o n  in these 
y e a r s , a  major role was also played by immigration from 
the rural areas of the country. Thanks to the 1897 census 
i n f o r m a t i o n  on the place of birth of the empire's i n h a b i ­
t a n t s ,  it is p o s s i b l e  to g a i n  an a c c u r a t e  p i c t u r e  of 
migration processes in the late 19th century. It is clear, 
for instance, that in T'bilisi Gubernia that even though 52 
per cent of the urban p o p u l a t i o n  in 1 897 was a c t u a l l y  born 
in the t o w n s , 14.4 per cent i m m i g r a t e d  fro m  T'bilisi 
G u b e r n i a  and a f urther 5.3 per cent from K'ut'aisi G u b e r -  
n i a . ^ 5  20,832 immigrants in the 16-40 age group moved from 
K'ut'aisi Gu b e r n i a  to T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  and only 5,348 in
the o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n , 1^  r e f l e c t i n g  both East G e o r g i a ’s 
greater urban development and the land shortage in the West 
of the country. Of rather g r e a t e r  significance, howev e r ,  
was the level of m i g r a t i o n  w i t h i n  the gubernii. This, of 
course, was n o t h i n g  n e w  in East Georgia, but for K ’ut'aisi 
Gubernia, w h ere in the past most m i g r a n t s  had g r a d u a t e d  
t o w a r d s  the t o w n s  and less c r o w d e d  c o u n t r y s i d e  of K'art'l- 
Kakhet'i, it was a major change. 41.2 per cent of the urban 
p o p u l a t i o n  of K' ut’aisi G u b e r n i a  m o ved from w i t h i n  the 
gubernia and only 2 2 . 8 per cent were born in the towns.1^
Central to this process were the e m e r g e n c e  of big 
industries in the main towns and the steady concentration of 
commercial activity, which in turn had been the product of a 
number of developments within Georgia since the 1860s. One 
of these, a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  above, was the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of 
the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  railway, w h i c h  not only did m u c h  to 
further the flo w  of goods and people b e t w e e n  the v a r i o u s  
parts of the country, but also c o n t r i b u t e d  e n o r m o u s l y  to 
Bat'umi's emergence as Georgia’s second industrial centre by 
linking it up with the Caspian Sea oil city of Baku.1^® The 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the r a i l w a y  itself, mor eover, led to the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a n u m b e r  of n e w  i n d u s t r i a l  branches, and 
through its auxiliary enterprises, workshops and depots the 
railway became the single largest employer by the end of the 
century.169
Also important, however, wer e  the changes m a d e  to the 
s t r u c t u r e  of urban e c o n o m i c  life and the a p p e a r a n c e  of 
several banking organisations prepared to provide the credit 
needed for the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of G e o r g i a ’s p r e d o m i n a n t l y  
s m a l l - s c a l e  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n t o  l a r g e - s c a l e  c a p i t a l i s t
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concerns. Prior to the 1860s the guild s t r u c t u r e  in the 
towns, and particularly in T ’bilisi, imposed so many regula­
tions on the n u m b e r  of a p p r e n t i c e s  and j o u r n e y m e n  that 
c r a f t s m e n  could employ, the m a x i m u m  w o r k i n g  day, and the 
n u m b e r  of r e s t - d a y s  and f e s t i v a l s  that ha d  to be o b ­
served , ^ 0 that it had become a major obstacle to the coun­
try's e c o n o m i c  progress. However, the guilds or a m k ’rebi 
suffered a major setback in 1865 when the antagonism between 
t h e m s e l v e s  and the city's larger b u s i n e s s e s  led to the 
latter e n c o u r a g i n g  the g o v e r n m e n t  to make up the city's 
fin a n c i a l  deficit by i m p o s i n g  n e w  taxes on the city's 
craftsmen, and on the markets, coffee houses and restaurants 
traditionally used by t h e m . ^ 1 Bloody riots ensued in June 
w h i c h  u l t i m a t e l y  pr o v i d e d  the g o v e r n m e n t  wi th the p retext 
for s t r e a m l i n i n g  the local guild str u c t u r e  a l ong R u s s i a n  
lines and d r a s t i c a l l y  c u r t a i l i n g  its powers. Thus freed 
from the i n t e r f e r e n c e  of the old city p a t r i archate, n e w  
businesses were able to develop relatively unimpeded.
Although official policy continued to view Georgia and 
the.rest of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  as a c olonial outpost, w h o s e  
prime purpose was to consume Russian manufactured products 
and supply the e m p i r e  with r a w  materials, i n d u s t r y  did, 
nevertheless, make some advances, encouraged in part by the 
g r o w i n g  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of ban k i n g  credit. Thus in 1866, a 
department of the State Bank opened offices in T'bilisi, in 
1871 the capital's f o r e m o s t  m e r c h a n t s  and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  
founded the T'bilisi C o m m e r c i a l  Bank, in 1873 the M u t u a l  
Creditors Society opened, in 187 4 the T'bilisi Nobility Bank 
and in 1 875 the K'ut'aisi No b i l i t y  Bank, and t h r o u g h o u t  the 
remainder of the century the number of institutions offering 
credit st e a d i l y  increased o p e n i n g  in Bat'umi, K'ut'aisi,
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P ’o t ’i and Tchiat'ura. W h ile in 1874 the T'bilisi C o m m e r ­
cial Bank loaned only 1.4 m i l l i o n  rubles, by 1896 it was
17 2able to loan 16 million and to open an office in Bat'umi. 1 
It- was against this background that Georgian industry 
began to expand in the late 1880s and 1 890s. W h e r e a s  
previously industrial expansion had been achieved primarily 
through the t e n d e n c y  of crafts pro d u c e r s  to change over to 
commodity production and through the growth of small-scale 
e n t e r p r i s e s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a l i m i t e d  divis i o n  of labour 
and predominance of manual techniques, now machine produc­
tion began to break into virtually all the main branches of 
industry, leading through the 1890s to a gradual decline in 
the re l a t i v e  i m p o r t a n c e  of m a n u f a c t u r i n g  and s m a l l - s c a l e  
capitalist production. By 1900 factory production occupied 
the m a j o r i t y  of Georgia's w o r k e r s  and was r e s p o n s i b l e  for 
the gr e a t e s t  part of the country's i n d u s t r i a l  output, 
although, as in the past, light indu s t r i e s  such as silk 
weaving, tobacco and food processing, breweries, shoes and 
clothes manufacture predominated (see table below). While 
these were p r e d o m i n a n t l y  loca ted in and around T'bilisi, 
Bat'umi was, n e vertheless, rap i d l y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i tself as 
Georgia's second most important industrial centre. By 1900 
there were over 10 factories in the town e m p l o y i n g  over 
3,500 w o r k e r s  to ma ke tin d r u m s  and wo o d e n  c rates for the 
export of B a k u ’s oil abroad, 1 ^  as well as a n u m b e r  of saw 
mills, brick factories, m a c h i n e  tool and boiler w o r k s h o p s  
and the ubiquitous artisan's businesses.
Table 17: Industry in Georgia in 1900',u
Small-Scale Enterprises
B r a n c h e s
of
I n d u s t r y
Bakeries 
Brick and 
Tiles 
Carriages 
Cheese 
Chemical 
(Paints)
Confect ion- 
aries 
Felt 
Glass
Gut Manufac­
ture 
Joinery and 
Veneer 
Leather 
Tanneries 
Marble Works 
Matches 
Mechanised 
Mills 
Metal Working 
Mineral Water 
Mineral Water 
Export 
Polygraphics 
Saw Mills 
Shoes 
Silk
Soap and 
Candles 
Spirits, Araqi, 
Cognac, Beer 
Tin Drums and 
Crates 
Tobacco
Transcaucasian 
Railways Main 
Workshops 
Weaving and 
Cotton 
Wooden Barrels 
Wool Rinsing
No. of No. of
Enterprises Workers
149
300
12
33
40
29
40
85
20
12
750
519
1 900 
84
26
270
160
151
280
500
78
45
3000
12
Value of 
Production 
( 1 0 0 0 s of 
rubles)
764 ,0
600,0
105,0
74,0
185,0
1 0 0 , 0
125,0
1 9 0 , 0  
2 9 0 , 0  
81 , 0
200,0 
630 , 0
25,0
TOTAL 1482 7046 3,386,0
Industry in Georgia in 19001^^
B r a n c h e s
of
I n d u s t r y
Bakeries 
Brick and 
Tiles 
Carriages 
Cheese 
Chemi cal 
(Paints ) 
Confection­
aries 
Felt 
G l a s s -
Gut Manufac­
ture 
Joinery and 
Veneer 
Leather 
Tanneries 
Marble Works 
Matches 
Mechanised 
Mills 
Metal Working 
Mineral Water 
Mineral Water 
Export 
Polygraphic s 
Saw Mills 
Shoes 
Silk
Soap and 
Candles 
Spirits, Araqi, 
Cognac, Beer 
Tin Drums and 
Crates 
Tobacco
Transcaucasian 
Railways Main 
Workshops 
Weaving and 
Cotton 
Wooden Barrels 
Wool Rinsing
TOTAL
Manuf acture
No. of No. of Value of
Enterprises Workers Production
( 1 0 0 0 s 
r ubles)
3 69 6 6 , 0
5 . 75 150,0
2 31 40,0
5 80 85,0
6 94 56,0
3 42 85,0
1 68 67,0
2 166 96,0
2 53 46,0
41
184 269,0
984 1,200,0
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B r a n c h e s
of
I n d u s t r y
Bakeries 
Brick and 
Tiles 
Carriages 
Cheese 
Chemical 
(Paints) 
Confection­
aries 
Felt 
Glass
Gut Manufac­
ture 
Joinery and 
Veneer 
Leather 
Tanneries 
Marble Works 
Matches 
Mechanised 
Mills 
Metal Working 
Mineral Water 
Mineral Water 
Export 
Polygraphics 
Saw Mills 
Shoes 
Silk
Soap and 
Candles 
Spirits, Araqi, 
Cognac, Beer 
Tin Drums and 
Crates 
Tobacco
Transcaucasian 
Railways Main 
Workshops 
Weaving and 
Cotton 
Wooden Barrels 
Wool Rinsing
TOTAL
Factory Production
N o . o f  N o . o f  Value of
Enterprises Workers Production
( 1 0 0 0 s
rubles)
A 10A 96,0
1 2 A 38,0
1 12 90,0
1 170 325,0
2 1A5 172,0
1 10 50,0
2 300 880,0
1 35 36,0
1 150 83,0
1 25 36,0
A 30 A 316,0
1 A 2 200,0
8 AA2 382,0
1 1 363 1 ,2A9,7
1 A2A 553,0
3 95 5 0 0 , 0
3 102 1,174,0
5 2 0 A 0 7 ,388,5
7 1218 2,119,8
1 2265 ?
1 A60 530,0
1 5 0 31,0
6 A 900A 16,513,0
T h r o u g h o u t  G e o r g i a  the n u m b e r  of e n t e r p r i s e s  a l m o s t  
q u a d r u p l e d  to 1,597 b e t w e e n  1886 and 1900, w h i l e  the value 
of i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t  r o s e  f r o m  8 , 2 8 0 , 2 0 0  r u b l e s  to 
21 ,099,000 in 1 9 0 0 . Seen in terms of value of output per
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head of the population, this c o n s t i t u t e d  a rise fro m  4.8 
rubles in 1886 to 10 rubles in 1 9 0 0 . ^ ^
The c o i n c i d e n c e  of i n d ustrial e x p ansion w i t h  the 
appearance of growing numbers of landless and impoverished 
peasants does much to explain the sudden growth of the urban 
population at the close of the century, but the most signi­
ficant development in Georgia's economy during this period, 
and one which partly explains the decline in the tendency of 
West G e o r g i a n  peasants to move e a s t w a r d s  to T'bilisi 
Gubernia and the growing numbers migrating within K'ut'aisi 
Gubernia, was the e m e r g e n c e  of Georgia, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  
West Georgia, as a mining centre of world significance.
Aside from some r e l a t i v e l y  m i n o r  su c c e s s e s  in cop p e r  
and oil mining in East Georgia, the most remarkable advances 
w e r e  m a d e  in c o a l  and m a n g a n e s e  m i n i n g  in K ' u t ' a i s i  
Gubernia. The discovery of rich coal deposits near Tqibuli 
in K'ut'aisi district aroused hopes that it could be tr ans­
formed into a major centre, but the problem of transporting 
the coal once it had been e x t r a c t e d  in h i b i t e d  invest ors. 
Moreover, even after the completion of the K'ut'aisi-Tqibuli 
line in 1887, lack of capital continued to present problems. 
Nevertheless, from a starting point of 175,000 puds in 1870, 
output rose to 380,000 puds in 1880, to 600,000 in 1890 and 
to 3,857,000 in 1900.1^  Coal extraction, ho w e v e r ,  paled 
into i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  besides the m a n g a n e s e  industry. The 
G e o r g i a n  poet and publicist, Akaki Dserete'li, w h o  first
d i s c o v e r e d  the shavi k'va or black rock in T c h i a t ' u na— Ln-
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1 8 7 8 , failed in his initial attempts to attract local capi­
tal and turned instead to Russia and W e s t e r n  Europe. Once 
local business men and l a n d o w n e r s  r ealised the pot e n t i a l  
profit to be gained, ho w e v e r ,  they began to offer serious 
resistance to foreign investors. Rather than in v e s t , t h e m ­
selves though, the majority sought to exploit the ore depo- 
sits with a minimum of input. Consequently, efficient and 
large-scale mining methods were not introduced to Tchiat'ura 
until the 1890s. Ilia T c h a v a t c h a v a d z e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  
bemoaned the petty-mindedness that was frustrating the pro­
gress of Georgia's potentially most precious asset. Writing 
for the n e w s p a p e r  Iver ia in 1886, he a c c u s e d  G e o r g i a n s  of 
building golden towers and moving mountains in their dreams 
but of s t a n d i n g  idle wh en it c a m e  to t aking ac t i o n  and 
argued that envy, enmity, p e t t y - m i n d e d n e s s  and g r o u n d l e s s  
self-esteem were at the root of the country's problems.
People are only concerned with making sure others 
don't get a n y t h i n g  [he wrote], and in this way 
p r o v i d i n g  for themselves. E v e r y o n e  is try i n g  to 
a p p r o p r i a t e  as l a r g e  a plo t  for h i m s e l f  as 
possible, to grab a large piece and leave everyone 
else empty - h a n d e d .  In a word, envy, e n m i t y  and 
petty-mindedness have brought the manganese busi­
ness to such a pass that the black rock really has 
a l m o s t  turned the p roducer himself, the o w n e r  of 
the ore and his w o r k e r  int o  'b l a c k  r o c k  and 
a shes ' . 1
Gr adually, however, the i n d u s t r y  was placed on a m o r e  
rational basis and by 1900 Georgia was supplying 50 per cent 
of the world's manganese exports. ^ 9
If one includes w o r k e r s  used as bearers, as well as 
faqe workers, the Tchiat'ura mines were employing over 6,000 
by 1 900. Add to this the s u b s t a n t i a l  n u m b e r  who must have 
been engaged in the Tqibuli coal mines and it is clear that 
t o g e t h e r  t h e y  a b s o r b e d  m u c h  of K ' u t ' a i s i  G u b e r n i a ' s
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T a b l e  18: M a n g a n e s e  M i n i n g  in G e o r g i a  1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 0 1® 0
Year No. of Miners Annual Output
in 1000s of Puds
Annual Exports 
in 1000s of Puds
1890
1894
1899
1900
2605 
2 186 
3250 
370 1
10,468, 1
1 1,0 1 2 , 0  
34, 131 , 0
40,363,4
8.400.4
9.599.5
25,073,4 
28,698,3
1 R 1itinerant labour.
This, therefore, and the e x p a n s i o n  of in d u s t r y  in 
Bat'umi and K ’ut'aisi m a kes clear why, despite the m a r k e d  
incease in the number of peasants leaving the land in search 
of employment in the last quarter of the century, there was 
a c t u a l l y  a decl i n e  in the p e r c e n t a g e  wh o  m o ved to the east 
of the country. It is also, of course, a further i n d i c a t o r  
of the extent to which national integration had progressed 
by the end of the century.
Unlike in the pre-reform period, industry's demand for 
labour was now easily met; conditions in the countryside 
continued to deteriorate, the average area of land available 
to each peas ant h o u s e h o l d  was c o n s t a n t l y  s h r i n k i n g 1®^ and 
the process of social differentiation within the peasantry 
had become more pronounced. Moreover, the tendency towards 
specialisation, detailed above, left many peasants vulner­
able to the vicissitudes of both the market and the weather. 
In areas like Kakhet'i, for instance, w h e r e  the p e a s a n t r y  
lived in constant fear that winter hail storms would destroy 
their vineyards, one bad harvest could ruin a household and 
place it in absolute dependence on the money-lending c o m m u n ­
ity.”' ^  Nothing illustrated the vulnerability of the pe a ­
santry more than the vine d i s e a s e s  of the 1 870s and 1880s.
Those who were dependent on m a r k e t i n g  their win e  s u d d e n l y
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found t h e m s e l v e s  with v i r t u a l l y  n o t h i n g  to sell and left 
with no choice but to work for someone else or seek employ­
ment in the towns.
Land shortage, too, forced the p e a s a n t r y  into over 
intensive cultivation of the soil. Argutinskii's report on 
Kakhet'i in 1886, for exa mple, notes that even in the 
n a t u r a l l y  fertile c o n d i t i o n s  of the Alazani valley, the 
peasants wer e  only a c h i e v i n g  m o d e r a t e  harvests. He c o n ­
cluded that the root cause of this was that the soil had 
been exhausted by the intensive cultivation it had been sub­
j e c t e d  to by p e a s a n t s  d e s p e r a t e  to m a k e  a l i v i n g . 1 
W r i t i n g  for the journal Iveria in 1905, N. M a r r  m a d e  the 
same point wh en a n a l y s i n g  the cause of r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
upheavals in Guria that year:
The cause of the Gurians dissatisfaction is their 
s h o r t a g e  of land. Lack of land is a serious c o n ­
cern not just for the peasant in Guria, but for 
the aznauri as well... Arable land is in short 
supply and its o w n e r  is unab le to let his land lie 
fallow. The o r c h a r d s  have been t r a n s f o r m e d  into 
fields... and one cannot talk of f e r t i l i s i n g  the 
e x h a u s t e d  l a n d  s i n c e  t h e y  s c a r c e l y  h a v e  any 
d o m e s t i c  cattle in the villa g e s  - the G u r i a n s  
(because of the land shortage) are unable to keep 
t h e m . 186
It is against this background that migration became so 
w i d e s p r e a d  a f eature of G e o r g i a n  rural life at the end of 
the century. The c o n t e m p o r a r y  press was full of d e s c r i p ­
t i o n s  of the p r o b l e m .  IC_o _11c hi_i a_ ( C o l c h i s )  d e s c r i b e d  
m i g r a t i o n  to the t o wns as "an e x c e p t i o n a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  
phenomenon", whilst t.he minutes of a discussion of rural 
government organisation by the K ’ut'aisi Gubernia office in 
1909 note that,
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As a result of land shortage and the m o u n t a i n o u s  
terr a i n  c o v e r i n g  muc h  of this gubernia, so d i s ­
a d v a n t a g e o u s  to the d e v e l o p m e n t  of agriculture, 
its p o p u l a t i o n  is resig n e d  to an i t i nerant l i f e ­
style in search of a living. A l m o s t  the entire 
w o r k i n g  a b l e - b o d i e d  p o p u l a t i o n  of S v a n e t ' i  , 
Ratcha, L e c h k h u m i ,  Guria, S a m e g r e l o  and Upper 
Imeret'i spends the g r e a t e r  part of the year not 
just far a w a y  fro m their villages, but often b e ­
yond the boundaries of the gubernia as well.1®®
In 1867, 7,042 passports wer e  issued in K'ut'aisi
Gubernia, but by 1892, 6,635 Wer e being issued in Ratcha 
p rovince alone and 21,059 in the g u b e r n i a  as a whole. In 
1897 10,994 p e o p l e  left R a t c h a ,  15.6 per cent of the
population, and in 1910, 14,151. It is e s t i m a t e d  that in
the first decade of the 2 0 th century, 70-80 per cent of the 
male a b l e - b o d i e d  w o r k i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  left the p r o v i n c e  in 
search of w o r k . 1®^ In 1897, som e  35,000 p e a s a n t s  we re 
issued wor k  p a s s p o r t s  in the g u b e r n i a  as a whole, w h i l e  in 
T'bilisi Gubernia, where the pressure on the land was not so 
intense, 28,846 peasa n t s  left their villages to look for 
w o r k . 19°
It is important too to note that although migration did 
result in the swelling of the urban population, a very large 
proportion of the peasantry worked in the mines, towns and 
villages of Geor g i a  on a seaso n a l  basis. In West Georgia, 
where so many peasants were already private owners of plots 
of land, however minute, this was particularly the case. If 
able to do so, peasant households sent at least one, prefer­
ably young and unmarried, member of their families to secure 
daily or s easonal labour, either n earby or in m o r e  d istant 
t o w n s  and villages. Generally, these left in the early 
a u t u m n  and r e t u r n e d  in late spring, but as the f i n a n c i a l  
difficulties of many families grew worse, so the tendency to
The main significance of migration of this sort lay not 
so much in the role it played in furthering the development 
of n a t i o n a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a m o n g  the Ge o r g i a n  peasantry, 
though this too was important, as in the strong links it 
e s t a b l i s h e d  b e t w e e n  the u r b a n  and r u r a l  p a r t s  of the 
country. B ecause of the r e l a t i v e l y  small size of Georgia, 
by the end of the 1 9 th c entury there was n o w h e r e  that was 
very far from one of the main towns, ports or m i n i n g  
centres. Rail travel, too, at least for those able to make 
use of it, had made distances seem very much shorter. Con­
sequently, it was not dif f i c u l t  for a peasant to live in 
Bat'umi or T'bilisi and yet retain strong links w i t h  his 
village. The full implications of this very quickly became 
obvious as the Georgian Social-Democratic movement acquired 
mas s support in the early 1 900s, and in the events of 1 905. 
Seasonal l a b o urers m o v i n g  b a c k w a r d s  and f o r w a r d s  fro m  the 
villages became the bearers of socialist ideas, picked up or 
half picked up, as the case may be, in the m a j o r  towns. 
S o c i a l i s m  in G e o r g i a  b e c a m e  the ideology not just of the 
urban masses, but of much of the peasantry too.1<^
It is clear, therefore, that muc h  changed in G e o r g i a  
during the 19th century. Russia's far from d i s i n t e r e s t e d  
protection laid the basis for the country to break free from 
the t r a d i t i o n a l  m o u l d  that had held G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  over 
the c e n t u r i e s  of P ersian and T urkish vassalage, and the 
peasant r e f o r m s  of 1864-7 1, in particular, did m u c h  to 
a chieve the e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  of the c o u n t r y  that had 
been so m a r k e d l y  absent previously. Such indeed was the 
level of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  by the end of the c e n t u r y  and so 
extensive was the mobility of the population, that despite
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the tsarist regime's efforts to divide the native population 
against itself by encouraging petty rivalries both between 
and w i t h i n  the n a t i o n a l i t i e s  i n h a b i t i n g  the country, and 
the c o n t i n u e d  pol i t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i v i s i o n  of 
Geor g i a  into gubernii, that the init ial a w a r e n e s s  of a 
shared identity, language and past was crystallising among 
all the components of Georgian society into a consciousness 
of Georgia's unique national identity. A w a r e n e s s  of the 
national idea and of national liberation movements elsewhere 
in Europe was producing an increasingly vocal intelligentsia 
that more and more turned to the peasantry for its audience. 
Even if one was to apply Stalin's e x c e s s i v e l y  p r e c i s e  and 
i n f l e x i b l e  d e f i n i t i o n  of the nation as "a h i s t o r i c a l l y  
evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of 
a common language, territory, economic life and psychologic­
al make-up, m a n i f e s t e d  in a c o m m o n  culture", there can be 
little doubt that Georgia fitted the description by the late 
19th century.
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Chapter Four
The Emergence of the National Question as a Political Issue
k .1 The Indigenous Origins of the Georgian National Move­
ment
A l t h o u g h  it was not until late in the c e n t u r y  that 
Georgian national consciousness reached the point where it 
cut across all sectors of society, i n v o l v i n g  peasant, 
artisan, entrepreneur and noble alike, in varying degrees of 
concern for the future and i n t e g r i t y  of their h o m e l a n d ,  
national .sentiment had found political expression consider­
ably-, ear1ie r .
As w a s  n o t e d  in the f i r s t  c h a p t e r ,  the G e o r g i a n  
t'avadaznauroba attempted to restore the Bagratid dynasty in 
1832 through an ill-conceived and poorly planned conspiracy 
against the Russian administration. Motivated as much by a 
desire to restore their own pr e s t i g e  as by their love of 
Geor g i a  many, if not most of those involved, t hought to 
return the coun t r y  to the v i c i s s i t u d e s  of the p r e v i o u s  500 
years by t r u s t i n g  in the a s s i s t a n c e  of Persia and T u r k e y . 1 
However, not all of those involved were monarchists and not 
all were motivated by a desire for self-aggrandisement.
Some Soviet G e o r g i a n  h i s t o r i a n s  have p r e s e n t e d  the 
period b e t w e e n  the a n n e x a t i o n  of G e o r g i a  in 1801 and the 
e m e r g e n c e  of a radical i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  in the 1860s as an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  void in which n o t h i n g  of w o r t h  was e i t h e r  
written or a c h i e v e d ,^ but whilst one might argue that little 
was done to advance the 'development of social ideas in this 
period, it is clearly the case that the patriotic sentiments 
e x p r e s s e d  by the leading l i t e r a r y  figures of the G e o r g i a n
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  b e t w e e n  1832 and the 1860s had a m a r k e d
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inf l u e n c e  on the v i ews of the new g e n e r a t i o n  in the p o s t ­
reform period.
If one ignores those m e m b e r s  of the t'avada z n a u r o b a  
who, in r e s p o n s e  to the erosion of their a u t h o r i t y  and the 
changes being wrought in Georgian society since the advent 
of Russian power, sought to reconsolidate their position by 
appealing to the shah of Persia and the Ottoman sultan,, the 
spirit of conservative patriotism of this period is perhaps
best e x e m p l i f i e d  in the p oetry of one of the mor e  e m i n e n t
m e m b e r s  of the a r i s t o c r a c y , Prince Grigol Orbeliani. R e ­
flecting both his own and many of his peers’ pre-occupation 
with G e o r g i a ’s past, Orbeliani's early p o e m s  stand out for 
their romantic depiction of Georgia’s history.
Although the restoration of the monarchy and the power 
of the t ’avadznauroba figured prominently in their aspira­
tions, this group clung r o m a n t i c a l l y  to the vi s i o n  of an
independent Georgia uncompromised by a need to pay tribute 
to Russia, Persia or Turkey.
No doubt giving expression to the views of many others 
like himself, Grigol Orbeliani wrote in his poem Givi Amil- 
akhvari (Givi Amilakhvari),
By whom, where, in what country is freedom
brought without sacrifices, without blood?
I will perish for my fatherland,
I know it, I feel it and declare it.^
In this way Orbeliani did not simply express his deter­
mination to restore the traditional rights of his class, but 
also declared G e o r g i a ’s right to an i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s tence, 
thu s  r e v e a l i n g  the e f f e c t s  of his and his c o l l e a g u e s  
exposure to the nationalist ideas then being advanced by the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  of Central and E a s t e r n  E u r o p e ’s n u m e r o u s
n a t i o n a l  minorities. It is just a little ironic that the 
means by w h ich the G e o r g i a n  a r i s t o c r a c y  had been brought 
into contact wit h  current Europ e a n  thought, i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
into Russia, should now lead to demands for the restoration 
of Georgia's independence.
However, the nation for which the patriotic Orbeliani 
was so ready to spill his blood was one that r e m a i n e d  t i g h t ­
ly bound to the n a r r o w  class interests of the t ' a v a d a z n a u - 
roba. His Georgia was populated by heroes performing acts 
of selfless courage against the Muslim foe, by individuals 
w hose social origin was the same as his own. It was a 
G eor g i a  in which his own poetic interests - p a t r i o t i s m ,  
h e r o i s m  and c h i v a l r y y w e r e  the society's g u i d i n g  precepts, 
and at its core was the system of batonqmoba.
Like others of his class who sought to retain their 
privileges during the lead up to the peasant reforms of the 
1860s, Orbeliani maintained that batonqmoba was one of the 
prime distinguishing features of Georgia's national identity 
and that the s y s t e m  of a l l e g e d l y  m u t u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  u p o n  w h i c h  it w a s  b a s e d ,  had p r o v i d e d  his 
o p p r e s s e d  c ountry wit h  the m e a n s  for its survi v a l  a gainst 
e n c r o a c h i n g  enemies. In the i m a g e r y  used to r e f l e c t  this 
r e l a t ionship, the p e a s a n t r y  was t r a d i t i o n a l l y  d e p i c t e d  as 
the country's plough, tilling the soil and providing Georgia 
with the m a t e r i a l  s u s t e n a n c e  for its survival, w h i l s t  the 
t ' a v adaznauroba was portrayed as a sword, a m i l i t a r i s t i c  
caste whose duty was to protect their n ative land and its 
defenceless workers.
This in large part e xplains the b a c k w a r d  looking, 
i n t r o v e r t e d  p a t r i o t i s m  of much of the a r i s t o c r a c y  in the
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1820s and 1830s, for whether or not this romantic version of 
the feudal relationship between themselves and the peasantry 
had any basis in truth, it was clearly the case that once 
Georgia had become a protectorate of Russia that the ration­
ale for the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a 's ex i s t e n c e  was fading. In 
e f f e c t ,  its t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  in G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  w a s  
becoming redundant.
It was this awareness of the threat posed by change to 
the traditional structures of Georgian society that led them 
to a rather qualified acceptance of the views being exposed 
by advocates of the national idea in Central Europe. Thus, 
Orbeliani’s translation into Georgian of the poem Nalivaiko 
by Kondratii Ryleev,^ a Decembrist of republican sentiments, 
in w h i c h  the author portr a y s  the U k r a i n i a n  s t r u g g l e  for 
n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  from the Poles in the 16th century, 
plays dow n  the r a d i c a l - d e m o c r a t i c  spirit of the original, v 9 
but emphasises its patriotic content.^ V
It is i n d i c a t i v e  of the h e t e r o g e n e o u s  c o m p o s i t i o n  of 
those involved in the plot of 1832 that alongside the narrow 
d e f enders of a r i s t o c r a t i c  p r i v i l e g e  and the p a t r i o t i c  
conservatives, there should be individuals whose patriotism 
revealed a far greater sympathy for the democratic views of 
the more radical of the Decembrists and who identified, in 
particular, with the struggle of the Poles for freedom from 
Russia. Thus, Simon Dodashvili, a man from a poor clerical 
background, who for a brief spell before his death in exile 
in 1836 b e c a m e  one of the lead i n g  figures in the G e o r g i a n  
intellig e n t s i a ,  b e c a m e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  the d e m a n d  for the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a Georg i a n  republic, the i n t e g r i t y  of 
w h i c h ,  h o w e v e r ,  he r e a d i l y  c o n c e d e d ,  c o u l d  o n l y  be 
g u a r a n t e e d  by Russian patronage. But while he linked
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Georgia’s fortunes with those of Russia, Dodashvili clearly 
did not have in mind the Russia of Nicho l a s  I. Rather, and 
in this way anticipating the intelligentsia of the 1860s, he 
pinned Georgia’s hopes to the prospect of social upheaval in 
Russia and the emergence of a more democratic society in the 
n o r t h .
However, the national and individual aspirations of all 
these groups suffered a cr u s h i n g  blo w  with the f a i l u r e  of 
the 1832 conspiracy, from w h i c h  they were never fully to 
recover. The mass exile of v i r t u a l l y  all the l e a d i n g  
figures in the country's s m a l l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  both u n d e r ­
lined G e o r g i a ’s i m p o t e n c e  in the face of R ussian p o w e r  and ' r 
left the country in a mood of resigned demoralisation.
Whilst the p a t r iotic spirit of those who had p a r t i c i ­
pated, the so-called qazarmelebi,^ was held in considerable 
esteem by those left behind, it was equally clear that their 
cause had been of the utmost futility. The t’avadaznauroba, 
in particular, understanding that it would have radically to 
revise its a t t i t u d e s  to Russia if it were to re t a i n  its p r i ­
vileged position in society, began the process of tra n s f o r m ­
ing itself into a loyal arm of the tsarist cause. Russia, 
it argued, meaning tsarist Russia, was the best defender of 
Georgia's interests, by w h i c h  it meant the p r e s e r v a t i o n  of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l  s t r ucture of G e o r g i a n  society. In re t u r n  
for loyal service to the tsar it hoped that the R u s s i a n  
crown would maintain its status in Georgia.
The policy of Nicholas I towards the qazarmelebi was in 
no small part r e s p o n s i b l e  for this appar e n t  v o l te-face. 
Re a l i s i n g  the a d v a n t a g e  of hav i n g  g r a t e f u l  ra t h e r  than 
h o s t i l e  s u b j e c t s  in a s e n s i t i v e  b o r d e r  r e g i o n  and
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appreciating the advantages to be gained from recruiting the 
indigenous nobility into the service of the regime, the tsar 
elected to e x e r c i s e  c l e m e n c y  t o w a r d s  those in exile and 
permit the majority to return to active life in Georgia long 
before their sentences had expired. It is probable too that 
Nicholas I calculated that a subservient Georgian nobility 
could be a useful ally in the war against the Muslim tribes 
of the Caucasus and in the regime's efforts to expand its 
influence into Persia.
Grigol Orbeliani presents an excellent example of the 
repentant Georgian nobility. Although continuing to express 
his patriotism in the poem Sadghegrdzelo (The toast), he was 
a l r e a d y  a d i f f erent man fro m  the one who had p r o t e s t e d  his 
ea g e r n e s s  to shed his blood for the f r e e d o m  of his na t i v e  
land. In Sadghegrdzelo Orbeliani pronounces the loyalty of 
Georgians to the Russian tsar,? and his hope that Nicholas I 
w o uld restore "the days of T'amar, the days of glory" to 
Geor g i a .
Interestingly, both Georgian radicals and Georgian con­
servatives were now reconciled to the fact that the fate of 
Geor g i a  was i n e x t r i c a b l y  bound up with that of Russia, 
although they had very differing hopes and expectations of 
their n o r t h e r n  neighbour. Nevertheless, this p r o n o u n c e d  
political orientation towards St. Petersburg, consolidated 
over the e n s u i n g  years by the s u c c e s s f u l  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of 
the t'avadaznauroba into the Russian service nobility and by 
the increased experience of the Georgian intelligentsia of 
higher education in Russia's universities, combined with the 
s u r v i v i n g  and strong spirit of p a t r i o t i s m  to shape the 
a t t i t u d e s  of the e m e r g i n g  g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  public 
figures.
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A l t h o u g h  G e o r g i a n  hopes of i n d e p e n d e n c e  were e x t i n ­
gui s h e d  in 1832, p a t r i o t i s m  was harder to e r a d i c a t e  and 
w o u l d  a l m o s t  appear to have been kindled by the failure of 
the plot and the subsequent exile of its main participants. 
The trauma of banishment to distant and frozen outposts of 
the R ussian e m p i r e  and the sorry spectacle of the G e o r g i a n  
queen being taken under arrest to M o s c o w  wer e  events that 
left indelible marks on the consciousness of a generation of 
Georgians. Living in an a t m o s p h e r e  that was steeped in 
national sentiment and knowing that independence was beyond 
their grasp, m a n y  found the t e m p t a t i o n  t o w a r d s  a r o m a n t i c  
appraisal of the past hard to resist. Konstantine Mamatsa- 
shvili, a contemporary and biographer of the Georgian r o m a n ­
tic poet Nikoloz Barat'ashvili, recalled a conversation with 
the poet which gives some impression of the prevailing mood 
of the time:
I r e m e m b e r  one J u l y  n i g h t  in 1838 w h e n  T a t o  
(B a r a t ' a s h v i l i ) and I went for a wal k  together...
Tato was in fine spirits... then the c o n v e r s a t i o n  
settled on our past life and the tragic finale to 
the 18th century, on King Irakle's i n f i r m i t y  
through old age, on the sacking of our Tp'ilisi in 
179 5... and so on. D u r i n g  t h i s  c o n v e r s a t i o n  
Nikoloz's expression, a l w a y s  laugh i n g  and c h e e r ­
ful, changed and he began to wipe tears away with 
his handkerchief. Very agitated, he said to me:
'Our own in a b i l i t y  has d e s t r o y e d  us!' And w i t h  a 
sigh, he added: 'Our poor Georgia’s destiny!’
Although few Georgians felt any sense of elation at the 
union, an increasing number was prepared to acknowledge that 
Georgia's best interests could only be served as a protect­
orate of Russia. Nikoloz Barat'ashvili gave poetic voice to 
this conflict between the goals of national security and i n ­
dependence in a celebrated epic poem entitled K'art'lis bedi
(The F a t e  of G e o r g i a ) ,  in w h i c h  the aut hor u s e d  r e a l
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c h a r a c t e r s  and real events to express the d i l e m m a  fa c i n g  
Ge o r g i a n  society. The cen t r a l  t h eme of the poe m  c oncerns 
the political orientation of Georgia following the invasion 
of the country by Agha Mohammed Khan in 1795. Opening with 
the Battle of Krtsanisi, in which a force of 5,000 Georgians 
repul s e d  an a r m y  of 35,000, Barat'ashvili prese n t s  the 
address of King Irakle to his troops in heroic and patriotic 
terms.^ After the fall of T'bilisi the poet f o l l o w s  the 
flight of the king and his chancellor, S o l o m o n  Leonidze, 
into the m o u n t a i n s  and there, against the d r a m a t i c  b a c k ­
ground of the Caucasus, he depicts a debate between the two 
men on the best future course of action for Georgia. Irakle 
favoured seeking Russian protection, but Leonidze, express­
ing the fears of a g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n s  living 40 years 
later, questioned the wisdom of this.
Do you know, my king, that the Iverians/ w i l l  be
c o n t e n t  in R u s s i a n  h a n d s ? /  U n i t y  of s t a t e
religion/ is of no benefit when/ the character of
the nations is different./ Who knows how/ Russian 
p o w e r  will behave t o w a r d s  p r e s e n t - d a y  K'art'li./
W h a t  if the R u s s i a n s  w e r e  to a s s i m i l a t e  the 
Georgians?/ How would the Russian crown heed the 
w i s h e s  of G e o r g i a n  s o c iety?/ And then my king, 
how many true men/ will suffer in silent torment?/
/ i n
Who then will praise Irakle's memory? u
Leonidze c o n c l u d e d  that wh i l s t  Geor g i a  r e t a i n e d  its 
independence and Irakle remained king, Georgians would make 
light of their misfortunes. Irakle did not c o n t r a d i c t  his 
chancellor, but retorted that only with Russian protection 
w o uld Geo r g i a  be able to w reak its revenge on Persia. He 
added, moreover, that Georgia's s u r v i v a l  was at stake and 
that sooner or later it would have no a l t e r n a t i v e  but to 
turn to its Russian neighbour.
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A l t h o u g h  both sides of the a r g u m e n t  are s trongly put, 
one is left with the impression that Barat'ashvili's s y mpa­
thies lie more with Leonidze than they do with King Irakle, 
for the final say in the debate is given to the chancellor's 
wife on his return home. Presented in idealised, patriotic 
form, Leonidze's wife confounds his expectations by scorning 
the idea of a p r o t e c t o r a t e  and the lure of a f a s h i o n a b l e  
life in the Russian capital. What pleasure, she asked 
r h e t o r ically, was there to be had in living h o m e l e s s  and
orphaned in a foreign land, imprisoned like a nightingale in 
1 1a cage?
Three years later, however, in 1842, by which time some
of the a nguish of the thirties had perhaps had t i m e  to
settle, Barat'ashvili redressed the balance in another poem,
Sap'lavi mep'is Iraklisa (The Grave of King Irakle), in which
he a c k n o w l e d g e d  that the union w i t h  Russia a d v o c a t e d  by
1 PIrakle had brought Georgia peace, security and education.
The shift in emphasis from ambivalence to acquiescence 
apparent in Sap'lavi m ep'is Iraklisa again c a p t u r e d  the 
s h i f t i n g  mood of the t ' a v a d a z n a u r o b a . I n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n ­
scious of the p e r m a n e n c e  of Russia's presence and the 
advantages derived from it, the greater part of the nobility 
resigned itself to making the most of its unavoidable predi­
cament and accepting service in the tsarist army or a d m i n i s ­
tration. Moreover, with the c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of Russia's 
influence in the Transcaucasus, there came a growing acc e p t ­
ance of the values of a hitherto relatively alien lifestyle. 
Many Georgian nobles, particularly the wealthier among them, 
n o w  began to dista n c e  t h e m s e l v e s  fro m  their t r a d i t i o n a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t  and g r a v i t a t e d  t o w a r d s  the capital, T'bilisi,
wh e r e  under the i n f l u e n c e  of Viceroy Vorontsov, they wer e  
e n c o u r a g e d  to live more in the ma n n e r  of the Europ e a n  and 
Russian aristocracy. The benefits of a European education 
became highly prized, but whilst this may have broadened the 
vision of some, it merely resulted in the crass imitation of 
anot h e r  culture a m o n g s t  others. The a b i l i t y  to speak 
Russian, or better still French, b e c a m e  a s y m b o l  of status 
and cultural a d v a n c e m e n t  and a tendency e m e r g e d  for the 
elite of Georgian society to communicate in Russian rather 
than in their native language. In another gesture of their 
a ppar e n t  re a d i n e s s  to accept cultu r a l  a s s i m i l a t i o n ,  the 
t’avadaznauroba began to Russify their own names.
The repentant participants in the 1832 conspiracy now 
justified the t s a r ’s c l e m e n c y  by t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  
into a loyal arm of Russian power in Georgia and the Cauca­
sus. Thus when in 1841, 1853 and 1865 peasant r e b e l l i o n s  
broke out in di f f e r e n t  parts of the country, the G e o r g i a n  
n o b i l i t y  wer e  the first to turn to the use of f o r c e I n  
1848, m i n d f u l  of the events taking place e l s e w h e r e  in 
Europe, the G e o r g i a n  a r i s t o c r a c y  felt c o m p e l l e d  to w r i t e  
d i r e c t l y  to Nicho l a s  I i n f o r m i n g  him of their u n s w e r v i n g  
loyalty:
E a c h  one of us f e e l s  p u r e  l o v e  and d e v o t i o n  
t o w a r d s  the Russian a u t o c r a t i c  monarchy... we 
desire that our services be requested, e ither 
within the country’s boundaries or without, if the 
d isorder now t h r e a t e n i n g  W e s t e r n  Europe should 
endanger the p r o s p e r i t y  of the state to w h i c h  
Georgia now has the honour of belonging t o . 1^
By d e s t r o y i n g  the t r a d i t i o n a l  r a t i o n a l e  for the 
t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a ' s  e x i s t e n c e  and p o s i t i o n  in G e o r g i a n  
society, the s t r e n g t h e n i n g  of Russ i a n  p o w e r  p ushed the 
no b i l i t y  to try to justify itself through m i l i t a r y  or
administrative service. This, however, further reduced the 
ties linking peasant to landlord, for where in the past the 
t'avad i had a l w a y s  lived on the land and shared the p e a s ­
a n t r y ’s c u s t o m s  and traditions, he no w  moved to the a d m i n ­
i s t r a t i v e  centres, c u l t i v a t e d  new habits and gra d u a l l y  
a l i e n a t e d  h i m s e l f  f r o m  his background. The s a m e  process 
also encouraged greater differentiation within the ranks of 
the t'avadaznauroba itself, since most aznaurni lacked the 
me a n s  to m a i n t a i n  t h e m s e l v e s  as a b s e n t e e  l a n d l o r d s  in the 
extravagant atmosphere of T ’bilisi high society and conse­
quently remained on their estates and preserved their tradi­
tional way of life. Many, it should be added, wanted noth­
ing e 1 s e .
By no means everyone, moreover, judged civilisation in 
t e rms of an individual's ability to ape R ussian manners. 
Closer links with Russia had brought G e o r g i a n s  g r e a t e r  
e d u c a t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  and a n e w  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  
admittedly still very small, emerged from the trauma of the 
1830s c o n s c i o u s  of a m i s s i o n  to a w a k e n  G e o r g i a n s ’ pride in 
and consciousness of their culture and history.
Deeply i n f l u e n c e d  by the G e r m a n  r o m a n t i c  m o v e m e n t  of 
the late 18th century, the Georgian intelligentsia concurred 
with the view of the nation as a natural, h i s t o r i c a l  unit. 
In their desire to prove Georgia's n a t i o n a l  c r e d e n t i a l s ,  
they e m b a r k e d  on a s y s t e m a t i c  s t u d y  of the c o u n t r y ' s  
history, language and culture. A c o n t e m p o r a r y  G e o r g i a n  
historian, Sulkhan Barat'ashvili, explained the need to know 
one's own nation's history in almost religious terms.
This [he said] is the sacred duty of everyone, and 
that is why I began to g ather toget h e r  d o c u m e n t s  
and other historical m a t e r i a l s . ^
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T h e i r  e f f o r t s  w e r e  c o m p l i m e n t e d  by t h o s e  of M - F
B r o s s e t ,  a F r e n c h  a c a d e m i c  r e c e n t l y  a r r i v e d  in St.
Petersburg. Brosset devoted his c o n s i d e r a b l e  e n e r g i e s  to 
the study and sy st emisat ion of G e o r g i a n  sources and in the 
process gave r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  to the new d i s c i p l i n e  of 
Kartvelology, or Georgian studies, and provided Georgian r e ­
s e a r chers with the c o n f i d e n c e  and belief in the value of 
their work to persist.
However, perhaps because the atmosphere was more con­
ducive to study, St. Petersburg became a more active centre (
of G e o r g i a n  studies in this period than T'bilisi. In the |
Ge o r g i a n  capital, a c o m b i n a t i o n  of zealous c e n s o r s h i p  and 
lack of funds, facilities and organisation prevented so much 
as the p u b l i c a t i o n  of a single journal until the 1850s - 
a l t h o u g h  not for the want of t r y i n g 1"^ _ s0 that d e s p i t e  
small pockets of activity, the intellectual life of Georgia ' 
appeared fractured and isolated. Konstantine Mamatsashvili 
summed up the problems facing himself and his colleagues in 
the 1840s and 1850s in an article written for Dr o e b a :
If three or four of us so much as joined together 
and r e s p e c t f u l l y  began to discuss l i t e r a t u r e  and 
public affairs, even this was c o n s i d e r e d  d a r i n g  
and worthy of great rejoicing.1®
Moreover, despite the folk e m p h a s i s  of the G e r m a n  
romantic movement, the Georgian historians of this period do 
not appear to have concerned themselves with the history of
/ .C
;
the Georgian people and its traditions and culture. Perhaps , 
this can be exp l a i n e d  by the nature of the i m m e d i a t e l y  
a v a i l a b l e  sources and the fact that h i s t o r i o g r a p h y  was as 
yet at an embryonic stage in Georgia. Whatever the reasons,
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the p r i m e  focus of interest in the years up to the peasant 
reforms remained the lives of the Bagratid kings and queens 
and the development of Georgian literature.
Their isolation was compounded too by the nature of the 
society they were o p e r a t i n g  in, for despite the changes 
taking place within the country, Georgia remained a tradi­
tional society, as yet only dimly a w a r e  of its c o r p o r a t e  
existence and which, because of the survival of batonqm o b a , 
c o n t i n u e d  strictly to define the rights of much of its 
population. E d u c a t i o n  and literacy, soon to be a c c o r d e d  
enormous importance in the awakening of national conscious­
ness by a n e w  g e n e r a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  
were still the pr e s e r v e  of a l i m i t e d  few and they, as yet, j 
had not com e  to regard the n a tion as s y n o n y m o u s  w i t h  the 
people that comprised it. fiA ■
4.2 Georgia and the Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia
D espite the abse n c e  of journals and n e w s p a p e r s  in the 
1830s and 1840s, the commitment of a number of individuals 
ensured that a bridge existed between the qazarm elebi of the 
1830s and the a p p e a r a n c e  in 1852 of the literary j ournal 
Tsiskari (The Dawn), which at last provided the small G e o r ­
gian i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  with a point of focus. As the sole 
Georgian journal, it was perhaps inevitable that it should 
become the scene of the first major intellectual rift in the 
ranks of the nobility and of the a p p e a r a n c e  of a r a d i c a l
intelligentsia that drew/' not just from Georgian patriotism 1
A
a n d  G e r m a n  r o m a n t i c i s m ,  to w h i c h  it w a s  u n d o u b t e d l y  
indebted, but also fro m  Russian think e r s  like H e r z e n  and 
Belinsky, from the emerging populist movement and from the 
Italian R i s o r g i m e n t o  and the e x p e r i e n c e s  of the n u m e r o u s
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national liberation movements of Central and Eastern Europe.
The new generation of Georgian youth emerged from the 
changing socio-economic and political conditions of Georgia 
and the Russian e m p i r e  in the m i d - 1 9 t h  century, when the 
once u n c h a l l e n g e d  aut h o r i t y  of the a r i s t o c r a c y  was being 
eroded by Russian political control, by the Armenian bour­
geoisie’s domination of the country's economic life and the 
g r o w i n g  tendency of the peasantry to q u e s t i o n  the role of 
batonqm oba. The emerging leaders of Georgia's intellectual 
renaissance came predominantly from those middle ranking and 
lower t'avadaznauri families most exposed to the upheavals 
s h a k i n g  G e o r g i a n  society and it was they, r ather than the 
more powerful t'avadebi, who suffered most from the loss of 
political authority to the Russians and they, too, who felt 
the encroachments of the bourgeosie and the growing dissat­
isfaction of the peasantry.
Fully a w a r e  that t r a d i t i o n a l  G e o r g i a n  society was 
c r u m b l i n g  about them and that there was no way back to the 
"golden age" of G e o r g i a n  history, Georgia's "angry y oung 
men" sought ways towards national regeneration. While shar­
ing t h e i r  p a r e n t s '  love of G e o r g i a ,  t h e i r  p a t r i o t i s m  
diffe r e d  from the previous generation's, i n s o f a r  as it 
rejected the backward-looking, romantic depiction of G e o r ­
gia's past so evident in the poetry of G r igol O r b e l i a n i  as 
not merely n o n - p r o d u c t i v e ,  but as an active i m p e d i m e n t  to 
the long overdue progress of the nation.
P icking up the threads left by S i m o n  D o d a s h v i l i  and 
Nikoloz Barat'ashvili, among others, it is scarcely surpris­
ing that the "sons" of G e o r g i a n  society should no w  turn 
t o w a r d s  their c o n t e m p o r a r i e s  in Russia for i n t e l l e c t u a l  
inspiration, for in the north, d espite the l i m i t a t i o n s
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imposed by the government on freedom of expression, Russian 
social thought was as vital and creative as anywhere else in 
Europe. In Georgia, however, where the intelligentsia r e ­
m a i n e d  very s m all and most of the p o p u l a t i o n  c o n t i n u e d  to 
live on the land, the a t m o s p h e r e  was far from c o n d u c i v e  to 
the development of ideas. There were, of course, no insti­
tutions of higher education.
It was against this background, and c o n f r o n t e d  by the 
dead-weight of tradition, that young Georgians turned in in­
c r e a s i n g  n u m b e r s  to the u n i v e r s i t i e s  of St. P e t e r s b u r g  and 
Moscow. Charged with a sense of m o r a l  duty to serve their 
people, they crossed the Caucasus with the deep conviction 
that through their studies they would be better able to map 
out their country's path to progress.
By the end of the 1850s, t h e r e  w e r e  30 G e o r g i a n  
students e nrolled at the U n i v e r s i t y  of St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1  ^
enough to form a s eparate circle and to b e c o m e  a w a r e  of 
their corporate existence and their joint tasks and respon­
sibilities. This group f o r m e d  the nucleus of the f uture 
Georgian publicists, writers, poets, historians and scien­
tists who were soon to become known in Georgian society as 
the t ' e r g d a l e u l n i ; literally, "those who have d runk f r o m  
the River T'ergi", an epithet which pointed to their Russian 
education, the T'ergi (or Terek) being the river that marked 
the border between Georgia and Russia.
In St. Petersburg, the Georgian students became a ctive­
ly involved in radical student politics; so m u c h  so, in 
fact, that 13 of their number found themselves incarcerated
in tsarist prisons f o l l o w i n g  student d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  in 
? o1861. Greatly influenced by the Russian populists and by
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Cherny shevsky, in particular, they came to share his abhorr­
ence of serfdom and the autocracy and his desire for social 
justice and equality.
Governed by a faith in the innate goodness of man, the 
t 'er g d a l e u l n i , like the populists, be l i e v e d  that if they 
could rid t h e m s e l v e s  of the o p p r e s s i v e  inf l u e n c e  of the 
tsarist regime and somehow harness the advances of science 
and technology to the creative energies of the people, they 
w o u l d  be able to usher in a ne w  age of d e m o c r a c y  and p r o ­
gress. The fundamental task, as the failure of the 1848-49 
uprisings in Europe had taught them, was not the granting of 
p o l i t i c a l  rights, w h ich in t h e m s e l v e s  were m e a n i n g l e s s  to 
the untutored masses, but the education and enlightenment of 
the peasantry and its material well-being. Without these, 
no amount of political rights could secure the equality c o n ­
sidered so essential by the young Georgian radicals.
In a d e v e l o p m e n t  w h i c h  u n d e r l i n e s  their debt to the 
Russian radical intelligentsia, a number of the t'ergdaleul­
ni began to write literature which took as its subject, not 
r o m a n t i c  y e a r n i n g s  for a distant past or the s p i r i t u a l  
c oncerns of isolated individuals, but the very real and 
specific problems facing Georgian society and, in particu­
lar, the survival of batonqm oba.
"Poetry", said one contemporary Georgian poet, Spiridon
Chitorelidze, "is a r e f l e c t i o n  of life, or to put it
p 1better, poetry is life itself...", a view w h i c h  was 
s u p p o r t e d  by one of the leading figures in G e o r g i a n  p ublic 
life over the next 40 years, Giorgi Dseret'eli.
A w r i t e r  [he said] is but one m e m b e r  of society, 
one of the individuals who taken collectively c o m ­
p r i s e  that s o c i e t y .  It is he w h o  f e e l s  an d  
reflects the joys and torments of society.22
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However, the distance of St. Petersburg from T'bilisi, 
and the fact that the sole Georgian literary journal, Tsis- 
k a r i , was in the hands of the liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e  
aristocracy, impeded the initial efforts of the t'ergdaleul- 
n_i to make an impact. Nevertheless, the first e x a m p l e  of 
the new, realist style of w r i t i n g  made its a p p e a r a n c e  in 
1 857 with a poem by the future founder of m o d e r n  G e o r g i a n  
theatre, Rapiel Erist'avi, entitled Mt'khovneli msajulisadmi 
(The Supplicant to the Judge),23 in which the author equated 
b a t o n q m oba with slav e r y  and q u e s t i o n e d  the m o r a l i t y  of a 
system that allowed one man to regard another as his person­
al property. D e s p i t e  the i m p o r t a n c e  of this poe m  to the 
radical G e o r g i a n  youth, however, the real b r e a k t h r o u g h  in 
G e o r g i a n  l i t e r a t u r e  cam e  wit h  the p u b l i c a t i o n  in 1859 of 
Daniel Tchonk'adze's novel, Suramis tsikhe (The Fortress of 
Surami), by T s i s ka r i . Not only did Tchonk'adze d epict the 
i n i q u i t i e s  and m o r a l  d e g r a d a t i o n  caused by b a t o n q m o b a ,  he 
also implied that force was the only solution to the peasan­
t r y ’s problems, since the t ' a v a daznauroba was i n c a p a b l e  of 
reforming itself.
An extract from the book d e s cribes the fate of a 
peasant boy, O s m a n  Agha (Nodari) and his mother, f o l l o w i n g  
the accidental death of the boy's father.
After his death, [said Osman-Agha] everything was 
in turmoil in our house: first the landlord took
a w a y  our viney a r d  on the g r o u n d s  that we wer e  no 
longer able to take care of it, then, one by one, 
he took our buffalos, and finally he o r d e r e d  my 
m o t h e r  to settle in his house as his servant...
Lord, how the poor woman implored him to leave her 
in peace and not destroy her family, but the land­
lord hardly seemed to listen - 'Oh, she'll cry and 
cry and then she'll calm down!' That's what s o m e  
of these l a n d lords believe. They don't see us as 
people; they think we're i n c apable of love or
h atred and think we have no f eelings or sense of 
justice.
O s m a n - A g h a  goes on to nar r a t e  how whe n  the landlord 
dec i d e d  to sell him, he and his m o t h e r  e scaped and went into 
h i ding in T ’bilisi. Soon recaptured, however, their f o r ­
tunes took an even worse turn. The landlord tied both of 
them to the threshing board and literally worked his mother 
to death. Finally, when the landlord raped the girl he 
loved, O s m a n - A g h a  took his r evenge by k i l l i n g  hi m  and his 
family.
The i mpact of this p a r a b l e - l i k e  story was all the 
g r e a t e r  for the fact that it d i a m e t r i c a l l y  o p p o s e d  the old 
view, r e c e n t l y  upheld in Ts i s k a r i  by A l e x a n d r e  O r b eliani, 
that b a t o n q m oba was a h a r m o n i o u s ,  m u t u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  
relationship. In the e n s u i n g  furore, T siskari wa s  filled 
with ind i g n a n t  letters fro m  the outra g e d  t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a , 
but despite their irate opposition, the volume of literature 
c o n d e m n i n g  the s o c i a l  i n j u s t i c e s  and i n e q u a l i t i e s  of 
Georgian society continued to grow. Ilia Tchavtchavadze and 
Akaki Dseret'eli, both students in St. P e t e r s b u r g  and soon 
to become the most distinguished representatives of the*late 
19th c entury G e o r g i a n  renaissance, both began to w r i t e  
critically of the established social order.
B e t w e e n  1858 and 1862, the f o r m e r  w rote a n u m b e r  of 
poems in which he sought to make the point that batonqmoba 
led not just to the d e g r a d a t i o n  and h u m i l i a t i o n  of the 
peasantry, but was the cause, too, of the n o b i l i t y ’s m o r a l  
d egeneration. If G e o r g i a n  society was to progress, it was 
essential, he argued, that s e r f d o m  be abolished. In his 
poem G u t ’nis deda (The Ploughman), moreover, and his novel
Katsia-adamiani?! (Is This Man a Human Being?!) which first
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appeared in 1861, Tchavtchavadze called on the peasantry to 
fight for their f r e e d o m  if n e c e s s a r y . 2 -^ Akaki D s e r e t ’eli, 
too, contributed to widening the gulf between the ’’fathers” 
and "sons" of G e o r g i a n  society with poems like Mu£huri_ (A 
W orker’s Poem)2^ and I m eruli nanina (An Imerian Lullaby),2 ^ 
w h i c h  f ocused on the hard lot of the peasantry and the i n ­
justice of a system in which one element of society existed 
solely through the labour of others.
On their return to G e o r g i a  in the early 1850s, the 
t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  p r e s e n t e d  a c o h e r e n t  o p p o s i t i o n  to the 
t’avadaznauroba’s efforts to salvage as much of its position 
as it could from the i m p e n d i n g  peasant reforms. As one 
w r i t e r  for the journal Iveria put it in an a r t i c l e  on 
Georgian literature written in 1883:
A l t h o u g h  the G e o r g i a n  nation had adapted to the 
times, s e r f d o m  n e v e r t h e l e s s  r e m a i n e d  i m m o v a b l e .  
Nobody had c o n s i d e r e d  how it could finally be 
overthrown, or how the injustices of their ancient 
f o r e b e a r e r s  could be rectified. The gene r a l  
thought of the nation was confused. Wherever one 
turned one heard the groans of slaves in one's 
ears. This situation was corrected only when the 
new generation, r e t u r n i n g  from their studies, 
raised their voices openly and c l a n d e s t i n e l y  
a gainst the i n j u stice of serfdom... the ’sons' 
i m m e d i a t e l y  e m p l o y e d  their en e r g i e s  and wits to 
destroy the old injustices and to destroy serfdom. 
They tried to seize the whip and knout f r o m  over 
the heads of the serfs and bring them into the 
country as men.
H owever, wh i l s t  there is little, if anything, in this 
to d i s t i n g u i s h  the t'er g a d a l e u l n i  fro m  the R u s s i a n  po p u l -
i
ists, they did differ in one cruc i a l  respect. W h e r e a s  the 
latter were p r e d o m i n a n t l y  c o n c e r n e d  with social and class 
issues, the Georgian students in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 
while not unmindful of these, were also acutely conscious of 
their natio n a l  identity and of a sense of duty t o w a r d s  the
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G e o r g i a n  nation. The sole purpose of their prese n c e  in 
Russia was to a s s i m i l a t e  Europ e a n  ideas and k n o w l e d g e  in 
p r e p a r a t i o n  for the strug g l e  to put Geo r g i a  on its feet 
again. This sense of duty and m i s s i o n  was h e i g h t e n e d  by 
their c o n v i c t i o n  that the future hopes of the G e o r g i a n  
people were e m b o d i e d  in them, and that the k n o w l e d g e  they 
had a c q u i r e d  was u seless unless put to the s ervice of the
p q
nation. 7 Thus, at a m e e t i n g  of G e o r g i a n  s tudents to 
discuss their participation in a large student demonstration 
in St. P e t e r s b u r g  in 1861, one of them, K'irile Lort'k'ip1- 
anidze, argued a gainst p a r t i c i p a t i o n  on the g r o u n d s  that 
they had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to the G e o r g i a n  people and that 
their i m p r i s o n m e n t  could set back the strug g l e  aga i n s t  
ignorance and lethargy in Georgia.2^
However, while it is clear that the t'ergdaleulni were 
i n f l u e n c e d  by current Russian r adical thought, it is also 
the case that in St. Petersburg they came into contact with 
a n u m b e r  of students from the other n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  
p o p u l a t i n g  the R ussian e m p i r e  and, in particular, P olish 
students, whose d e d i c a t i o n  to the c o n t i n u i n g  s t r u g g l e  for 
national liberation made a lasting impression on the G e o r ­
gians. Awareness, too, of the numerous national-liberation 
movements across Europe and perhaps also a growing sense of 
nostalgia for their own homeland intensified their feelings 
of commitment and hardened their resolve to achieve national 
liberation for Georgia. Ilia Tchavtchavadze, who emerged 
as the leader of the G e o r g i a n  student body in St. P e t e r s ­
burg, was later to reflect the v i e w s  of his c o m p a n i o n s  in an 
article published in 1881.
Our country [he wrote] is t r o u b l e d  by a very
different pain and is o p p r e s s e d  by c o m p l e t e l y
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different worries... our contemporary life demands 
s o m e t h i n g  c o m p l e t e l y  different, cries out for 
something completely different... and that ’som e ­
thing different' is the resurrection of our fallen 
identity, the need to put G e o r g i a  on its feet 
again and defend it against every c o n c e i v a b l e  
danger... the p resent child r e n  of Georgia have no 
more important task.
The t'ergdaleulni saw no contradiction between this and 
their a i m s  for social reform, wer e  not burde n e d  by doubts 
that e m p h a s i s  on r e u n i f i c a t i o n  and a u t o n o m y  might perhaps 
interfere with their other goals of liberating the serfs and 
e nding the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  and p o l i t i c a l  d o m i n a t i o n  of the 
t’avadaznauroba. Under conditions in which the very surviv­
al of the n ation was held to be under threat, in w h i c h  the 
coun t r y  had been r e l e g a t e d  to the status of a co l o n i a l  
outpost of the Russ i a n  e m p i r e  and in w h i c h  the G e o r g i a n  
language and culture were continually denigrated and gradu­
ally being exclu d e d  from the o f f i c i a l  life of the country, 
from the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  from the courts, f r o m  the e d u c a ­
tional institutions and even from the Georgian aristocratic 
circles participating in the high society of T'bilisi court 
life, the t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  a rgued that the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  
must be put before all else. They were not, or course, the 
first G e o r g i a n s  to attach such i m p o r t a n c e  to the n a t i o n a l  
question, but w h ere they d i f f e r e d  fro m  their p r e d e c e s s o r s  
was the way in which they perceived the question. For them, 
it was not s i m p l y  a m a t t e r  of h o w  to go about a c h i e v i n g  
independence from the Russians, or how to restore the Bagra- 
tid dynasty, but of how to lay the basis for the nation's 
revival. Central to this approach and the most significant 
point of departure from past formulations of the question in 
Georgia, was their identification of the nation not with its
kings and ruling classes, but w i t h  the peop le as a whole,
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with their language, their customs and habits and with their 
social and economic life. In the writings and poetry of men 
like Akaki D s e r e t ’eli, the t e r m s  eri (nation) and khalkhi 
(people) became almost synonymous. Thus the t'ergdaleulni 
had no interest whatsoever in perpetuating a way of life in 
which the creative energies of the peasantry were stifled by 
the old, traditional, patriarchal social structure. Their 
desire was for a just, d e m o c r a t i c  and equal society, in 
which the creative energies and talents of the people could 
be utilised to the full. Looking back on the 1860s, another 
of the most prominent figures of the Georgian radical intel­
ligentsia, Iakob Gogebashvili, noted:
All our lives we have been sincere s u p p o r t e r s  of 
equality of rights. We hated any kind of dom i n a ­
tion and opposed it. We ha ted the d o m i n a t i o n  of 
the aznaur o b a , of the bureaucracy, of the b o u r ­
geoisie... In the n e w s p a p e r  D r oeba we p r i n t e d  an 
article in which we expressed the view that until 
the land was completely owned by those who worked 
it, neit h e r  u n i v e r s a l  prosp erity, e q u a l i t y  or 
freedom could be established in mankind.
It is apparent, therefore, that the sam e  s ocial a t t i ­
tudes inculcated during the years spent in Russia's univer­
sities also i n f o r m e d  the t 'e r g d a l e u l n i 's u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
the national question and that within the Georgian context 
they r e g a r d e d  natio n a l  and social issues as i n e x t r i c a b l y  
i n t ertwined. Thus to achi e v e  l i b e r a t i o n  and to o v e r t h r o w  
what they felt was a redundant and decrepit social system, 
it was first n e c e s s a r y  to a b o l i s h  b a t o n q m o b a . On ly w h e n  
freed from its restrictive influence would Georgian society 
be able to achieve prosperity and national integration, only 
then would the peasants "come into the country as men".
However, the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the serfs, w h i l s t  of 
crucial importance, still left Geor g i a  subject to the
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chauvinist, colonialist policies of a government that was, 
at best, i n d i f f e r e n t  to the needs and a s p i r a t i o n s  of the 
Georgian people. In these circumstances, the t'ergdaleulni, 
who shared the view of the n ation as a n atural unit w h i c h  
provi d e d  its m e m b e r s  with the best means for f u l f i l l i n g  
their poten tial, c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  to regard the right to 
national self-government as a natural extension of the indi­
vidual's d e m o c r a t i c  rights to the e m b o d i m e n t  of their 
collective spirit, the nation.
Mankind [wrote Akaki Dseret'eli] consists of var­
ious nations and nationalities, each of which must 
c o n t r i b u t e  its piece, its c r e a t i v e  share to the 
t reasure house of humanity. An i n d i v i d u a l  who 
does not, first and foremost, serve'liis n ative 
people, cannot be of any use to humanity.
Since, however, Georgia's size and r e l a t i v e  s o c i o ­
economic backwardness militated against independent revolu­
tionary action, the Georgian intelligentsia came to regard 
its main task as the spread of e d u c a t i o n  to the m a s s e s  and 
through it, the d e v e l o p m e n t  of n a t i o n a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  in 
p r e p a r a t i o n  for n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n . 2 ^ M e a n w h i l e ,  in the 
absence of any independent means of overthrowing the tsarist 
r e g i m e  in Georgia, the t'ergdaleulni i d e n t i f i e d  their 
strug g l e  for na t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  w i t h  the s t r u g g l e  of the 
revolutionary opposition in Russia to overthrow the tsar.
A m o n g  the G e o r g i a n  radical i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  th ere does 
not appear to have been any specifically anti-Russian senti­
ment, but rather hostility and resentment towards the chauv­
inistic policies practised by the tsarist regime against the 
n a t i o n a l  minorities. However, the G e o r g i a n s  d r e w  a sh arp 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the curr e n t
administration and what they referred to as "young Russia"._
225
We have a high rega rd for our fraternity, unity 
and f r i e n d s h i p  with the peoples of Russ ia [wrote 
Akaki Dseret'eli ]. It is true that a m o n g  the 
Russians there are those who have no sympathy for 
our f r a t e r n a l  union, but there is also yo ung 
Russia, with whom we wish to progress arm in arm, 
not just for the r e a l i s a t i o n  of our natio n a l  
ideals, but also for our social ideals.
This conception of a divided Russia had a considerable 
bearing too on their notion of national liberation, for they 
did not n e c e s s a r i l y  u n d e r s t a n d  this to mea n  i n d e p endence, 
but rather the right of the Georgian people to choose their 
own path to progress. As part of the tsarist empire, of 
course, that right was denied, but as part of a s o c i e t y  in 
which democracy, freedom and equality were to be the guiding 
precepts, it w o u l d  have to be a c k n o w l e d g e d .  The t ’e r g d a l ­
eulni had no desi re for i n d e p e n d e n c e  if by a c h i e v i n g  it, 
they simply became more vulnerable to pressure from repr ess­
ive r e g i m e s  in Turkey and Persia. What they w e r e  s e e k i n g  
was a g u a r a n t e e  for G e o r g i a n  na t i o n a l  rights as part of an 
equal and mutually beneficial relationship with a democratic 
Russia. As an article in Droeba expressed it in 1877:
G e o r g i a  should not be w h i p p e d  up into the body and 
organism of Russia like some inanimate source of 
food, but should stand a l o n g s i d e  her, as a v i g o r ­
ous, h e a l t h y  entity m a r c h i n g  a l o n g  the road of 
progress together with Russia. °
W h ile the exact natu re of this r e l a t i o n s h i p  does not 
appear to have been f o r m u l a t e d  in deta il at any time, and 
account has to be taken of undoubted differences of opinion 
among the t ’ergdaleulni, Giorgi Dseret’eli at least gave an 
idea of the sort of relationship envisaged in an article for 
kvali (The furrow), written in 1895. At home he called for:
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the g r a n t i n g  of every i n d i v i d u a l  private liberty 
and c ontrol over our d o m e s t i c  affairs, [but in 
foreign affairs] joint endeavour on behalf of the 
w h o l e  state and the defence and c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of 
the state through mutual assista n c e . ^
Having f o r m u l a t e d  their v i e w s  in the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
atmosphere of Russian university life in the late 1850s and 
early 1860s, this first generation of Georgian students now 
began to return h o m e  to face the p r o b l e m  of put t i n g  their 
ideas and theories into practice. Ilia T c h a v t c h a v a d z e , 
ap p a r e n t l y  unable to control his i m p a t i e n c e  to return to 
T'bilisi any longer, was one of the first of the t 1 e rgda 1 - 
eulni to leave, abandoning his studies in the middle of his 
final year. Standing before the Caucasian mountains for the 
first time since lea v i n g  Geor g i a  in 1857, he c o n t e m p l a t e d  
how he w ould react to his n ative land af ter four y e a r s 1 
a bsence in Russia, and perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  how it 
would react to him.
How will I res p o n d  to my country and how wil l  it 
respond to me? I wondered what new things I could 
d e s c r i b e  to it and what it w o u l d  tell me. Wh o 
knows, I thought, perhaps my country will turn its 
back on me, rejecting me as planted and reared in 
f oreign soil? On the other hand, since I do at 
least bear my country’s ineffable stamp within me, 
it w o n ’t turn its back. But what will I do if my 
country f o l l o w s  me and tells me of its griefs, its 
sorrows and its joys, its hope and despair? What 
if I have g r o w n  u n a c c u s t o m e d  to its langu a g e  and 
can no longer understand...^°
This, then, was his gr e a t e s t  fear, that after so m u c h  
time abroad he would be out of touch wi th G e o r g i a n  reality 
and w o u l d  no l o n g e r  be a t t u n e d  to the a s p i r a t i o n s  of 
Georgian society.
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4.3 The T ’e r g d a l e u l n i  and the L a n g u a g e  Issue
Ilia Tc h a v t c h a v a d z e ' s  return to G e o r g i a  in 1861 c o i n ­
cided wit h  the e n a c t i o n  of the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the serfs in 
European Russia and the movement of the reform issue to the 
forefront of Georgian political life. Tchavtchavadze, h o w ­
ever, chose to c o m m e n c e  his career as a p o l i t i c a l  activist 
and publicist not with a direct attack on batonqmoba, but by 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on the d e c e p t i v e l y  i n n o c u o u s  i s s u e  of 
language.
Like all the t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  who f o l l o w e d  h i m  back to 
Georgia, T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  was d i s t u r b e d  by the p r e d o m i n a n t  
lack of a w a r e n e s s  of G e o r g i a n  h i s t o r y  and of the n a t i o n ’s 
cultu r a l  roots, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a m o n g  the elite of G e o r g i a n  
society. R u s s i f i c a t i o n  of proper n a m e s  was, it s e e m e d  to 
him, g r a d u a l l y  be ing a c c o m p a n i e d  by R u s s i f i c a t i o n  of the 
G e o r g i a n  language and a g r o w i n g  d i s r e g a r d  or even d i s d a i n  
for Georgian custom and tradition. For Tchavtchavadze, with 
his belief in the nation as a synthesis of its past history, 
culture and language and his c o m m i t m e n t  to the n a t i o n a l  
regeneration of Georgia, this was an indication of serious 
degeneration. In his own words,
The prostration, d e b a s e m e n t  and d i l u t i o n  of the 
nation begins at the point when it forgets its 
history, when it loses all r e c o l l e c t i o n  of its 
past... neglect of o n e ’s h i s t o r y  portends the 
spiritual and material disintegration, destruction 
and c o m p l e t e  u n d o i n g  of the nation. The past is 
the dead basis of the present, just as the present 
is the p l a t f o r m  for the future. These three 
periods r e p r e s e n t i n g  three d i f f e r e n t  m o m e n t s  in 
the life of the n a tion are bound to g e t h e r  in such 
a way that one without the other is unimaginable, 
incomprehensible and unrecognisable...
It was T c h a v t c h a v a d z e ’s r esolve to a w a k e n  G e o r g i a n  
national consciousness that led him to write a review in the
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fourth edition of Tsiskari in 1861 entitled, "A few words on 
Prince Revaz Shalvis dze Erist'avi's translation of Kozlov’s 
’The M a d w o m a n ’”, in w h i c h  he p r e s e n t e d  his r e a d e r s  with a 
cr i t i q u e  not just, or even mainly, of Revaz E r i s t ’avi's
translation of Kozlov, but also of the style and content of 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  G e o r g i a n  literature. It was a d e l i b e r a t e
challenge to the older generation of liberal and conserva­
tive aristocrats and an attempt to stir up the turbid waters
of G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  life. T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  had chosen 
his ground carefully, for appreciating that language and the 
spread of literacy were g o i n g  to be crucial to any a t t e m p t  
to nurture a sense of national self-awareness among the pop- 
uation, he reali s e d  that G e o r g i a n  lite r a t u r e  had to be
/  O
wrested from the exclusive control of the t’avadaznauroba.
As in many t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c i eties l i t e r a t u r e  r e m a i n e d  the 
private d o m a i n  of an educa t e d  elite, w h i c h  s c a r c e l y  c o n ­
cerned itself with the in t e r e s t s  of the m a j o r i t y  of the 
population. In Georgia, however, the problem of illiteracy 
was compounded by the fact that literature continued to be 
written in an artifical, archaic ecclesiastical style which
bore litt le r e l a t i o n s h i p  to the current usage of the 1 a n - 
43g u a g e .
Whilst the editorial board of Tsiskari, in its role as 
guardian of Georgian literary standards, regarded the pre­
s e r v a t i o n  of this style as a q u e s t i o n  of p r e s e r v i n g  the 
purity of the language, the t'ergdaleulni, with Tchavtchav- 
adze as their foremost spokesman, saw it as another bastion 
of narrow, class privilege and, as such, an obstacle to the 
e d u c a t i o n  and e n l i g h t e n m e n t  of the people and the f o r w a r d  
march of the nation. In their view, the spread of literacy
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w a s  c r u c i a l  to the s t r u g g l e  for n a t i o n a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  and
to awareness of a shared history and fate.
...philology and history [wrote Tchavtchavadze] go 
side by side and interact with each other, because 
the life of the nation is revealed and illuminated 
in its language, w h i c h  a c c u r a t e l y  reflects every 
change in its fortunes and mode of e x i s t e n c e . ^
Consequently, any literary form that simply marked time 
and failed to reflect the b roader social and e c o n o m i c  
changes occurring within a society was, they maintained, an 
i m p e d i m e n t  to progress. The l i t e r a t u r e  of a nation, like 
the language itself, must belong to all the people and 
depict its life, its s h o r t c o m i n g s ,  and its a s p irations. 
E ch o i n g  the s e n t i m e n t s  of his colleagues, T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  
maintained that;
The langu a g e  of man g r o w s  and develops like an 
i n d i v i d u a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  and to the extent that it 
grows, it changes, just as we, when we grow, 
change; it often happens that laws w h ich wer e  
once e s s e n t i a l  turn out to be w o r t h l e s s  later; 
therefore, the n e w  l a n g u a g e  d iffers from the old 
in the sa me way as a youth differs fr om an old 
m a n .
Thus Tchavtchavadze’s critique addressed itself both to 
the style and content of Revaz E r i s t ’a v i ’s t r a n s l a t i o n  and 
through it, to the style and content of Georgian literature 
in general. But it is also clear that the t’ergdaleulni saw 
m or e  at stake here than just li t e r a r y  standards. It w a s  
their o pinion that the future v i a b i l i t y  of the G e o r g i a n  
nation was in the balance, that its ca p a c i t y  to s u r v i v e  
rested on the a b i l i t y  of the langu a g e  to adjust to the t i m e s  
and to reflect and be able to e xpress the c o m p l e x i t i e s  of 
modern life.
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The development of the nation [wrote Iakob Gogeba- 
shvili] is directly dependent on the development 
of the language... if the langu a g e  slips back and 
degenerates, the abil i t y  to reason declines, 
weakens and is empoverished. 6
To which he added:
Only those p eoples who reason and express t h e m ­
selves in their native tongue are able to advance 
along the road to progress.
The r e v i e w  p r e c i p i t a t e d  a furious response fro m  the 
G e o r g i a n  a r i s t o c r a c y , not least b ecause a man as y o u n g  as 
Tchavtchavadze had had the temerity to criticise his elders 
in such u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  terms. Readers of Tsisk a r i  com-
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plained of his "impudence". But the nature of the attack 
w a s  far too s e r i o u s  to be d i s m i s s e d  so l i g h t l y .  The 
t ' a v a d a z n a u r o b a , or its l eading r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  at least, 
recognised that the t'ergdaleulni constituted a threat not 
merely to their cultural hegemony, but also to their social 
standing. The egalitarian message of the t'ergdaleulni and 
their criticism of the inertia caused by batonqmoba led the 
"fathers" of Georgian society to describe them as renegades 
who had be t r a y e d  their n ative c ulture for the sake of an 
education in Russia, to which they responded that patriotism 
does not cons ist of blind a d m i r a t i o n  of one's own country, 
r e g a r d l e s s  of its faults, but the r e c o g n i t i o n  of those 
faults and the struggle to correct them, Yes, they replied, 
turning the tables on their critics, we were in Russia,
...but we did not c o m e  a w a y  with a k n o w l e d g e  of 
art... we did not learn to judge h u m a n  w o r t h  and 
morality by ranks and decorations, we do not co n ­
s i d e r  b i g o t r y  an d g r o v e l l i n g  to be s u p r e m e  
virtues, but hold dear the interests of the masses 
and not the idle minority; we are not godless, it 
is just that our god is the god of e q u a l i t y  and 
b r o t h e r h o o d  and not of s e r v i l i t y  and o b s e q u i o u s ­
ness, the god of the workers and the oppressed and
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not of the p h a r i s e e s  and s w i n d l e r s . ^
The g r o w i n g  divide over the l anguage issue and the 
steady return of Georgian students from the Russian univer­
sities e n c o u r a g e d  T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  to co n s i d e r  st a r t i n g  a 
separate journal in which the t ’ergdaleulni would be able to 
express their v i ews w i t h o u t  h i n d r a n c e  fro m  the editors of 
_T s_ _i _s k £  _r i_ and as f r e e l y  as w a s  p o s s i b l e  u n d e r  t s a r i s t  
censorship laws. The decision to go ahead was announced in 
Octo b e r  1862 and the first e dition of the new m o n t h l y  
journal Sak’art1 velos Moambe (The Georgian Herald) appeared 
in January 1863.^°
Although primarily a literary journal which set itself 
the task of revising the accepted norms of Georgian literary 
practice, Sak’art1velos Moambe included numerous articles on 
historical and economic themes which concentrated on the two 
f u n d a m e n t a l  issues of r a i s i n g  n a t i o n a l  self-consciousness 
and the need to oppose batonqmoba. But undoubtedly its most 
significant service to the t♦ergdaleulni was its provision 
of a focal point around which they could develop their ideas 
and from which they could counter the arguments of the Tsis- 
kari generation.
As editor, Tchavtchavadze harboured no illusions about 
his journal’s ability single-handedly to transform Georgian 
society. What he did hope, however, was that it would help 
expand Georgians’ consciousness of their national identity, 
lead t o w a r d s  the r e i n v i g o r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
life and g e n e r a t e  the nucleus of an i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  that 
would be committed to his own ideas of progress, democracy 
and social equality. An article in S a k ’a r t ’velos M o a m b e  
claimed:
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Our c oncern is w i t h  the life of the people of 
Georgia. Its i m p r o v e m e n t  is our first and last 
w i s h . ** ”*
And in the first edit i o n  of the journal T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  
wrote:
Every man who does not cover his eyes wit h  b l i n ­
kers sees that the life we had y e s t erday no longer 
exis ts today, that it is c h a n g i n g  and a d v a n c i n g  
forward, b r i n g i n g  new ways with it. E v e r y t h i n g  
changes under its great influence. What yesterday 
man thought to be an eter nal truth and to be 
r e s p e c t e d  as an u n a v o i d a b l e  ne cessity, we often 
c o m e  to regard as a crude m i s t a k e  today, and it 
sur p r i s e s  us that our p r e d e c e s s o r s  could have 
b e l i e v e d  tha t  s u c h  o b v i o u s  s t u p i d i t y  w a s  an 
eternal truth. The t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  are a t t e m p t i n g  
to es t a b l i s h  the e s s e n t i a l  need 1 to c hange our 
e x i s t i n g  life and to explain it through clear 
s c i e n t i f i c  evidence. They believe that life is 
growing more healthy 'with the assistance of k n o w ­
ledge and science, which are themselves the fruits 
of l i f e 1.
Ilia Tchavtchavadze aside, most of the figures who were 
soon to lead the G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  revival of the late 
19th century, Akaki Dseret'eli, Kirile Lort'k'ip'anidze, 
N i k o N i k o l a d z e ,  Giorgi Dseret'eli and Iakob Gog eg7 a s h v i 1 i 
among them, gathered around the journal in a loose grouping 
that came to be k n o w n  as P » or the First Group. 
They did not c o n s t i t u t e  a f o r m a l l y  o r g a n i s e d  body, but 
rather, c o n s i s t e d  of a n u m b e r  of i n d i v i d u a l s  f r e q u e n t l y  
h o l d i n g  d i v ergent views, but who, ne v e r t h e l e s s ,  w e r e  in 
agreement that the most immediate tasks facing them were the 
need to mount a strong opposition to batonqm o b a , to awaken 
national self-awareness and to bring the benefits of educa­
tion and science to the people. These, in th eir opinion, 
were the key to national revival.
The c o m p a r i s o n  with the g e n e r a t i o n  rift in R u s s i a n
society w h ich the debate b e t w e e n  the fath ers and sons in
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Georgia inevitably brings to mind is, nevertheless, misl ead­
ing insofar as it conceals the extent of the task facing the 
t'ergdaleulni. Whereas in Russia the intellectual debates 
and developments of the 1830s and 1840s prepared much of the 
g r o u n d  for the e m e r g e n c e  of the s o - c a l l e d  "sons", in 
Georgia there had been very little autonomous development of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  life since the e f f e ctual s i l e n c i n g  of the 
t'avadaznauroba after the 1832 conspiracy. Thus as well as 
facing p r o b l e m s  of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  b a c k w a r d n e s s ,  poverty, 
ignorance, w i d e s p r e a d  i l l i t e r a c y  and the c o o l n e s s  of the 
tsarist administration towards any attempts to improve lit­
eracy in the G e o r g i a n  language, the t'ergdaleulni also had 
to c ontend with the often i n c o m p r e h e n d i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  of a 
traditionally-minded aristocracy that saw in their efforts 
to r e v i t a l i s e  G e o r g i a n  soci e t y  only a betra y a l  of a wa y  of 
life that had survived for hundreds of years. This sense of 
betrayal felt by the "fathers" towards the iconoclasm of the 
r adical G e o r g i a n  youth is r e f l e c t e d  in a poe m  by Gr i g o l  
O r b e l i a n i  w r i t t e n  in 1874 entit l e d  Pasu khi shvilt fa (An 
A n s w e r  to the Sons) in w h i c h  he wrote:
They have arrived., and n o w  what?...
We have been completely let down...
Woe to our hopes... woe to your return!...
We said, now light will be shed on our land!
But the unfortunates,
The pure hearts,
Who went to study have been corrupted.
Despair
and unbelief
have been planted
deep in their pure hearts;
-What use have we for prayer?
Why do we need God?
Our intellect is our god!^^
Although the t 1ergdaleulni were temporarily set back by 
the closure of S ak'art1 velos M o a m b e  in J a n u a r y  1 864 a fter
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just one year in print, the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the serfs in 
T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  the f o l l o w i n g  N o v e m b e r  gave rise to a 
fresh surge of o p t i m i s m  for the future. The r e a c t i o n  of 
most of the radical i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was a l m o s t  ecstatic. 
W h a t e v e r  its l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and as yet few paid m u c h  heed to 
these, emancipation had removed the bonds tying the serf to 
landlord and thus opened the w a y  for G e o r g i a n  p easants to 
acquire their own land.
The abolition of batonqmoba [wrote Tchavtchavadze 
in D roeba in 1 867 ] has not only changed the p o s i ­
tion of the lan d l o r d s  and peasants, but that of 
the w h ole of society... in my opinion, we should 
add that batonqmoba did not harm these two classes 
alone, but was a disease that hindered the success 
of the entire country, of every one of its inhabi­
tants.
With the stultifying influence of batonqmoba on Geo r ­
gia's economic developments now removed, the way was open, 
they thought, for the i n i t i a t i v e  of the G e o r g i a n  p e a s a n t r y  
to insp ire the country's e c o n o m i c  recovery. N o t h i n g  was 
more important than this, for without a sound economic base, 
there could be no end to poverty, no universal literacy, no 
cultural advance and no national revival. With the reform 
a p p e a r i n g  to hold out so much, one can u n d e r s t a n d  G iorgi 
Dseret'eli's optimism.
Do you k n o w  [he asked his readers] w h e r e  I found 
my c ourage? In the l i b e r a t i o n  of the peasants.
Yes, from that time when our b r o t h e r s  re g a i n e d  
their long-lost justice, from that day I found a 
 brighter, stronger and more just source of life.55
S har i n g  the a b h o r r e n c e  of the R u s s i a n  P o p u l i s t s  for 
capitalism, the t'ergdaleulni maintained that the surest way 
to Georgia's recovery was through careful management of the 
country's a g r i c u l t u r a l  resources. Thus a l t h o u g h  they
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in the future, the i m a g e r y  co n j u r e d  up by reports of l a n d ­
less peasants, poverty, d isease and p o o r - h o u s e s  from the 
most a d v a n c e d  c a p i t a l i s t  state, Britain, i nduced them to 
seek ways of avoiding the capitalist mode of production a l ­
together. For the ttergdaleulni too, there was an addition­
al fear that rapid industrialisation might destroy the cul­
tural roots of the G e o r g i a n  nation. Ilia T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  
argued that:
The first creators of the wealth of a nationality 
and of a nation were the plough and the soil 
alone, and they will c ontinue to be the sole 
creators... The well-being of political and econ­
omic life depends on these two factors.
To which he added
Our economic strength continues to be the country 
and agriculture... our complete attention must be 
focused purely on the countryside, must b e long 
only to the c o u n t r y s i d e  and if not for ever, at 
least for the time b e i n g . ^
M oreover, the t e r g d a l e u l n i  still be l i e v e d  in the 
possibility of all social classes pulling together for the 
grea t e r  bene fit of s o c i e t y  and saw in the d e v e l o p m e n t  of 
capitalism a further threat to the unity of the nation. The 
answer, they felt, to these problems lay in the creation of 
cooperatives of agricultural associations. One author for 
the new journal of the t e r g d a l e u l n i , Droeba,58 maintained 
that they were i deally suited to G e o r g i a n  conditions. In 
the largely mistaken belief that communal production was a 
distinctive feature of Georgian agriculture, he thought that 
associations could increase productivity as well as prevent 
the f r a g m e n t a t i o n  of the land into tho u s a n d s  of s m a l l  
holdings. 59 Associations, would help mend class rivalries
and provide for the moral and technical education regarded 
as so essential to national renaissance. As another writer 
for Droeba put it:
When both the peasants and the t ’avadaznauroba are 
accepted into the associations, then the unity and 
trust which are essential to economic success will 
spread b e t w e e n  them. They will b e c o m e  mo re 
f a m i l i a r  with each other's needs, will c o m e  to 
share common interests and will in this way quick­
ly a c h i e v e  t h e  b e s t  f r o m  l i f e  a n d  f r o m  
fc\ n
education.
As is clear fro m  the above, the t'er g d a l e u l n i  did not 
ignore the need for d i s c u s s i o n  of the c o u n t r y ’s e c o n o m i c  
p r o b l e m s  and r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Given their r e l a t i o n s h i p  wit h  
the Russian r e v o l u t i o n a r y  intellig e n t s i a ,  of course, it 
w o u l d  have been unusual if they had. N e v e r t heless, in the 
period i m m e d i a t e l y  after the a b o l i t i o n  of b a t o n q m o b a  in 
T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  and into the early years of the 1870s, 
their emphasis was primarily on education and on the task of 
awakening national self-consciousness.
A .4 Enlightenment and National Self-Consciousness
The a t t i t u d e  of the t 'er g d a l e u l n i  in this r e s p e c t  is 
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  if one bears in mind that w h a t e v e r  their 
reservations about the inadequacies of the peasant reforms, 
they belie v e d  that the way had been opened for a b r e a k ­
through to a better, mo re just, more equal a-nd d e m o c r a t i c  
society. It might take more or less time, but the c racks 
we re visi bly a p p e a r i n g  in the e difice of the old social 
s t r u c t u r e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  as G e o r g i a ' s  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t  still lagged behind even that of Russia's, and 
as they had i d e n t i f i e d  their country's future w i t h  the 
success of the revolution within Russia itself, there seemed
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little sense in a d o p t i n g  more p r e c i p i t a t e  policies. H o w ­
ever, whilst they may have been optimistic about the impact 
of the emancipatory laws on the socio-economic development 
of Georgia, the t1 ergdaleulni were genuinely concerned that 
the Russian government was threatening the very existence of 
G e o r g i a  and G e o r g i a n  culture. At a time whe n  the a v o w e d  
policy of the tsarist r e g i m e  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  was to 
a s s i m i l a t e  all the i n d i g e n o u s  peoples of the area into the 
mid-stream of Russian culture, it was therefore argued that 
there was an urgent need to strengthen the awareness of the 
c o m p o n e n t  e l e m e n t s  of the G e o r g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  of their 
shared cultural, h i s t o r i c a l  and lingu i s t i c  heritage. To 
some extent, this purpose was a l r e a d y  being s erved by the 
growing economic integration of the country, but there was 
the danger here that as the native p o p u l a t i o n  c a m e  into 
cl oser contact wit h  the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c entres of R ussian 
power in the Transcaucasus, so they would also become more 
susceptible to Russification.
That G e o r g i a n s  had g e n u i n e  cause for c o n c e r n  was m a d e  
clear by a m e e t i n g  of school dir e c t o r s  held in T ’bil i s i  in 
1871 to discuss the recent e d u c a t i o n  r e f o r m  in E u r o p e a n  
Russia and make recommendations for the Transcaucasus. In a 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  of chau v i n i s t  d i s r e g a r d  for the i n d i g e n o u s  
cultures of the area, the meeting resolved to further d o w n ­
grade the teaching of the native languages:
The t e a c h i n g  of these lan g u a g e s  [ p r o c l a i m e d  the 
d i r e c t o r  of the T ’b i l i s i  t e a c h e r s ’ t r a i n i n g  
institute, Zakharov] which possess neither their 
own literature nor grammar, would only be harmful 
to the schools, which scarcely have enough time to 
get through the existing courses.
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To which, w i t h  d i s a r m i n g  frankness, Ilyashenko, the 
regional inspector of schools added:
Overall, the solicitude of the government for the 
t e a c h i n g  of native lan g u a g e s  is sc a r c e l y  o p p o r ­
tune, even in its present form, and perhaps even 
paralyses the success of the Russian language. In 
any case, by a p p o i n t i n g  t eachers of native l a n g ­
uages with offic i a l  righ ts to i n s t i t u t i o n s  of 
learning, and by r e w a r d i n g  them with ranks and 
pensions, we are not moving towards assimilation, 
w h i c h  one w ould i m a g i n e  should be our mai n  aim; 
rather, such resp ect on the part of the a u t h o r i ­
ties for the native languages increases their i m ­
portance in the eyes of the local p o p u l a t i o n  and 
gives l e g i t i m a c y  to the p o s s i b i l i t y  of their 
managing with only their own languages in public 
life, ignoring the state language.
I l y a s h e n k o ' s  q u a l m s  c o n c e r n i n g  the g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
apparent ’’solicitude" for the native languages of the Trans­
caucasus stemmed from the official view adopted in the 1840s 
that not only was it i m p o r t a n t  for Russian o f f i c i a l s  to be 
able to understand the languages, customs and traditions of 
the local populations, but that the latter w ould be b etter 
equipped to learn Russian if they first had a sound grasp of 
the grammatical structure of their own languages. But such 
p e d a g o g i c a l  concerns aside, the central thrust of this 
policy, the ultimate absorption of the native peoples, was 
in complete harmony with the views expressed by Ilyashenko. 
They differed solely on the means to be employed. However, 
v i e w e d  from Georgian, A r m e n i a n  or Azeri eyes, even the 
arrangements of the 1840s and 1850s left much to be desired, 
for a l t h o u g h  G e o r g i a n  was a c o m p u l s o r y  part of the e d u c a ­
tional c u r r i c u l u m  for all na t i o n a l i t i e s ,  t e a c h i n g  was for 
the most part c o n d u c t e d  in Russian. Not only did this 
severely disadvantage non-Russian pupils who had to compete 
in c l a s s e s  and e x a m s  w i t h  n a t i v e  R u s s i a n s ,  it a l s o
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d i s c o u r a g e d  a t t e n d a n c e  at schools at a l l . ^  A report from
the i n s p e c t o r  of schools for T'elavi distr i c t  w r i t t e n  in 
1863 illustrates some of the problems:
In the t o w n  of T'elavi gen e r a l l y  all the i n h a b i ­
tants speak Georgian. Even the A r m e n i a n s  sp eak 
almost nothing but Georgian, with the exception of 
two or three families which are trying to maintain 
their native language... Consequently, when the 
pupils leave school at two o'clock, they don't 
hear a single sound of R ussian as a l m o s t  none of 
th em has any conta c t s  with Russians. There is 
only the period from eight o'clock till two - the 
time they are at school. Here they just listen to 
the teacher who explains everything in Russian and 
asks them q u e s t i o n s  [in Russ ian] about the s u b ­
jects taught them. But the pupils a n s w e r  the 
t eacher [in Russian] with d i f ficulty and with 
terrible mistakes... The pupils are made to learn 
the corrections to their mistakes by heart, but as 
soon as they leave the school they forget t h e m  and 
the next day the sa me story is re p e a t e d  all over 
a g a i n .
The inspector's solution was not to give consideration 
to teach i n g  in Georgian, but to ban the use of G e o r g i a n  in 
c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h i n  the school. This, of course, was 
a n a t h e m a  to the radical inte l l i g e n t s i a ,  who r e g a r d e d  the 
spread of education in the vernacular as vital to Georgia's 
hopes of n a t i o n a l  renaissance. The use of R u s s i a n  as the 
m e d i u m  of instruction, however, d o w n g r a d e d  the sta t u s  of 
Georgian, set back the task of improving literary standards 
and acted as a direct impediment to educational attainment 
a m o n g  the n o n - R u s s i a n  population. Forced even in p r i m a r y  
school to use a language they could not understand, Georgian 
children lost interest in learning.
Throughout the 1860s, moreover, the predicament of the 
G e o r g i a n  language g r e w  more criti c a l  as the v i e w  that its 
study h i n d e r e d  a s s i m i l a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  supp ort in o f f i c i a l  
circles and in 1867, it ceased to be compulsory for all but
Georgians. In the T’bilisi Classical gymnasium the number.
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of ho urs devoted to G e o r g i a n  fell fro m  19 to 11 a week, 
w h i l s t  the n u m b e r  as s i g n e d  to Russian rose to 35. O u t s i d e  
the g y m n a s i u m ,  in T ’b i l i s i ’s p r i m a r y  schools, G e o r g i a n  and 
Armenian could now only be studied if the local population 
could pay the teachers i t s e l f . ^  Perhaps as a c o n s e q u e n c e  
of these developments, the percentage of Georgians among the 
pupils en r o l l e d  in T ' b i l i s i ’s schools declined from 39 per 
cent in 1859 to 19 per cent in 1871 and a mere 13.7 per cent 
in 1878.66
Following the recommendations of the directors’ meeting 
in 1871, Georgian was effectively removed from the list of 
o f f i c i a l  subje c t s  with the ru l i n g  in N o v e m b e r  1873 that 
native languages should only be taught in secondary schools 
and progymnasia, if those desiring instruction paid for it 
t h e m s e l v e s . ^  Consequently, the status of Georgian language 
teachers, like that of the subject itself, went into serious 
decline, so that in 1877 the soli tary G e o r g i a n  t e a c h e r  at 
the Technical Gymnasium was paid at a rate of 50 kopecks an 
hour, whilst teachers in other subjects received on average 
between three and five roubles.^® According to D r o e b a , the 
gymnasium had stopped teaching Georgian altogether by 1878 
and in other institutions, of which the Aleksandre Teachers’ 
T r a i n i n g  I n s t itute was the p r i m e  exam ple, the p o s i t i o n  of 
the language had reached such a low point that even reading 
a G e o r g i a n  book or n e w s p a p e r  was re g a r d e d  as a p u n i s h a b l e  
offence.^9
Al t h o u g h  directly o pposed to one another, both the 
Rus-sophile administration and the t’ergdaleulni fully a p p r e ­
ciated the i m p o r t a n c e  of education. It had become, as 
I l y a s h e n k o  i n t i m a t e d  in his c o m m e n t s  at the school d i r e c ­
t o r ’s m e e t i n g  in 1871, a critical w e a p o n  in the r e s p e c t i v e
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struggles for national self-awareness and pride on the one 
hand and R u s s i f i c a t i o n  and c o m p l e t e  a s s i m i l a t i o n  on the 
other. The t 'e r g d a 1e uIn i m a i n t a i n e d  that G e o r g i a ’s p r o s ­
pects of national liberation were to a large degree depend­
ent upon the extent to w h ich e d u c a t i o n  was ex t e n d e d  to the 
mass of the population, for only in this way could the 
peasantry be eased from the traditional, paternalistic way 
of life which, for better or worse, had served it for 
centuries. Only t hrough k n o w l e d g e  and literacy could the 
peasantry be p e r s u a d e d  of the b enefits of science and c o m e  
to a closer appreciation of its own national identity.
Who does not kno w  [wrote Akaki D s e r e t ’eli] that 
the h a p p i n e s s  of the people d epends on its level 
of consciousness, that without education and w i t h ­
out e n l i g h t e n m e n t ,  it w i l l  be i m p o s s i b l e  to 
improve its life, to develop or advance. It will, 
in other words, be i m p o s s i b l e  to a c h i e v e  p r o ­
gress .
But despite their commitment, with the state apparatus 
lined up against them, they faced an a l m o s t  i n s u p e r a b l e  
task. Thus their response to the developments of the 1860s 
and 1870s was muted by the censors and was, in the main, 
c o m p e l l e d  to focus on p e d a g o g i c a l  a r g u m e n t s  s t r e s s i n g  the 
d i s a s t r o u s  effect of g o v e r n m e n t  e d u c a t i o n a l  policy on the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of the local population. Child r e n  w e r e  b e i n g  
hope l e s s l y  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  by hav i n g  to study in an a l i e n  
language and, consequently, the country's need for expertise 
and knowledge was being ignored. Nevertheless, such was the 
inefficiency of the censor, that articles masked in Aesopian 
language or which, under the guise of describing situations 
in foreign countries, drew unstated but clearly recognisable 
a n a l o g i e s  wi th the s i t u a t i o n  n e arer at hand, o c c a s i o n a l l y
a p p e a r e d  in the press. Such was ’one a r t i c l e  p r i n t e d  i_n_
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Droeba in 1876, taken from a pamphlet published in Paris in 
1869 describing the struggle of the Cretan national libera­
tion movement against the Turks. That the article intended 
the C retan n a t i o n a l i s t s  to be u n d e r s t o o d  as G e o r g i a n s  and 
the Turkish government as tsarist is patently clear, but so 
poor was the state of the relationship between the Russian 
and O t t o m a n  e m p i r e s  at the time, that it was taken at face 
value and a l l o w e d  to slip past the censors. In a passage 
c losely r e f l e c t i n g  the d i v e r g e n c e  of v i ews over e d u c a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  the t'ergdaleulni and the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
the author claimed:
They [the C retan n a t i o n a l i s t s ]  saw e d u c a t i o n  as 
the p r i m e  means of s e c u r i n g  p opular liberation, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  as the T u r k i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  a l s o  
favou r e d  education, though of a type that w o u l d  
serve its own purposes, whilst the patriots sought 
to direct e d u c a t i o n  t o w a r d s  serving the people. 
Consequently, they clashed over this question. On 
the one side stood mi ght and the axe, w h i l s t  on 
the other stood reason and intelligence.^1
N o w  that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had m a d e  c l e a r  its 
commitment to the assimilation of the indigenous peoples of 
the T r a n s caucasus, the onus of d e f e n d i n g  the n a t i o n a l  
culture and language rested predominantly on the shoulders 
of the radical intelligentsia. With Russian established as 
the langu a g e  of t u i t i o n  in public schools and G e o r g i a n  n o w  
only taught on a v o l u n t a r y  basis, it was clear that the 
language was genuinely threatened. Under these conditions, 
the t 'ergdaleulni cam e  to rega rd the c r e a t i o n  of a w e l l -  
educated, p a t r i o t i c  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  as its mo re i m m e d i a t e  
task. The priority was to ensure that the elite of Georgian 
society was well-educated, not because its members were any 
mor e d e s e r v i n g  of a good e d u c a t i o n  than the rest, but
2 A3
b ecause as yet they alone had the m eans to acquire an e d u c a ­
tion. O n c e  e d u c a t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  it w a s  h o p e d  tha t  the 
Georgian intelligentsia would put itself at the service of 
the people.
Our new Georgians [wrote Droeba in 1866] must not 
dista n c e  t h e m s e l v e s  from the people, but should 
live among them and inspire their children; they 
should insp ire them wi th words and with the pen, 
both fr om afar and face to face... they should 
become the teachers of the people.
Six years later an article by Sergi Meskhi, the editor 
of Droeba called for an end to the sterile and debilitating 
arguments between the fathers and the sons of the Georgian 
i ntelligentsia. There were simply not enough e d u c a t e d  
G e o r g i a n s  for them to be able to afford the luxury of 
debating whose was the greatest contribution to the national 
cause, when the future existence of the nation was s i m u l t a n ­
eously being undermined by government policy.
Our country is currently in such a state [ w r o t e  
Mesk h i ]  that it has b e c o m e  ess e n t i a l  for every 
Georgian to lend a hand to public affairs and help 
put them on the right path. Every m e m b e r  of 
society should do e v e r y t h i n g  in his or her p o w e r  
to assist our society.^
Akaki Dseret'eli was not as disposed as Sergi Meskhi to 
let b ygones be bygones, but he too called on all G e o r g i a n s  
to unite to p reserve their n a t i o n a l  identity. E x p l a i n i n g  
the differences between the "old" and "new" generations, he 
argued that these were essentially differences of attitude, 
not of age. Thus anyone who sought to keep a b r e a s t  of the 
socio-economic developments within society and who sought to 
serve the c o m m o n  good, b elonged to the new g e n e r a t i o n ,  
whilst those who thought only of themselves and identified
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society's interests with their own narrow class interests, 
belonged to the old generation. Dseret'eli was particularly 
c r i t i c a l  of those of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s  who f itted this 
latter category, regarding them as useless parasites on the 
nation. W h e n  one's c ountry was threatened, he p r o c l a i m e d ,  
one has no right to p e r s o n a l  indul gence, but is d u t y - b o u n d  
to come to its defence. He wrote:
...whosoever has not f u l f i l l e d  his duty has no 
right to the love of his mother, his sist e r s  or 
his wife. It is a d i s g r a c e  for a man to rest his 
head on his mother's knee, embrace his sisters, or 
sit beside his wife, when our brothers are spill­
ing their blood in s e l f l e s s  struggle. Do you not 
see the p r e d i c a m e n t  of our country?... I cannot 
wait. I must hurry to w h e r e  my duty takes me... 
victory or death.
In the i m m e d i a t e  term, therefore, the t 'e r g d a l e u l n i  
argued that the intellig e n t s i a ,  as the most c o n s c i o u s  
e l e m e n t  in the G e o r g i a n  po pulation, must play the l e a d i n g  
role in both protecting the national culture from internal 
and e x t e r n a l  threat and in g u i d i n g  the p e a s a n t r y  t o w a r d s  a 
time when it w o uld be able to play a fuller, mo re a c t i v e  and 
a w a r e  part in the life of the nation. By d o ing this, 
however, the intelligentsia would be merely fulfilling its 
debts to the peasantry, for as Meskhi reminded his readers:
W h a t  h a v e  we done, we the e d u c a t e d ,  for our 
p eople? By whose labo urs have we been r e a r e d ?
Have we retur n e d  even a third of wh'at the p eople 
have given us?. ^
Ge orgians, however, had to take the i n i t i a t i v e  by 
establishing their own primary and secondary schools in the 
towns and villages and by creating a cadre of well-qualified 
teachers who could teach in the native language, help st and­
ardise Georgian grammar and bring literacy to the peasantry.
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At stake was the continued existence of the nation, d e m a n d ­
ing of every G e o r g i a n  u n q u a l i f i e d  support of the n a t i o n a l  
cause. Thus, when in 1878 Niko Nikoladze, a p r o m i n e n t  
figure a m o n g  the t ' e r g d a l e u l n i , but one who m a i n t a i n e d  
closer links with Russia than m o s t , ^  put forward the case 
that one could serve one's country equally well wherever one 
lived, and that it did not m a t t e r  wh at language G e o r g i a n s  
studied in, so long as they studied, D r o e b a 1s editor r e s ­
ponded with a lengthy and vigorous criticism, the urgency of 
which was undoubtedly caused by the fact that these claims 
ca me from w i t h i n  the ranks of the radi c a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  
itself. Whilst by the late 1870s differences had emerged 
a m o n g  th em about the future social o r g a n i s a t i o n  of the 
nation, there was still broad agreement on cultural issues. 
Nikoladze, however, threatened to undermine this unity and 
to w e a k e n  G e o r g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  to Russification. Mes khi's 
reply again emphasised the t'ergdaleulni's conviction that 
all educated Georgians were duty-bound to serve their coun­
try, and that they had a debt to repay to the w o r k i n g  
p e o p l e . n  However, it was on the l anguage q u e s t i o n  that 
Nikoladze incurred Droeba's greatest wrath, because it was 
p r e c i s e l y  oh this issue that the t 'ergdaleulni had pl a c e d  
their great e s t  e m p h a s i s  and injec t e d  the bulk of their 
effort.
Nikoladze's arguments, claimed Meskhi, would not only 
ensure further decline in Georgian linguistic standards, but 
w o u l d  a l s o  e x c l u d e  m o s t  of the p o p u l a t i o n  f r o m  the 
educational process. What sense could there possibly be in 
educating a child in an incomprehensible language, when it 
was possible to teach in a langu a g e  he or she could u n d e r ­
stand? Already, Georgia’s best educated young men wro t e _ ^ a M
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expressed themselves better in Russian than Georgian, thus 
raising the very real possiblity that the Georgian intelli­
gentsia would soon no longer be able to communicate with its 
own people and would lose touch with its own roots.
However, whilst this difference of opinion emerged from 
w i t h i n  the ranks of the t ' e r g d a l e u l n i , it is clear that 
Nikoladze's was a minority view. A considerable part of the 
f o r m e r ' s  e f f o r t s  w e r e ,  in fact, d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  the 
creation of privately run schools sponsored by the Georgian 
c o m m u n i t y  and in w hich the m e d i u m  of i n s t r u c t i o n  was 
Georgian. Sponsorship of this kind was considered particu­
larly important since, unlike the Armenian community which 
was predominantly concentrated in the urban centres and had 
considerable funds at its disposal, the Georgian urban popu­
lation was mostly poor and the t'avadaznauroba was scattered 
across the country and often far from the nearest school.
In 1877, a joint s t a t e m e n t  of the T'bilisi G u b e r n i a  
t'avadaznauroba ind i c a t e d  its rea d i n e s s  to put aside, a 
definite sum of money every year to provide for the teaching 
of children from impoverished noble families, and at the end 
of the same year, the gubernia's t'avadaznauroba set up its 
own society whose express purpose was the establishment of 
its own schools and the p r o v i s i o n  of m a t e r i a l  aid to 
t alented pupils at other schools. Funds were p r o v i d e d  by 
private donations, m e m b e r s h i p  fees and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r o m  
the t'avadaznauroba b a n k . ^
The T'bilisi t'avadaznauroba school was opened in 1879 
with two classes, expanding in 1881 to three. The emphasis 
in these was on a c q u i r i n g  a sound k n o w l e d g e  of G e o r g i a n  
before p r o g r e s s i n g  to learn i n g  Russian, the i m p o r t a n c e  of
w h i c h  was, n e v e r t heless, s t r e s s e d . ® 0 By the turn of the 
century, the school taught all eight secondary classes, had 
665 pupi ls from all the social cla s s e s  and in 1 902 had to 
turn d o w n  500 a p p l i c a t i o n s  for lack of space and s t a f f . ® 1 
Referring to the school, Ilia Tchavtchavadze proclaimed:
G e o r g i a n  soc i e t y  should give its w h o l e - h e a r t e d  
support... if it does not wis h  Georgia's n a m e  and 
all trace of its ex i s t e n c e  to be swept like dust 
from the face of the earth.®^
However, the t 'e r g d a l e u l n i  did not c onfine their 
a c t i v i t i e s  to the p r o m o t i o n  of t e a c h i n g  in the native 
language, but sought to use it to convey to Georgians of all 
b a c k g r o u n d s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  inspire them t o w a r d s  
p a t r i o t i c  l o v e  for t h e i r  n a t i v e  l a n d  and a s e n s e  of 
s pi r i t u a l  unity to m a t c h  the country's a d v a n c i n g  e c o n o m i c  
unity. A d o c u m e n t  b e l o n g i n g  to the Society for the Spread 
of L i t e r a c y  a m o n g  Georgians, f ounded in 1879,®® m a k e s  the 
same point:
A l t h o u g h  our soci e t y  calls itself a s ociety for 
literacy, it w o uld be a great m i s t a k e  to think 
that all its fo u n d e r s  had in min d  was the t e a c h i n g  
of read i n g  and writing. The sincere wis h  of the 
found e r s  was p r i m a r i l y  the c r e a t i o n  of a school 
w h i c h  w o uld act as the hearth of our culture. 
C ulture r e p r e s e n t s  the country's broad s p i r i t u a l  
and material development; it is, in other words, 
the union of all forces which create the possibil­
ity of the people's independence.®^
Writing about the 1860s Ilia Tchavtchavadze noted that 
one of the greatest achievements of the radical intelligent­
sia had been to bring the concept of the nation to the fore­
front of political discussion and reinvest the word m a m u l i , 
w h i c h  had come to be used in the l i m i t e d  sense of an 
"estate", with its original meaning of "homeland". This, he
maintained, was s y m b o l i c  of the grad ual r e s t o r a t i o n  of
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G e o r g i a n  unity after cen t u r i e s  of d i v i s i o n  into petty 
p r i ncedoms. As a result of this r e s u r g e n c e  of interest in 
the nation, it was s c a r c e l y  surprising, he felt, that 
Georgia’s past, present and future should be becoming major 
subje c t s  of research. The G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  b e c a m e  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n c e r n e d  to f a m i l i a r i s e  itself with the 
c o u n t r y ’s h i s t o r i c a l  s o u r c e s .  T h e i r  p e d a g o g i c a l  and 
l i t e r a r y  use of h i s t o r y  was p r e d o m i n a n t l y  didactic; they 
saw h i s t o r y  as a m e a n s  to teach c o m i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  h o w  to 
learn from the failures and s u c c esses of the past and 
prepare for the future, and a m e ans al so to teach them the 
supreme virtue of loyalty to the nation. Previous Georgian 
historiography did not, in their opinion fulfil any of these 
functions.
Our cursed history [wrote Ilia Tchavtchavadze to 
D a v i t ’ E r i s t ’avi ]  ...it’s just the h i s t o r y  of 
kings and wars; the nation is n o w h e r e  to be 
seen... the p e o p l e  as the a c t i v e  e l e m e n t  in 
history languish in the s h a d o w s .
Davit’ Bak’radze, the outstanding Georgian historian of 
the 19th century, mad e  a c o n s c i o u s  effort to shift h i s t o r y  
from its previous emphasis on the dynastic interests of the 
B a g r a t i d s  and the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a  t o w a r d s  what he a r g u e d  
should be its true concern, the nation.
History [he wrote] ...should be real and complete, 
an epoch by epoch picture of the nation. H i s t o r y  
has a duty to define where and how the nation was 
e stablished, what places it has passed through, 
what culture it has brought to the country of its 
settlement, what influence the country's location 
and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  h a v e  had on its t y pe, 
character and orientation, what relationships it 
has had wit h  other peoples and what traces they 
have left in its way of life..*
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A m a r k e d  and s c a r c e l y  s u r p r i s i n g  f e a t u r e  of the 
expanded interest in Georgia's history was the growing pre­
valence of historical themes in literature. As with most of 
the s c h o l a r l y  w o r k s  on the nation's past w r i t t e n  over the 
same period, the tendency of the writers concerned was not 
to pres ent a dry d e p i c t i o n  of the events in c h r o n o l o g i c a l  
order, but to interpret moments from the country's past and 
use them to draw lessons for the present and the future. In 
this way, many writers were able to use history and histori­
cal events or personalities to inculcate national sentiment 
and p a t r i o t i s m  a m o n g  their readers, w i t h o u t  i n c u r r i n g  the 
d i s a p p r o v a l  of the censors. Through the use of heroic 
figures drawn both from Georgia's real and mythical past or, 
as in the case of Akaki Dseret'eli's S i z m ar i (The Dream), ® ^  
from the pages of Shot'a Rust'aveli's epic poem Vep'khvist- 
qaosani (The Knight in the Panther's Skin), these w r i t e r s  
endeavoured to set the moral and patriotic standards for the 
nation. Thus Elguja, the hero of Ale x a n d r e  Qazbegi's book 
of the same name, stands out as a m o d e l  of modesty, courage, 
s e l f l e s s n e s s  and resolution, a free spirit p r e p a r e d  to 
sacrifice his life in the struggle against oppression of any 
kind, be it from Russian c h i n o v n i k i  or the m o r a l l y  corrupt 
slave dealer and clan elder, Gogi Chop'ikashvili.®® Iakob 
G o g e b ashvili, too, besides his a c t i v i t i e s  as a p u b licist, 
inspector of schools and author of school text b o o k s , w a s ,  
in his capacity as editor of the children's journal Nobat'i 
(The Gift), the author of s everal h i s t o r i c a l  s t o r i e s  in 
which above all else, he emphasised the themes of unifica­
tion and national revival.
Despite c o m p l a i n t s  about the c o m p l a c e n c y  of G e o r g i a n
youth towards the nation and its survival, the t'ergdaleulni
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had already begun to make an impression on educated society 
by the 1870s. D r o e b a , for instance, c o m m e n t e d  in 1871 on 
the growing number of teachers and writers researching into 
folklore and described the annual mass spring exodus of the 
urban i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to the villa g e s  to tap the rich oral 
t r a d i t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  p e a s a n t r y . ^ 1 However, whilst 
encouraged by this bourgeoning desire to ensure the survival 
of poetry and legend passed fro m  g e n e r a t i o n  to g e n e r a t i o n  
for centuries, many t"ergdaleulni, Ilia Tchavtchavadze among 
them, were concerned that despite its undoubted contribution 
to the language, folkl o r e  alone could do little to help 
understand the origin, history and development of the nation 
and that more emphasis should be placed on disciplines like 
linguistics, archeology and ethnography which, they argued, 
merited equal if not greater stress. The latter was regar­
ded as being of p a r t i c u l a r  importance. No h i s t o r y  of the 
country could be c o m p l e t e  w i t h o u t  a thoro u g h  study of the 
people’s economic and juridical life, of its customs and its 
t r a d i t i o n s . ^  In this respect, it is perh aps w o r t h  n o t i n g  
that although there were Georgians who specialised in parti­
cular fields, m a n y  of the radi c a l  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  led very 
wide-ranging intellectual lives, making forays into various 
and often largely unrelated areas of research. If there was 
a common theme, it was simply that one way or another, they 
we re all linked t o w a r d s  f u r t h e r i n g  the i n t e r e s t s  of the 
Georgian nation.
U n doubtedly, the tsarist r e g i m e  was right to see 
n a t i o n a l i s t  m o t i v e s  in the t ’e r g d a l e u l n i ’s e f f o r t s  to 
sharpen the c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of the G e o r g i a n  people of their 
own corporate existence. The young radicals of this period
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b e l i e v e d  t h e m s e l v e s  involved in a st r u g g l e  for survi v a l  
against the administration’s blatant attempts to obliterate 
all traces of a se p a r a t e  G e o r g i a n  i d e n t i t y  and, as such, 
inten d e d  their s c h o l a r l y  pursuits as a counter to Russian 
policy and propaganda which, in accordance with its avowed 
desire to assimilate all the peoples of the Transcaucasus, 
sought to emphasise the differences within Georgian society 
and r efused to r e c o g n i s e  the c o m m o n  ethnic origins of 
G e o r g i a n s  from dif f e r e n t  parts of the country. Thus, not 
only was G e o r g i a  split into two a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  units, but 
the Russian word for a Georgian, G ruzin, was applied only to 
people from K ’a r t ’1 - K a k h e t ’i . M o u n t a i n  G e o r g i a n s  like the 
P'shavs, T’ushs, Khevsurs and Svans were treated as differ­
ent peoples, as were West Georgians, who were referred to as 
Imerians despite the fact that they spoke the same language 
and shared numerous customs and traditions. Consequently, 
much of the t ' e r g d a l e u l n i ’s a c t i v i t y  was d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  
refuting government assertions and underscoring the cultur­
al, linguistic, historical and territorial unity of Georgia. 
They did, however, face a major problem in that although the 
T ’ushs, P ’shavs, I m e r i a n s  and others did share a c o m m o n  
language and customs they, nevertheless, referred to t h e m ­
selves as T ’u s h e b i , P ’s h a v elebi and I m e r e l e b i , w h i l s t  the 
G e o r g i a n  s e l f - a p p e l l a t i o n ,  K ’a r t *v e l i , al so had the m o r e  
restrictive meaning of someone from K'art’li. The cause, as 
Sergi Meskhi pointed out in an article for Droeba, e m p h a s i s ­
ing the vital role played by the p a p e r ’s j o u r n a l i s t s  in 
f a m i l i a r i s i n g  G e o r g i a n s  wit h  the various parts of th eir 
c o u n t r y , was the fragmentation of the Georgian state since 
the M i d d l e  Ages. Th us, w h e r e a s  G e o r g i a n s  s p o k e  of
Sak'art'velo by the 12th century, meaning all of present day
Georgia and more, by the 19th century much of that sense of 
unity had e v a p o r a t e d . ^  This c o n s t i t u t e d  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
d i f f i c u l t y  for the t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  and one too w h i c h  was 
exacerbated by tsarist policies. If, therefore, the country 
was to avoid assimilation, it was essential that Georgians, 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y  those with an education, take an a ctive 
interest in their own country. Meskhi underlined this in a 
separ a t e  art i c l e  for D r o e b a , in w h i c h  he r e f e r r e d  to his 
s h a m e  on m e e t i n g  a F r e n c h m a n  who had t r a v e r s e d  the length 
and breadth of G eorgia on foot and k n e w  more about the 
country than he did. Borrowing this foreigner’s advice, he 
lectured his readers that if they w i s h e d  to be of ser v i c e  to 
the people and society, they should first become acquainted 
with the situation and needs of their cou n t r y . ^
The f r e e d o m  and a b i l i t y  of the t * e r g d a l e u l n i  to 
i n f l u e n c e  social thought was i n e v i t a b l y  h a n d i c a p p e d  by
strict c e n s o r s h i p  on the one hand and the low level of
liter a c y  on the other. It was, for instance, i m p o s s i b l e  
openly to challenge tsarist rule in the Caucasus, let alone 
call for its overthrow. Never t h e l e s s ,  t hrough j u d i cious 
accounts of the development of national liberation movements 
in Europe and aided by an upsurge of n a t i o n a l  s e n t i m e n t  in 
connection with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the t 'erg­
d aleu l n i had by the 1880s gone a long way t o w a r d s  k i n d l i n g  
n a t i o n a l  s e n t i m e n t  and m a k i n g  an issue of the n a t i o n a l  
question.
Although, as has been stated above, the i n t e l l e c t u a l  
roots of the radical intelligentsia are to be found chiefly 
in the q a z a r m elebi of the 1830s and 1840s and the R u s s i a n
Populists, it is cle a r l y  the case that they also d r e w
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inspiration from the nationalist movements spreading across 
Europe.
Garib aldi, M a z z i n i  and Koss u t h  have b e c o m e  the 
ideal for every conscious patriot.
w r o t e  Akaki D s e r e t ’eli in the 1860s and indeed, t h r o u g h o u t  
that and the f o l l o w i n g  decade the G e o r g i a n  rad i c a l  press 
paid close a t t e n t i o n  to the str u g g l e s  of the r e p r e s s e d  
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  of E u r o p e . ^  The R i s o r g i m e n t o  became, in 
effect, a s u r r o g a t e  for a n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t  at home, 
whilst Garibaldi was portrayed as the ideal patriotic hero0® 
and parallels were drawn between Italy’s fate and Georgia’s. 
In 1875 Meskhi wrote:
Relatively speaking, the Italian p e n i n s u l a  p r e ­
sent ed the sam e  sort of picture once given by 
Georgia: formerly a powerful, flourishing ruler
of entire countries, the Roman empire was now r e ­
duced to litle Italy and this little country was, 
mor eover, split into still s m a l l e r  ki nsd o m s , 
principalities, republics and dependencies.^0
As rapturous report followed rapturous report describ­
ing the selfless struggle of the Italian people for national 
u n i f i c a t i o n  and independence, the inf e r e n c e  for G e o r g i a n s  
must have been clear.
Everyone understands [wrote Droeba in 1866] that 
the tim e  is c o m i n g  for all Italians to unite and 
for Italy’s existence to be confirmed once and for 
all. None of them fears the sac r i f i c e  that has 
to be mad e  for their native land and all are ready 
to give everything for their country.10®
But whilst reports of unification in Italy and Germany 
and of struggle in Greece, Bulgaria and Ireland were written 
with s y m p a t h y  and recei v e d  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  in G e o r g i a n  
intellectual circles, there can have been few who expected
to see Garibaldi's feats e m u l a t e d  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s .
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They did, however, offer a g l i m m e r  of hope for the future 
and did suggest that the tide of European d e v e l o p m e n t  was 
perhaps m o v i n g  in favour of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of n a t i o n a l  
states, that history, in effect, was on their side.
Moreover, whilst opportunities to arouse and activate 
national self-consciousness were for the most part hindered 
by the tsarist regime, the latter, nevetheless, provided the 
Georgian intelligentsia with a classical means for encourag­
ing the spread and d e e p e n i n g  of natio n a l  sentiment. As 
r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the O t t o m a n  and Russian e m p i r e s  g r e w  
sourer through the 1 860s and 1 870s and the pr o s p e c t  of war 
loomed closer, Georgians sensed an opportunity was arising 
to take revenge against the Turks. Motivated by its i m m e d ­
iate territorial ambitions, the authorities encouraged the 
native p o p u l a t i o n  to wor k  up its spleen a gainst its t r a d i ­
tional e n e m y 101 and thus unwittingly provided the t'ergdal­
eulni with a means to stir up latent national emotions, for 
by c o n d u c t i n g  an ir r e d e n t i s t  c a m p a i g n  in the press and 
elsewhere for the reincorporation of parts of Georgia then 
under Turkish occupation, the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was able to 
r e m i n d  G e o r g i a n s  of their e s s e n t i a l  unity in a way that 
would otherwise have been unthinkable. With almost 200,000 
G e o r g i a n s  still living in T urkish G e o r g i a , 1^  it s uddenly 
became permissible to stress the primacy of national unity, 
to emphasise the injustice of the Turkish presence on G e o r ­
gian soil and to recall the f o r m e r  t e r ritorial, political, 
l i n g u i s t i c  and even rel i g i o u s  unity of all Georgians. 
W h i l s t  this no doubt served the s h o r t - t e r m  plans of the 
government to extend its borders, the t'ergdaleulni under­
stood very well that it also offe r e d  th em a rare c h a n c e  to
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focus the minds of the i n d i g e n o u s  p o p u l a t i o n  on their 
national identity.
I r r e d e n t i s m ,  so of ten a feature of n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e ­
ments, played on the old a n t a g o n i s m s  b e t w e e n  G e o r g i a n  and 
Turk and gave the f o r m e r  a sense of n ational p urpose that 
had p r e v i o u s l y  been lacking. Unable to offer m e a n i n g f u l  
r e s i s t a n c e  to the Russian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and, in any case, 
r e l u ctant to aban d o n  the d e f e n s i v e  shield a f f o r d e d  by its 
presence, however obnoxious its policies, Georgians could at 
last both id e n t i f y  their enemy, and feel free to fight him. 
Historic memories were revived and a campaign initiated to 
acqua i n t  readers of the G e o r g i a n  press with the fate of 
their 1 o n g - f o r g o t t e n  broth e r s  in Turkey. C o r r e s p o n d e n t s ,  
including the editor of Tsiskari, travelled in Turkish G e o r ­
gia to return with h a r r o w i n g  tales of na t i o n a l  o p p r e s s i o n  
and s t i r r i n g  a c c o u n t s  of G e o r g i a n s 1 r e a d iness to fight for 
national u n i t y . C h r i s t i a n  Georgians were shamed by the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of their M u s l i m  b rothers to cling to their 
language, customs and identity, whatever the circumstances.
They r e m e m b e r  that they are our b rothers [ wrote 
Dro-eba ], that for a long time we shared the same 
identity, defen d e d  our n a tive land t o g e t h e r  and 
defended Georgia’s faith and independence against 
fierce enemies. They remember Vakhtang-Gorgaslani 
and the immortal Queen T'amar...1^
Irredentism did, however, raise the uncomfortable question 
of religion, for in their early a t t e m p t s  to def i n e  the 
e ssence of G e o r g i a n  nationality, the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i  pl a y e d  
n o t i c e a b l y  u p o n  the i n f l u e n c e  of C h r i s t i a n i t y .  The 
Christian and Orthodox Church, claimed Ilia Tchavtchavadze, 
was and r e m a i n e d  "the source of the p e o p l e ’s m o r a l i t y  and 
e t h i c s " , a  statement which can hardly have endeared him
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to his M u s l i m  com p a t r i o t s .  Increasingly, though, f actors 
like shared territory, cult ure and l anguage s u p e r c e d e d  
religion as the t'ergdaleulni prepared to reconstitute the 
national boundaries of the medieval Georgian state.
When war finally began in 1877, thousands of Georgians
1 D
volunteered to fight, although there may have been some 
confusion as to the exact circumstances of the Georgians in 
Turkey, as the following extract from a patriotic statement 
by the K'ut’aisi town duma suggests:
At the time when our co-religionists in Turkey are 
w o r n  d o w n  by the hated M u s l i m  yoke w h i c h  bore 
h e a v i l y  on our a n c e s t o r s  f r o m  g e n e r a t i o n  to 
generation, can we possibly remain indifferent?...
Can we forget our fellow believers?... 1
W h a t e v e r  the confusion, G e o r g i a n s  of v a r y i n g  b a c k ­
grounds were caught up in a war, w h i c h  they c o n s i d e r e d  a wa r 
of national liberation. Many of the t !ergdaleulni, when not 
actually engaged in the fighting, contributed to the patrio­
tic mood with reports from the front for Droeba, Iveria and 
K a v k a z , d e s c r i b i n g  the t r i u m p h a n t  r e c a p t u r e  of the old 
G e o r g i a n  p r o vinces of A t c h a r a - k o b u l e t  !i , C h i l d i r i  and 
Shavshet’i.
When in 1 878 the war ended, the moo d  was of t r i u m p h  and 
optimism. The national frontiers had been extended almost 
to e n c o m p a s s  the t e r r i t o r y  of the m e d i e v a l  state and s o m e  
200,000 compatriots had been reunited with their motherland. 
In an atmosphere of national exultation, a Muslim Georgian 
d e l e g a t i o n  a r r i v e d  in T ' b i l i s i  in A u g u s t  1878, to an 
e c s t a t i c  r e c e p t i o n .  A d d r e s s i n g  the d e l e g a t e s ,  A k a k i  
D s e r e t ' e l i  r e m i n d e d  all G e o r g i a n s  of t h e i r  c o m m o n  
inheritance:
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uur ioreiatners Dequeaunea tneir aesce ndents two 
t h i n g s :  the m o t h e r  t o n g u e  and n a t i o n a l i t y
(e r o b a ). Both have been p r e s e r v e d  equa l l y  by 
Christian and Muslim Georgians alike.10
4.5 The Defence of National Culture Against Russification
The s u c c e s s f u l  c o n c l u s i o n  of the war also brought a 
change in the attitude of the Russian government. Whereas 
in the p e r i o d  up to and d u r i n g  the w a r  G e o r g i a n s ’ 
irredentist ambitions had been encouraged, they now consti­
tuted an obstacle to Russia's own plans to establish a deep 
sea port in Bat'umi and secure the border zone by s e t t l i n g  
it with citizens loyal to the tsar. In the vie w  of the 
administration, the religious convictions of the indigenous 
population of South-West Georgia made them unreliable allies 
in any future conflict wit h  the Turks. Conse q u e n t l y ,  the 
government attempted to sow dissension between Christian and 
Muslim Georgians100 and to encourage the latter by force or 
p e r s u a s i o n  to return to Turkey. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  in a rare 
i nsta n c e  of c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  the R ussian and O t t o m a n  
governments, the Turks attempted to lure them back to Turkey 
with p r o m i s e s  of land, w h i l e  in 1 879 the a p p e a r a n c e  of the 
muhajiri movement, emphasising the religious beliefs of the 
local population, led to a considerable exodus.110 Feeling 
be t r a y e d  by the Russians, the G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  
immediately began to counter official propaganda. Special 
efforts were made to establish national schools and to send 
t eachers and text - b o o k s  to help spread l i t e r a c y  in the 
G e o r g i a n  language. Mindful, too, of R u s s i a n  agit a t i o n ,  
warnings were issued against religious intolerance.
D i f f e r e n c e  of faith does not i m p e d e  and does not
1 1 1interfere with our fraternity and unity... 1 1
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wrote Sergi Meskhi, whilst Ilia Tchavtchavadze, who had pre­
viously identified the Christian faith as a key constituent 
of the national character wrote:
The Georgian, who has been t o r m e n t e d  for his own 
faith, respe c t s  the beliefs of others. C o n s e ­
q u e n t l y ,  t h e r e  is no c a s e  in our h i s t o r y  of 
G e o r g i a n s  w i s h i n g  to oppress or p e r s e c u t e  the 
faiths of other peoples. Armenians, Jews as well 
as Muslims, live among us and are unable to fault 
us on t h i s  a c c o u n t .  P e o p l e  p e r s e c u t e d  and 
o p p r e s s e d  for their beliefs in other c o u n t r i e s
found f r e e d o m  of c o n s c i e n c e  and a peace f u l  haven 
112m  o u r s .
In many respects, the tsarist post-war decision to pick 
up the threads of the a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t  policy t e m p o r a r i l y  
a b a n d o n e d  for the war, s u c c e e d e d  only in c o n s o l i d a t i n g  
n a t i o n a l  f e e l i n g  a m o n g  G e o r g i a n s  and u n i t i n g  the i n t e l l i ­
gentsia. It did contr i v e  to send man y  M u s l i m s  back to 
Turkey, of course, but by the end of the decade G e o r g i a n
c o u n t e r - p r o p a g a n d a  had arres t e d  the exodus and t e m p t e d
others to return. The tsarist officials at first countered 
this development by refusing to issue entry visas, but then, 
co n c e r n e d  by the effect this policy was hav i n g  on G e o r g i a n  
public opinion, gave way. One of the first s u c c e s s f u l  
mobilisations of popular feeling against the regime since it 
annexed the country in 1801, this was an indication that the 
avowed aim of the t'ergdaleulni to imbue the Georgian people 
with a sense of their ow n  i d e n t i t y  was a c h i e v i n g  its p u r ­
pose. But though a vict o r y  of sorts for the G e o r g i a n
intellig e n t s i a ,  it did not p resage a ne w  phase of e n l i g h t ­
ened tol e r a n c e  from St. Petersburg, but was r a t h e r  an 
isolated gesture of conciliation before the mood of m e s s i a n ­
ic Russian c h a u v i n i s m  a l r e a d y  m a k i n g  itself felt in the
1870s c l i m a x e d  in the 1880s in an a g g r e s s i v e  drive to
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R u s s i f y  the n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  of the e mp ire .
The assassination of Alexander II on 1st March 1881 was 
all the pretext required by his successor, Alexander III, to 
strengthen and extend the police powers of the Ministry of 
the Interior and c urtail the inf l u e n c e  a c h i e v e d  by the
z e m s t v a , city g o v e r n m e n t s  and courts during his f a t h e r ’s
reign. Greatly influenced by his advisor and former tutor, 
P o b e d o n o s t s e v , the tsar d i r e c t e d  Russia back t o w a r d s  the 
slogan "autocracy, orthodoxy and nationalism" and effective­
ly c rushed hopes for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
rights. Policy towards non-Russians, particularly the Jews, 
became marked at best by intolerance and at worst brutality.
In January 1882, the limited autonomy conferred on the 
T r a n s c a u c a s u s  through the v i c e - r e g e n c y  was t e r m i n a t e d  and 
the g u b e r n i i  of the region s u b o r d i n a t e d  d i r e c t l y  to St. 
Petersburg. In place of the former vice-regent, Dondukov- 
Korsakov was appointed governor-general and in preparation 
for the o n s l a u g h t  against the n a t i o n a l  e x i s t e n c e  of the
Ge o r g i a n  people, a n u m b e r  of changes were mad e  in key
positions controlling the areas of religion, culture, educa­
tion and the press. Yan o v s k i i  and A r c h b i s h o p  Pavle, me n  
from the same mould as their masters in St. Petersburg, were
1 n
appointed to control education and religion respectively. J 
Even the public use of the word S a k ’a r t 1 v e l o , in a d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  a n t i c i p a t i n g  P o l a n d ’s f a t e  t w o  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  w a s  
b a n n e d , w h i l s t  the Russian press was encouraged to revive
racist v i e w s  to the effect that G e o r g i a n s  were l a w l e s s
118brigands and Asiatics. J
The d o w n g r a d i n g  of the G e o r g i a n  language and its
gradual exclusion from the educational system witnessed over
the preceding 15 years was now pursued with renewed vigour.
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In 1883 Delyanov, the M i n i s t e r ■of Education, i n s t r u c t e d  
Yanovskii to ensure that no Georgian or Armenian suspected 
of separatist sympathies be allowed to retain a position in 
state service, education or the ch u r c h . 1 1^ Although already 
p r e j u d i c e d  against in man y  ways, this was the mo st w i de- 
sweeping measure yet employed against the indigenous peoples 
of the Transcaucasus, particularly as the charge of separat­
ism could be and was levelled against those who sought to
A
protect the use of G e o r g i a n  on p e d o g o g i c a l  g r o u n d s  or to 
defend the national culture. Ilia Tchavtchavadze noted in 
an a r t i c l e  for Dr o e b a  in 1882 that a m o n g s t  the b i z a r r e  
e v i d e n c e  q uoted by the c o n s e r v a t i v e  n e w s p a p e r  M o s k o v s k i e  
V e d o m o s t i 11  ^ of supposed separatist sentiment, was the fact 
that G e o r g i a n s  and A r m e n i a n s  not only staged their own 
plays, but a t t e n d e d  them in s u f f i c i e n t l y  large n u m b e r s  to 
cover the costs of h e a t i n g  and lighting, w h i l s t  R u s s i a n  
t h e a t r e  w a s  p o o r l y  a t t e n d e d  and u n a b l e  to c o v e r  s u c h  
c o s t s .11®
This a t t e m p t  to exclude all but the most R u s s i f i e d  of 
G e o r g i a n s  from state service was f o l l o w e d  in 1885 by a 
c i r c u l a r  issued by Ya n o v s k y  b a n n i n g  the use of G e o r g i a n  in 
schools. Henceforth, those who w a n t e d  their c h i l d r e n  to 
study the native language would have to provide for tuition 
at home.11^ Attacks were also directed against the Georgian ? 
educational press and censorship tightened. In a confiden­
tial report w h ich clearly i n d i c a t e d  the i n t e n t i o n s  of 
government policy Yanovsky wrote:
I have to say that it w o u l d  be more useful to
R ussian state interests if such subjects as b i o ­
graphy, artic l e s  and stories fro m  the h i s t o r y  of 
Georgia, and geography were banned from the jour­
nals published in the languages of the indigenous
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p eoples of the Caucasus, because such subjects 
can, in different ways, very easily become nation­
alist weapons. 0
Having concentrated his efforts on weakening Georgians' 
resistance to linguistic and cultural assimilation, Yanovsky 
then turned his attentions towards undermining the efforts 
of the t ' e r g d a l e u l n i  to r e c o n s t r u c t  n a t i o n a l  unity. 
Attempting to drive a wedge between the regions comprising 
the Georgian nation, the official view gave credence to the 
opi n i o n  that the Khevsurs, Imerians, Svans, T'ushs and 
Megrelians all constituted different nationalities. Some of 
the evidence used to support these arguments bordered on the 
ludicrous as Georgians were quick to point out.121 Indeed, 
d e f i n i t i o n s  of n a t i o n a l i t y  based on the shape and size of 
one's skull or on clothing could scarcely claim to be scien­
tific. If as arbitrary a criterion as costume was employed, 
it could, as Ilia Tchavtchavadze indicated, make one nation 
of the peasantry of Tula Gubernia and another of the peasan­
try of M o s c o w  G u b e r n i a  s i m p l y  on the basis of the style of
1 p ?head-dress prevalent in their respective areas. 1 ^
More t h r e a t e n i n g  to n a t i o n a l  unity, ho w e v e r ,  was the 
government's attempt to replace Georgian with Megrelian as 
the m e d i u m  for t e a c h i n g  R ussian in Samegrelo's schools. 
Claiming that Georgian was not understood by the native po p ­
ulation, the g o v e r n m e n t  was able to appear as if it was 
defending the right of Megrelians to a good education. At a 
time, moreover, when it was repressing national minorities 
(Georgians included) elsewhere in the empire, the government 
conferred "nation" status on Samegrelo and began to devise a 
n e w  a l p h a b e t  for the l a n g u a g e ,  d e s p i t e  the f a c t  t h a t  
Megrelian and Georgian clearly belong to the same language
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group, are pronounced similarly and have similar grammatical
1 p q
structures. This and s i m i l a r  projects u n d e r t a k e n  in
Svanet'i and Ap'khazet'i from 1889-1890 failed to a ttract 
the supp ort of the local p o p u l a t i o n s  and thus a c h i e v e d  
little, but n e v e r t h e l e s s  i n d i c a t e d  the s e r i o u s n e s s  of the 
threat posed to G eorgia’s national existence. 1
The Russian policy of divide and rule was also employed 
to exploit the mounting class and national tensions between 
Georgians and Armenians. By encouraging antagonism of this 
sort, the regime was able to divert the energies of the two 
nations into fru i t l e s s  sq u a b b l e s  about e t h n o g e n e s i s  and 
their r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to h i s t o r y  and to s t y m i e  the 
p rogr e s s  a c h i e v e d  at m e e t i n g s  held in the 1870s t o w a r d s  a 
united c a m p a i g n  against a u t o c r a c y  and u l t i m a t e l y  for a
I O C
federal Transcaucasian state. ' J The regime manipulated the 
desire of the A r m e n i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  for an e x t e n s i v e  
territorial base under Russian patronage and certainly did 
n o t h i n g  to d i s c o u r a g e  n a t i o n a l i s t  A r m e n i a n  a c a d e m i c s ,  of 
w h o m  P r o f e s s o r  P a t k a n i a n  was the most n o t o r i o u s  examp l e ,  
fro m  laying cl a i m s  to v i r t u a l l y  all of Geor g i a  s outh of 
T ’bilisi, from denigrating Georgian culture and history and 
lauding their o w n J 2^ It is probably no coincidence either, 
that w r i t i n g  of this nature was at its peak d u r i n g  the 
1880s, the worst years of reaction. To many Georgians who 
recalled that Georgia had for centuries provided a haven for 
Armenian refugees fleeing from persecution in Turkey, such 
i n g r a t i t u d e  c o n f i r m e d  their g r o w i n g  p r e j u d i c e s  about the 
a lle g e d  n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the A r m e n i a n  people. 
The more prescient among the intelligentsia, however, u nder­
stood the dangers of this line of thought and s ought to
prevent their critiques of Patkanian and his associates from
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degenerating into an argument with the Armenian nation as a 
whole, from w h i c h  neither side could hope to gain. Ilia 
T c h a v t c h a v a d z e , in a long r e f u t a t i o n  of Patkanian's and 
other's claims, in which he presented a case supported by a 
barrage of Georgian, Armenian, Greek, R o m a n  and A s s y r i a n  
sources, went to great pains to stress that he had no 
quarrel wit h  the A r m e n i a n  people, w h o s e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to 
c ulture and h i s t o r y  he did not doubt, but wit h a f e w  i n d i v i ­
duals who did not, he argued, rep r e s e n t  the mass of the 
population.
Every n ation [he wrote] has its own i n d i v i d u a l
character, its own inner hopes, desires, a s p i r a ­
tions and its own innate worth. '
But Russification did not always pursue such an insidu- 
ous path. D uring the last q uarter of the c e n t u r y  the 
government pursued a blatant policy of reserving some of the 
best state land in G eorgia for c o l o n i s a t i o n  by R u s s i a n  
p e a s a n t s .  A s u r v e y  c o n d u c t e d  in 1874, for i n s t a n c e ,  
r e v e a l e d  that there were 49 ne w  R ussian s e t t l e m e n t s  in 
T'bilisi and Borchalo d i s t r i c t s  alone, c o n s i s t i n g  of 85 0 
households, and f.ollowing the e x p a t r i a t i o n  of Ap'khaz 
Muslims to Turkey in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish war, 
the initial migration of landless peasants from Samegrelo to 
Ap'khazet'i was q uickly reduced to a trickle to a l l o w  the 
area to be colonised by R u s s i a n s . w h i l s t  reservation of' 
land in this way e n c o u n t e r e d /o p p o s i t i o n  d uring the years 
i m m e d i a t e l y  after the peas ant r e f o r m s  of 1864-71, by the 
1890s land shortage had b e c o m e  so acute that G e o r g i a n  
peasants found t h e m s e l v e s  in i n c r e a s i n g  confl i c t  w i t h  the 
g o v e r n m e n t .  In a typical case, the g o v e r n m e n t  r e f u s e d
264
numerous requests from East Georgian highlanders to settle 
in the valley of Shirak. M a k i n g  a prete n c e  of p r o t e c t i n g  
the i n t e r e s t s  of n o m a d i c  s h e p h e r d s ,  the a u t h o r i t i e s  
a c t u a l l y  planned to settle the valley with Russians. In 
1 903, the head of S i g h n a g h i  d i s t r i c t  w r o t e  to the g o v e r n o r  
of T 1bilisi:
For the purpose of Russifying the area assigned to 
me I c o n s i d e r  it ess e n t i a l  to put aside land for 
resettlement in Shirak. 112,000 desyatiny will be 
used for the Russian s e t t l e m e n t s ,  half of w h i c h  
will be good arable land and the rest pasture. 30
Such naked d i s r e g a r d  for the int e r e s t s  of the native 
peasantry ultimately proved counter-productive as it s t i m u ­
lated a n t i - R u s s i a n  s e n t i m e n t  and, in this case, drove the
h i g h l a n d e r s  to p r e - e m p t  m a t t e r s  by s e t t l i n g  in the valley
13 1without government permission.
In fact, t h r o u g h o u t  the worst years of n a t i o n a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s s i o n  the i n s e n s i t i v i t y  of the g o v e r n m e n t  
t o w a r d s  the needs, hopes, a s p i r a t i o n s  and d e s i r e s  of the 
Georgian people and the crudity of its attempts to a s s i m i ­
late them into the Great Russian culture not only failed to 
achi e v e  its purpose, but so o u t r a g e d  the p a t r i o t i s m  of the 
t’avadaznauroba that all but its most conservative elements 
unit ed behind the t ’e r g d a l e u l n i ’s defence of the nation. 
Oliver Wardrop witnessed the changing political climate:
The can be little doubt of the fact that the 
excessive precautions taken by the police, with a 
view to put down political agitation of any kind, 
have produced the very thing they are intended to 
prevent. A c ountry squi re in tal k i n g  to me, one 
day, about a little m a r k e t - t o w n  near his home, 
said, ’They have posted a g e n d a r m e  there. Until 
he came nobody ever bothered about politics. Now 
there is nothing else talked o f ’.
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There was, however, rather mo re to the t'avada znaur- 
o b a 1s b e h a v i o u r  in the p o s t - r e g e n c y  period than injured 
n a t i o n a l  pride. Since their rel u c t a n t  a c c e p t a n c e  of the 
peasant reforms and the subseqent failure of many of their 
number to adjust to the changing socio-economic environment, 
the t 'avadaznaurebi had looked to the tsar to defend their 
status in return for loyal service. Muc h  of the o p t i m i s m  
too of l eading l i b e r a l - m i n d e d  nobles like D i m i t r i  Q ipiani 
had rested on the assumption that the zemstva and judicial 
reforms introduced in European Russia would be extended to 
Georgia. However, the likelihood, w e a k  even in A l e x a n d e r  
II's reign, that these r e f o r m s  w o u l d  reach the T r a n s c a u c a -  
sus, collapsed with the coronation of his son. Distrustful 
of anything that appeared to mediate between the autocracy 
and the people, the tsar r e g a r d e d  the z e m stva w i t h  h o s t i l ­
ity. In itself a considerable blow to the hopes and morale 
of the liberal t'avadaznauroba, the effect of this was c o m ­
pounded by Delyanov's instruction to Yanovskii in 1883 that 
no Georgian suspected of separatist sympathies be retained 
in state service. Since virtually any expression of concern 
for the survival of the national culture was now interpreted 
as indicative of nationalism this directive attacked many of 
those who considered themselves loyal servants of the tsar. 
Thus, in a few years, the new regime in the Caucasus a l ien­
a t e d  the s u p p o r t  a c c r u e d  o v e r  the p r e v i o u s  40 y e a r s .  
Dimitri Qipiani, who had played such a prominent role in the 
defence of batonqmoba in the early 1860s, now found himself 
supporting the t'ergdaleulni* s opposition to discrimination 
against G e o r g i a n  culture. A d d r e s s i n g  h i m s e l f  d i r e c t l y  to 
Yanovskii, he asked:
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Chingis Khan, Lang T'emur, Shahabaz and Nadirshah 
were unable to s hatter our natio n a l  e x i s t e n c e  - 
can it now be that you want to shatter it, at a 
tim e  when we have w i l lingly, lovin g l v  and h o p e ­
fully placed our faith in ’Russia...?
The t'avadaznaurebi went to great pains to r e a f f i r m  
both their faith in and loyalty to the throne and to absolve 
the tsar of any blame for the situation in Georgia, clearly 
i m p l y i n g  that D o n d u k o v - K o r s a k o v  was p u r s u i n g  a d e l i b e r a t e  
and u n j u s t i f i e d  c a m p a i g n  of n a t i o n a l  r e p r e s s i o n  w i t h o u t  
Al e x a n d e r  I l l ’s knowledge. In a letter to the g o v e r n o r -  
general, in his capacity as leader of the nobility, Qipiani 
e x p r e s s e d  his c oncern at the o b s t a c l e s  put in the wa y  of 
Georgians seeking state service, the exclusion of Georgian 
from the school syllabus and at the administration's efforts 
to oppose the unification of Georgia's regions:
Can all this p o s s i b l y  serve the int e r e s t s  of the 
g o v e r n m e n t  [he asked], w h i c h  has taken under its 
protection tormented Orthodox Georgia, for which 
it d eserves our b o u n d l e s s  g r a t i t u d e ?  I c o n s i d e r  
it my sacr ed duty to hold b y * t h e s e f e e l i n g s  of 
g r a t i t u d e  and loyalty and p r e c i s e l y  for this 
reason fail to understand people’s anger at me.
Al t h o u g h  Qipiani may g e n u i n e l y  have b e l i e v e d  in the 
b e n e v o l e n c e  of the tsar, the G e o r g i a n  press e m p l o y e d  the 
same d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  the tsar and his e x e c u t i v e s  as a 
tactic to enable it to sustain the unequal struggle against 
the regime. While an unconvincing distinction, especially 
since the a b o l i t i o n  of the v i c e - r e g e n c y  and the direct 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of the C a u c a s i a n  g u b e r n i i  to St. P e t ersburg, 
it nevertheless remains an indication of the curious nature 
of censorship in late tsarist Russia that it enabled Droeba 
and other papers, while they survived, to criticise go v e r n ­
ment policy and challenge the underlying philosophy of the
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r e g i m e  t o w a r d s  the n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s .
In J anuary 1882, in another d e m o n s t r a t i o n  of the 
a p p a r e n t l y  h a p h a z a r d  nature of tsarist censo rship, the 
G e o r g i a n  t h e a t r e  in T ' b i l i s i  s t a g e d  a p l a y  e n t i t l e d  
S.a_m_sh_£t)_l£ (The M o t h e r l a n d ) ,  w h i c h  r e c a l l e d  G e o r g i a ' s  
struggle for national freedom against Shah Abbas. That the 
allegorical content of the play quickly communicated itself 
to the a u d i e n c e  is clear fro m  the o b s e r v a t i o n s  of a s p e c ­
tator following a scene in which the Georgian soldiers swore 
by the flag their readiness to die for their country:
It was an a s t o n i s h i n g  m o m e n t  and had a g e n u i n e l y  
m i r a c u l o u s  effect on the spectators. The w h o l e  
audience, fro m  the front rows of the stalls to the 
back of the gallery, rose to its feet, ready to 
kneel in respect before the national flag. ^
It was, in fact, s u f f i c i e n t l y  a s t o n i s h i n g  to d r a w  
c o m m e n t  from Katkov's paper M o s k o v s k i e  V e d o m osti to the 
effect that Georgians should cover the costs of the produc­
tion by s e l l i n g  their flag to the circus. Such a crude and 
intemperate response was grist to the nationalist mill and, 
indeed, elicited a sharp reply from Ilia Tchavtchavadze in 
D r o e b a , in which he fierc e l y  c r i t i c i s e d  Katkov' views, 
d espite his k n o w n  i n f l uence on the tsar. But D r o e b a 's 
apparent good fortune was drawing to an end and in 1885 the
Ministry of Internal Affairs closed it down, "because of its
18 7
anti-government tendencies". '
Despite the importance of the press, the greatest pos i ­
tive achievement of the intelligentsia was the establishment 
of the S o c i e t y  for the S p r e a d i n g  of L i t e r a c y  a m o n g  
Georgi ans, an o r g a n i s a t i o n  w h ose activities, as st a t e d  
above, ex t e n d e d  beyond the l i m i t s  s u g g e s t e d  by its title.
Funded by s u b s c r i p t i o n  fees, private c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and
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donations from the nobility banks, the society undoubtedly 
did play an i m p o r t a n t  role in s p r e a d i n g  literacy. Aside 
from its a s s i s t a n c e  to the n o b i l i t y  scho ol in T'bilisi, it 
had by 1888, despite frequent government opposition, set up 
schools in Bat'umi (considered especially important because 
of its location in Atchara), Dzveli Senaki, K'ut'aisi, 
Gomaret'i, Dsinarekhi, Khelt'ubani and T ' i a n e t 'i1^8 and was 
a s s i s t i n g  a f urther 81 in K'ut'aisi g u b e r n i a  a l o n e . 1^  It 
also s u p p o r t e d  lib r a r i e s  and r e a d i n g  rooms, ran eve n i n g  
courses, trained teachers, c o l l e c t e d  ancient artifacts, 
tre a s u r e s  and e t h n o g r a p h i c a l  material, recor d e d  folklore, 
restored monuments, performed agricultural relief work and 
encouraged research into Georgia's culture. Almost a symbol 
of c r y s t a l l i s i n g  n a t i o n a l  unity, the soc i e t y  r e c r u i t e d  
members throughout Georgia and maintained agents wherever 
possible to help set up schools, propagandise its ideas and 
raise funds.
A m o n g  its mo st s i g n i f i c a n t  a c h i e v e m e n t s ,  the s o c i e t y  
became an important publisher and played a vital role in en­
couraging the development of Georgian literature during the 
worst years of n a t i o n a l  repression, g i v i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  
support to pat r i o t i c  w r i t e r s  like N ikoloz B a r a t ' a s h v i l i , 
Akaki Dseret'eli, Vazha Pshavela, Alexandre Qazbegi and Ilia 
T c h a v t c h a v a d z e .  A c a t a l o g u e  of b o o k s  on s a l e  at the 
society's shop in 1904 gives some indication of its success, 
and of the taste of G e o r g i a n  readers. Of the 874 entries, 
782 were published in Georgian, with the greatest concentra­
tion of titles being either h i s t o r i c a l  or l i t e r a r y  and the 
bulk of the f o r m e r  t ending t o w a r d s  the M i d d l e  Ages and r e ­
flecting the rising interest in Georgia's "golden a g e " . ^ 0
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Whilst most of the resistance to the administration's 
a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  in the 1880s took a legal form, 
some of the new g e n e r a t i o n  of Georgians, v i c t i m s  of the 
humiliating educational system, adopted the organisational 
methods of the populists, formed underground cells and con­
ducted e x t r a - l e g a l  a c t i v i t i e s  against the regime. The 
centre of this n e w  o p p o s i t i o n  was the T'bilisi seminary, 
where the atmosphere of repression fuelled an increasingly 
violent nationalist reaction among the students and cu l m i n ­
ated on 24th May 1886, in the a s s a s s i n a t i o n  of the rect or 
Chudetskii. In the subsequent investigation Laghiashvili, a 
student at the seminary, was arrested and his diary, giving 
details of the underground organisation at the seminary and 
other e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in the city, fell into the 
hands of the police.
A l t h o u g h  the g o v e r n m e n t  t r i e d  to p l a y  d o w n  the 
p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of L a g h i a s h v i 1 i 's act, there can be 
no doubt that the assassination was also used as an opportu­
nity to i n t e n s i f y  att a c k s  against the G e o r g i a n  c o m m u n i t y .  
Chudetskii's funeral was transformed into'a demonstration of 
Russian nationalism and Exarch Pavle is attributed with pro­
claiming at the graveside:
Cursed be the people who produ c e d  your m u r d e r ­
er.
Such c o m m e n t  from the suppo s e d  "shepherd" of the 
G e o r g i a n  flock caused an outcry a m o n g  the popul a t i o n ,  
already angered at the steady Russification of the Georgian 
Church. Qipiani wrote to the exarch p o i n t i n g  out that, if 
true, Pavle's statement was incompatible with his status and 
he s h o u l d  r e s i g n .  Th e e x a r c h ,  h o w e v e r ,  d e n i e d  the
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accusation and Qipiani, in one of the ironies of the history 
of G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t ,  was found gui l t y  of 
insulting him, dismissed from his job and exiled to Stavro­
pol, w h e r e  in 1887 he is b e l i e v e d  to have been m u r d e r e d  by 
tsarist agents.
4.6 The Search for National Unity
W h i l e  Rus s i a n  c h a u v i n i s m  and of f i c i a l  p olicy t o w a r d s  
the na t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  helped foster unity on c u l t u r a l  
matters among the Georgian intelligentsia and nobility, the 
most fundamental social division, between the t’avadaznaur- 
oba and p e a s a n t r y ,  c o n t i n u e d  to d e t e r i o r a t e  as lan d  
shortage, inc r e a s e d  rents, debts, poverty and m i g r a t i o n  
fuelled class antagonism.
In the first optimistic years after the peasant reforms 
most of the leading figures in the Georgian intelligentsia 
tended to ignore socio-economic issues to concentrate on the 
n e e d  to d e v e l o p  a s e n s e  of n a t i o n a l  s e l f - a w a r e n e s s .  
Increasingly, however, they b e c a m e  a w a r e  that the r e f o r m s  
had a c c e l e r a t e d  the pace of social change and that class 
relations, instead of impro v i n g ,  as some had h o p e d  they 
would, had taken a serious turn for the worse. Thus, just 
as Georgia appeared to have achieved the territorial, econo­
m i c  and to s o m e  e x t e n t  the p o l i t i c a l  u n i t y  t h a t  the 
t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  had been s t r i v i n g  for, the s t rain on the 
social s t r u c t u r e  that had been the m a i n s t a y  of G e o r g i a n  
society for over 600 years intensified.
Moreover, as these changes in the n a t i o n ’s 'social 
fabric forced the intelligentsia to reassess its approach to 
the n a t i o n a l  question, so the latent d i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  its 
ranks began to surface. Thus, w h i l e  there were those w h o
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maintained that national unity was of paramount importance 
and that pres ent d i f f e r e n c e s  be put aside to c o u n t e r  the 
threat to G e o r g i a ’s existence, others argued that the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  was i n e x t r i c a b l y  bound up wit h  social 
issues and that until the d o m i n a t i o n  of the n o b i l i t y  was 
e n d e d ,  u n t i l  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s  w e r e  e x t e n d e d  to all, 
national unity would remain out of reach. 1ZfZf
Ilia Tchavtchavadze, who belonged to the former cate­
gory, was p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i s t u r b e d  by the threat of social 
d i v i s i o n  to n a t i o n a l  unity, fear i n g  that in t e r n a l  strife 
would cause Georgians to lose sight of their national ident­
ity and w e a k e n  their c o m m o n  s truggle a gainst tsarist 
polic i e s  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s . W r i t i n g  in the 1 870s, by 
which time the impact of the peasant reforms had been felt, 
Tchavtchavadze demanded:.
W h e r e  can one f i n d  a G e o r g i a n ,  or G e o r g i a n  
society? I want to ask you one question: Do we
e x i s t  s o m e w h e r e ? . . .  A n d  if t h e s e  a r e  n o t  
Georgians, then what are they? They are t’a v a d n i , 
aznaurni, merchants, peasants, the ranked and the 
u n r a n k e d  - t h e y  are all t h e s e  t h i n g s ,  but 
G e o r g i a n s  are nowhere. The t *avadi loathes the 
a z n a u r n i , the a z n a u r n i  hates the t *avadi and the 
peasant hates them both. Can they r eally be 
Georgians, the children of the one Georgia? .
Given his a ctive support for the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the 
serfs and his u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  c r i t i c i s m  of the s l o t h  and 
ig n o rance of the nobility, Tchavtcha v a d z e ' s  e m p h a s i s  on 
class r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  may, at first, seem to n e g a t e  his 
earlier position. But if one bears in mind that his o b jec­
t i o n  to 19th c e n t u r y  bat_onqinoba w a s  tha t  it g r o s s l y  
di s t o r t e d  a p r e v i o u s l y  organic and m u t u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  
re lationship, it b e c o m e s  easier to disc e r n  the t h r e a d s  of 
c o n s i s t e n c y  in his thought. B a t o n q m o b a  n eeded c h a n g i n g
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precisely because it no longer fulfilled this function, but 
had become, instead, a means for one class to exploit 
a n o t h e r  and an o b s t a c l e  to the e c o n o m i c  and c u l t u r a l  
progress of the nation.
N e vertheless, the a b o l i t i o n  of b a t o n q m oba did not in 
Ilia Tchavtchavadze’s mind signal the demise of the t’avad- 
a z n a u r o b a . In fact, he had no o b j e c t i o n  to the n o b i l i t y  
o w n i n g  estates, p rovided they e m p l o y e d  r a t i o n a l  f a r m i n g  
techniques and contributed to the wealth of the nation, but 
more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  he sought to r evive the old, a l l e g e d l y  
m u t u a l l y  b e n e f i c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the n o b i l i t y  and 
the peasantry. Thus, w h i l e  the n a r o d n i k i  might argue that 
the key to Russia’s future lay in agricultural and communal 
ownership, Tchavtchavadze maintained that the form of o w n e r ­
ship mo st suit ed to G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  was one based on a 
f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the t'av a d a z n a u r o b a  and 
peasantry.
What has preserved us, [he asked] we a handful of 
people? The sword and the plough! The reason we 
have a home today, that we are firmly established 
wh ere we are, that we have not been s c a t t e r e d  as 
others have and b l o w n  from one pl ace to another, 
that we have overcome so many tireless enemies and 
survived, that our nation has maintained the soil, 
an d  th e s o i l  our n a t i o n  is b e c a u s e  f r o m  the 
b e g i n n i n g  to the present we have held the s w o r d  in 
one hand and the plough in the other. We will, 
moreover, continue to survive so long as we retain 
these two invincible forces of durability.1^
Clearly contained in this statement is Tchavtchavadze’s 
c o n v i c t i o n  that Geor g i a  was and should c o n t i n u e  to be an 
ag r a r i a n  society, but e qually clear is the i m p o r t a n c e  he 
a t t a c h e d  to the role of the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a  and his b e l i e f  
that it still had a vital part to play in the c o u n t r y ’s 
future. His desire to m a i n t a i n  c o n t i n u i t y  with Georgia's
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past aside, muc h  of the r eason for this can be found in his 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  that G e o r g i a / e m u l a t e  the a c h i e v e m e n t s  of •;';v 
Europe without suffering the miseries of enclosures, indust­
rialisation and proletarianisation of the population. Thus 
when Tchavtchavadze spoke of the nobility as the "sword" of 
the nation, he did not intend that it revert to its martial 
traditions, but rather that it act as the fount of the 
nation’s knowledge and wisdom, adopting the progressive role 
of the European bourgeoisie without exploiting the mass of 
the people. The peasantry, meanwhile, should organise into ' 
commercial and productive associations and acquaint itself 
with advances in agricultural techniques.
Ilia T c h a v t c h a v a d z e ’s a p p r o a c h  to the p r o b l e m  of , 
national and social unity, which he himself termed "mending 
the broken bridge" (chatekhili khidis g a m t ’eleba) was po si­
ted first upon the belief that such an ideal class relation­
ship had, in fact, once existed and second, that the f i s ­
sures m a n i f e s t  in c o n t e m p o r a r y  G e o r g i a n  soc i e t y  w e r e  not 
only unnecessary, but also reversible.^  ^  A m a j o r  d i f f i ­
culty, however, was that in stressing the absolute i m p o r t ­
ance of n a t i o n a l  unity, he u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  the depth of the 
social divisions within the country and, in so doing, failed 
to attract the unqualified support of any one section of the 
society. Right up until his a s s a s s i n a t i o n  in. 1907, he 
continued to believe in the possibility of reconciliation, 
despite the progressive decline in peasant-noble relations 
during the last qua r t e r  of the 19th century. In part his 
p r o b l e m  was shared by all the n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a :  
in the virtual a b s e n c e  of an i n d i g e n o u s  bourgeo i s i e ,  the 
traditional standard-bearer of the national idea in Europe *
w h o  w a s  to lead the n a t i o n a l  r e v i v a l  in G e o r g i a ?
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Tchavtchavadze attempted to resolve this problem by appeal­
ing to the t'avadaznauroba's sense of patriotism and respon­
sibility. By leading by example, it could win the trust and 
support of the peasantry. In reality, h o w e v e r ,  his hopes 
were doomed to failure.
Having conceded reluctantly to the abolition of batonq- 
m o b a , few t!avadaznaurebi were in a mood for further conces­
sions, and far from a d j u s t i n g  to the t imes by seek i n g  to 
r a t i o n a l i s e  the m a n a g e m e n t  of their estates, strove to 
sustain their expansive way of life by exploiting acute land 
shortage to raise rents to unprecendented levels. That they 
had little interest in class reconciliation can be seen from 
a series of articles by Giorgi Dseret'eli -for Kvali in 1899 
on the history of the K ’ut’aisi land Bank. From its founda­
tion in 1876, the t ’a v a d a z n a u r e b i  a t t e m p t e d  to m o n o p o l i s e  
control of the bank, excluding not just wealthy peasants and 
m e r c hants, from w h o m  they made no effort to conc e a l  their 
contempt, but also az n a u r n i  who, because of the s m a l l  size 
of their e states e ngaged in c o m m e r c e  to s u p p l e m e n t  their 
incomes. The p a t r i a r c h a l  nature of the t ’avadi f a m i l i e s  
enabled them to exert a powerful influence on the course of 
the bank’s affairs throughout the 1880s and into the 1890s. 
Describing this power, Dseret'eli wrote:
Many still remember what a powerful unifying force 
this patriarchal custom was. It often happened at 
m e e t i n g s  that som e respected, eld e r l y  t ’avadi- 
shvili would raise an eyebrow to indicate his d i s ­
pleasure or stroke his moustache threateningly and 
i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  60 to 80 men, all bea r i n g  his 
name, would reach for their khandzhals. Who does 
not recall the h o n o u r a b l e  Bakhva P aghava and the
i m p o r t a n c e  of a wave of his hand at bank m e e t -  
. 148
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Faced by i n t i m i d a t i o n  and contempt, and given the 
steady increase of land disputes in the post-reform period, 
whatever residue of trust the peasantry might once have felt 
for the no b i l i t y  was quic k l y  eroded. But even if Tchav-
tchavadze's ideas had received popular support it is diffi­
cult to imagine how they would have succeeded in practice, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  if one bears in mind his equal c o m m i t m e n t  to 
democratic reform and i d e n t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
for all. Tchavtchavadze, who was normally quick to a c k n o w ­
l e d g e  the f o r c e  of c h a n g e  in s o c i e t y  s e e m s ,  in this
instance, to have ruled out the p o s s i b i l i t y  that p r e s e n t e d  
w it h  equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and rights, peasants m ight very 
well have wanted to abandon agriculture altogether.
However, whilst Tchavtchavadze preached class reconcil­
i a t i o n ,  a g r o w i n g  n u m b e r  of his a s s o c i a t e s ,  G i o r g i
Dseret’eli, Niko Nikoladze, Sergi Meskhi, Kirile Lort'kip'- 
anidze and P. Umikashvili among them, reacted to the socio­
e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  of the 1870s quite differently. T hough 
they shared Tchavtchavadze’s desire that Georgia’s national 
revival avoid the pain and dislocation of Europe’s industri­
alisation, they were, nevertheless, convinced that industri­
alisation, the emergence of an indigenous industrial bour­
geoisie and a c c u m u l a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  capital, r e p r e s e n t e d  
the c o u n t r y ’s only way forward. D i r e c t l y  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  
Tchavtc h a v a d z e ,  they argued that the n o b i l i t y  wa s a spent 
force with no useful purpose left to perform.
The t ’avadaznauroba has lived out its time [wrote 
G. Dseret'eli], ...it is unable to work, has no 
le a r n i n g  and is c o n s e q u e n t l y  b e c o m i n g  poorer, 
losing its power and gradually even its status. ^
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With the growth of European and Russian capital in the 
1870s, s t i m u l a t e d  in large part by the c o m p l e t i o n  of the 
railway, they became concerned•that Georgia was becoming a 
colonial adjunct of the major powers. Their response was to 
e n c o urage G e o r g i a n s  to take a mor e active role in the 
c o m m e r c i a l  life of their own country. Till then, it was 
argued, G e o r g i a n s  had used the r espite brought by Rus s i a n  
r u l e  to r e b u i l d  t h e i r  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  c e d i n g  c o n t r o l  of 
c o m m e r c e  to A r m e n i a n  and Greek refugees flee i n g  Turkey. 
Now, however, it was time for Georgians to compete, for not 
only was the w e a l t h  of the coun t r y  falling into the hands of 
foreign investors, but trade, e s p e c i a l l y  in East Georgia, 
had b e c o m e  a virtual A r m e n i a n  monopoly. As a result, 
G e o r g i a n s  had b e c o m e  a m i n o r i t y  w i t h i n  their own capi t a l  
city. M a n y  t 'ergdaleulni saw this as a serious threat to 
the future of the n ation and, a r g u i n g  agai nst Ilia T c h a v ­
tchavadze, actively encouraged Georgian peasants to migrate 
to the urban centres to combat this monopoly.
It should be a source of great shame for real 
G e o r g i a n s  (if 'real G e o r g i a n s '  e x i s t  in our 
country today) [wrote Sergi Meskhi], ... that what 
was once the Georgians' capital city, Tp'ilisi, is 
now the p r o p e r t y  of Armenians. Half the i n h a b i ­
tants of c o n t e m p o r a r y  Tp'ilisi are A r m enian; 
c o m m e r c e  and barter are c o n t r o l l e d  by them; the 
city's land is theirs; the buildings constructed 
on the land are nearly all theirs... In short, 
A r m e n i a n s  hold the city in their p o w e r f u l  c l a w s  
and for the m o m e n t  d o m i n a t e  and o r g a n i s e  all its 
a ffairs.
G. D s e r e t ' e l i  and N i k o l a d z e  c a l l e d  u p o n  r i c h  and 
e d u c a t e d  G e o r g i a n s  to c o m b a t  the s i t u a t i o n  by i n v e s t i n g  
their m o n e y  and skills in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of factories, 
believing that not only did the profusion of raw materials 
in the Transcaucasus provide the right conditions for such
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enterprise, but that the nation’s future prosperity depended 
upon it.1^ ”1 Unless G e o r g i a n s  were more active in the 
economic development of the country, not only would its r e ­
sources and urban centres be lost to foreign control, but 
G e o r g i a n s  w o u l d  be c o n d e m n e d  to an exi s t e n c e  of rural 
p overty and ignorance. By e n c o u r a g i n g  the e m e r g e n c e  of an 
indi g e n o u s  b o u r g e o i s i e  they did not, however, accept the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  low wages and poor w o r k i n g  
conditions, but envisaged a form of social contract in which 
factory owners protected the living standards and interests 
of their workers. Mor e  broadly, they a d v o c a t e d  a class 
alliance called ’’the common ground” (saert’o niad agi), which 
was to incorporate the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie and 
the peasantry. It was recommended that the latter, who were 
to be given land free of charge, form p r o d u c t i v e  and trade 
cooperatives, aided by v illage banks, with the ai m  of 
squeezing out the money-lenders and middle men whose a ctivi­
ties had had such a pernicious effect on peasant agriculture 
since the e m a n c i p a t i o n  r e f o r m s  of 1864-71. They d i s t i n ­
guished sharply between the role of the industrial bourgeoi­
sie, w h ich they c o n s i d e r e d  progressive, and that of the 
petit commercial bourgeoisie which, they maintained, contri­
buted not h i n g  to natio n a l  p r o s p e r i t y  and r e t a r d e d  p e a s a n t  
farming. F r o m  a n a t i o n a l i s t  p e r s p e c t i v e  this p a r t i c u l a r  
argument had the added attraction that the vast majority of 
the c o m m e r c i a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  was Armenian. Thus Gio r g i  
Dseret'eli wrote:
Now, wh en the order of our lives has been turned 
inside out, when labour has a c q u i r e d  great value 
and m o n e y  b e c o m e  a n e c e s s i t y  for all, these m e r ­
chants have become the maggots of the country, e x ­
ploit i n g  our t i mes and s u c k i n g  at the nation's 
brain... W h e r e a s  before the peas ant was a l o r d ’s
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serf and paid hi m  begara ... he is no w the serf of 
Armenians and Jews and is forced to pay them with 
his last shirt. ^ 2
The "common ground" idea owed much to the intelligent­
sia’s awareness of the importance of similar class alliances 
to successful nationalist movements in Europe and its con­
cern too that the m o v e m e n t  for n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  and 
social r e f o r m  in G e o r g i a  had no s trong class to ident i f y  
with its p r o g r a m m e ,  or to press for the r e a l i s a t i o n  of its 
aim. Other considerations aside, the t ’ergdaleulni appre­
ciated that there was little prospect of G e o r g i a n s  ta k i n g  
i n d e p e n d e n t  action to secure their f r e e d o m  and c o n c l u d e d  
that, in the immediate term, the country's interests lay in 
the e d u c a t i o n  of the population, s t i m u l a t i o n  of the rural 
economy, defence of the p e a s a n t r y  a gainst m i d d l e  men and 
money-lenders and encouragement of rich Georgians, whatever 
their social background, to challenge the Armenian hold on 
the urban centres and invest in the industrial development 
of the nation. Having accepted that there was little G e o r ­
gians could do in the immediate term to determine their own 
destiny and c o n v i n c e d  a n y w a y  that the main s t i m u l u s  for 
change within the empire would come from the Russian guber- 
nii, the t1 ergdaleulni considered their most important task 
lay in p r e p a r i n g  the p o p u l a t i o n  for that m o m e n t  in the 
future when G e o r g i a n s  would a s s u m e  control of th eir own 
affairs. It is for this reason, rather than any i n t r i n s i c  
merit they might have had, that the t'ergdaleulni w e r e  so 
e n t h u s i a s t i c  in their support for the r e f o r m s  i n t r o d u c e d  
into Russia during the 1860s and 1870s. Thus, despite crit­
icising its considerable limitations, they campaigned v igor­
ously for the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the z e m stvo system, or er oba
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as it was known in Georgia, to the Transcaucasus, believing 
that not only w ould it provide G e o r g i a n s  with valua b l e  
e x p e r i e n c e  of m a n a g i n g  their own affairs, but that it c o n ­
tained the seeds of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  and mi ght b e c o m e  the 
nucleus for future n a t i o n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t U n f o r t u n ­
ately, however, their c a m p a i g n  for the e x t e n s i o n  of the 
eroba system, trial by jury and the right to hold court pro­
ceedi n g s  in the n ative language fell v i c t i m  to offic i a l  
p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n  and u l t i m a t e l y  died a c o m p l e t e  death with 
the advent of A l e x a n d e r  Ill's mo re i n t o l e r a n t  a t t i t u d e  to 
domestic reform.
With or without reform from above, however, one of the 
g r e a t e s t  obs t a c l e s  to the n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  of the 
Georgian intelligentsia continued to be the weakness of the 
native bourgeoisie on the one hand and the relative strength 
of the A r m e n i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  on the other. The latter, 
h a v i n g  no p a r t i c u l a r  s y m p a t h y  for the n a t i o n a l  or social 
aspirations of the Georgian population, was concerned to de­
f e n d  its m o n o p o l y  o v e r  the c o u n t r y ' s  t r a d e  and, in 
particular, that of T'bilisi. This it e n d e a v o u r e d  to do 
through its d o m i n a t i o n  of the city guilds, the m u n i c i p a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  and the city's cred it o r g a n isations. As Sergi 
Meskhi complained:
In Tp'ilisi e veryone k n o w s  that the M u t u a l  Trust 
Society and the Commercial Bank have a race char­
acter, that if a m e r c h a n t  isn't Armenian, he need 
not expect to fin.d it easy to derive any b enefit 
from the b a n k .154
There was a danger, the t'ergdaleulni realised, that 
A r m e n i a n s  w o uld interpret the call for G e o r g i a n s  to fight 
for a share in their country's w e a l t h  a n d •c r i t i c i s m  of the
role of m e r c h a n t s  and m o n e y - l e n d e r s  as a threat to their
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existence. Consequently they sought to assure the Armenian 
community of its good intentions.
We are the enemy of no people, least of all the 
Armenians [wrote Meskhi], because we well under­
stand that a people is a l w a y s  innocent of the 
often appalling acts committed by a few of its re­
presen t a t i v e s ;  we k n o w  full well that in the 
Caucasus, in good t i m e s  and in bad, we share a 
c o m m o n  fate, that living together, we must pull 
together. But we are the enemy of an y o n e  who 
spares n o t h i n g  to fill his own s t o m a c h  and line 
his pockets; who seeks to ma ke a poor man in 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  pay i nterest of a t * u man or mor e  on 
every t'uman lent; who forces the peasant to sell 
his last piece of land, his property and his 
household goods to meet a debt; who squeezes the 
people and demeans man's human dignity. "
However, since the vast majority of the money-lenders 
and m e r c h a n t s  was, in fact, A r m enian, the d i s t i n c t i o n  was 
not as clear as Me s k h i  w o u l d  have liked. There were, of 
course, many Armenians who suffered equally badly from the 
hands of their compatriots as the Georgians did, but, never­
theless, a substantial part of the Armenian community and, 
importantly, its most vociferous and influential part, felt 
itself t h r e a t e n e d  by the t'ergdaleulni. C o n s e q u e n t l y  a 
campaign was initiated through the Armenian press accusing 
the G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  of s e e k i n g  the ruin of the 
entire Armenian population of Georgia.
Al t h o u g h  e l e m e n t s  of a n t i - A r m e n i a n  p r e j u d i c e  did 
occasionally surface in the writings of the t'ergdaleulni, 
there can be little doubt that they g e n u i n e l y  w a n t e d  to 
avoid n a t i o n a l i s t  c lashes with their closest n e i ghbours. 
Aside from the tolerant nature of their brand of nationalist 
theory, which acknowledged the right of all nations to exist 
and the unique c o n t r i b u t i o n  of each to w o rld c u l t u r e  and 
history, the t'er g d a l e u l n i  tried to av oid co n f l i c t  on the
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practical grounds that in the unequal struggle against tsar­
ism it merely served the interests of the government if the 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  of the Cauca s u s  d i s s i p a t e d  their l i m i t e d  
strengths in futile tirades against each other. The support 
of the t'er g d a l e u l n i  for a T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  f e d e r a t i o n  e x ­
pres s e d  in D rosha* and at the C a u c a s i a n  C o n f e r e n c e  held, 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,  in S w i t z e r l a n d  in 18 7 4, u n d e r l i n e d  their 
desire to protect the national rights of all the minorities 
living in the Caucasus.
But even the federal idea was a source of c o n c e r n  to 
the Armenian bourgeoisie, in as much as T'bilisi, the centre 
of its activities, w ould have b e c o m e  subject t o a  G e o r g i a n
1 Ej £
administration.  ^ It should be added too that the Armenian 
a t t i t u d e  to federation, as to the idea of i n d e p e n d e n c e  of 
any kind, was i n f l u e n c e d  by fear of losing Rus s i a n  p r o t e c ­
tion a gainst the Turks. A l t h o u g h  this was also a c o n c e r n  
among Georgians, it does not appear to have influenced their 
thinking on the national question to quite the same degree.
The p r o b l e m  of p r e v e n t i n g  the strug g l e  for c o n t r o l  of 
the domestic market degenerating into nationalist strife was 
made more d i f f icult by the fact that T ’bilisi was not just 
the commercial centre of the Armenian bourgeoisie, but also 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l  centre of Armenia's na t i o n a l  revival. 
Moreover, perhaps because of the Armenians' long experience 
of persecution from others and perhaps also because of their 
resentment of the t'avadaznauroba's arrogance towards them, 
their n a t i o n a l i s m  took a more a s s e r t i v e  and less t o l e r a n t  
form. Thus, as part of a typically n a t i o n a l i s t  d e s i r e  to 
s e c u r e  a t e r r i t o r i a l  base, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the
*See footnote 125.
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i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  laid c l a i m s  to all of the land south of the 
River Mtkvari, including T'bilisi, ignoring that their resi­
dence in the area was relatively recent.1^
Furthermore, in pursuit of the argument that numerical 
superiority within an area gives one claim to its ownership, 
they set about asserting the predominance of Armenians and 
Armenian culture in the borderlands.^®® The clergy contri­
buted s trongly to the n e w  mood of national a s s e r t i o n  by 
calling on Armenians who had lived in Georgia for centuries
and spoke only Georgian to abandon it in favour of Armenian
1 8 Qand to hate Georgian. To the indignation of the Georgian
intelligentsia attempts were also made to convince Georgian
C a t h o l i c s  living in A k h a l t s i k h e  that they wer e  r eally
A r m e n i a n  and should the r e f o r e  cease their a t t a c h m e n t  to
1 f \ n
G e o r g i a n  culture. Beh a v i o u r  of this nature i n e v i t a b l y
fuelled the kind of natio n a l  strife the t'ergdaleulni had 
assiduously been avoiding. Thus, G. Dseret'eli, having c o m ­
plimented the strength of Armenian culture went on to write:
But as we know, for everything good something bad 
is sure to follow. The Armenian clerical movement 
has erected a barrier around Armenian society and 
closed the door to the Armenian nation having con­
tacts with us. It has alienated Armenian society 
from Georgian society.
To the d espair of the t'ergdaleulni the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
was e x a c e r b a t e d  by the e m e r g i n g  c h a l l e n g e  of the G e o r g i a n  
petit-bourgeoisie to Armenian domination of T'bilisi as land 
s hort a g e  and the need for m o n e y  forced the p e a s a n t r y  to 
m i g r a t e  to the towns. In T'bilisi, this r e v e a l e d  i t s e l f  
most c learly in the struggle for c ontrol of the m u n i c i p a l  
council which, since its i n c e p t i o n  in 1875, had a c c r u e d  
sufficient power to give it a dominating influence over the
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city's economic liie.,w The extremely limited franchise, 
based on property owne r s h i p ,  had re t u r n e d  a s u c c e s s i o n  of 
administations run by the wealthiest section of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie until, in 1890, the increased representation of 
Georgians in the third category of voters, the most numerous 
but also the least influential, enabled the so-called "Geor­
gian Party" to secure nearly half the s e a t s . 1® 3 A l t h o u g h  
subs e q u e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n  of the f r a n c h i s e  till in 1897 it 
c overed only 1.7 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n  r e e s t a b l i s h e d ^  
the Armenian position, the politicisation of national divi­
sions by the 1 890 elect i o n  c o n t i n u e d  to split the two c o m ­
munities, with the representatives of both sides now c l a i m ­
ing to speak on behalf of their respective nations.1®^
Whilst this sharpened national self-awareness among the 
G e o r g i a n  population, it is clear that the r e s u l t a n t  i n t e r ­
ethnic conflict was not what Giorgi Dseret'eli and his 
associates had envisaged when they urged Georgians to regain 
control of their towns. It is, however, hard to imagine any 
other consequence given the strength of the Armenian pos i ­
tion and the i m p o r t a n c e  of the b o u r g e o i s i e  in A r m e n i a ’s 
n a t i o n a l  revival. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  d e s p i t e  the g r o w t h  of the 
G e o r g i a n  bourgeoisie, it still r e m a i n e d  in its e m b r y o n i c  
stages and signally failed to fulfil the p r o g r e s s i v e  role 
e xpec t e d  of it by the t'er g d a l e u l n i . Most were e i t h e r  
artisans, s m a l l - s c a l e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  or the sort of m e r ­
chants the Georgian intelligentsia had denigrated so v i g o r ­
ously in the 1870s. Moreover, poorly e d u c a t e d  and o f t e n  
illiterate, they were hardly suited to taking up the lead in 
Georgia’s national revival.
Thus, a l t h o u g h  the t'er g d a l e u l n i  successfully brought 
the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  into the p o l i t i c a l  arena in G e o r g i a
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and although they galvanised a broad spectrum of the popula­
tion into s u p p o r t i n g  its d e f e n c e  of n a t i o n a l  culture, the 
class barriers dividing Georgian society proved an intract­
able ob s t a c l e  to na t i o n a l  unity. The idea of a "third 
estate" popular among some sections of the intelligentsia, 
in which the latter would join forces with the bourgeoisie 
and p e a s a n t r y  might have w o r k e d  had the b o u r g e o i s i e  been 
s t r o n g e r  or, at least, G e o r g i a n  rather than Armenian. But 
in Georgia it was weak and uneducated, while the peasantry, 
still largely i l l i t e r a t e , h a d  its a t t e n t i o n  f o c u s e d  on 
the land issue.
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Chapter Five 
The National Question and Political Parties
The struggle to develop a Georgian national conscious­
ness had come a long way since the 1860s, when the t’ergdal­
eulni first began their campaign to galvanise the population 
into the defence of its native language and culture. By the 
1890s, 30 years after Ilia Tchavtchavadze, Akaki Dseret'eli, 
K'irile L o r t 1 k 1 i p 1 anidze and others first r e t u r n e d  from 
their studies in St. Petersburg, socio-economic developments 
and the efforts of the radical intelligentsia to inject the 
p o p u l a t i o n  wit h  a sense of n a t i o n a l  pride, had c o m b i n e d  to 
ensure that few Georgians were unaware of their collective 
identity and that among the intelligentsia there now existed 
a d e t e r m i n e d  c o m m i t m e n t  to protect the n a t i o n a l  h e r i t a g e  
against Russification. Niko Nikoladze, perhaps the most 
c o m m i t t e d  ad v o c a t e  of close ties with Russia a m o n g  the 
t ' e r g d a l e u l n i , was, nevertheless, quick to p e r c e i v e  the 
movement of popular opinion when, as early as 1865, he wrote 
in Kolo k o l :
The Georgian people grows daily more imbued with 
the idea of natio n a l  independence. We w o u l d  not 
be in the least bit m i s t a k e n  to say that at p r e ­
sent the Russian g o v e r n m e n t  in Geo r g i a  has no 
w e l l - w i s h e r s ,  beyond a h andful of court n o t ­
ables... l e a d i n g  o f f i c i a l s  and a f e w  m a j o r  
p rope r t y  owners... all the rest live and think 
imbued with the spirit of nationalism.1
It seems likely, however, that Niko Nikoladze's own fear of 
nationalism and particularly of separatism, led him to exag­
gerate the nature of this new mood of self-assertion. Cer­
tainly, in 1865 the idea of natio n a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  had few 
adherents, even among the intelligentsia, whilst among the 
mass of the p o p u l a t i o n  the qu e s t i o n  s c a r c e l y  even arose.
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There was, however, coupled with an attachment to the s y m ­
bols of Georgian culture, a growing resentment towards the 
p r a ctices of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h ich was gi v i n g  rise to the 
e m e r g e n c e  of a cautious n a t i o n a l i s m ,  c o n s t r a i n e d  by the 
memory of the country’s recent past and a realistic assess­
ment of Georgia's a bility to sustain its i n d e p e n d e n c e  
against likely Turkish aggression. In this respect, West 
Georgia was particularly vulnerable as Noe Zhordania, leader 
of the Social-Democratic Party in Georgia and President of 
the in d e p e n d e n t  Ge o r g i a n  republic till its fall in 1921, 
later recalled in his memoirs. Describing the attitude of
p
the peasantry in his native Guria in the late 19th century 
towards the questions of separatism and the Russian presence 
in the area, he noted the abs e n c e  of the "national d i r e c t ­
ion" in the province, and as c r i b e d  this p r i n c i p a l l y  to the 
fact that:
Guria was situated on the Turkish border and in 
constant fear of a ttack and d e s t r u c t i o n  and was, 
therefore, g r e a t l y  sat i s f i e d  with Russia, w h i c h  
was stationed on the border and defended them.
The i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was, moreover, well a w a r e  of the 
fu t i l i t y  of Geo r g i a  s t r u g g l i n g  in iso l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  the 
tsarist empire, and for those a m o n g  it who had n e e d e d  r e ­
m i n d i n g  of the coerc i v e  p o w e r  of the state of w h i c h  they 
were a part, the c r u s h i n g  defeat of the Polish n a t i o n a l i s t  
m o v e m e n t  in the 1860s was a sa l u t o r y  lesson, not least 
because the reluctance of the Polish peasantry to support a 
cause led by the a r i s t o c r a c y  was a r e m i n d e r  of the social 
divisions that fissured Georgian society.
On the positive side, as was emphasised in the preced­
ing chapter, the t'ergdaleulni were closely attached to the
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Russian democratic movement and identified the continuation 
of Georgia's burgeoning national revival with the overthrow 
of the autocracy, and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a federal state 
in which Georgia, either as an autonomous national unit, or 
as part of a federal C a u c a s i a n  republic, would be d e v o l v e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o w e r s  to d e t e r m i n e  the course of her future 
development.^
By the 1890s, however, the t'ergdaleulni were no longer 
the aggressive, iconclastic, young radicals who had set out 
to shatter the traditional mould of Georgian society in the 
1860s, but the elder s t a t e s m e n  of the inte l l i g e n t s i a ,  the 
figure-heads of the movement for national renaissance, and 
firmly c o m m i t t e d  to the goal of class r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  and 
unity, believing that only by mending the bridge fractured 
by social a n t a g o n i s m  could G e o r g i a  ensure its n a t i o n a l  
revival. This and other a c c e p t e d  wi s d o m s ,  howev e r ,  cam e  
under increasing scrutiny towards the end of the century as 
a new g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  youth began to q u e s t i o n  the 
relevance of ideas developed in the context of the 1860s and 
1870s to the problems confronting the country in the 1890s.
5.1 The T 'ergdaleulni under Challenge
The decade of the 1880s in Georgia, as elsewhere in the 
Russian empire, was a period in which the radical intelli­
g e n t s i a  w a s  f o r c e d  on the d e f e n s i v e  as the a u t o c r a c y  
a t t a c k e d  the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  m o v e m e n t  and e n d e a v o u r e d  to 
undermine the liberal reforms conceded over the previous 20 
years. In the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , as was noted above, these 
years witnessed a marked intensification of official chau­
vinism and a protracted campaign to Russify the indigenous
cultu r e s  of the region. In this new climate, p apers like
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D r o e b a , S h r o ma (Labour) and I m edi (Hope) found t h e m s e l v e s  
under increasing pressure from the censors, until one by one 
they were closed down, r e a c h i n g  the point in 1885 when 
Iveria was the sole surviving political and literary journal 
still being printed in Georgian. In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
the journal's editor, Ilia Tcha v t c h a v a d z e ,  was faced with 
the dilemma of whether to allow I veria to follow the fate of 
its contemporaries, or to comply with the censors' require­
m e nts and contrive, by w h a t e v e r  means possible, to defend 
the gains of the past two decades. Tchavtchavadze opted for 
the latter course, b e l i e v i n g  that h o w e v e r  r e s t r i c t e d  the 
content of /the journal, it was nevertheless important that 
the movement for national-cultural revival in Georgia retain 
a c entral point of focus for its literary activities. In 
pursuit of this end, he t r a n s f o r m e d  Iveria from a m o n t h l y  
journal into a daily and called on all Georgians, regardless 
of p o l i t i c a l  persuasion, to unite around the paper in its 
defence of the nation against current tsarist policies.-*
Iveria r e m a i n e d  the sole G e o r g i a n  p o l i t i c a l  paper in 
print until the appearance of Kvali in 1893, and despite the 
e m e r g i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  to its a p p r o a c h  to the p r o b l e m s  of 
contemporary Georgian life, continued to assert considerable 
influence on the views of the intelligentsia into the early 
years of the 20th century. Although the views most commonly 
expressed in the paper were those of Ilia Tchavtchavadze and 
others of the 1860s' g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  radicals, most 
n ot a b l y  to the effect that in the e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  the 
intelligentsia should be directing its efforts to overcoming 
class a n t a g o n i s m  and uni t i n g  all G e o r g i a n s  in a p a t r i o t i c  
s trug g l e  for natio n a l  r e n a i s s a n c e  and, by i m p l i c a t i o n ,
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liberation, I_veria was by no means the m o u t h p i e c e  of one 
group alone. Before the publication of Kvali commenced, the 
paper provided an outlet, in the absence of any alternative, 
for all o p p o n e n t s  of the tsarist g o v ernment. Thus, the 
small Georgian populist movement, which since the closure of 
its own journal I m edi in 1883, had been without a publishing 
organ of its own, willingly cooperated with Tchavtchavadze 
despite their contrary views.^
But w h ile Iveria was for so long the solitary legal 
voice of Georgian resistance, the dilution of the content of 
the legal press led to the a p p e a r a n c e  of a p l e t h o r a  of 
h a n d w r i t t e n ,  u n d e r g r o u n d  n e w s - s h e e t s  and journals in the 
e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t e s  and schools of Georgia.^ A l t h o u g h  
these uniformly adopted the views and approach of the t'erg­
daleulni, emphasising patriotism, education in the national 
language, the defence of national culture and greater social 
equality, it was, n e v e r theless, of s i g n i f i c a n c e  that the 
a b s e n c e  of a forthright, legal G e o r g i a n  paper should have 
encouraged Georgian youth to take their own, albeit rather 
restricted, literary initiatives. The seeds wer e  being 
sown, in effect, for the development of a serious challenge 
to the t'ergdaleulni's intellectual domination of Georgian 
society in a decade's time. For the time being, h o w e v e r ,  
the students and pupils of the 1880s were a l m o s t  wh o l l y  
indebted to the writings and poetry of Ilia Tchavtchavadze, 
Akaki Dseret'eli, Iakob Gogebashvili, and other figureheads 
of the same generation.
Much the same could be said of the outlook of Georgian 
students being educated in the universities of the Russian 
e m p i r e ,  but h e r e ,  the m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  s t a g e  in the
d e v e l o p m e n t  of the n e w  g e n e r a t i o n  of the r a d i c a l
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  came t o w a r d s  the end of the decade, when 
moves wer e  u n d e r t a k e n  to set up a united o r g a n i s a t i o n  of 
G e o r g i a n  students. A c c o r d i n g  to police records, the idea 
was first mooted in 1889 among students at the University of 
St. Petersburg, who then w r o t e  to their c o u n t e r p a r t s  in 
Moscow suggesting closer contacts and unification of their 
respective circles.^
The e n t h u s i a s t i c  r e c e p t i o n  of the plan in M o s c o w  led, 
in turn, to the inclusion of Georgian student groups at the 
U n i v e r s i t i e s  of Odessa, Kharkov, Kiev and W a r s a w ,  and a 
number of other Russian educational establishments, and in 
J u l y  1882, to the h o l d i n g  of a s e c r e t  c o n f e r e n c e  in 
K'ut’aisi, a t t e n d e d  by 20 a p p o i n t e d  delegates. The issues 
raised centred on the national question, Georgian-Armenian 
relations, the loss of G e o r g i a n  land to f o r e i g n e r s  and the 
idea of a federation of Caucasian peoples, and, in the main, 
repeated the preoccupations of the older generation of the 
radical i ntelligentsia. But wh i l s t  the i n f l u e n c e  of the 
tErgdaleulni predominated in the discussions, the question 
of organisation, almost ignored in the past, now emerged as 
a m a t t e r  of c rucial importance. Till the present, it was 
maintained, the opposition to the government in Georgia had, 
for all its merits, been too diffuse. What was needed, 
therefore, was a c e n t r a l i s e d  and c l a n d e s t i n e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
with its own p r o g r a m m e  and set of a i m s  to c o o r d i n a t e  the 
activity of all its members.^
At this time, many G e o r g i a n  students, s h a r i n g  the 
r e v e r e n c e  of edu c a t i o n  and k n o w l e d g e  incu l c a t e d  in large 
part by the radical i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  over the last 30 years, 
regarded themselves as the torch-bearers of a new society,
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destined to lead the Georgian people out of their ignorance \
I
and into a m o r e  just, equ i t a b l e  and rational world. This j
ii
sense of mission and responsibility was recalled by the pro- j 
min e n t  G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  Grigol Uratadze in his 
r e m i n i s c e n c e s  of his first chi l d h o o d  enc o u n t e r  with a 
student in his native village of Azana. Describing his new 
neighbour, who was on vacation from Russia, he observed:
The student and the student body as a whole were a 
gen u i n e  cult for my student neighbour. And this 
was not because he h i m s e l f  was a student. No, he 
was s i n c e r e l y  con v i n c e d  that only the students, 
through their struggle, could change the existing 
order and that the students wer e  the sole force 
w h i c h  could lead the people out of darkness and 
give it happiness. He b elieved in this so deeply 
that when he spoke about it he b e c a m e  c o n s u m e d  
with passion and it seemed that before you stood a 
man who at any m o m e n t  w ould take off and plunge 
himself into battle.
Thus, the new organisation, despite its ultimate desire 
to involve the mass of the p o p u l a t i o n  in the s t r u g g l e  for 
national liberation, gave no thought to the establishment of 
workers' or peasants' cells, but c o n c e n t r a t e d  all its 
efforts on those i n s t i t u t e s  of higher e d u c a t i o n  at w h i c h  
there were k n o w n  circles of G e o r g i a n  students. The a i m  of 
the organisation was the liberation of Georgia from tsarist 
d o m i n a t i o n ,  and the means to that end, selfless s e r v i c e  to 
the nation. Interestingly, the d e l e g a t e s  voted a g a i n s t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  links with R ussian r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  on the 
grounds that active involvement in the all-Russian movement 
would sap the strength of their limited resources.11
Following the K'ut'aisi conference, the Warsaw univers­
ity group assumed a particularly active role in the drawing 
up of a p r o g r a m m e  and statutes and was r e s p o n s i b l e  for 
n a m i n g  the o r g a n i s a t i o n  S a k 'a r t 'velos t 'a v i s u p '1ebis 1 iga
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(The Georgian League of Liberty). The preamble to the pro­
gramme and statutes again cast the student body in the role 
of enlightener of the people:
Georgia is an oppressed state [it declared]. The 
G e o r g i a n  people is t h r e a t e n e d  wit h  the danger of 
losing its native language, its c u s t o m s  and its 
land. The Georgian community lacks the material 
wealth and the means for its intellectual develop­
ment. In its centuries-long history the Georgian 
people has often e x p e r i e n c e d  s i m i l a r  plight and 
found a way out. Nor will it lose hope now. To 
prevent the d i s p e r s a l  of our s t r e ngths fro m  the 
beginning and to conduct a clear-sighted struggle, 
we are c r e a t i n g  S a k 1 a r t 1 velos t!avisup’lebis Liga. 
Tlavisup,lebis liga plans to bring Georgia out on 
to the broad path of socio-economic and political 
d evelop m e n t .  It is trying to explain to the 
Georgian people the causes of its backwardness, to 
make it a w a r e  of its own sorry state and to o r g a n ­
ise it to fight for freedom from oppression.1
The p r o g r a m m e  went on to u n d e r l i n e  the i m p o r t a n c e  of 
e d u c a t i o n  to the future of the people and the nation, d e ­
clared the L e a g u e ’s unity with the s t r u g g l e  of the R ussian 
people and the oppressed national minorities of the empire 
a gainst the tsar, and called on all Geo r g i a n s  to unite in 
the strug g l e  for a f e d e rated Caucasus in w h i c h  n e i t h e r  
national nor religious bigotry would be tolerated.
Despite its desire for unity, however, the League found 
itself divided on a n u m b e r  of issues; in particular, what 
sort of relationship should it have with the Russian revolu­
tionary movement, and should or should not the proposed Cau­
casian f e d e r a t i o n  d eclare its i n d e p e n d e n c e  of the R u s s i a n  
state? These and other issues were reviewed at the League’s 
second c o n f e r e n c e  held in T'bilisi in July 1893. But by 
then, such were the differences of opinion within the organ­
isation, that no policy decisions could be r e a c h e d .
It w o u l d  appear that altho u g h  most of the d e l e g a t e s
and, in all probability, most of the Georgian student body,
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still stood on the same broad, democratic position occupied 
by the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i  that there had, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  been a 
d e m o n s t r a t i v e  shift in the balance of forces in the year 
i n t e r v e n i n g  b e t w e e n  the two conferences, and that n e w  
curre n t s  of thought were b e g i n n i n g  to make their prese n c e  
felt. The W a r s a w  circle, in particular, s h o w e d  signs of 
being influenced by Marxist ideas, and in Noe Zhordania and 
P’ilipe Makharadze, already possessed two future leaders of 
G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a c y , one of the M e n s h e v i k  wing, the 
other of the Bolsheviks.”1^
However, in 1894, before it could put any of its plans 
into operation, the police brought the League to an abrupt 
end, u n c o v e r i n g  the entire n e t w o r k  and a r r e s t i n g  the mai n  
participants. Nevertheless, despite its failure to achieve 
its purpose, the League had for a w h ile provided a f o r u m  for 
the e m e r g i n g  g e n e r a t i o n  of r adical students to share and 
develop its v i ews and, as such, marks an early step in the 
evolution of a new political force in Georgian society.
A rather more s i g n i f i c a n t  step was taken in D e c e m b e r  
1 892, when a group of 13 of the most r a d i c a l l y  m i n d e d  r e p r e ­
sentatives of the young Georgian intelligentsia, certain of 
whom had been members of T'avisup'alis Lig a , met in Qvirila 
(now Zestap'oni) with the aim of e s t a b l i s h i n g  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o m m o n  ground to produce a joint p r o g r a m m e  s t a t i n g  their 
v i e w s  and e n d s . 1^ By the a d m i s s i o n  of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
there was considerable confusion among them about what the 
correct course of a ction should be, but there is no doubt 
that a number of those assembled in the small West Georgian 
village regar d e d  t h e m s e l v e s  as S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  and the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of a n e w  c u r r e n t  of t h o u g h t  in the
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country. up till now, the terms of the debate in Georgia 
about the country's future had been determined by the t'erg- 
daleulni, with no other group possessing either the moral or 
intellectual standing to challenge them. Thus, despite the 
i n d u b i t a b l e  changes taking place w i t h i n  the c o u n t r y  - the 
spread of c o m m o d i t y  relations, the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of the 
economy, the g r o w t h  of the market, the d ecline of the 
t'avadaznauroba, the social differentiation of the peasan­
try, the e m e r g e n c e  of an i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  b o u r ­
geoisie, the exacerbation of rural poverty and accelerating 
urbanisation - the debate on Georgia's future continued, in 
the m a i n ,  to h i n g e  on the q u e s t i o n  of w h e t h e r  or not 
c a p i t a l i s m  was des i r a b l e  in Georgia, and on the need to 
unite all sections of G e o r g i a n  society around the nation, 
regardless of their economic interests. The dominant view 
of those g a t h e r e d  at Qvirila, h owever, was that those who 
continued to reason along these lines had their heads buried 
in sand, and were no longer in tune with the society around 
them. Ca p i t a l i s m ,  they m a i ntained, was not s o m e t h i n g  one 
picked off a shelf to be r e t a i n e d  or r ejected a c c o r d i n g  to 
one's tastes, but dev e l o p e d  r e g a r d l e s s  of one's d e s i r e s  
through the interplay of social and economic forces.
The Q v i r i l a  meeting, it is true, did not p r o d u c e  the 
unity of purpose or the p r o g r a m m e  hoped of it, but by the 
time of its second meeting in February 1893, the group, soon 
to be l abelled M e s a m e Dasi or the "Third Group" by Gi o r g i  
Dseret'eti, the editor of Kva 1 i , was able to unite a r o u n d  a 
programme written by Noe Zhordania entitled Ekonomiuri dsar- 
mateba da erovneba (Economic Progress and Nationality), in 
which the author produced the first attempted Marxist a n a l y ­
sis of Georgian society and sought to indicate the fallacies
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in the a r g u m e n t s  of the 1860s and 1870s g e n e r a t i o n  of 
1 7radicals. '
In the last 20-25 years [he wrote] our way of life 
has changed perceptibly. Following the abolition 
o f batonq m o b a , the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the r a i l w a y s  
and the postal and telegraph system, industry and 
commerce came into their own... The merchant, not 
sat i s f i e d  with o p e r a t i n g  in one defined area, 
wants his goods to dominate everywhere, to compete 
with f oreign goods and c onquer ne w  markets... 
Thus, different areas are linked together m ateri­
ally. The village, the tow n  and the district 
emerge from their particular existences and in one 
area the p r o m i n e n t  crop b e c o m e s  corn, in anot h e r  
wheat and in a third wine, and so on... E c o n o m i c  
centres are being e s t a b l i s h e d  to w hich needed 
goods are being t a k e n  and fro m  which they are 
being delivered; this is d r a w i n g  the people t o ­
gether: merchants, ar t i s a n s  and workers. Here
too, different administrative and public institu­
tions are forming, schools opening, the educa t e d  
and s c h o l a r l y  are c o m i n g  together, exchange of 
ideas is emerging and literature is rising to its 
feet... In short, n e w  c o n d i t i o n s  have arisen... 
the ne w  life has given birth to new demands, has 
complicated and multiplied formerly simple rela­
tions, d ivided labour e c o n o m i c a l l y  b e t w e e n  the 
n a t i o n ' s  p a r t s  and p l u n g e d  the c o u n t r y  i n t o  
the course of world c o m m e r c e . ^
W h e r e a s  G e o r g i a n  soc i e t y  had p r e v i o u s l y  c o n s i s t e d  of 
three mutually exclusive classes, the t'avadaznauroba, the 
clergy and peasantry, between which there was very limited 
social mobility, economic change, he continued, particularly 
since the e m a n c i p a t i o n  of the peasantry, had i n t r o d u c e d  
unprecedented social fluidity. The former pre-eminence of 
the t'avadaznauroba was fading as its property was mortgaged 
or sold to the increasingly acquisitive bourgeoisie, whilst 
the f o r m e r  social h o m o g e n e i t y  of the p e a s a n t r y  was g i v i n g  
way to the e m e r g e n c e  of a p r o s p e r o u s  m i n o r i t y  on the one 
hand, and a majority trapped in a vicious circle of debt on 
the other. In these conditions, wrote Zhordania, the social 
divide was ceasing to be between the t'avadaznauroba and the
308
peasantry, but to be b e t w e e n  the rich and the poor, the 
haves and have nots. S i l b i s t r o  Jibladze, ano t h e r  of those 
present at the Q v i r i l a  m e e t i n g  in D e c e m b e r  1892, and d e s ­
tined to play a p r o m i n e n t  role in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the 
s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e m e n t  in Georgia, u n d e r l i n e d  Zhor- 
dania's m e s s a g e  by e m p h a s i s i n g  the ne w  social r e l ations 
dominating the country:
...our contemporary life presents two new antago­
nistic estates or classes. On the one hand, the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of physical and mental labour and 
on the other, the parasitical bourgeois-capital- 
ists; the lot of the former is unbearable labour 
and drudgery, w h i l e  that of the latter is to e x ­
propriate the fruit of this labour. This is where 
the bridge has collapsed in our country and where 
it has been d e s t r o y e d  in som e  places for a long 
time already.1^
By his use of the "collapsed bridge" m e t a p h o r  (chat e - 
khili k h i d i ), Jibladze e x p l i c i t l y  directed his attack 
against the group gathered around Iveria and, in particular, 
those r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i  w h o s e  v i e w s  on 
class relations remained encapsulated in the phrase "chate- 
khili khidis g a m t ’eleba" (the repair of the broken bridge). 
Quite clearly, moreover, this a m o u n t e d  to mor e  than just a 
c r i t i q u e  of I _ ls a n a l y s i s  of s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  in 
Georgia, but was also, b ecause it focused d i r e c t l y  on the 
central pillar of its appro a c h  to the n a t i o n a l  question, 
class unity, an attack on the content of its n a t i o n a l  p r o ­
gramme .
To many in Iveria this cha l l e n g e  was t a n t a m o u n t  to 
heresy, a denial, in effect, of what they had fought for, of 
30 years of selfless struggle for the national cause and, as 
such, goes a long way to e x p l a i n i n g  the i n d i g n a t i o n  of the 
response from some of the paper’s most noted correspondents.
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It was not until 1894, h owever, that the lines of battle 
b e c a m e  s harply delineated; in the m e a n t i m e  it was not at 
all unusual for Iveria to publish work by the r e p r e s e n t a ­
tives of the new intellectual current. Thus, in accordance 
with Iveria's policy of accepting a broad range of views and 
encouraging young writers, the short-stories and novels of 
Egnate N i n o s h v i l i , g e n e r a l l y  regarded as the leader of the 
Qvi r i l a  group, d e p i c t i n g  the social forces at wor k  in the 
Ge o r g i a n  countryside, were f r e q u e n t l y  pub l i s h e d  in Tchav-
tchavadze’s paper without drawing a particularly hostile re- 
POsponse. In this Iveria was joined by Kvali, which in the
first year since its i n c e p t i o n  in J anuary 1893, did little
to distinguish itself politically from its senior companion.
That is, it a d v o c a t e d  the d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  of life, r a i s i n g
the level of national self-awareness, and the development of
n a t i o n a l  culture and natio n a l  unity. In c ertain respects,
it even appeared more conservative that Iveria, criticising
the strict policy of the saadgilmamulo bank on issuing loans
to the t ’avadaznauroba and recommending, among other things,
that the g ospel should o ccupy pride of place in all Geor-
p 1gians' reading. 1 But Giorgi D s e r e t ’eli, who had r arely 
seen eye to eye with his more illustrious rival, Ilia Tchav- 
tchavadze, was, it seems, still seeking a new direction for 
his paper and while not a c t u a l l y  e s p o u s i n g  the v i e w s  of 
Zhordania, N i n o s h v i l i  and their c o l l e a g u e s  himse l f ,  Kvali 
began to give them increasing coverage. Thus an article by 
Ninoshvili appeared in 1893 criticising Iakob Gogebashvili’s 
argument that technical schools were of greater benefit to 
Geo r g i a  than c l a ssical g y m n a s i a ,  since the f o r m e r  a l l o w e d  
landowners to increase both their own and the national in­
come by exploiting the skills of school leavers. It pointed
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out that although Britain was the most technologically a d ­
vanced and the wealthiest country in the world, its workers 
were still impov e r i s h e d .  The issue, therefore, was not so 
much national wealth, as how it was distributed, and educa­
tion had an i m p o r t a n t  role to play in s haping the p o p u l a ­
tion’s attitude to this and related problems.
Capitalism [wrote Ninoshvili] requires neither our 
p e r m i s s i o n  nor our praise and glo r i f i c a t i o n ;  it 
will arrive unrequested. The task of the intelli­
g e n t s i a  and of w r i t e r s  is to prepare the ground 
for wealth so that the worker will reap the bene­
fit of his labour, and no one will die of hunger 
in the s t r e e t s . ^
At the end of his first year as joint e d itor w i t h  his 
wife Anastasia T ’u m a n i s h v i l i - D s e r e t ' e l i , Giorgi Dseret'eli 
was able to observe:
Kvali has alre a d y  ga t h e r e d  around it the new 
young, future generation, w h ich is prepa r e d  to 
s a c r i f i c e  itself for the sake of the coun t r y  and 
considers itself fortunate.
But the real t urning point for K v a l i , the point at 
w h i c h  its d i f f e r e n c e s  with Iveria and to a lesser extent 
Moambe (The Herald),2Zf became unbridgeable came in May 189A , 
f o l l o w i n g  the d e a t h  t h r o u g h  t u b e r c u l o s i s  of E g n a t e  
N i n o s h v i l i  at the age of 35. R e p o r t i n g  in p erson on the 
funeral in K o n t c h k a t ’i, West Georgia, Giorgi D s e r e t ’eli 
l aunched a v i t u p e r a t i v e  and largely g r a t u i t o u s  a t t a c k  
against Iveria’s editors, accusing them of having no greater 
interest than lining their own pockets whilst the n a t i o n  
stood in danger, the tone of w h ich u n d o u b t e d l y  f u r t h e r  
widened the chasm now yawning open between the two p a p e r s .  
But of g r e a t e r  i m p o r t a n c e  was Dseret'eli's c o m m e n t a r y  on
Silbistro Jibladze's funeral oration, describing Georgia as
a land riven by class struggle, t hrough w h i c h  the seeds of 
capitalism’s downfall were ripening. The duty "of the best 
representatives of the new generation”, he declared, was to
prepare the people for that moment, and to hasten its arri-
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val. ° It was this speech that inspired Dseret'eli to 
declare the coalescence of a new ideological force in Geor­
gian p o l i t i c a l  life, a force to w h ich he gave the name 
M e s a m e Dasi .(The Third Group), and w h i c h  has s u b s e q u e n t l y  
come to be seen as the pr e c u r s o r  of the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  
Party in Georgia. Rather curiously, however, D s e r e t ’eli 
c l a i m e d  that ’’not one arti c l e  of their p r o g r a m m e  c o n t r a ­
d i c t e d ” his own ideas, and indeed went on to s u m m a r i s e  it in 
terms which would suggest he was correct: the need to bring
literacy to the people, to introduce scientifically founded 
ideas, to keep the people abreast of world developments and 
to use e v e r y t h i n g  w o r t h w h i l e  in w o rld d e v e l o p m e n t  to help 
the people.  ^ 7 If this had been all the p r o g r a m m e  had 
a m o u n t e d  to, it w o u l d  not, of course, have c o n t r a d i c t e d  
either his v i e w s  or, for that matter, the v i e w s  of m a n y  of 
those a s s o c i a t e d  with Iveria and Moambe. But since it, in 
fact, a m o u n t e d  to rather more than that, it may be that 
Dseret'eli had not fully grasped what the programme implied. 
Nevertheless, his articles in Nos. 21 and 22 of Kvali cover­
ing J i b l a d z e ’s funeral, do mark a t urning point in the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of p o l i t i c a l  thought in Georgia, for a l t h o u g h  
under Dseret'eli Kvali c o n t inued to be guided by the sam e  
broad democratic outlines as in the past, there is no doubt 
that from this m o m e n t  M e s a m e Das i c a m e  to a c q u i r e  an i n ­
creasingly prominent place within the paper and a guaranteed 
means of airing its beliefs publicly.
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Fro m  this mome n t ,  too, the rift b e t w e e n  Iveria and 
Kvali and to a lesser extent between Moambe and Kvali began 
to become more pronounced. Giorgi Dseret'eli attempted to 
explain their differences in an editorial at the beginning 
of 1895.
Whe n  ne w  d e m a n d s  g r o w  s tronger in society and a 
n e w  party c o m e s  to the fore, it is i n e v i t a b l e  that 
sooner or later, this will be f o l l o w e d  by the 
a p p e a r a n c e  of a journal e x p r e s s i n g  its point of 
view. We must regard the f o u n d i n g  of Kvali as 
just such a circu m s t a n c e .  On its a p p e a r a n c e  our 
t h i n k i n g  g e n e r a t i o n  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w o  c a m p s .  
Georgian thought tore away the enveloping fog and 
soon fierce collisions occurred between the diff­
erent schools of thought.
Whilst there was some truth in this assessment, parti­
cularly as regards the differences between the Mesame Dase- 
lebi and Iveria, it is not an entirely satisfactory explana­
tion. Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  it sw e e p s  aside the m a n i f e s t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  Giorgi Dseret'eli's p o s i t i o n  and the 
M a r x i s t  v i e w p o i n t s  of Noe Zhordania, Jibladze, M a k h a r a d z e  
and others of the ne w  g e n e r a t i o n  w r i t i n g  for K v a l i . Thus, 
for all his o p p o s i t i o n  to I ver i a , G. Dseret'eli's p e r s o n a l  
o pini o n s  were f r e q u e n t l y  c o m p a t i b l e  with those of his 
rivals. In the first edition of the paper in J a n u a r y  1 893, 
for example, he declared himself in favour of class unity:
There is one estate w h i c h  unites every o n e  - c o n ­
sciousness of one's national identity and dedica­
tion to the p e o p l e . ^
This was, of course, in 1 893, but p r e c i s e l y  two years 
later, several months after his recognition of Mesame D a s i , 
and only four days after his article purporting to see Kvali 
as the s t a n d a r d - b e a r e r  of the ne w  p r o g r e s s i v e  c a m p  of a 
polarised society, he criticised the alleged bias of Iveria
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ana stated:
Fortunately for us, the main part of our nation is 
not involved in these rival parties (dasebi), but 
listens to all ideas and controversial discussions 
impartially.. . 0
Mesame D a s i , he went on to explain, was a group
that has re j e c t e d  class partic u l a r i s m .  It has 
decla r e d  its interest to be the entire G e o r g i a n  
nation, r e g a r d l e s s  of class, origin or estate. 
The G e o r g i a n  nation is not just the p e a s a n t r y  or 
the t'avadaznauroba but a collective body which is 
peasant and t ' a v a d a z n a u r i , priest and merchant, 
o fficial and rent collector. This c o l l e c t i v e  
entity is the G e o r g i a n  nation, f o r m e d  by a h i s ­
torical culture and consolidated by its own lang­
uage, its own national faith and its own national 
existence. We should try to support all c i r c u m ­
stances, all measures, w h i c h  can s t r e n g t h e n  the 
w h o l e  G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n ,  e n v i g o r a t e  it in its 
totality, politically and economically. We should 
also oppose any a c t i v i t y  w h i c h  could lead to the 
d o m i n a t i o n  of the c o l l e c t i v e  by anv one part and 
to its advance over the other parts.
In fact, it was not Iveria that supported the division 
of Georgian society into parties, but Mesame D a s i , which re­
garded them as the natural c o n s e q u e n c e s  of the d i v i s i o n  of 
society into antagonistic classes. Iveria's espousal of the 
"common ground" theory was directed at preventing precisely 
such a division.
The bitte r l y  p o l e m i c a l  tone of the debate b e t w e e n  
Giorgi Dseret'eli and I veria cannot, therefore, be a t t r i ­
buted solely, or even mainly, to ideological rivalry. There 
were, of course, differences between them. Dseret'eli, like 
Niko N i k o l a d z e  and Sergi Meskhi, till his death in 1883, 
supported the industrial development of Georgia, encouraged 
Georgians to compete on level terms with the Armenian bour­
geoisie, and saw no special role for the t'avadaznauroba in 
the future d e v e l o p m e n t  of the nation. This did not lead
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effect that the advocates of the "common ground" between the 
t'avadaznauroba and the p e a s a n t r y  were using the idea as a 
cover for reestablishing the domination of the t'avadaznau- 
r o b a . There was a m p l e  evidence in the w r i t i n g s  of the 
t'ergdaleulni that those of them who did support the common 
ground concept also envisaged a future in which the nobility 
w ould be shorn of its p a t r i a r c h a l  privileges. It may be, 
therefore, that the tone of the debate owe d  as muc h  to the 
poor personal relations between Giorgi Dseret'eli and cer­
tain of those ga t h e r e d  around Iver i a , most notably, I. 
Tchavtchavadze, as to genuine policy disputes. The insinua- 
tion too in Dseret'eli's report on Ninoshvili's funeral that 
I v e r i a 's n i g g a r d l y  and tardy p a y m e n t  for the author's r e ­
ports and stories m a y  have h a s t e n e d  his death, c e r t a i n l y  
appears to have soured relations further without adding to 
the quality of the debate.22
The equally r a n corous conflict b e t w e e n  Iver ia and 
M e s a m e Dasi was to som e  extent a s p i l l - o v e r  of the clash 
with G. Dseret'eli, insofar as the group at t a c k e d  Iver ia 
from the pages of Dseret'eli's paper. But in this case it 
also reflected a deeper ideological and generational rift.
Youth looks on the habits, ways and t h e o r i e s  of 
its predecessors with a critical eye...
wrote Ninoshvili in a manner reminiscent of a similar divi­
sion in the 1860s,
...in short, at e v e r y t h i n g  w h i c h  in one way or 
another has i m p o r t a n c e  to h u m a n  life. Whatever, 
in its opinion, seems unnecessary baggage for the 
progress of life, ...it throws out. The old g e n e ­
ration sees that the p r i n c i p l e s  a c k n o w l e d g e d  as 
supreme moral principles in its time are rejected
by the new generation as immoral and inappropriate 
to. progress..., the old g e n e r a t i o n  s e e s  the 
changes in life and the newly introduced elements, 
but doesn't u n d e r s t a n d  them and, therefore, sees 
e v e r y t h i n g  as m i s t a k e n  and l a c k i n g  in truth, b e ­
cause it has not experienced, discussed or studied 
these novel developments.^^
Thus ,on the one side, the I veria intellectuals, mostly 
in their m i d - 5 0 s  n o w  and jealous of their a u t h o r i t y  and 
status, m o c k i n g l y  d i s m i s s e d  G. Dseret'eli's c l a i m  that the 
young writers on Kvali represented a new political grouping 
in G e o r g i a n  society, w h i l e  the latter, stung by I v e r i a 's 
condescension and anxious to assert themselves, responded by 
denigrating the achievements of the t'ergdaleulni and quest­
ioning the relevance of their ideas. Jibladze, for example, 
describing Iveria and Moambe in 1895, wrote:
Both in gen e r a l  share the same direction, both 
have the same slogan e n s c r i b e d  on their banner: 
patriarchal isolationism and the revival and con­
solidation of batonqmoba in a new guise. They see 
social progress and social int e r e s t s  through the 
eyes of a long-formed principle. Of course there 
are d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  them. But these d i f f e r ­
ences relate more to the ex t e r n a l  side of things 
than the internal. Their direction in our litera­
ture should be acknowledged as 'reaction'.^
Interestingly, Zhordania and Jibladze subsequently con­
ceded that their attacks had at times been intemperate and 
unjust, but explained them in terms of the need to challenge 
the intellectual domination of the old generation.
...such excesses are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of any ne w  
party [wrote Zhordania], which, seized by e n t h u ­
s i asm for n e w  ideas e m e r g e s  for the first tim e  
onto the field of action.
But the g e n e r a t i o n  divide was also founded on clear 
ideological and policy differences. Iveria scoffed at the 
suggestion that Georgia was dividing into two antagonistic
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classes, maintaining that the reverse was in fact the case, 
that the previous, rigid distinctions between the t'avadaz­
nauroba and the peasantry had been blurred and that the only 
remaining division was not between classes, but between rich 
and poor. It was society's task to ameliorate those differ­
ences.
If we have any e n e m i e s  [wrote V. Dseret'eli in 
I v e r i a ], they are foreigners. We are all poor.
lore, there are no classes in our coun-
At least until 1898, much of the debate between Iveria 
and M e s a m e Dasi centred not on the m e r i t s  or o t h e r w i s e  of 
Marxism, but on whether or not capitalism existed in G e o r ­
gia. Certain, though by no means all, of the Iveria group, 
m a i n t a i n e d  that it did not exist and, f u r t h e r m o r e ,  that it 
was not desirable that it should do so, whilst Mesame Dasi 
pointed to the growing division of labour, the development 
of mark e t s  and c o m m o d i t y  rel a t i o n s  and of i n d u s t r i e s  as 
i n c o n t e s t i b l e  proof that G e o r g i a  was no e x c e p t i o n  to the 
changes taking place in Russia and elsewhere in Europe. The 
Iveria writers feared that the emphasis on class differences 
would divide the nation against itself and thus prevent the 
r e a l i s a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  freedom. P o l i t i c a l  and e c o n o m i c  
differences should be submerged until this primary goal was 
achieved. Thus in 1897, Iveria announced:
A great task has arisen: the d e v e l o p m e n t  of
national self-consciousness through national self- 
defence and the development of the nation through 
European education and science. Today, due to the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e  of our times, we all c o m p r i s e  one 
party, are i m b u e d  with the same idea. Our m e a n s  
and our method for realising this idea are ident­
ical. But if someone indicates some new means, we 
will accept it, so long as it does not c o n t r a d i c t  
our idea and destroy the n e c e s s a r y  unity of our
8 7nation. 1
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But M e s a m e Dasi argued that this unity was, in any 
case, a myth and that Iveria was simply fooling itself when 
it p u r p o r t e d  to see the n a t i o n ’s parts d r a w i n g  closer t o ­
gether. Zho r d a n i a  likened the paper to a spoilt child who 
asks for the m o o n  and begins to cry w h e n  told he can't have 
it. But no a m o u n t  of crying could bring about the i m p o s s ­
ible.38
Certain of the most prominent t'ergdaleulni were pre­
pared to accept the existence, i n e v i t a b i l i t y  and even 
desirability of capitalism, and some, like Niko Nikoladze, 
had long called on Georgians to compete on equal terms with 
the Armenian bourgeoisie. But even among those who argued 
that not only was c a p i t a l i s m  u n a v o i d a b l e  in Georgia, but 
that it was a l r e a d y  wel l  ensconced, there were m i s g i v i n g s  
about the a t t i t u d e  of the m e s a m e daselebi t o w a r d s  the 
national question, a belief that they cared litle for either 
n a t i o n a l  s e n t i m e n t  or consciousness. Iakob G o g e b a s h v i 1 i , 
for example, welcomed their defence of the working people, 
but added:
Social change alone is not enough for our country 
to flourish; we also c onsider it vital that we 
gain national f r e e d o m . 3 ^
w hile Akaki Dseret'eli c o m p l i m e n t e d  their d i r e c t n e s s  
and honesty, but accused them of being over-negative to the 
past, of rolling all that was good and bad indiscriminately 
over the cliff.
But the claim that the mesame daselebi had no interest 
in national issues was not entirely justified. They too de­
fended n a t i o n a l  culture and the right of G e o r g i a n s  to an 
education in their own language, but where they differed was
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on tne point or emphasis. They argued that the natio n a l  
q u e s t i o n  should not and could not be divorced from the 
social question, and that the t'ergdaleulni's preoccupation 
wit h  n a t i o n a l  unity had caused them to lose sight of the 
socio-economic changes that had affected Georgia since the 
peasant r e f o r m s  of the 1 860s and 1 870s. The fact of the 
matter, they declared, was that the same forces w h i c h  had 
overcome the economic isolation of Georgia's regions in the 
19th cen t u r y  and forged them into an i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n t e r ­
d e p e n d e n t  social, e c o n o m i c  and political bond, had also 
produced a s ociety in w h i c h  the m i n o r i t y  d e p e n d e d  for its 
well-being upon the exploitation of the labour of the m a j o r ­
ity. Their economic and political interests were d i a m etric­
ally o pposed and to argue, therefore, in t e r m s  of n a t i o n a l  
unity was to ignore this f u n d a m e n t a l  reality. In other 
w o r d s ,  Z h o r d a n i a  and his c o l l e a g u e s  e m p h a s i s e d  the 
p a r a m o u n t c y  of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  bonds over the national. 
Furthermore, they argued that Georgia's national interests 
were tied to its e c o n o m i c  progress, to the d e v e l o p m e n t  of 
its p r o d u c t i v e  forces and its active p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the 
w o rld di v i s i o n  of labour. If G e o r g i a  were to thrive as a 
nation, it would have to follow the road,
...along which Europe itself set out a long tim e
ago and whose central pillar is secured on a base
of trade, or c o m m e r c e  and industry. P r o d u c t i o n  
[wrote Zhordania], capitalist production - that's 
the key to Europe's strength. The great n a t i o n a l  
di v i s i o n  of labour first oc c u r r e d  in E ngland in 
the 14th-16th centuries; the town grew apart from 
the village and urban life was stimulated. The 
modern capitalist structure was inculcated here... 
It was followed b y  France, Germany, and remaining 
E u r o p e a n  states and America... The c e a s e l e s s
a d v a n c e  of c a p i t a l i s m  was a c c o m p a n i e d  by f u n d a ­
mental changes in life. It variegated the manners 
and c u s t o m s  of the peoples, d e s t r o y e d  the old 
legal and p o l i tical structure, s h a t t e r e d  the
idyllic, p a t r i a r c h a l  relations, unified each
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nation s e p a r a t e l y  and joined others together, 
caused art, l i t e r a t u r e  and science to flourish; 
in short, gave rise to such energy, such triu m p h ­
ant progress in m a n k i n d  as had p r e v i o u s l y  never 
been d r e a m e d  of. On the other hand, that same 
capitalism divided the nation into two parts: the
rich and poor, the l a n d o w n e r  and the landless 
peasants, the bourgeoisie and the worker. It also 
c a u s e d  s o c i a l  d i v i s i o n ,  g a v e  b i r t h  to c l a s s  
struggle and brought the working people on to the 
political stage, thus digging its own grave.^1
But although Zhordania placed the formation of the G e o ­
rgian n ation in the 19th c entury and re g a r d e d  it as a p r o ­
duct of capitalism, he also believed that the raw material 
of nationality. - language, c o m m o n  a n c e s t r y  and a c o m m o n  
h i s t o r y  - had long given the G e o r g i a n  people a shared 
interest in the defence of their natio n a l  identity. A 
psychological bond, in other words, united all Georgians and 
had been strengthened by the consolidation of the nation in 
the last c e n t u r y . ^  In contra d i c t i o n ,  moreover, of the 
accusations of excessive materialism levelled at him, Zhor­
dania m a i n t a i n e d  that "the ess e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "  of 
n a t i o n h o o d  was w h e t h e r  or not a people felt itself to be a 
n a t i o n . ^  By this criterion, as he freely a c k n o w l e d g e d ,  
citing France as a case in point, people of all persuasions, 
classes and backgrounds could share certain interests which 
co n c erned "the entire n a t i o n ’s p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  life". 
However, w hile such natio n a l  interests might prove s u f f i ­
cient to unite the nation against a common external enemy, 
they could not prevent the emergence of political and econo­
mic d i s s i d e n c e  in cond i t i o n s  of peace. Natio n a l  e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t  perfo r c e  brought the c o m p o n e n t  c l a s s e s  of the 
nation into conflict.^
What Zho r d a n i a  was saying, therefore, was not that 
n a t i o n a l  struggle should be entirely s u b s u m e d  w i t h i n  the
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economic ana political struggle of the working people, but 
that G e o r g i a  had r eached a point in its d e v e l o p m e n t  w h ere 
the shared interests of society were outweighed by the diff­
erences dividing it and that the future of the nation could 
best be served by i n d e n t i f y i n g  its i n t erests with those of 
its working people.
5.2 The Emergence of Political Parties
The Social-Democratic Party
The social tensions r e l e a s e d  by the peasant r e f o r m s  
mounted steadily in both the towns and villages of Georgia 
t h r o u g h o u t  the 1890s. The rural c o n d i t i o n s  d e s c r i b e d  in 
C hapter 3 gave rise to sporadic, u n c o o r d i n a t e d  and angry 
o ut b u r s t s  of viole n c e  on the one hand and m i g r a t i o n  to the 
towns, p a r t i c u l a r l y  T ’bilisi and Bat'umi, on the other, 
wh e r e  desp i t e  the e x p a n s i o n  of c o m m e r c e  and industry, the 
n u m b e r  of w o r k e r s  seeking e m p l o y m e n t  vastly e x c e e d e d  the 
n u m b e r  of jobs available. Such was the c o m p e t i t i o n  for 
work, moreover, that employers were able to dictate severe 
terms, to e nforce p i e c e - w o r k  and hire and fire on a daily 
basis. In T ’bilisi the ave r a g e  w o r k i n g  day e x c e e d e d  14 
hours and rea c h e d  16-17 hours if one includes c o m p u l s o r y  
overtime, whilst workers were paid, on average, 60 kopecks 
to one ruble a d a y . ^  A poor wag e  in the best of c i r c u m ­
stances, it b e c o m e s  a l m o s t  d e r i s o r y  when one r e c a l l s  that 
many of those w o r k i n g  in T ’bilisi had gone there to earn 
enough to provide for families left behind in the villages. 
In addition to the insecurity, long hours and poor pay, the 
municipal council's policy of looking after the development 
of the inner city to the v irtual neglect of the workers' 
suburbs ensured that they lived in conditions of the utmost
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squalor. ° An official investigation into the causes of the 
plague w h i c h  s truck Bat'umi in 1901 d e s c r i b e d  the town's 
housing conditions:
The workers' lodgings are all built in the same 
long fashion, from thin planks, with low ceilings 
and are set out in lines or parallel rows; they 
are divided into s m all c a g e - l i k e  rooms. The 
floors ... are mostly laid directly on the ground, 
leaving no room for ventilation. The small, 
narrow porches alongside the rows of rooms and the 
dark, little w i n d o w s  besides each door are the 
sole features resembling human dwellings and dis­
tinguish them externally from stables. The floors 
were m o s t l y  rotten and full of holes ... there 
were signs of dam p  and the decay caused by it all 
o v e r  the w a l l s  and c e i l i n g s  ... the l i t t l e  
w i n d o w s ,  usua l l y  one to a room, were c overed in 
g r i m e  and grease; in place of the broken panes, 
the w i n d o w s  were boarded up w i t h  thin strips of 
wood, tin and cardboard, or stuffed full of old 
rags... The entire tow n  is c overed in a n e t w o r k  
of such houses, or to be more accurate, hovels... 
They ... are c r o w d e d  wit h  the poor who pay an 
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  high price not just in money, but 
wit h  their h ealth ... these toi l i n g  people who 
li v e  w h e r e v e r  t h e y  can r e s t  t h e i r  t o r m e n t e d  
bodies. They live in attics, in pitch-black, 
e v i l - s m e l l i n g  cellars w here there are stacks of 
human beings instead of stacks of firewood; they 
live in damp, surrounded by the most awful stench 
and w i t h o u t  light; in w i n t e r  they keep w a r m  
through the combined heat of their own bodies and 
they live in te r r i b l y  c r o w d e d  c o n d i t i o n s  - five, 
seven or nine people in places where two to three 
men can barely fit... It hardly needs saying that 
such lodgings in Bat'umi - t h i s . k i n g d o m  of c o n ­
stant rain, dam p  and fever - have a ruinous, 
d e s t r u c t i v e  effect on the tenants and e s p e c i a l l y  
on the growing bodies of children and do not just 
shake the roots of a person's he a l t h  and sap his 
a b i l i t y  to w o r k ,  but a l s o  r e d u c e  his l i f e  
e x p e c t a n c y . ^
Nor does it need much saying that such c o n d i t i o n s  
proved fertile breeding ground for unrest among the workers 
and wer e  a direct cause of the strike m o v e m e n t  w h i c h  n o w  
began to deepen its roots in Georgia. The years 1894-96 
witnessed large-scale strikes in the capital's biggest fact­
ories and its railway yards and workshops demanding higher
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pay, shor t e r  hours, an end to fines at wor k  and i m p r o v e d
A O
medical services, while in December 1898, a mass strike by
r a i l w a y  workers, w h i c h  began in T ’bilisi and spread to 
Mikhailovo and Samtredia, provided clear evidence that they 
were learning the benefits of discipline and organisation. 
For the first time the strikers held firm against government 
pressure, arrests and the use of troops, and on 21st D e c e m ­
ber, a week after the strike had begun, the government con­
ceded to the railwaymen's d e m a n d s . ^
The same conditions also ensured a sympathetic response 
to the i n c r e a s i n g l y  n u m e r o u s  and a c tive s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  
cells emerging in the railway workshops and in the T ’bilisi 
workers' districts of Nadzaladevi and Navt'lughi. The first 
of these a p p e a r e d  in 1891, some two years prior to the first 
m e e t i n g  of M e s a m e D a s i , and c o n s i s t e d  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  of a 
group of Marxist-oriented Russians led by a mechanic at the 
Singer factory named Fedor A f a n a s ' e v . ^ O  jn fact, one of the 
outstanding features of the development of social-democratic 
cells in Georgia thoughout the 1890s was the prominent role 
played by Russian workers who had either come voluntarily to 
Geor g i a  for jobs, or who had been sent south as p u n i s h m e n t  
for their part in disturbances in Russia. Thus in 1892, the 
s o - c alled ’’A f a n a s ’ev c i r c l e ” was joined by a n o t h e r  R u s s i a n  
organisation, led by T. Mayorov.^^ Georgians were, however, 
increasingly drawn to the circles, but as the mesame dalele- 
bi were to discover in 1894, when they attempted to organise 
their own reading groups, language presented a considerable 
obstacle to their progress. Thus, although they soon estab­
lished contact with the e x i s t i n g  cells and had a c c e s s  to 
their collections of socialist literature, there was nothing
in Georgian. Consequently, translation from Russian, German
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and French became one of the first major tasks undertaken by 
the new group.
M a n y  of these circles, and c e r t a i n l y  those run by the 
mesame daselebi were of a predominantly educative nature at 
this stage, seeking to familiarise the workers with Marxist 
thought rather than organise them. But parallel to the 
reading circles organised by young intellectuals like Sil - 
bistro Jibladze, were a growing number of cells which orig­
inated among the workers themselves and. placed as much, if 
not more, e m p h a s i s  on a g i t a t i o n  and p r o p a g a n d a  work a m o n g  
fellow workers. Leaving aside the question of the impact of 
this work, the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  on w h i c h  these 
w o r k e r s ’ cells w e r e  founded wer e  to have a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n ­
fluence on the future development of the social-democratic 
m o v e m e n t  in Georgia, insofar as it was in this period that 
the tradition was established of funding their own organisa­
tions and of electing leaders from b e l o w . ^3 In later years, 
the attempts of the Bolshevik wing of the social-democratic 
movement to base the Transcaucasian party organisations on 
small, clandestine cells of appointed, professional cadres 
was to founder against this tradition.
By 1896, there wer e  s o m e  25 illegal w o r k e r s ’ c i r c l e s  
operating in T'bilisi alone and similar groups had now begun 
to appear in Bat'umi and K'ut ^ a i s i . ^  That year, the first 
e fforts at c o o r d i n a t i o n  of their work c o n c l u d e d  in the 
creat i o n  of the T'bilisi P r o p a g a n d a  C o l l e c t i v e  and a p r o ­
clamation issued to the railway workers calling on them to 
waken from their hibernation and prepare themselves for the 
a p p r o a c h i n g  hour of v i c t o r y , 55 wh i l s t  in 1897, in r e s p o n s e  
to the c o n s t a n t l y  e x p a n d i n g  n u m b e r  of a c t i v e  c e l l s ,
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representatives or the various social-democratic groups in 
T’bilisi agreed to the establishment of the T ’bilisi Social- 
Democratic Committee, whose task was to be the coordination 
of activities in the city, the maintenance of contacts with 
other Transcaucasian centres and the strengthening of ties 
w i t h  the R u s s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n . ^  T h u s  in 1898, the 
committee which at this stage consisted entirely of T ’bilisi 
workers, voted to send Vaso T sabadze to attend the first 
RSDLP C ongress in Minsk, only to be t h w a r t e d  by his arrest 
soon before his planned departure.^^
Although neither Mesame Dasi nor the social-democratic 
c i r c l e s  in G e o r g i a  a p p e a r  to h a v e  b e e n  t r o u b l e d  by 
factional strife during the 1890s, it is clear that as their 
ranks grew larger and the scale and extent of their activi­
ties broadened, that differences began to emerge over tac­
tics.^® Thus, a l t h o u g h  the f o r m a t i o n  of the T ’bilisi C o m ­
m i t t e e  in 1897 can be seen to mark the b e g i n n i n g  of a u n i ­
fied Social-Democratic Party in Georgia, it can also be seen 
as a development which highlighted existing differences of 
o pinion a m o n g  the lea d i n g  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  about the best 
courses of action. Essentially, these boiled d o w n  to 
w h e t h e r  the party should aba n d o n  the use of legal m e a n s  of 
struggle and go completely underground, or whether it should 
e m p l o y  every means at its disposal, i n c l u d i n g  the legal 
press. The mesame daselebi, who from the very beginning had 
made use not just of Kvali , but also of I ver ia and M £a. m bje t o 
propound their ideas, were the chief proponents of the a r g u ­
ment that continued use of the press was an invaluable means 
of raising the level of political sophistication of the po p ­
ulation, a view c learly shared by G. U r a t a d z e  who, in his
reminiscences of the period, maintained that Kvali was the
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means by which his generation became acquainted with M a r x ­
ism. By this time, moreover, the daselebi already had plans 
to take over the paper and to t r a n s f o r m  it into a paper of 
M a r x i s t  thought and a pot e n t i a l  centre for t r a i n i n g  party 
cadres. However, the underground movement, which was con­
c e n t r a t e d  m o s t l y  a m o n g  the workers' circles, set grea t e r  
emphasis on organisation and preparation of the workers for 
the coming political challenge to the autocracy. Noe Zhor­
dania quickly became aware of the difference of opinion over 
tactics when he r e t u r n e d  from Europe after four years' 
absence and, not surprisingly for a man who had written r e g ­
ularly for the G e o r g i a n  press even w h i l s t  abroad, took a 
negative view of those who sought to abandon its use.
a narrow, sec t a r i a n  tende n c y  a p p e a r e d  [he 
wrote], which rejected any kind of legal work and 
was sat i s f i e d  only with n o n - l e g a l  propaganda.
Therefore, these strata re g a r d e d  the p a r t i c i p a ­
tion of Marxists in Kvali n e g a t i v e l y ^
Soviet h i s t o r i a n s  f r e q u e n t l y  cite this d e v e l o p m e n t
approvingly, but it is not at all clear, as s e e m s  to be
their implication, that the division between those in favour
of a b a n d o n i n g  the use of legal m e t h o d s  and those who
defended them c o i n c i d e d  with the later di v i s i o n  of the
S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y  i n t o  M e n s h e v i k  and B o l s h e v i k
factions. In fact, after Giorgi Dseret'eli had handed over
Kvali to the m e s a m e daselebi at the b e g i n n i n g  of 1898, a
n u m b e r  of future Bolsheviks, i n c l u d i n g  p r o m i n e n t  f i g u r e s
c. n
like P ’ilipe Ma k h a r a d z e ,  wrote a r t i c l e s  for the paper, 
while in late 1897, at a large meeting of Georgia's leading 
Social-Democrats, which would almost certainly have included 
I. J u g a s h v i l i  (Stalin), L. Ketskho v e l i ,  A. D s u lukidze, M.
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Tskhakaia and Makharadze, the future nucleus of the Leninist 
o r i e n t a t i o n  in the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  party o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  not 
only was the con t i n u e d  use of the paper e ndorsed by a m a j o r ­
ity of those present, but the bete noire of Soviet Georgian
historians, Noe Zhordania, was elected u n o p p o s e d  to the 
f \ 1
editorship.
Although the meeting was remarkable more for the solid­
arity of those present than for the appearance of an ’’oppor­
tunist” and a ”revolutionary” split within the party, it is 
i m p o r t a n t  to note that one of the main reasons it had been 
called was to iron out a c o m m o n  policy on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s ­
tion, f o l l o w i n g  a d i s a g r e e m e n t  that had e m e r g e d  on this
issue at an earlier meeting in 1897 in Zhordania’s home town
f\ P
of Lanchkhut’i. Whilst it is not entirely clear what the 
latter had been proposing, it is at least a p p a r e n t  that he 
had favoured giving the national question greater prominence 
in the party’s propaganda work and that, in doing so, he had 
found himself in isolation. What is most interesting about 
the subsequent debate in T ’bilisi, however, is that far from 
there being an acute d i v i s i o n  of opin i o n  on the question, 
there was virtual u n a n i m i t y  that for the time being, at 
least, the n a t i o n a l  qu e s t i o n  should be shelved. The sole 
d i s c o r d a n t  n o t e  at the p r o c e e d i n g s  w a s  s t r u c k  by 
Zhordania. ^
The argument of the majority was twofold: first, that
the e m p h a s i s  on the n ational qu e s t i o n  would raise the 
problem of national unity and temporary class alliances at a 
tim.e when for tactical reasons they should be concentrating 
on shifting the workers’ circles from the economic struggle 
to the political, and putting forward issues which distanced
the working masses from the ruling classes; secondly, that
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nationalist demands were unpopular with the Georgian people 
b ecause of their a n x i e t y  about the c o n t i n u e d  threat from 
Persia and p a r t i c u l a r l y  Turkey, and that as a consequence, 
the people might turn its back on the party. At a time too, 
w he n  social divisions, e s p e c i a l l y  in rural Georgia, wer e  
more acute than ever, it scarcely made sense to call on the 
peasantry to make common cause with the t ’avadzanauroba, nor 
for the w o r k i n g  people as a w h ole to unite with the n a t i o n a l  
bourgeoisie, since the latter was as yet small and virtually 
powerless. At the s a m e  meeting, a more e x t r e m e  v i e w  put 
f o r w a r d  by the B a t ’umi d e l e g a t e s  and most of the R u s s i a n s  
present, that socialists had no business at all with nation­
al matters was, however, rejected. ^
Of still further interest, particularly in view of the 
accusation sometimes levelled at him that he was a national­
ist, is that shortly after this meeting Zhordania accepted 
the c o r r e c t n e s s  of the m a j o r i t y  view. In his m e m o i r s  he 
attributes this change of heart to a discussion he held with 
the p e a s a n t r y  of his home vill a g e  in January 1898 d u r i n g  
w h ich it b e c a m e  clear that they a s s o c i a t e d  the idea of 
n a t i o n a l  f r e e d o m  with a return to the i n s e c u r i t y  of the 
past:
I saw that for them the f r e e d o m  of the na t i o n  
meant a return to old times... I turned to wal k  
away and said to myself: the comrades are right.
This fruit is premature, the people must first be 
wakened on different ground. With this decision I 
returned to T p ’ilisi. ^
Although Zhordania is guilty here of over-generalisa­
tion from the particular experiences of one village situated 
close to the Turk i s h  border, and w i t h  a recent m e m o r y  of i n ­
vasion and an illicit c r o s s - b o r d e r  slave trade, it was,
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nevertheless, undoubtedly the case that although Georgians 
were now conscious of their national identity and prepared 
to d e m a n d  the defe n c e  of their n a t i o n a l  culture and native 
language, this consciousness did not take the form of poli­
tical nat i o n a l i s m .  Outside of the i n t e lligentsia, there 
appear to have been few d e m a n d s  for i n d e p e n d e n c e  or even 
autonomy, whilst among the peasantry, as Zhordania narrates, 
there was a marked absence even of the anti-Russian senti­
ment one might have expected, given the official chauvinism 
of the government.
With the establishment of the T ’bilisi Committee, the 
size and influence of the Social-Democratic Party in Georgia 
co n t i n u e d  to expand throu g h o u t  the r e m a i n i n g  years of the 
19th century and into the 20th century. Party workers were, 
for instance, be l i e v e d  by the g o v e r n m e n t  to have p layed a 
prominent part in the successful rail strike of 1898, and in 
1899, 75-100 w o r k e r s  r e s p o n d e d  to leaflets fro m  the Kvali 
printing press with a small demonstration outside the city 
to mark the first celebration of May Day in Georgia.^7 The 
following May, 500-600 people gathered under banners bearing 
portraits of Marx, Engels and Lassalle and slogans calling 
for the d o w n f a l l  of autocracy, w h i l e  in August 1900, party 
members played an influential part in organising T ’bilisi's 
first g eneral strike,^® w hich a l t h o u g h  it failed in the 
immediate term to force concessions from the government and 
most of the private employers, n e v e r theless, p r o v i d e d  the 
party wit h  an u n p r e c e d e n t e d  o p p o r t u n i t y  to extend its i n ­
f luence and exploit the p r e v a i l i n g  mood of discontent. In 
this respect, it is worth not i n g  that the r e l a t i v e l y . o p e n  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  upon w h ich the party cells wer e
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based enabled them to expand in response to the popular mood 
in a way that a more secretive and hierarchical organisation 
could not. A s i g n i f i c a n t  feature of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
r e s p o n s e  was its decis i o n  to send 5 0 per cent of the 900 
w o r k e r s  a r r e s t e d  d u ring the t w o - w e e k  strike back to their 
v i l l a g e s , ^  a decision which was to be repeated again else­
wh e r e  in the country, and w h i c h  had an i m p o r t a n t  part in 
spreading the influence of the social-democratic movement 
from the urban centres to the rural areas, and establishing 
it as a mass-party by the time of the first Russian revolu­
tion in 1905.
In 1901, the social-democratic movement celebrated May 
Day in the centre of T'bilisi for the first time, d e m o n ­
strating both its growing confidence and the swelling n u m ­
bers at its c o m m a n d .  In an a t m o s p h e r e  further c h a r g e d  by 
the industrial crisis deepening throughout Russia, and the 
threat of r e d u n d a n c i e s  and reduced pay, a c r o w d  of over
2 , 000 w o r k e r s  and s e m i n a r y  s t u d e n t s  g a t h e r e d  in the 
soldiers' bazaar, c a r r y i n g  b anners e x p l i c i t l y  c a l l i n g  for 
the overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of a d e m o ­
cratic republic. In response to what it saw as a b latant 
po l i tical c h a l l e n g e  to the a u t h o r i t y  of the r egime, the 
T'bilisi a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  re s o l v e d  to settle the issue by 
force and d e s p a t c h e d  a d e t a c h m e n t  of Coss a c k  c a v a l r y  to 
assist the police in breaking up the demonstration. In the 
ensuing clash, 14 w o r k e r s  wer e  w o u n d e d  and 30 ar r e s t e d . ^ ®  
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  however, it m a r k e d  a w a t e r s h e d  in the 
a t t i t u d e  of the g o v e r n m e n t  t o w a r d s  the socia 1 - d e m o c r a t i c  
movement in the Caucasus, for although official concern at 
the movement's activities had already been mounting, there
had still been a t endency to regard it as rather less of a
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threat to s t a b i l i t y  than, the nationalists. Noe Z h o r d a n i a  
comments on this in his memoirs:
Kvali came out with the c e n s o r ’s p e r mission, but 
despite that, apart from direct appeals, (i.e. to 
the people), we freely p rinted all our ideas. 
This can be exp l a i n e d  by two c i r c u m s t a n c e s :  the
censorship committee had received a circular from 
Petersburg instructing it to pay special attention 
to p r o p a g a n d a  of a n a t i o n a l i s t  character. Poems 
became the main victims of this order. Our propa­
ganda, however, was m a i n l y  of a s o c i o - e c o n o m i c -  
h i s t o r i c a l  character, and the censor wa a young 
man, C. Zhuruli, of a decent nature and a liberal 
f r a m e  of mind. He d i d n ’t k n o w  M a r x i s m  and kept 
within the bounds of the circular. Once, however, 
he c o m p l a i n e d  to me - ’Thanks to you, I have no w  
been given additional work, I have been ordered to 
study Marxism'.'"1
Zhordania would have been well to have taken this as a 
w a r n i n g  of things to c o m e  for, in the a f t e r m a t h  of the May 
Day demonstration, the police issued warrants for the arrest 
of all the leading members of the movement, including Zhor­
dania, who now found h i m s e l f  forced to go into hiding. 
From this m o m e n t  s o c i a l - d e m o c r a c y  in G e o r g i a  c a m e  to be 
regarded as an equal threat as nationalism, while the future 
of Kvali as an effective voice of social-democratic opposi­
tion was placed in serious doubt.
There can be little doubt, h owever, that the i n i t i a l  
complacency of the government towards the movement had made 
it c o n s i d e r a b l y  easier for it to e s t a b l i s h  its roots a m o n g  
the population, not just in T'bilisi, but in the other towns 
of the Transcaucasus and to no small extent in the country­
side as well. Bat'umi, the fastest growing town in Georgia 
and the centre of the p e t r o l e u m  industry, is a case in 
point. It had had its own s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
since the turn of the century, led by Karlo Chkheidze, 
future leader of the 1917 P e t r o g r a d  Soviet and Isid o r e
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Ramishvili, and in February 1902, when Rothschilds laid off 
389 workers from their petroleum-container building factory, 
it was able to play a p r o m i n e n t  part in o r g a n i s i n g  the 
workers’ demonstrations for their reinstatement.*^3 On 8th 
March, the g o v e r n m e n t  r e s p o n d e d  to the first of these by 
a r r e s t i n g  348 of the p a rticipants, but the f o l l o w i n g  day 
w he n  6,0 00 people s u r r o u n d e d  the barracks h o l d i n g  the 
p ri s o n e r s  to d e m a n d  their release, the troops opened fire, 
k i l l i n g  15 and w o u n d i n g  50 in an i ncident that was to a s s u m e  
a significant role in the further development of the social- 
democratic movement in West Georgia, and more particularly, 
the province of Guria.*^ Hundreds of workers, many of them 
members of the social-democratic circles, were expelled back 
to their villages in the s u r r o u n d i n g  c o u n t r y s i d e  where, 
according to Grigol Uratadze, who was a native of the area, 
the words "Bat’umi worker” became legend among the peasantry 
and a symbol of resistance against the t s a r . ^
Despite r e t r o s p e c t i v e  a t t e m p t s  to di s c o v e r  or create 
intractable divisions within the Caucasian social-democratic 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  during this period, it is appar e n t  that at 
least until 1 903, and in many respects' long after that, they 
were remarkable for their unity on most major issues. Even 
P'ilipe M a k h a r a d z e  c l a i m e d  of the C a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
that at this time,
... there was less evidence of o p p o r t u n i s t  and 
r e v i s i o n i s t  tendencies; in fact, it is p o s s i b l e  
to say that they did not exist.*^
While, a c c o r d i n g  to B. S o u v a r i n e  in his b i o g r a p h y  of 
Stalin, Makharadze maintained that Georgian Social-Democracy 
’’m a i n t a i n e d  its u n i t y ” as late as 1904 and ’’had n e i t h e r
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internal quarrels or s p l i t s " . ^
The Menshevik Uratadze, moreover, notes that the Trans­
c a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  were free even from the disputes 
over "economism11 that preoccupied the Russian organisations 
about this t i m e :
It also needs to be noted that, g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k ­
ing, the s truggle c o n ducted so b i t t e r l y  a m o n g  
Socia 1 - D e m o c r a t s  over s o - c alled ’e c o n o m i s m ’ in 
Russia had no place in the Caucasus. ’Econ o m i s m '  
did not show itself in our country.
This s a m e  unity of p urpose is equally evident in the 
approach adopted towards the national question in the after- 
math of the m e e t i n g  to discuss the issue in late 1897. 
C entral to this a p p r o a c h  lay the belief that not only was 
Georgia's future linked wit h  that of Russia, a vie w  long 
held by the radical intelligentsia, but that the only way to 
a chieve the o v e r t h r o w  of the a u t o c r a c y  was thr o u g h  the 
establishment of close ties with the proletariat of Russia 
(Rossiya).
... The united stren g t h  of the workers, w h a t e v e r  
their nationality [wrote the Georgian Social-Demo- 
crat L a d o  K e t s k h o v e l i  in 1901], that is the 
mission of the proletariat... Russians, Georgians 
and Armenians... w o r k e r s  seized by one aim, i n ­
spired by one purpose, i m b u e d  with one interest.
Their s t r e n g t h  lies p r e c i s e l y  in this unity of 
spirit... ^
In con junction with this commitment to unity with the 
Russian proletariat, the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  also sought to 
counter the saert’o niadagi (common ground) theory popular 
a m o n g  what they l a b e l l e d  the " n a t i onalists" or "patriots", 
with the idea of class struggle. Thus, w h e r e a s  the t ’erg- 
da l e u l n i  had tried and, in fact, still c o n t i n u e d  to try to
relieve the tensions building up between the t ’avadaznauroba
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and the peasantry, the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  u n d e r s c o r e d  their 
d i f f e r e n c e s  and s tressed the ab s o l u t e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of 
their interests. Moreover, in a n u m b e r  of p a m p h l e t s  and 
articles written in association with the 100th anniversary 
of Russian annexation in September 1901, they endeavoured to 
further undermine the t'avadaznauroba's claim to lead Geor­
gian society. The aristoc r a c y ,  pointed out the n e w  u n d e r ­
ground social-democratic journal Brdzola (The Struggle)®0 in 
its first edition, had thr o u g h  its f a w n i n g  s u b s e r v i e n c e  
towards the Russian monarch and its obsequious celebration 
of the anniver s a r y ,  d e m o n s t r a t e d  both its lack of moral 
scruples and the unbridgeable gulf dividing itself from the
Q -1
rest of G e o r g i a n  society. A p r o c l a m a t i o n  issued by the 
T ’bilisi C o m m i t t e e  on S e p t e m b e r  26, 1 901, in the f o r m  of a 
dialogue between the t'avadaznauroba and the tsar, in which 
the former confirmed its devotion to the Russian crown and 
d i s a s s o c i a t e d  itself from events like the M a y  Day d e m o n ­
st r a t i o n  e arlier in the year, was posted all over the city 
and intended to illustrate as graphically as possible that 
common nationality was no guarantee of shared interests and 
that there could be no reconciliation with either the auto-
Q O
cracy or the aristocracy.
But a m o n g  the most i m m e d i a t e  tasks c o n f r o n t i n g  the 
Social-Democrats in an area remarkable for its confusion of 
nationalities, was to prevent the social and economic ten­
sions that m a r k e d  the last decade of the 19th c e n t u r y  and 
the early 20th cent u r y  from e x p r e s s i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  in o u t ­
breaks of inter-ethnic Violence. In this respect, at least, 
they were on c o m m o n  ground with the t 1 e r g d a l e u l n i  who, as 
has been s h o w n  above, devoted c o n s i d e r a b l e  energy to this 
problem in the 1870s and 1880s. By the 1890s, however, the
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situation in the Transcaucasus had been exacerbated by the 
rapid m i g r a t i o n  of the rural p o p u l a t i o n  to the towns and a 
sudden influx of A r m e n i a n  refug e e s  f o l l o w i n g  the T urkish 
massacres of 1894-96 and 1902-04.^ Disqualified from sett­
ling in the rural border areas by a g o v e r n m e n t  decree in 
1901 r e q u i r i n g  the r e l o c a t i o n  of r e f u g e e s  in urban areas,
7,000 of them had m oved to T ’bilisi by 1903, w h i l e  d uring 
1905 alone, a further 20,000 settled in the city in the wake 
of violent clashes between Armenians and Azeris elsewhere in
Q  A
the Transcaucasus. Thus, despite a substantial increase 
of 33 per cent in the capital’s Georgian population between 
1897 and 1905 to 55,000, the influx of refugees ensured that 
the Armenians remained the largest ethnic group within the 
city, wit h  a d r a m a t i c  rise fro m  their 1 897 total of 47,133 
to 84,000 in 1905.85
W h e r e a s  in the past ethnic riva l r y  had in part been 
c o n t a i n e d  by the fact that the G e o r g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  was 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y  rural, d e v e l o p m e n t s  in the period since the 
peasant reforms of 1864-71 had brought the communities into 
greater proximity. Now, most starkly in T ’bilisi, not only 
was the Georgian aristocracy in conflict with the Armenian 
bourgeoisie, but a nascent Georgian bourgeoisie had begun to 
assert itself and w o r k e r s  of all n a t i o n a l i t i e s  w e r e  in 
increasingly desperate competition for jobs at a time when 
the growth in the city’s population far exceeded the pace of 
its i n d u s t r i a l  expansion. Moreover, far fro m  m i x i n g  w i t h  
other nationalities, the migrants, whether they were refu­
gees from Turkey or peasants from rural Georgia, u p r o o t e d  
from the predictability and familiarity of their traditional 
c o m m u n i t i e s ,  sought as far as it was possible, to r e c r e a t e
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f e l l o w  nationals. Thus T ’bilisi, w h i c h  on the surface 
a p p e a r e d  to be a m i x e d  city, d r a w n  from a m u l t i t u d e  of 
different ethnic backgrounds, was, in reality, a city sharp­
ly divided into separate national districts, like the Geor- 
g i a n  D i d u d e  and N a v t ’l ughi, the A r m e n i a n  A v l a b a r  and 
Sololaki and the Azeri Kharpukhi.
The problem was further complicated by the coincidence 
of ethnicity and class division in T ’bilisi society, a cir­
cumstance which had led to the domination of the municipal 
council, elected by the w e a l t h i e s t  and most p r o p e r t i e d  
section of the population, the Armenian bourgeoisie. With 
the Georgian community virtually excluded from meaningful 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the c i t y ’s affairs, the a c c u s a t i o n  arose 
that the A r m e n i a n s  wer e  d e f e n d i n g  their i n t erests above 
those of the p o p u l a t i o n  as a whole, leading one p r o m i n e n t  
G e o r g i a n  journalist, N. K h i z a nishvili, to refer s a r c a s ­
tically to the council as the ’’Sololaki p a r l i a m e n t ” , after 
the district in which T ’bilisi’s richest Armenians were con­
c e n t r a t e d . ® ^  M e a n w h i l e ,  the e f f o r t s  of the G e o r g i a n  
i n t e l ligentsia, o r c h e s t r a t e d  by Niko N i k o l a d z e  f r o m  his 
journal M o a m b e , to extend the f r a n c h i s e  so as to fa i r l y  
r ep r e s e n t  the c i t y ’s various natio n a l  interests, exci t e d  
Armenian fears and caused a further polarisation of the c o m ­
munities.8 ^
For the R ussian g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h i c h  had a long e s t a b ­
lished policy of preventing the formation of broad fronts of 
opposition to its policies by provoking inter-ethnic rival­
ries of this sort, the s i t u ation was a cause for s o m e  s a t i s ­
faction. Interestingly, however, w i t h  the a p p o i n t m e n t  of 
Prince G.S. Golitsyn as governor-general to the Caucasus in
1896, and a noted Russophile, Velichko, as editor of the 
journal K avkaz in 1897, there was a shift in the offic i a l  
a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  the Armenians. W h ile on the one hand it 
continued to block all Georgian efforts to broaden the elec­
torate, on the other it r eversed its past policy of b e ­
f r i e n d i n g  the A r m e n i a n  bourgeoisie, w h i c h  it had rightly 
seen as a c o n s e r v a t i v e  force in the Caucasus, and began to 
incite the Georgians against it. Velichko wrote a series of 
articles pointing to the dangers likely to threaten a nation 
which lacked a strong bourgeoisie of its own:
The absence of one’s own bourgeoisie to any people 
during our times is quite dangerous, when economic 
questions have a predominating significance; it 
is very n e c e s s a r y  to have a class, a people with 
i n d u s t r i a l  energy who w o u l d  be r e p l e n i s h e d  not 
only from below, but from above; i.e. with repre­
s e n t a t i v e s  of the n o b i l i t y  w h o  have a d j u s t e d  to 
the new conditions. Otherwise the nobility will 
fall and the people will b e c o m e  the slaves of 
alien exploiters.
And if anyone had failed to catch his meaning, there 
could be little roo m  for a m b i g u i t y  when he added that the 
Russian government was alarmed by the economic deterioration 
of the Georgian people since they
...in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  appear the closest to us 
in spirit and culture.
By the turn of the century, the C a u c a s i a n  a d m i n i s t r a ­
tion had helped sow the seeds of discord, not just b e t w e e n  
Georgians and Armenians, and Armenians and Azeris, but had 
also done much to fuel the g r o w i n g  distrust b e t w e e n  the 
local population and the Russian workers, whose contribution 
to the s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e m e n t  in the 1890s had since 
d w i n d l e d  and been repla c e d  by a t e n d e n c y  t o w a r d s  R u s s i a n
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chauv i n i s m .  But the g r o w i n g  a t t r a c t i o n  of the r i g h t - w i n g
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  like Russkoe S o b r a n i e  and the "Group of
Patriots", particularly among Russian railwaymen, reflected
mor e  upon the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  n e w  a w a r e n e s s  of the folly of
sending political exiles to work in places like the T'bilisi
railway yards, than any sudden change of heart among the old 
Q 0p e r s o n n e l . M a n y  of the latter had been arrested and moved 
on in the aftermath of the 1898 and 1900 rail strikes, to be 
replaced by more reliable skilled labour from inner Russia, 
w h ich was not only paid more than the G e o r g i a n  workforce, 
but was also a r e l i a b l e  source of o p p o s i t i o n  to the strike 
movement.
Concerned that the government's propaganda was dividing 
the working people, and that the population would be swayed 
by the a r g u m e n t s  of the n a t i o n a l i s t s  that their p r o b l e m s  
were the fault of one or another ethnic group, rather than a 
product of the autocratic regime and the class struggle, the 
Social-Democrats declared in Brdzola that nationalism was 
now the main enemy of progress and that the struggle against 
it was their main task.^1 In a separate article tracing the 
advances of the movement since 1899, Lado Ketskhoveli gave 
much the same message:
The workers' m o v e m e n t  in our c o u n t r y  is g r o w i n g  
ceaselessly, gigantically, in spite of the diffi­
culties and o b s t a c l e s  the m o v e m e n t  is meeting. 
One of these obstacles, and an e x c e p t i o n a l l y  
strong one, is that our working peoples consist of 
many d i f f erent n a t i o n a l i t i e s  (Georgians, A r m e n ­
ians, Russian, Tatars (sic), Oset'ians, etc.), who 
frequently do not fully understand one another, as 
a consequence of which greater efforts are needed 
to instil in them an a w a r e n e s s  of the c o m m o n  
nature of their interests; and this becomes still 
more difficult when the g o v e r n m e n t ,  e x p l o i t i n g  
n atio n a l  a n t a g o n i s m  a m o n g  the workers, sharp e n s  
these differences still more, luring Russian w o r ­
kers to its side with lies and deceptions; they 
c o n s t a n t l y  tell these w o r k e r s  that the 'natives'
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(t u z e m t s y ) are h o s t i l e  to all R u s s i a n s  and would 
even drink their blood, if they could only estab­
lish their own kingdom...^2
But it was also c learly i m p o r t a n t  for the Social- 
Democrats that they should not allow their opponents among 
the Armenian bourgeoisie and the Georgian intelligentsia a 
monopoly over the national question, for although they might 
have calculated, probably correctly, that there was little 
support for national autonomy amongst either the Georgian or 
the A r m e n i a n  population, it was, n e vertheless, a b u n d a n t l y  
clear that strong feeling existed among all sections of soc­
iety on issues like the use of the native language in educa­
tion, in the courts and go v e r n m e n t .  C o n s c i o u s  of this, 
B r d z o l a , w h i c h  had d e v e l o p e d  close links wit h  Iskra (see 
footn o t e  80), declared its support for n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  
rights and the struggle against Russification in an unsigned 
article e n t i t l e d  " N a t i o n a l i s m  and S o c i a l i s m " . ^  But the 
article drew a sharp distinction between this and advocating 
either n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m y  or c o m p l e t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and d e ­
clared its opposition to the argument that the struggle for 
general democratic freedom be postponed until after national 
freedom had been secured. In the author's opinion, the r e ­
pr e s s i o n  of the rights of n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  ranked with 
the repression of individual and civic rights and could only 
be pre v e n t e d  by the victory of the d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e m e n t ,  
meaning socialism:
Na t i o n a l  f r e e d o m  appears as a part of g e n e r a l  
d e m o c r a t i c  f r e e d o m  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  one cannot 
subordinate all democratic freedom to it. There­
fore, whenever national and general democratic in­
terests are joined, national interests should give 
way to the general. This is the point of v i e w  on 
w h i c h  the c o n s c i o u s  p r o l e t a r i a t  stands and wit h  
which the bourgeoisie can never agree.
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Thus, w h i l e  the a r t i c l e  d e c l a r e d  itself in support of 
the right to the use of o n e ’s own l a n g u a g e  in e d u c a t i o n  and 
g o v e r n m e n t  and legal affairs, and opposed, like Lenin in 
I s k r a , any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on the basis of nationality, it 
also w a r n e d  the p r o l e t a r i a t  a gainst the b o u r g e o i s i e ’s 
attempts to appropriate the national idea and manipulate it 
to c onceal the e x i s t e n c e  of a n t a g o n i s t i c  class int e r e s t s  
within the nation. The true interests of the working class 
could only be served by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  al l i a n c e  w i t h  the 
pr o l e t a r i a t  of the peoples of R o s s i y a . However, in the 
immediate term, while the revolutionary movement had yet to 
achieve even bourgeois democratic refoms, it was perfectly 
l e g i t i m a t e  to form a t e m p o r a r y  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  the n a t i o n a l  
bourgeoisies insofar as their demands represented an advance 
on the present.
But a m a j o r  d i f f i c u l t y  still f a c i n g  the S o c i a l - D e m o -  
crats in G e o r g i a  was that w h ile i n d i v i d u a l  m e m b e r s  f r o m  
different parts of the country might get together from time 
to time, as in the 1897 meeting in T’bilisi, they continued 
to be divided into quite separate and autonomous committees 
and groups. Thus, a l t h o u g h  the e x i s t e n c e  of journals like 
Brdzola and Iskra provided some policy guidance, there was, 
as yet, no central organ to coordinate the activities of the 
various organisations. A c c o r d i n g  to Zhordania, plans had 
been made in 1901 for a joint c o n f e r e n c e  at the end of the 
year to correct the s i t u a t i o n , ^  but had been t h w a r t e d  by 
the mass a rrests f o l l o w i n g  the May Day d e m o n s t r a t i o n  that 
year, and it was not until D e c e m b e r  1 902, by wh ich t i m e  man y  
of those a r r e s t e d  had been released, that the r e p r e s e n t a ­
tives of the T ’bilisi, B a t ’umi and Baku c o m m i t t e e s  and a
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number of other bodies met at the Tiliputchuri restaurant in
T ’bilisi to draw up a project for a unity congress.^
In the meantime, however, some significant changes had
al r e a d y  occur r e d  in the T ’bilisi party organisation. The
arrest of much of the lead e r s h i p  in the early s u m m e r  of 1901
had c reated a v a c u u m  in the T'bilisi C o m m i t t e e  w h ich had
been filled in November by the election of a new generation
of party activists, most of w h o m  had been a s s o c i a t e d  more
with the party's underground operations than its legal con-
Q 7cerns like K v a l i . 1 The change in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
attitude to the latter had, moreover, as evidenced by Zhor- 
dania's arrest, s t r e n g t h e n e d  the hand of those who had 
a l w a y s  oppo s e d  the journal on the grou n d s  that it was too 
limited for the current stage of the revolutionary struggle, 
and that of the underground journal Brdzola. At the begin­
ning of 1902, word reached members of the previous leader­
ship, i n c a r c e r a t e d  in T ’b i l i s i ’s M e t e k h i  prison, that the 
committee had jointed with the RSDLP. In his memoirs, Zhor- 
dania claims that he and his colleagues were astonished by 
the n e w s , but it may be that he is gu i l t y  of a t t r i b u t i n g  
v i e w s  to h i m s e l f  w h i c h  he did not a c t u a l l y  hold, or, at 
least, express until som e  tim e  later. He c l a i m s  to recall 
his concern that the RSDLP positions on the national organi­
sational and agrarian questions were substantially different 
from Georgian perceptions, but the agrarian question aside, 
it is d i f f icult to see what he means. The p r o b l e m  of the 
most suita b l e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  str u c t u r e  had not yet been 
fully resolved within the various Caucasian committees and 
nor, for that matter, was it clear where the Russians stood. 
Lenin had still to write "What is to be done?" and it was 
"fi~oX u n t i l  th~e s e c o n d  R S D L P  C o n g r e s s  in 1 903 t h a t  the
m a j o r i t y  a c c e p t e d  his ideas, and then only by a s lender 
margin and after a number of delegates had already left the 
congress. As for the national question, it is true that the 
RSDLP did not have a fixed policy on the issue, but n o t h i n g  
concr e t e  had been ad v a n c e d  by any of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
organisations yet either, while Brdzola’s pronouncements on 
the national question were indistinguishable from Iskra’s.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Zhordania claims that
it c o n v i n c e d  him still furt h e r  of the need for a cen t r a l
organ which, a m o n g  other things, w o u l d  be s t rong enough to
Q Qm a i n t a i n  polic i e s  suited to the needs of the a r e a ”  and, 
certainly, after his release to Ganja in Oct o b e r  1902, he 
became actively involved with the T ’bilisi Committee in the 
organisation of the conference which in December 1902 united 
the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  in a new body ca l l e d  the 
C a u c a s i a n  Union. In v i e w  of the a s s e r t i o n  too that the
T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  were alre a d y  split into f a c ­
tions, it is worth noting that, despite the new composition 
of the T ’bilisi C o m m i t t e e ,  Noe Zho r d a n i a  was not only i n ­
vited to chair the conference, but was also g iven the task 
of drawing up a project for the party’s programme. Further­
more, far from making any concessions to nationalism, Zhor­
dania proposed the establishment not of a federation, but of 
r e g i o n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  for the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  w i t h i n  the 
wider setting of a democratic Russia.1^
The first c ongress of the C a u c a s i a n  Union was hel d  in 
March 1903, shortly after the news had been received of the
i no
f o r t h c o m i n g  RSDLP congress in Brussels. The d e l i b e r a ­
tions, therefore, of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  r e ­
volved around the election of delegates to Brussels as well
342
as upon the e l e c t i o n  of the C a u c a s i a n  Union C o m m i t t e e  and 
discussion of the party programme. By an unfortunate twist 
of fate, Zho r d a n i a  had d e p a r t e d  for Europe to avoid r e ­
arrest s h o r t l y  before n e w s  of the RSDLP c o n g r e s s  arrived, 
and was consequently neither able to defend his project nor 
be elected as a delegate to Brussels.
In a demonstration of its commitment to international­
ism, the Cau c a s i a n  Union voted to join the RSDLP as a 
r egional o r g a n i s a t i o n  and stres s e d  that it was itself the 
representative not of any one national group, but of all the 
peoples of the Caucasus. As one member of the committee put 
it in a letter to I s kra;
...the C a u c a s i a n  c o m r a d e s  are o pposed to racial 
(national) organisations. From the very beginning 
each of these committees [comprising the Cauca­
sian Union] w o r k e d  in every l a n g u a g e 'and r e p r e ­
sented the workers of the whole city regardless of 
nationality and independent of the composition of 
the c o m m i t t e e .  The Union's c o m m i t t e e  has been 
elected from the representatives of the local c o m ­
mittees and from comrades working in the Caucasus 
regardless of whether a comrade had the fortune or 
m i s f o r t u n e  to be a m e m b e r  of this or that r a c e . 1^
What is more interesting, however, is that the C a u c a ­
sian Union r ejected Zhordania's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  on the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  and opted instead for a f o r m u l a  w h i c h  
called for the creat i o n  of a federal d e m o c r a t i c  state
i n c
divided not on national, but on t e r r i t o r i a l  lines. J 
Des p i t e  I s k r a 1s inf l u e n c e  in the Caucasus, m o r eover, no 
mention was made of the right of nations to self-determina­
tion.1^  it may be that the Union's decision was influenced 
by the v iews of the Union of A r m e n i a n  S o c i a 1 - D e m o c r a t s  
which, before its merger with the T'bilisi Social-Democratic 
Committee at the end of 1 9 0 2 1(^  had published its own m a n i ­
festo in w hich it de c l a r e d  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a f e d e r a l
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Russian republic essential for the protection of the inter­
ests of the d i f f e r e n t  n ational e l e m e n t s  c o m p r i s i n g  the 
state. But if this is the case, the U n i o n ’s p r o g r a m m e  i g ­
nored other important aspects of the Armenian manifesto such 
as recognition of the right of nations to self-determination 
and provision for national cultural autonomy.10®
As by this time Lenin had p r o n o u n c e d  that f e d e r a t i o n  
did not accord with the objective progress of the economic 
and political development of society and did not correspond 
to the interest of the class struggle of the proletariat, it 
is not surprising that when the Second Congress got underway 
du r i n g  the s u m m e r  of 1903 that the three C a u c a s i a n  d e l e ­
gates, D. T ’op'uridze from T ’bilisi, S. Zurabov from Bat'umi 
and B. Knuniants from Baku, should find themselves embarras- 
ingly isolated on the issue. Noe Zhordania, who was invited 
to the congr e s s  as an o b s e r v e r  after learn i n g  of it fro m  
Madame Plekhanova whilst in Geneva, commented on their u n ­
ease:
Such was the a t m o s p h e r e  that d e v e l o p e d  that the 
T ’bilisi group did not dare reveal its programme, 
let alone present it. The great m a j o r i t y  of the 
delegates was of an extremely centralist frame of 
mind and w o u l d  not hear of federation; they did 
not even believe in the existence of the national 
question. ^
A l t h o u g h  it may be true that a c e n t r a l i s t  m o o d  did 
prevail at the congress and certainly ideas like federation 
and national cultural autonomy received short shrift from 
most of the delegates, it is, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the case that 
they passed resolutions guaranteeing all nationalities the 
right to an e d u c a t i o n  in their own l a n guages at state e x ­
pense,, the right to the use of native languages in all local
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public and state institutions on a par with the state lang­
uage, and the right of n ations to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  It 
may be, of course, as Z h o r d a n i a  suggests, that the latter 
meant different things to different people and most did not 
u n d e r s t a n d  it, but it h ardly s u b s t a n t i a t e s  his c l a i m  that 
for the m a j o r i t y  the n a t i o n a l  quest i o n  did not e x i s t . 110 
Ironically, moreover, in v i e w  of the fede r a l i s t  stance of 
the C a u c a s i a n  Union delegates, Zhordania's a r g u m e n t  in 
favour of r e g i o n a l  self-government (oblastnoe samoupravle- 
n i e ) for T r a n s c a u c a s i a  c o i n c i d e d  with Lenin's p roposal in 
favour of regional self-government for areas like the Cauca­
sus, Finland and Poland, distinguished by specific economic 
c o n d i t i o n s  or ethnic c o m p o s i t i o n  and was passed by a c o m ­
fortable majority. Uratadze, too, who was a close supporter 
of Zhordania, m a i n t a i n s  that these rights, c o n t a i n e d  in 
artic l e s  three, eight and nine of the party p r o g r a m m e ,  
formed the basis of the Georgian Social-Democratic organisa­
tions' approach to the national question up till 1917.111
The national question was not yet, therefore, a subject 
of any great dispute in T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  s o c i a l - d e m o c r a c y , 
although the congress did present the somewhat unusual spec­
tacle of the future leader of Georgian Menshevism in agree­
ment with Lenin on regional self-government, whilst the Cau­
casian Union delegates, two of whom were future Bolsheviks, 
came to Brussels and London with a mandate to support feder­
ation. That the Union's c o m m i t m e n t  to f e d e r a t i o n  was not 
particularly strong, however, is apparent from the decision 
of its second congress in October 1903 to a b a n d o n  it in 
favour of the p r o p osals a c c e p t e d  in L o n d o n . 112 I n t e r e s t ­
ingly, moreover, in v i e w  of later dispu t e s  over the issue
w i t h i n  the p a r t y ,  n o n e  of the C a u c a s i a n s ,  Z h o r d a n i a
included, appears to have demonstrated any sympathy for the 
Bund’s demands on national cultural autonomy.
The national question aside, two main policy decisions 
taken by the RSDLP congress were conveniently shelved by the 
Caucasian Union and kept from the local organisations until 
Zhordania’s return from abroad at the beginning of 1905 made 
it i m p o s s i b l e  to c onceal the m  any further. Thus the split 
over the party's organisational principles, a source of con­
fusion to most even in Russia, was quite unh e a r d  of in 
Georgia outside of a select few, while the congress's rather 
n e g a t i v e  e s t i m a t i o n  of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p o t e n t i a l  of the 
peasantry was an embarrassment, particularly in West Geor­
gia, where since mid-1902 the party had made rapid strides 
among the disaffected villages of Guria, Imeret'i and Same- 
grelo. In fact a separate Social-Democratic committee had 
already been established in Guria in 1903, and, in response 
to its urgent d e m a n d s  for i n f o r m a t i o n  on the congress' 
decisions', on the a g r a r i a n  question, the Union C o m m i t t e e  
claimed it was still waiting for the protocols. As a conse­
quence the separate Caucasian committees adopted their own 
polic i e s  on the peasant q u e s t i o n  until the RSDLP 'Unity' 
Congress in 1906.112
- The Socialist-Federalists
By 1904 a number of factors had combined to create the 
rather paradoxical position of a mass-based Social-Democra­
tic Party in a predominantly rural society. Party c o m m i t ­
tees existed not only in T'bilisi, K'ut'aisi and Bat'umi, 
but a l s o  in the p r o v i n c e s  of G u r i a ,  S a m e g r e l o  and 
Imeret'i.11 ^  In fact, such was the strength of the movement
in G u r i a ,  that e v e r y  v i l l a g e  n o w  had its o w n  p a r t y
organisation, and the Gurian Social-Democratic Committee was 
able to mount an effective boycott of all government insti­
tutions,1^  while by the end of 1 904 600 social-democratic 
groups were o p e r a t i n g  under the g u i d a n c e  of the Imeret'i- 
Samegrelo Committee.11^ By the end of 1905, moreover, one 
third of the 15,000 M e n s h e v i k s  in the Russian e m p i r e  cam e  
from the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  and the vast m a j o r i t y  of them from 
G eorgia.11^
Among the factors which had combined to make possible 
this state of aff a i r s  was the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  
alluded to in Chapter Three. Thus the proximity of town and 
coun t r y  and the e x p a n s i o n  of the rail n e t w o r k  in the late 
19th cen t u r y  had f a c i l i t a t e d  the g r o w i n g  m o b i l i t y  of the 
p o p u l a t i o n  in the a f t e r m a t h  of the peasant reforms. As 
industry had developed, so the towns had expanded, drawing 
on the swelling flood of migrant peasants driven from their 
villa g e s  by the s e e m i n g l y  endless cycle of land shortage, 
poor harvests, redemption dues, high taxation and debt. In 
the squalid conditions of the country's main urban centres, 
the u p r o o t e d  p e a s a n t r y  provided a fertile b r e e d i n g  gr o u n d  
for the social-democratic movement, not least because in the 
concept of proletarian internationalism the Social-Democrats 
were able to provide the m i g r a n t  p o p u l a t i o n  with a n e w  
source of identity which did not, like its potential rival, 
na t i o n a l i s m ,  a w a k e n  fears of isolation, s e p a r a t i o n  fro m  
Russia and invasion by Turkey or Iran.
The party was, moreover, c o n s i d e r a b l y  aided by the 
coincidence of national and class divisions in Georgia and 
the relative social homogeneity of the population. Thus the 
vas t  b u l k  of e t h n i c  G e o r g i a n s  b e l o n g e d  e i t h e r  to the
pe a s a n t r y  or the nobility, w h i l e  the b o u r g e o i s i e  was p r e ­
d o m i n a n t l y  Armenian. Since, too, so many of the t'avadaz- 
naurebi had been d i s p o s s e s s e d  by A r m e n i a n s  one can easily 
u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  so many of them e m b r a c e d  an i d e o l o g y  that 
identified the bourgeoisie as the class enemy.
Furthermore, the proximity of town and country did not 
merely facilitate the migration of the peasantry to the in­
dustrial centres, but also made it possible for the peasants 
to move back and forth to the t o w n s  with c o n s i d e r a b l e  f r e ­
quency. V. Chubinidze, a Social-Democrat who worked in the
X /
Tchiat'ura mines in 1905 recalled the itinerant lifestyle of / \
'■ y
the workforce in his memoirs:
The mine workers had a high turnover - some worked 
only d uring the s u m m e r ,  s o m e  only in w i n t e r  for 
two to three months or more, while some worked for 
even less time and then returned to their villages 
and their families and once more took up agricul­
tural work. A little later they w o u l d  load up 
their saddle-bags with corn bread and dry cheese, 
onions and perch, sling their w o r k i n g - t o o l ,  the 
pick-axe, over their arm and once more set out for 
wor k  in one or a n o t h e r  of T c h i a t ’u r a ’s mines. In 
this way they c i r c u l a t e d  b e t w e e n  Tchiat'ura and 
their villages.11®
And in this way they also provided the social-democrat­
ic movement with a means for disseminating its ideas in the 
countryside and politicising the peasantry. It is at least 
questionable, however, whether the party would have enjoyed 
quite the success it did in the rural areas had it not been 
for the government's policy of expelling recalcitrant w o r ­
kers back to their native villages. The sudden influx of 
workers who had been active in the Bat'umi social-democratic 
m o v e m e n t  into Guria in May 1902 and 1903, for instance, 
simply added fuel to the local population's anger about land 
shortage, the continuing payment of redemption dues, duties
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to landlords, and state and church taxation during a period 
of acute famine. The workers’ resistance to the government 
in Bat’umi won them the immediate respect of the peasantry 
and by the end of 1902 a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  slogans w h ich had 
been current in Bat'umi were b e c o m i n g  c o m m o n p l a c e  in the 
villages. The g o v e r n m e n t ’s use of coerc i o n  in support of 
the local t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a , moreover, s e ems only to have 
added to the peasantry's resolve and c o n v i n c e d  it still 
further that any c o n f r o n t a t i o n  wit h  the n o b i l i t y  would 
necessarily involve a confrontation with the government too.
These factors aside, another important key to the suc­
cess of the Social-Democrats in the years between 1898 and 
1904, and one identified by Grigol Uratadze with reference 
to Guria, was the virtual absence of any o p p o s i t i o n  from 
parties or groups of rival political persuasions.
Whe n  we began work a m o n g  the Gurian peasants we 
had no opponents in the form of parties or groups 
with a set programme and corresponding organisa­
tion. They sympathised only with our social-demo­
cratic o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and we and only we a p p e a r e d  
at all the m e e t i n g s  and gatherings, thanks to 
which all the ideological and organisational work 
was c o n c e n t r a t e d  in our hands. This, of course, 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  a s s i s t e d  our links and close r e ­
lations with both the Gurian peasants and the pea­
sants of other districts. The p e a s a n t r y  saw and 
knew only our social-democratic organisations.^1^
From April 1904, however, following the formal creation 
of the Georgian Socialist-Federalist Party at a congress of 
em i g r e  G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  in Geneva, the S o c i a l - D e m o ­
crats were for the first time faced with an organised chall­
enge to their endeavours to win the support of the Georgian 
people. The new party, which stood on a platform which e m ­
braced demands for national autonomy within a Russian feder­
ation, defence of the national language, regeneration of the
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Georgian economy principally through the strengthening and 
encouragement of an indigenous bourgeoisie, socialisation of 
the land, rejection of class struggle in favour of national 
unity and the creat i o n  of a d e m o c r a t i c  re p u b l i c  with a 
Constituent Assembly, was the realisation of a plan that had 
existed among certain members of the Georgian intelligentsia 
from the b e g i n n i n g  of the 20th century. In fact, the i n i ­
tial idea for a party w h i c h  w o u l d  take up the cause of the 
G e o r g i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  and tie natio n a l  r e n a i s s a n c e  to the
emergence of a Georgian-led economic revival emanated from
1 p oMoambe in the 1890s, while the idea of autonomy within a 
federal Russian state picked up the idea first raised by the 
t 'ergdaleulni in Prosha in 1873 and t h e r e a f t e r  f r e q u e n t l y  
proposed by Ilia Tchavtchavadze in the pages of Tveria.
But a l t h o u g h  the n e w  p r o p o n e n t s  of f e d e r a t i o n  and the 
idea of s a e r t ’o niadagi had muc h  in c o m m o n  wit h  the t ’erg- 
daleulni there is no doubt that they stood far closer to in­
dividuals like Giorgi Dseret'eli and Niko Nikoladze than to 
Ilia Tchavtchavadze. Thus they saw no specific role for the 
t 'avadaznauroba in their plans for the future, but placed 
instead an emphasis on economic recovery led by the national 
bourgeoisie and supported by the entire nation. They recog­
nised the existence of class divisions, but maintained that 
a m o m e n t  had arrived, or was close to arriving, w h e n  the 
shared interest of all G e o r g i a n s  in the defence of their 
national identity would override these differences. Archil 
Jorjadze, the leading ideologue of the future Social-Federa­
list Party expressed his belief in this trend in an article 
written in 1901:
Our s ociety is divided into groups, ... the l a n d ­
o w n e r  a n d  t h e  w o r k e r  of t h e  l a n d ,  t h e
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industrialist, the merchant and the daily worker 
live in e c o n o m i c  o p p o s i t i o n  to one another. We 
cannot deny this. Only in spite of this do there 
exist such phenomena in our society which not only 
w e a k e n  this opposition, but give birth to the 
basis for c o m m o n  pr a c t i c a l  action b e t w e e n  the 
rival groups. These phenomena teach us that Geor­
gia has entered into that historical time when we 
no longer need the d i v i s i o n  and p a r c e l i s a t i o n  of 
soc i e t y  and the people, but rather its unity and 
recovery.
The influence of this orientation began to make itself 
felt among the Georgian intelligentsia with the appointment 
of G. Laskhishvili, later to become a leading member of the 
Socialist-Federalists, to the editorial board of Moambe in 
1898, but became more explicit when the owner of M o a m b e , A. 
Jabadari, bought the paper Tsnobis P'urtseli (The Newssheet) 
in late 1 9 0 0.^2 ^ Tsnobis P ' u r t s e l i , w h i c h  had till then 
adopted a broad patriotic stance and sought to provide more 
information about world and domestic affairs to an informa­
tion-starved public, now became the organ which, in effect, 
gave rise to the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t  Party in 1904. Its 
e d i t o r i a l  board, wit h  figures like A. Jorjadze, G. L a s k h ­
ishvili and G. Rtskhiladze among others, already contained 
the nucleus of the future party.
Despite the r e s t r i c t i o n s  i m p o s e d  by censorship, the 
paper quickly gave indication of its concern at the lagging 
economic development of Georgia, the loss of native land to 
foreigners, the i m p o v e r i s h m e n t  of the p e a s a n t r y  and the
i pi
status of the G e o r g i a n  l a n g u a g e . L i k e  Sergi M e s k h i  and 
others in the 1870s and 1880s, the new group maintained that 
the d e v e l o p m e n t  of c a p i t a l i s m  in G e o r g i a  should take a 
national direction, should, in other words, be accomplished 
through local initiative and the protection of the national 
markets. Like their predecessors, they also believed that
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once this had been achieved, the c o m m o n  interest of the 
population in the development of the economy and the defence 
of Georgian culture would contain class antagonism.
We should not match the Georgian capitalist, i.e. 
the m e r c h a n t  and the i n d u s t r i a l i s t  against the 
Georgian worker [wrote Jorjadze] but against that 
foreign element which has a monopoly over our c o m ­
merce ...
While the Georgian working people, he asserted,
...is compelled to put its private class interests 
beneath our c o m m o n  i n t e rests and so a f f i r m  the 
maturity of its national self-awareness. 12Zf
The initial efforts of the group to form a party o r g a n ­
isation w h ich could rally popular support to its ideals 
foundered, however, on a conflict of interests w i t h i n  the 
group itself and its absence of any real contact with either 
the p e a s a n t r y  or the w o r k i n g  class. Only in Ma y  1903 w i t h  
the first a p p e a r a n c e  of the illegal paper, S a k ’a r t 1 velo 
(Georgia), in Paris did they begin to move closer t o w a r d s  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  a joint p r o g r a m m e  and a party o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
framework. ^ 5
In the first edition of the paper, the editorial board 
addressed an open letter to Russia’s liberals and socialists 
in which it laid down the main elements of its national p r o ­
gramme, the most noteworthy feature of which was its e m p h a ­
tic statement that Georgia should remain part of a d e m o c r a ­
tic, federal Russian state:
It is not our wish to e s t a b l i s h  an i n d e p e n d e n t  
state [claimed the letter]. We clearly and u n a m ­
b i g u o u s l y  p r o l a i m  that we are not s u p p o r t e r s  of 
political separatism. It is our desire and a m b i ­
tion to achieve a constitution suited to the part­
icular condi t i o n s  of Georgia. We wish to r e m a i n  
within the framework of Russia's political organs 
and s e e k  c o m p l e t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o n l y  in our
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d o m e s t i c  affairs. In a word, we want to achieve1 Ok 7
national autonomy.
W i t h  the e x c e p t i o n  tha t  S a k ' a r t ' v elo c a l l e d  for 
n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m y  for Geo r g i a  rather than for a federal 
Transcaucasus, a fact which inevitably drew opposition from 
the T'bilisi Armenian bourgeoisie, which saw its domination 
of the national economy threatened, 1 2  ^ it amounted to little 
more that what the t'ergdaleulni had been demanding 30 years 
before and gave ample demonstration both of the continuing 
i n f l u e n c e  of the latter and of the c aution w h i c h  g o v e r n e d  
the attitudes even of the intelligentsia towards separatism. 
It may be, of course, that muc h  of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  h a r ­
boured a desire for an independent state in which they would 
hold sole responsibility for Georgia's destiny, but if this 
was the case, most were equally concerned that independence 
might sever their ties with Europe, the source of nearly all 
their a s p i r a t i o n s  for Georgia, and expose the c o u n t r y  once 
more to Turkish invasion. P r a g m a t i s m ,  too, i n f o r m e d  the m  
that i n d e p e n d e n c e  was not a cause likely to w i n  m u c h  s y m ­
pathy from the bulk of the population.
In an a t t e m p t  perhaps to stir national s e n t i m e n t ,  the 
paper further d e m a n d e d  that r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the f e d e r a l  
centre of the e n v isaged state and G e o r g i a  be based on the 
1783 Treaty of G e o r g i e v s k  a b r o g a t e d  by Russia in 1801. 
Under this a g r e e m e n t  K 'art'1- K a k h e t 1i had ceded c o n t r o l  of 
its foreign policy to Russia in return for the latter's 
g u a r a n t e e  of Georgia's s o v e r e i g n t y  in d o m e s t i c  affairs. 
However, where the 1783 treaty recognised the authority of 
the Bagratid dynasty, S a k ' a r t 'velo called for a c o n s t i t u ­
tional-parliamentary structure and G e o r g i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
in a central Russian assembly.128
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The paper’s influence was, however, peripheral at best; 
l i m i t e d  by its di s t a n c e  from G e o r g i a  and the c o n t i n u i n g  
failure of its ideas to find a s y m p a t h e t i c  echo from the 
Georgian people. Its main achievement, in fact, before its 
closure in May 1905 was the all-party congress of Georgian 
emigres in Geneva in 1904 which announced the formation of 
the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t  Party. S a k ’a r t ’velo had also i n ­
tended that the c ongress issue a joint policy s t a t e m e n t  by 
the Socialist-Federalists, Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), 
Anarchists and Social-Democrats, but the latter refused to 
become involved in anything more than a general discussion 
and abandoned the proceedings. The remaining parties, h o w ­
ever, found s u f f i c i e n t  c o m m o n  ground to issue a s t a t e m e n t  
which, a l t h o u g h  not a m o u n t i n g  to a p r o g r a m m e ,  p r o v i d e d  
suffi c i e n t  basis for joint action. In particular, they 
a f f i r m e d  the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t s ’ d e m a n d  for n a t i o n a l  
autonomy, condemned the Bolshevik emphasis on centralism and 
strict party discipline and adhered to the SRs' position on 
the acceptability of the use of violence and the transfer of 
land from private ow n e r s  to the c o l l e c t i v e  o w n e r s h i p  of 
c o m m u n e s  of peasant c o o p e r a t i v e s ^ ^  Through the s o c i a l ­
isation of the land in this way, but the r e t e n t i o n  of p r i ­
vate o w n e r s h i p  of the means of production, the S o c i a l i s t -  
Federalists hoped to win support among the country’s small- 
scale land owners, the nucleus, in fact, of what they hoped 
w ould be t r a n s f o r m e d  into the n a t i o n a l  bourgeoisie. H o w ­
ever, whilst the policy might have had some attraction in a 
society where communal land-holding still predominated, it 
failed to take into account the extent to w h i c h  p r i v a t e  
ownership, particularly in the west part of the country, was
354
already the norm in Georgia.
Partly in consequence of this, but also because of the 
success of the Social-Democrats in organising and propagand­
i s i n g  a h e a d  of t h e m ,  the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t s 1 (SFs1) 
suc c e s s e s  continued, in the main, to be r e s t r i c t e d  to the 
intelligentsia. G. Laskhishvili himself noted:
A m o n g  the intellig e n t s i a ,  of course, we r a p i d l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d  the paper (S a k ' a r t 1v e l o ) , but a m o n g  
the workers, who wer e  of gre a t e r  interest to us, 
it became very difficult to distribute the paper. 
Our propagandists and those few workers who were 
then in our party r e t u r n e d  copies of the paper 
stating that the w o r k e r s  did not want to read 
it. I3U
But d espite its o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  weakness, the s i m p l e  
existence of the party, its strength among the intelligent­
sia and its readiness to contest the issues with the Social- 
Democrats in the legal and underground press, and in public 
meetings appreciably altered the situation in Georgia. Most 
notably, the national question, till now reduced to second­
ary status by the Social-Democrats, was forced to the fore­
front of political debate and the struggle to influence the 
Georgian people. As Uratadze put it:
With the a p p e a r a n c e  of this party the p r a c t i c a l  
r e s o l u t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  ente r e d  the 
order of the day. From then on this q u e s t i o n  
never left the order of the day either in the 
press or at gene r a l  meetings. P o l e m i c s  on this 
issue, sometimes very fierce, continued between us 
up to the announcement of Georgian independence on 
May 26, 1918.131
5.3 The Question of Autonomy
During the period 1904-05, the revolutionary movement 
s a n k  d e e p  r o o t s  t h r o u g h o u t  the l e n g t h  and b r e a d t h  of 
Georgia, enveloping both the towns and countryside and e n ­
gaging the t'avadaznauroba, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry
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and the p r o l e t a r i a t  in its d e m a n d  for the o v e r t h r o w  of the 
autocracy. But whilst to a grea t e r  or lesser degree the 
entire country was affected by the mood, nowhere did the re­
v o l u t i o n a r y  u p s u r g e  quite m a t c h  the int e n s i t y  r e v e a l e d  in 
the province of Guria. Here, as contemporary observers, in­
clu d i n g  the French consul, Ale x a n d r e  Chayet, and W e s t e r n  
travellers noted, government authority simply broke down and
1 o p
ceased to function. The c o n s e q u e n t  p o w e r  v a c u u m  was
filled by what quickly came to be k n o w n  as the "Gurian 
republic". Luigi Villari, an Italian witness of the events 
in Guria in 1905, wrote,
For the past two years they [the peasants] have 
been putting the theories of Social-Democracy into 
practice, def y i n g  the R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  and re- 
f u s i n g  to r e c o g n i s e  a n y  a u t h o r i t y  but t h e i r  
o w n ,133
w h ilst Lenin's new paper, V p e r e d , not noted for its u n ­
stinted praise of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of the 
peasantry, was stirred to comment:
The Gurian peasant movement is a rare phenomenon 
in a world history: this is not a typical peasant
jacquerie, but a totally c o n scious p o l i t i c i a l  
movement which is in complete accord with the c o n ­
s c i o u s  m o v e m e n t  of the p r o l e t a r i a t  of all 
Russia. ^  3Zf
From 1903, moreover, and throughout 1904 when elsewhere 
in the Transcaucasus the revolutionary movement had still to 
a chieve the p e n e t r a t i o n  of 1905, the province o f f e r e d  a 
haven of free speech and a s s e m b l y  and b e c a m e  a f o r u m  for 
political debate between the groups opposed to the gov e r n ­
ment. Most imp o r t a n t l y ,  however, with the a t t e n d a n c e  at 
such meetings frequently exceeding 500, the debate offered 
an u n p r e c e d e n t e d  o p p o r t u n i t y  for i n f l u e n c i n g  the v i e w s  of
the p u b l i c . I t  is s c a r c e l y  surprising, therefore, that 
the party newly formed in Geneva, the Socialist-Federalists, 
should attempt to challenge the Social-Democrats in what had 
become the stronghold of their power.
Putting aside for the m o m e n t  their n u m e r o u s  inter n a l  
differences, the SFs focused attention on the national ques­
tion and land redistribution, accusing the Social-Democrats 
of indifference to the fate of the nation and attacking the 
premise that argument over the national question should be 
postponed until after the victory of the democratic revolu­
tion and that once the social or the class struggle had been 
settled, the national question would resolve i t s e l f . T h e  
SFs no doubt felt t h e m s e l v e s  on strong g round w i t h  the 
national question, as from 1904 onwards there was scarcely a 
demonstration or a strike in Georgia which did not include 
respect for national rights a m o n g  the list of its d e ­
m a n d s . 1^  The peasa n t s  of M a r t q o p i  in East Georgia, for 
example, demanded in March 1905 that all court business be 
con d u c t e d  in G e o r g i a n  and called for the clos u r e  of their 
village school until G e o r g i a n  was made c o m p u l s o r y  and the 
teaching of Russian limited to senior pupils, whilst in the 
sam e  m o nth all the villages of K'iziqi p r o v i n c e  sent d e l e ­
gates to a meeting in Bodbiskhevi which, echoing calls heard 
all over the country, demanded that
...independent s e l f - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  be introduced 
into the villages and c l a s s - b a s e d  l a w - c o u r t s  be 
abolished. That a single district court be estab­
lished before which all classes would be equal ... 
that all court and busin e s s  m a t t e r s  be c o n d u c t e d  
in Georgian, that the judge be elected by popular 
mandate. Georgian should be used in all institu­
tions... and e d u c a t i o n  should be in G e o r g i a n  and 
compulsory up to the age of 16.
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And in Guria, w here due to the exha u s t i v e  debates 
between the rival parties on the national question the issue 
had had a more thoro u g h  public e x p o s u r e  than in any other 
part of Georgia, the demands for more local self-government, 
recognition of the equality of all nations and provision for 
national liberty in state legislation figured alongside the 
more c o m m o n  calls for an e d u c a t i o n  in one's own language, 
use of Georgian in the courts and the protection of national 
culture, and f r e q u e n t l y  a c c o m p a n i e d  other d e m a n d s  for the 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n  of landlord p r o p e r t y  and its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
among the peasantry, the overthrow of the autocracy and the 
establishment of broad democratic r i g h t s . Q u i t e  evident­
ly, the efforts of the t'ergdaleulni s i n c e - t h e  1870s to 
instil a sense of national consciousness into the Georgian 
people were c o m i n g  to fruition. For the SFs, however, the 
desire to defend one's n a t i o n a l  cultural heritage, w h ilst 
laudable, was not in itself enough to ensure its survival. 
Nor was the overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of 
democracy. What was required, they argued, was a for m  of 
p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  w hich w o uld both u n d e r s t a n d  and be 
re s p o n s i v e  to the a s p i r a t i o n s  of the local population; and 
since, in their view, this funct i o n  could not be f u l f i l l e d  
by a central g o v e r n m e n t  in a state the size of Russia's, 
they a d v o c a t e d  the creation of a f ederal r epublic w i t h  
national autonomy for the most sizeable and nationally c o n ­
scious of the former empire's national minorities.
The tsarist g o v e r n m e n t  aside, of course, the g r e a t e s t  
obsta c l e  to the new party c a m e  fro m  the s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  
m o v e m e n t  w hich alr e a d y  enjoyed the c o n f i d e n c e  of the 
p e a s a n t r y  and had the c o n s i d e r a b l e  a d v a n t a g e  of a w e l l -  
e s t a b l i s h e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  S i n c e  to o  the
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peasantry comprised the vast majority of the population and 
particulary the ethnic Georgian population, it was crucial 
for the SFs that they undermine the authority of the Social- 
D e m o c r a t s  in the villages and pose a r e a l istic and popular 
a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o g r a m m e .  This they a t t e m p t e d  to a c h i e v e  by 
a s s e r t i n g  the p r i m a c y  of the national q u e s t i o n  over the 
social q u e s t i o n  and by p r o p o s i n g  the s o c i a l i s a t i o n  of the 
land as a means to both s a t i s f y i n g  the i m m e d i a t e  r e q u i r e ­
me n t s  of the p e a s a n t r y  and for laying the basis for the 
future transformation to a socialist society once the period 
of capitalist development had exhausted itself.
The latter proposal, however, borrowed from the Russian 
Social Revolutionary Party, did not take sufficient account 
of the extent of private farming in Georgia and ignored the 
virtual disappearance of the commune. As noted in Chapter 
Three, sat’e m o , or communal, ownership was non-existent in 
the west of the country with the exception of Ratcha, while 
in the east it s urvived only in the use of g r a z i n g  g r o u n d s  
and w o o d l a n d s .  The SFs' h o p e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  the 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of all land to s p e c i a l l y  created c o m m u n e s  
m o d e l l e d  after the Russian mir w o u l d  win the m  support, 
foundered in the absence of a strong tradition of communal 
o w n e r s h i p  and exi s t e n c e  and against the d esire of the 
peasantry for land of their own.
On the other hand, despite the social antagonisms that 
fissu r e d  G e o r g i a n  society, the a t t e m p t  to win supp o r t  for 
their national unity platform was at least conducted against 
a background of maturing national consciousness and growing 
insistence on the satisfaction of specific national demands. 
The SFs solution to the p r o b l e m  of ho w  to exploit the moo d
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of national assertion without appearing to favour the inter­
ests of any one class was to a c k n o w l e d g e  the i m p o r t a n c e  of 
class struggle to the development of society without attach­
ing to it e x c l u s i v e  significance. Thus, t h r o w i n g  d o w n  a 
c h a l l e n g e  to the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  they r e j e c t e d  the 
latter's a r g u m e n t  that the nation was a product of the 
capitalist epoch by asserting that although class struggle 
influenced the transformation of society and capitalism had 
contributed to the further consolidation of the nation, the 
h i s t o r y  of n ations a c t u a l l y  p r e c e d e d  the h i s t o r y  of class 
s t r u g g l e . 1^  D e v e l o p i n g  this argument, Gr. Gv e l e s i a n i ,  an 
SF theorist of the na t i o n a l  question, m a i n t a i n e d  that the 
initial div i s i o n s  of s ociety were based not on class or 
property ownership, but on tribal rivalries. Without really 
explaining the cause of this rivalry, he further argued that 
the tribe was the i m m e d i a t e  p r e c u r s o r  of the n a t i o n  and 
sometimes even synonymous with it.1^  He concluded:
From this, it is clear that tribal confl i c t  is 
e s s e n t i a l l y  the same as na t i o n a l  conflict, w i t h  
the difference that today the latter takes a diff­
erent for m  and is more complex. To the extent 
that the tribe fought for the w h o l e  tribe, to the 
extent that it defen d e d  its separ a t e  e ntity and 
f actual situation, it was c o n d u c t i n g  a n a t i o n a l  
struggle.1
Without suggesting how tribal society was transformed 
into the nation, G v e l e s i a n i  n o w  felt able to q u e s t i o n  the 
S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ’ case that it was u n n e c e s s a r y  to m a k e  a 
particular issue of the national question since the success­
ful conclusion of the social struggle would remove the cause 
of national conflict. Thus, if, as the SFs asserted, tribal 
or national conflict preceded class struggle and was there­
fore an entirely independent factor, it was evident that the
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d i s a p p e a r a n c e  or class a n t a g o n i s m  was no g u a r a n t e e  that 
national rivalry would not persist. It was a mistake, they 
ma i n t a i n e d ,  to try to u n d e r s t a n d  the n ational q u e s t i o n  
solely in terms of socio-economic forces, a point emphasised 
by the SF, S. Gabunia, who claimed that
the innate, essential characteristic of the nation 
is c o n s c i o u s n e s s  (s h e g n e b a ) and s e l f - a w a r e n e s s  
(t'vit’s h e m e t s n e b a ) ; n a t i o n a l i t y  is the c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s  by a defined group of its i n d ividual 
personality and the desire to defend that person- 
a l i t y . 1
Moreover, to the Social-Democrats’ claim that by making 
a special issue of the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  they d ivided the 
w o r k i n g  class, the SFs r e s p o n d e d  that the r e v e r s e  was in 
fact the case, that by making provision for national aspira­
tions they would defuse the national question. On the other 
hand, the r e l u c t a n c e  of the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  to r e c o g n i s e  
the existence of a separate national factor risked offending 
n a t i o n a l  s e n s i b i l i t i e s  and driv i n g  a. wedge b e t w e e n  the 
peoples of the Russian empire even after the class struggle 
had been won. Gvelesiani wrote
...besides the m a t e r i a l  instinct there exists 
w i t h i n  man s o m e t h i n g  w h ich m o t i v a t e s  hi m  p o w e r ­
fully and wh i c h  ma kes hi m  fight. One form of this 
is the idea of f r e e d o m  for o n e ’s country, for, if 
you like, the n a t i o n a l  idea. W h e r e v e r  this idea 
collides with some obstacle, wherever it is t r a m p ­
led on by someone, the struggle which we call the 
n a t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e  w i l l  s l o w l y  a w a k e n  and 
develop.
Nor, they added, even assuming the victory of a social­
ist revolution, could one rely on the w o r k i n g  class to 
prevent n a t i o n a l  oppression. The p r o l e t a r i a t  of a g r eat 
power, by i m p l i c a t i o n  the Russians, was no more or less 
prone to chauvinism than the bourgeoisie and just as likely
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to use its po s i t i o n  to secure itself advantage. 143 The 
na t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  was, therefore, a p r a c t i c a l  qu e s t i o n  of 
i m m e d i a t e  c o n c e r n  to the w o r k i n g  p e o p l e  of b o t h  the 
oppressed and the oppressor nations, for until such time as 
full national rights were conceded to the minorities by the 
people of the great power, national chauvinism would persist 
and thus hinder the development of class consciousness.
That the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  were a w a r e  of the need to 
combat national chauvinism among the Russian proletariat and 
to meet certain of the aspirations of the national m inori­
ties can be seen from articles three, eight and nine of the 
party programme discussed above, while Lenin’s sensitivity 
to the dangers posed by Russian nationalism to the unity of 
the working class was clearly indicated in his reply in 1914 
to the critics of arti c l e  nine, the right of n a t i o n s  to 
self-determination:
Let us c o n s i d e r  the posit i o n  of an o p p r e s s o r  
nation. Can a nation be free if it o p p r e s s e s  
other natio n s ?  It cannot. The int e r e s t s  of the 
f r e e d o m  of the G r e a t - R u s s i a n  p e o d 1 e r e q u i r e  a 
struggle against such oppression.
It was his belief, moreover, that not only did the 
right e s t a b l i s h  the p r i nciple of eq u a l i t y  b e t w e e n  the 
nations of the empire and satisfy the desire of the m i n o r i ­
ties for national freedom, thus paving the way for proletar­
ian unity, but that it would, in practice, a c t u a l l y  reduce 
the likelihood of secession.
The SFs were, however, dismissive of the right to self- 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  suspecting, and not w i t h o u t  reason, that it 
was no mor e  than a tactic d e s i g n e d  to d i s a r m  the n a t i o n a l  
l i b e r a t i o n  move m e n t s .  The right was so broad, it was
a r g u e d ,  as to be b e r e f t  of r e a l  c o n t e n t .  W h a t ,  t h e y
362
p o i n t e d l y  asked, did the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  s have in mind by 
the nation? Were the minority nationalities to take this to 
im p l y  the entire nation r e g a r d l e s s  of class, or did the 
rights of the p r o l e t a r i a t  carry rather more w eight that 
those of the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the nobility? 1^  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  even a s s u m i n g  that the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  c o n ­
ferred this right on the entire nation how, in practice, was 
the will of the nation to be e l u c i d a t e d ?  And was it c o n ­
ceivable, asked G v e l e s i a n i  in 1908, that the B o l s h e v i k s  
w o uld accept the result of a r e f e r e n d u m  w h i c h  s u p p o r t e d  
something considerably more extreme than the national auto­
nomy and federation demanded by the S F s ? 1Zf® And why, if the 
S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  were sin c e r e l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  
freedom, did they reject f e d e r a t i o n  in favour of o u t r i g h t  
political secession when they knew perfectly well that inde­
pendence went beyond the aspirations of many nationalities 
for g r e a t e r  control over the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of their own 
affairs?
In r e a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  S F s  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  
establishment of a bourgeoisjdemocracy to be the most likely -! t
o u t c o m e  of the o v e r t h r o w  of the autocracy, a c i r c u m s t a n c e  
which, in their view, made the protection of national m i n o r ­
ity rights more crucial than ever. The danger, they argued, 
was that in a c e n t r a l i s e d  r e p u b l i c a n  state in w h i c h  one 
nationality enjoyed numerical superiority over the rest, the 
de jure rights of the minorities would count for very little 
against the de facto p o w e r  of the R ussian b o u r g e o i s i e  and 
its desire for economic expansion. Worse still, the r esent­
ment likely to be e n g e n d e r e d  a m o n g  the m i n o r i t i e s  by the 
frustration of their ambitions was likely to manifest itself
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in the emergence of nationalist movements led by the indig­
enous bourgeoisie and a subsequent decline in the class-con­
sciousness of the population. It was precisely the possibi­
lity of such an e v e n t u a l i t y  that made it e s s e n t i a l  that 
national freedom be protected by the devolution of control 
over d o m e s t i c  a ffairs to a u t o n o m o u s  r e p u b l i c s  and f e d e r a ­
tions. Writing for Tsnobis P'urtseli in 1905, Laskhishvili 
expounded on this point:
If we were sure that the Russian liberation m o v e ­
ment would end in total triumph for the ideals of 
the proletariat, then, of course, we could c o n ­
sider talk about the natio n a l  qu e s t i o n  s u p e r f l u ­
ous. But unfortunately, it is still premature to 
talk about this victory and in the near future the 
bourgeoisie will be in command. We take into con­
sideration all these facts and maintain that today 
it is n e c e s s a r y  to force the b o u r g e o i s i e  to c o n ­
cede to a u t o n o m y  so that in the future we can 
avoid far worse national struggle which would i m ­
pede the direct strug g l e  b e t w e e n  the classes ... 
not even the da s e l e b i  deny that n a t i o n a l  o p p r e s ­
sion ensures the d o m i n a t i o n  of the bourgeoisie. 
They should not therefore deny that the interests 
of the p r o l e t a r i a t  d e m a n d  that the state be so 
o r g a n i s e d  as to w e a k e n  the o p p r e s s i o n  of one 
nation by another. We think that one can achieve 
this better in conditions of autonomy than through 
the central democratic representative government 
proposed by the daselebi. 1
During 1905 the organisational structure of the SFs u n ­
d o u b t e d l y  improved, e n a b l i n g  them to make use of the i n ­
creased political freedom accorded by the decline in g overn­
m e n t a l  a u t h o r i t y  to i n t e n s i f y  their c a m p a i g n  for n a t i o n a l  
unity and autonomy. Combined with the slogan "Georgian land 
for the Georgians", this provided the party with a platform 
which won considerable support among many of the t'avadaz- 
naqroba and particularly those who had lost land to foreign­
ers or were in danger of doing so, among the intelligentsia 
g a t h e r e d  around Ilia T c h a v t c h a v a d z e  , Akaki Dseret'eli and
o t h e r s  who, w h i l s t  not in a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  e v e r y t h i n g
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advocated by the SFs, at least identified with their demand 
for autonomy, and the bourgeoisie which though suspicious of 
the socialist overtones of the SFs1 pronouncements neverthe­
less welcomed their advocacy of class unity in the interests 
of the n ation and their support for the d e v e l o p m e n t  of a 
strong and p r o g r e s s i v e  G e o r g i a n  m i d d l e -c l a s s . In this 
respect, it was the SFs’ contention that the bourgeoisie had 
a m a j o r  role to play in r a i s i n g  the cultural level of the 
nation and paving the way through the economic development 
of the country for the eventual triumph of socialism.^
Encouragement for national autonomy came consistently 
from Iveria which, like Tsnobis P'urtseli presented decen­
tralisation based on national-territorial autonomy as both 
the most d e m o c r a t i c  s o l u t i o n  of the r e q u i r e m e n t s  of the 
n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  and the best means of r o o t i n g  out 
national discord.
We support a u t o n o m o u s  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  for the 
Caucasus [wrote the editor of Iveria] and we also 
c o n s i d e r  union b e t w e e n  its n ations to be e s s e n ­
tial, ... but at the s a m e  tim e  we want to r e t a i n  
our national existence and entirety within defined 
territorial bounds. The central organ of the Cau­
c asian s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  should not be c o n c e r n e d  
wit h  m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  to the control of each 
nation's and, specifically, the Georgian nation's 
domestic life; only questions concerning the r e ­
so l u t i o n  of the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  rel a t i o n s  of the
peoples of the entire Cauca s u s  should e n ter its 
1
competence. J
Less p r e d i c t a b l e  than the support of I v e r i a , h o w e v e r , 
especially in view of the assistance given by many leading 
t 'avadebi during 1 905 to the 'Black Hundreds' and the t s a r ­
ist regime, was the d e c i s i o n  of a special m e e t i n g  of the 
t'avadaznauroba of T'bilisi and K'ut'aisi Gubernii in April 
of that year to appeal to the tsar for a u t o n o m y  on the
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grounds that the full cultural development of the Georgian 
people could only be achieved if it had its own administra­
tion and l a w s . ^ 2
Despite these successes, however, the influence of the 
SFs proved l i m i t e d  in the main to the large towns, w h i l e  the 
peasantry, the main target of their propaganda, remained out 
of reach, a state of affairs w h i c h  con t i n u e d  to blight the 
party’s prospects up to the invasion of Georgia by Russia in 
1921. In part, the failure of the SFs may be a t t r i b u t e d  to 
the p e a s a n t r y ’s concern, w h e t h e r  justified or not, that 
a u t o n o m y  w o uld w e a k e n  Georgia's ties with Russia and thus 
invite the unwanted attentions of Turkey and that the demand 
for autonomy might isolate Georgia from the broader opposi­
tion movement. But at root, the SFs greatest difficulty lay 
in the fact that the call for saert'o niadagi ( c o m m o n  
ground) was no more popular in the early 20th c e n t u r y  than 
it had been in the late 19th. If one bears in mind that the 
p e a s a n t r y ’s e c o n o m i c  p r e d i c a m e n t  c o n t i n u e d  to g r o w  worse, 
that unlike in Russia peasants remained "temporarily obli­
gated" to their l a n dlords until such time as they r e d e e m e d  
their plots of land, that l a n d lords could veto peasants' 
requests to purchase these plots, that only 47.6 per cent of 
e x - sabat o n o  peasa n t s  had a c t u a l l y  s u c c e e d e d  in p u r c h a s i n g  
any land since the 1860s,^ 3  and that under the pressure of 
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  and m o u n t i n g  debt, the a v e r a g e  area of 
land f a r m e d  by the peasants had been s t e a d i l y  r e d u c e d  (see 
Chapter Three), it is difficult to imagine how the SFs hoped 
to p e r s u a d e  the p e a s a n t r y  of the b e n e f i t s  of a c l a s s  
alliance that incorporated the t'avadaznauroba without first 
indicating their wish to satisfy the peasantry’s thirst for 
their own land. Furthermore, in a country where individual
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f a r m i n g  w a s  a l r e a d y  w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  and a g a i n s t  a 
background of mounting peasant militancy and demands for the 
abolition of "temporary obligations", the immediate and free 
t r a n s f e r  of the land used by the p e a s a n t r y  into their p r i ­
vate property, the return of m o n e y  a l r e a d y  paid for the 
redemption of land plots, the return of all land taken from 
the p e a s a n t r y  by the n o b i l i t y  in the 1 860s and 1 870s, the 
a b o l i t i o n  of all duties to the landlords, the free use of 
forests and pastures and the r e d u c t i o n  of the g h ala and 
kulukhi payments for rented land to a maximum of 10 per cent 
of the harvest, the SFs pr o p o s a l  for s o c i a l i s a t i o n  of the 
land d e m o n s t r a b l y  failed to meet the peasantry's e x p e c t a ­
tions . 1 ^  A
In the period b e t w e e n  1906 and the b e g i n n i n g  of the 
first world war, the SFs hopes of linking the national ques­
tion to the agrarian question and of thus winning the a l leg­
iance of the p e a s a n t r y  were b oosted by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
d e c i s i o n  to step up the c o l o n i s a t i o n  of the Transc a u c a s u s .  
Thus by 1908, the Transcaucasian branch of the Peasant Land 
Bank e s t a b l i s h e d  in T'bilisi in M a r c h  1906 had p u r c h a s e d  
258,000 d e s y a t i n y  of private land for its c o l o n i s a t i o n  
fund,1^5 while from 1906-08, 10,000 Russian peasants of both
sexes settled in G e o r g i a  a l o n e . 1^  D e s i g n e d  in part to 
e n e r v a t e  the peasant m o v e m e n t  in the inner g u b e r n i i  of 
Russia by o f f e r i n g  peasants f a v o u r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  on the 
periphery of the empire, the policy also had the purpose of 
furthering the government's Russification schemes stepped up 
in the wake of 1905 and of d i v i d i n g  Russian and G e o r g i a n  
peasants and w o r k e r s  against each other. Ho w e v e r ,  the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of the SFs to stand by the p r i n c i p l e  of
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party may have retained of transforming itself from a party 
of the intelligentsia into a mass-based organisation. Thus 
i nstead of e m p h a s i s i n g  the inj u s t i c e  of s elling land to 
Russian peasants when so many Georgians were landless, the 
party o bjected to the policy on n a t i o n a l i s t  grounds. The 
resolution of the land question, wrote the SF paper Amirani 
(Amirani) in April 1908, d e m a n d e d  not the i n f l a m m a t i o n  of 
i n t e r n a l  strug g l e  but the u n i f i c a t i o n  of all the G e o r g i a n  
people to ensure that G e o r g i a n  land r e m a i n e d  in G e o r g i a n  
hands, a statement which faithfully reflected the majority 
vie w  at the p a r t y ’s third congress in Oct o b e r  1 907."*^® 
Then, despite c o n f i r m a t i o n  of the party's support for 
socialisation of the land and its opposition to privatisa­
tion, it was stated that,
in the period of domination by reaction the choice 
of the present s o c i a l i s a t i o n  tactic is i n c o r ­
rect.
What was needed, they believed, was a peasant land bank 
which would not only prevent the loss of land to foreigners, 
but also enable G e o r g i a n  p easants to buy land fro m  the 
t ' a v a d a z n a u r o b a . Such a policy, however, w h ile likely to 
have won friends a m o n g  the poor and d e r a c i n a t e d  gentry, 
ignored that the Georgian peasantry regarded the land they 
were being asked to buy as rightfully theirs. Consequently, 
when the SFs appealed to the national ideals of the peasan­
try, s u g g e s t i n g  that it buy land to p reserve its n a t i o n a l  
heritage, the latter q u e s t i o n e d  why respect for the s a m e  
national ideal should not oblige the nobility to return land 
to the peasantry. It was furt h e r  observed that the bank 
wo u l d  do n o t h i n g  for the p r o b l e m s  of the n o n - c r e d i  t w o r t h y
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majority of peasants.160
The SFs inconsistency over socialisation, moreover, was 
to lead to a p a r t i n g  of the ways with the SRs in 1910 and 
r e f l e c t e d  g r o w i n g  f r u s t r a t i o n  at the p a r t y ’s f ailure to 
deepen its i n f l u e n c e . 161 D i f f e r e n c e s  w i t h i n  the party at 
its c o n g r e s s e s  in 1906 and 1907 c o n t i n u e d  to prevent the 
publication of a joint programme and witnessed the emergence 
of a c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i v e r g e n c e  of v i ews on the party's role. 
Thus even Archil Jorjadze, one of its leading figures, found 
h i m s e l f  in a m i n o r i t y  both in his vie w  of the state as an 
impediment to the realisation of s o c i a l i s m 162 and that the 
party should be reinforcing its commitment to socialisation, 
not q u a l i f y i n g  it, by e x t e n d i n g  it to include the m e a n s  of 
p r o d u c t i o n  as well as l a n d . 163 By 1914, not only had the 
SRs a b a n d o n e d  the alliance, but a n e w  party, the N a t i o n a l  
Democrats, standing on a more blatantly nationalist platform 
had split a w a y  from the SFs. The b reak-up of the party, 
however, did nothing for the fortunes of the organisations 
concerned, but m e r e l y  divided their previous support and 
prompted a further decline in their influence.
The Social-Democratic Response
Although in other respects the decisions and events of 
the Second RSDLP Congress were to divide the Transcaucasian 
party org a n i s a t i o n s ,  just as they divi d e d  the p a rty as a 
whole, they co n t r i v e d  n e v e r t h e l e s s  to achi e v e  a t e m p o r a r y  
con c e n s u s  a m o n g  them on the n a t i o n a l  question. Thus the 
r e s o l u t i o n  passed by the First Congress of the C a u c a s i a n  
Union in M a r c h  1903 a p p r o v i n g  a fede r a l  s t r u c t u r e  for the 
future R ussian state was qui c k l y  a b a n d o n e d  in f a v o u r  of
articles seven, eight and nine of the RSDLP statutes and the
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provision for regional self-government approved by Noe Zhor- 
dania and, of course, the m a j o r i t y  of the d e l e g a t e s  to the 
Brussels/London Congress. Consequently, 1904 witnessed what 
in r e t r o s p e c t  was to prove the rather rare s p e c t a c l e  of 
Zhordania and Stalin in alliance against those, both outwith 
and w i t h i n  the party, who saw the solut i o n  to the na t i o n a l  
question in the provision of national territorial autonomy 
for the minority peoples.
Among the Armenian population the latter idea quickly 
gained ground following the announcement on 12th July 1903 
of an ill-considered government decree appropriating all the 
property and funds owned by the Armenian C h u r c h . A b l e  to 
exploit the mood of popular outrage over what was perceived 
as a wholly unwarranted attack on the central pillar of the 
n a t i o n ’s cultural identity, the n a t i o n a l i s t  H n chak and 
Dashnaktsutiun parties, both of which had suffered a decline 
in recent years, enjoyed an unexpected r e v i v a l . g u t  more 
significantly, both for the government and the Social-Demo­
cratic Party, the decree prompted a reexamination of their 
relationship with Russia and a move away from their preoccu­
pation wit h  l i b e r a t i n g  West A r m e n i a  fro m  the Turks. This 
still remained their ultimate goal, but the doubt now thrown 
upon the autocracy’s intentions towards Armenia inclined the 
bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to greater participation in 
the R ussian o p p o s i t i o n  m o v e m e n t  and, like the G e o r g i a n  
Socialist-Federalists, but with rather more success, to p r o ­
pagandise for the creation of an autonomous republic.
Of particular concern to the Social-Democrats was the 
D a s h n a k  and S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t  app e a l  to A r m e n i a n s  and 
Georgians to subordinate their particular class interests to
those of the nation as a w h o l e  and,their a r g u m e n t  that not
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only were the common traits of their respective populations 
of greater import than the social issues dividing them, but 
that class struggle was an a ctive i m p e d i m e n t  to na t i o n a l  
revival. Clearly contained in this was both a challenge to 
the social-democratic view that the national question was a 
social issue w h i c h  w o u l d  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  be r e s o l v e d  by the 
victory of the international proletariat and the convict ion 
that in Russia only the united efforts of the w o r k e r s  and 
peasants of all nationalities would achieve the overthrow of 
autocracy.
In response, the Social-Democrats denied the incompati­
bility of class struggle and natio n a l  r e n a i s s a n c e  and 
asserted that far from being incompatible, it was a necess­
ary precondition. In other words, national renaissance was 
the product of economic advance, but the latter was i m p o s s ­
ible wit h o u t  class struggle. D e v e l o p i n g  the a r g u m e n t  
further, they m a i n t a i n e d  that a b a n d o n m e n t  of the class 
struggle would lead to the sacrifice of wor k e r s ’ interests 
to those of the n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  and that a u t o n o m y ,  by 
dividing the workers’ movement, would ultimately facilitate 
the e x p l o i t a t i o n  of the proletariat. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the 
mutual antagonism of the Armenian and Georgian bourgeoisies, 
c o m b i n e d  with c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of much of the f o r m e r  in 
T'bilisi, would ensure that any attempt to establish n ation­
al a u t o n o m y  on a t e r r i t o r i a l  basis in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  
w o uld lead to conflict b e t w e e n  the A r m e n i a n  and G e o r g i a n  
pr o l e t a r i a t  and the s u b m e r s i o n  of class c o n s c i o u s n e s s  in 
c h a u v i n i s m . A s  the G e o r g i a n  B o l s h e v i k  A l e k ' s a n d r  
Dsulukidze put it:
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Desp i t e  the fact that today the G e o r g i a n  and 
A r m e n i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  are s q u a b b l i n g  with each 
other, the G e o r g i a n  and A r m e n i a n  p r o l e t a r i a t  are 
b o u n d  t i g h t l y  to e a c h  o t h e r  and the f i r e  of 
n a t i o n a l  s c h i s m  has been e x t i n g u i s h e d  b e t w e e n  
them; but if you now bring in autonomy, the fire 
w i l l  i g n i t e  again... In t o d a y ’s c o n d i t i o n s  
a u t o n o m y  is h a r m f u l  and d a n g e r o u s  for the p r o l e ­
tariat . 1 67
M o r e  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in vie w  of the 
government's attempts to whip up inter-ethnic conflict among 
the indigenous nationalities of the Transcaucasus, emphasis 
on^ national differences was deemed by the Social-Democrats 
to be pla y i n g  into the hands of the r e g i m e . 1^  Moreover, 
what need was there for autonomy, they argued, b r u s h i n g  
aside objections that the RSDLP statutes on national rights 
c o n t a i n e d  no g u a r a n t e e s  that t h e s e  r i g h t s  w o u l d  be 
respected, w h e n  the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  had a l r e a d y  p r o p o s e d  
re g i o n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  for areas like the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by a specific way of life or n a t i o n a l  m a k e -  
u p . 169
The genuine anxiety shared by most of the Transcaucas­
ian Social-Democrats that the notoriously volatile relation­
ship between the Armenian and Azeri populations could degen­
erate at any moment and thus destroy instantly their patient 
e n d e a v o u r s  to e s t a b l i s h  mu t u a l  trust and an a w a r e n e s s  of 
common class interests among the workers of the two c o m m u n i ­
ties was also an undoubted factor in their opposition to the 
Bund's attempt to win approval for the division of the RSDLP 
into n a t i o n a l  organisations. Noe Zhordania, a m o n g  o t her 
Georgian Mensheviks subsequently ber a t e d  as " n a t i o n a l i s t s "
by the Bolsheviks, consistently opposed the division of the 
party along these lines and was quite u n e q u i v o c a l  in his
condemnation of the Bund. Writing for Iskra in August 1904 
(by w h i c h  t i m e  Lenin had been ousted fro m  the e d i t o r i a l
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board), he m a i n t a i n e d  that given the a m a l g a m  of d i f f erent 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  living in the Cauca s u s  and the r e g i o n ’s long 
history of inter-ethnic conflict the principle of the unity 
of all n ations in a single, powerful, s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  
organisation was of the utmost importance.
The p r o l e t a r i a n s  of all n ations [he w rote of the 
Tr a n s c a u c a s u s ]  - Arme n i a n s ,  Georgians, Russians, 
Tatars (sic) etc. - responded to this call and, in 
spite of the i n f l a m m a t i o n  of natio n a l  h atred by 
the bourgeois press., held out their hands to each 
other as brothers in the c o m m o n  strug g l e  against 
our common enemies. The local committees of the 
party which, in their turn, joined the C a u c a s i a n  
Union, sprang up on this soil. As you see, our 
organisational principle is directly at odds with 
the Bund's, for which the latter can never forgive 
the Caucasian Union.1 ^
What, however, p r o m p t e d  their p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c e r n  on 
this issue was the d e c i s i o n  of a group of A r m e n i a n  Social- 
D e m o c r a t s  to break a w a y  from the C a u c a s i a n  Union and the 
RSDLP in the wake of the Brussels/London Congress and form a 
separate party called the Organisation of Armenian Social- 
D e m o c r a t i c  W o r k e r s  (OASDW).1^ ”1 The c atalyst for this 
d e c i s i o n  a ppears to have been the fai l u r e  of the C a u c a s i a n  
Union d e l e g a t e s  to the c ongress to stand by the latter 
organisation's mandate recommending a federal solution for 
the n ational question, and c e r t a i n l y  f e d e r a t i o n  was to 
occupy a central p o s i t i o n  in the new party's m a n i f e s t o .  
What most troubled the r e m a i n i n g  T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  s o c i a l -  
democratic committees, particularly in view of the alleged 
low class-consciousness of the Armenian proletariat and its 
susceptibility to nationalist propaganda, was the organisa­
tion's d ecision to e m u l a t e  the Bund and d e c l a r e  that not 
only was it the case that only an Armenian social-democratic 
party could defend the interests of the A r m e n i a n  pro-
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letariat, but that the Armenian proletariat was inseparable 
from the rest of Armenian society and that:
The A r m e n i a n  proletariat, u nited in a socialist 
party, should try to elucidate the public opinion 
of Armenians so that the Armenian proletariat will 
be the true child of its r a c e . 1 '
Clearly sharing Zhordania's concern, Stalin accused the 
OASDW in an article for Proletariat is Brdzola (Proletarian 
Struggle) in September 190 4 of distracting the attention of 
the p r o l e t a r i a t  fro m  the class struggle. It was not the 
purpose of the Social-Democratic Party, he wrote, to eluci­
date and r e p r esent the v i ews of public opinion as a whole, 
but to make clear the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  nature of the class 
int e r e s t s  d i v i d i n g  society. It was not the duty t h e r e f o r e  
of Social-Democrats to ensure that the national proletariats 
be the "true children" of their r e s p e c t i v e  races, but that 
they educate the workers, as indeed the united Transcaucas­
ian organisations had been doing since long before the OADSW 
made its appearance, in the spirit of proletarian i n t e r n a - } 
t ionali s m .173
The federal issue aside, the A r m e n i a n  party cited as 
grounds for its break away from the RSDLP its opposition to 
"the a b s o l u t e  c e n t r a l i s m  in its form of organisation", and 
one sta t u t e  in the C a u c a s i a n  Union's r e g u l a t i o n s  a l l o w i n g  
for the cooption of members to that body's central institu­
tion. But as Z h o r dania argued, the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e  
was still very much a live issue w i t h i n  the RSDLP, w h i l s t  
obj-ection to one statute in the Caucasian Union regulations 
was scarc e l y  grou n d s  for f o r m i n g  a ne w  party. 1^A It is' 
perhaps mor e  likely that the A r m e n i a n  d e c i s i o n  was c o n d i ­
t i o n e d  by the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of the t i m e ,  t h a t  the
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combination of Armenian national sensitivity in the wake of 
the Turkish m a s s a c r e s  in the 1890s and the g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of the A r m e n i a n  Church's p r o p e r t y  in 1903, 
together with the predominance of Georgians in the Transcau­
casian Social-Democratic organisations lay at the heart of 
their decision to separate.
Ironically, the c o m m i t m e n t  to the pr i n c i p l e  of party 
unity demonstrated by the Transcaucasian Social-Democratic 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  in its d e a l i n g s  with the A r m e n i a n  group was 
itself proved wanting with the return of Noe Zhordania from 
exile in 1 905. In reality, the a p p e a r a n c e  of unity m a i n ­
tained by the Bolshevik-dominated Caucasian Union up to this 
point was s o m e t h i n g  of a facade, insofar as it had fa iled to 
i n f o r m  the local c o m m i t t e e s  of the results of the Second 
Congress. Consequently, a l t h o u g h  man y  party m e m b e r s  wer e  
aware that a dispute of some kind existed among the leader­
ship, they did not fully understand the issues involved nor 
did they a p p r e c i a t e  the extent or the i m p l i c a t i o n s  of the 
d i v i s i o n  that had o c c u r r e d  in London. Even in late 1904, 
when a representative of the party centre was sent to speak 
on the nature of the split, the Caucasian Union ensured that 
the provincial committees received the content of the paper 
in the most a b b r e v i a t e d  f o r m J ^  In January, ho w e v e r ,  the 
Union took the first steps towards embroiling the Transcau­
casus in the dispute when, in a c c o r d a n c e  wit h  Lenin's 
advocacy of a party of professional revolutionaries appoint­
ed from above, it commanded the T ’bilisi Committee to dis­
band itself whilst it selected a new body to replace it.”* ^  
Unfortunately for the Caucasian Union, its decision to take 
action coincided with the unexpected arrival of Zhordania in
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vice of the T'bilisi Committee, he encouraged its resistance
to the Caucasian Union and quickly set about explaining the
nature of the issues d i v i d i n g  the party leadership. In an
article written in cooperation with Noe Ramishvili for the
Georgian paper Sotsial-Demokrati, Zhordania focused on the
dispute over party m e m b e r s h i p  at the Second Congress. It
was Lenin's argument, he upheld, that left to t h e m s e l v e s
w o r k e r s  could not obtain s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  consciousness,
that they could get no further than the trade union struggle
for higher wages, shorter hours and better living conditions
and that they could only ach i e v e  po l i t i c a l  a w a r e n e s s  with
17 7the a s s i s t a n c e  of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . ' 1 
This, c o m b i n e d  with the a t t e n t i o n s  of the tsarist police, 
necessitated the creation of a centralised party of profes­
sional revolutionaries formed from the intelligentsia whose 
task would be to direct the course of the' workers' movement. 
Thus the role of the Cent r a l  C o m m i t t e e  would no l onger be 
to,
...just advise, convince and argue (as it had done
in the past), but actually to direct the orchestra
It can, by its own judgement, disband a local
committee, establish a new one, forcibly introduce
a n e w  m e m b e r  to the c o m m i t t e e  and d i s m i s s  an old
one. In this way, in the opin i o n  of Lenin, the
local c o m m i t t e e  b e c o m e s  a mere- agent of the
17 RCentral Committee. '
Seen in this light, Lenin's a p p r o a c h  t h r e a t e n e d  the 
basis of most of the party organisations in the Transcauca­
sus where, since the 1890s, there had been both a tradition 
of heavy recruitment from the working class and a commitment 
to e l e c t i o n  of party leaders by the rank and file. M o r e ­
over, the recent rapid expansion of the party had drawn not
just on workers, but also on the p e a s a n t r y  and had as such 
taken the local o r g a n i s a t i o n s  in c o m p l e t e l y  the o p p o s i t e  
direction to that envisaged by Lenin. Consequently the idea 
of an elitist party o r g a n i s a t i o n  d r a w n  p r i m a r i l y  f r o m  the 
intelligentsia dictating to the local committees from s o m e ­
where in Russia or, worse still, in Europe was scarcely c a l ­
culated to win much s y m p a t h y  in the area. P r o b l e m s  of 
communication aside, Caucasian Social-Democrats questioned 
the wisdom of an undifferentiated approach to questions of 
or ganisation, tactics and s t r a t e g y  whe n  c o n d i t i o n s  in the 
Transcaucasus so clearly demanded quite different methods.
If Z h o r d a n i a  had n eeded any further support for his f 
case against the Bolsheviks, the d e c i s i o n  of the C a u c a s i a n  
Union to d e m a n d  the r e s i g n a t i o n  of the T ’bilisi C o m m i t t e e  
could not have been better timed. Here was a c o n c r e t e  
example of Leninist policy in action. The latter, however, 
b u t t r e s s e d  by Z h o r d a n i a ’s support, issued a s trong r e p r o o f  
to the C a u c a s i a n  Union i n f o r m i n g  it that the T'bilisi 
Committee was elected by the T'bilisi workers and only they 
had the r i g h t  to d i s s o l v e  i t . 1 ”^  C o n f r o n t e d  by t h i s  
challenge the Bolsheviks responded by publishing a leaflet 
w h i c h  they d i s t r i b u t e d  a m o n g  the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a ­
tions, d e c l a r i n g  the old c o m m i t t e e  d i s b anded and the 
a p p o i n t m e n t  of n e w  personnel. But w i t h i n  a m o n t h  of the 
start of the st r u g g l e  for control of the T ’bilisi d i s t r i c t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  support for the old c o m m i t t e e  was so o v e r ­
w h e l m i n g  tha t  the p o s i t i o n  of the n e w  b o d y  b e c a m e
i o n
untenable. In the p r o v inces too the C a u c a s i a n  Union
found itself fi g h t i n g  a l osing battle and by the s p r i n g  
every Transcaucasian organisation with the exception of Baku 
had embraced Zhordania's position.181
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The Caucasian Union, however, continued to act as if it 
alone was representative of Transcaucasian social-democracy, 
with the consequence that just as revolutionary fervour in 
Georgia reached its climax, the party which depicted itself 
as the vangu a r d  of the p r o l e t a r i a t  was divided agai n s t  
itself and in c a p a b l e  of doing more than f o l l o w  in the tail 
of events. A police report issued at this time e s t i m a t e d  
that because of inner-party disputes in T’bilisi ’’...produc­
tivity of the organisation fell by 50 per cent...".1®^
Meanwhile, the militant mood of the workers and, most 
r e m a r k a b l y ,  the Gu r i a n  p e a s a n t r y  provi d e d  an ironic b a c k ­
g r o u n d  to the c o n t i n u i n g  d i s p u t e  o v e r  the a b i l i t y  of 
workers, let alone peasants, to go beyond ’’trade-union co n ­
sciousness". Such a s i t u a t i o n  clearly could not be p e r ­
m i t t e d  to persist and to break the d e a d l o c k  the T'bilisi 
Committee, now "cleansed" in Zhordania’s words "of Bolshev­
ism", called a conference of the Transcaucasian organisation
to elect a regional committee and thus bypass the Caucasian 
1ft?Union. 1OJ D espite the split, however, there was as yet 
little to divide the party over the n a t i o n a 1 q u e s t i o n  and 
rank and file party m e m b e r s  who had c o o p e r a t e d  t o g e t h e r  
happily for years continued to do so.
In fact, for much of 1905 the radical parties, includ­
ing the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s , the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t s  , the 
Hnchaks and Dashn a k s  m a n a g e d  to find a modus v i v e n d i  over 
the d e v i s i v e  natio n a l  issue. But this was c o n d i t i o n e d  as 
much by their common fear that the violent clashes between 
Armenians and Azeris in Baku in December 1904 would spread 
to T'bilisi and d i s s i p a t e  the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  f e r v o u r  of the 
population in ethnic violence, than any agreement over the
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future settlement of the national question. Thus throughout 
the first months of 1905 all parties laid heavy emphasis on 
the unity and friendship of all nationalities and warned the 
people to be on guard against what they saw as g o v e r n m e n t  
a t t e m p t s  to cont a i n  the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  mood by s e t t i n g  the 
nationalities against each other.
In m i d - s u m m e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  the f i r s t  c r a c k s  in the
alliance began to appear when Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, newly
appointed as viceroy to the Caucasus, quickly nullified the
destabilising effect of the appropriation of Armenian Church
1 ft Ap r o p e r t y  by r e p e a l i n g  the decree on 1st August. The
placatory effect of this measure was quickly compounded by 
the tsar's decis i o n  to pe r m i t  ele c t i o n s  for the s o - c a l l e d  
"Bulygin Duma", a purely a d v i s o r y  body with an e x t r e m e l y  
narrow electoral base, made even narrower in the Transcauca­
sus by the r e s t r i c t i o n  of the f r a n c h i s e  to the m a j o r  
cities.”*®^ As a consequence, the Armenian bourgeoisie r e ­
tained its d o m i n a t i o n  of the T'bilisi City Cou n c i l  and 
seemed almost certain to win the right to represent T'bilisi 
in St. Petersburg. The first of the measures, in p a r t i c u ­
lar, helped strip the opposition of the Armenian bourgeoisie 
and i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to the g o v e r n m e n t  of m u c h  of its 
strength, gi v i n g  rise to s p o n t a n e o u s  parades, c h u r c h  s e r ­
vices and r a p t urous press c o m m e n t  in c e l e b r a t i o n  of the 
great event. Most disconcerting, however, for the opposi­
tion movement as a whole, was the spectacle of a delegation 
of the Armenian population's most "worthy" representatives 
conveying their gratitude for the compassion of the tsar to 
the viceroy's palace.1®^ The Dashnaktsutiun too almost c o m ­
pletely abandoned its anti-tsarist activities to focus its 
a t t e n t i o n  on Turkey and T'bilisi's d e t e r i o r a t i n g  A r m e n o -
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Azeri relations.1®^
This v o l t e - f a c e  by the A r m e n i a n s  inev i t a b l y  p r o m p t e d  
accusations of treachery from the Social-Democrats and e x ­
p r e s s i o n  of n a t i o n a l i s t  outrage a m o n g  the G e o r g i a n  b o u r ­
geoisie and sections of the intelligentsia. More important­
ly, it undermined the limited trust established between the 
radical parties and destroyed the prospect of a united front 
against autocracy. Thus in November 1905 when the Armeno- 
Azeri violence all had been at such pains to prevent earlier 
in the year finally exploded, the Dashnaks played an active 
part in the hostilities, exacerbating rather than facilitat­
ing the task of the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  s in a p p e a s i n g  the two 
sides.1®®
As too the government regained the initiative towards 
the end of the year and the o p p o s i t i o n  m o v e m e n t  c a m e  under 
increasing strain, the schism which had divided the Social- 
D e m o c r a t i c  Party in the early spring r e a s s e r t e d  itself. 
W it h  fr i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  the two f actions a l r e a d y  ra i s e d  by 
arguments over the advisability of encouraging or even p r e ­
paring for armed insurrection and the Mensheviks’ decision 
to participate in the elections to the state duma, their r e ­
maining areas of cooperation were brought to an abrupt halt 
by the government's closure of the daily paper Elva (Light­
ning) in Arp.il 1 906.1®^ Coinciding as it did with a marked 
increase in the arrest of party m e m b e r s  and e v i d e n c e  of 
m o u n t i n g  c o n f i d e n c e  in g o v e r n m e n t  circles that they could 
sustain the offensive against the opposition movement, this 
appears to have convinced the Bolsheviks that the existing 
conditions necessitated the cessation of all further a c tiv­
ity and the t e m p o r a r y  d i s b a n d m e n t  of the party to p r e v e n t
more arrests. But at a joint m e e t i n g  of the s o c i a l - d e m o ­
cratic o r g a n i s a t i o n s  in the T ’bilisi w o r k e r s ’ district of 
Nadzaladevi, the Mensheviks, who by now far outnumbered the 
Bolsheviks, r e j e c t e d  this advice, no doubt s u s p e c t i n g  the 
l a t t e r ’s motives, and agreed to expand the p a r t y ’s u n d e r ­
ground activities.1^0 Frustrated and powerless, the Bolshe­
viks went their own way, s c a t t e r i n g  across Transcaucasia. 
It was, claimed Zhordania,
...their f i n a l  s e p a r a t i o n  f r o m  the G e o r g i a n  
people.
It is true that even after the Fourth RSDLP " U n i f i c a ­
tion” Congress, held in Stockholm between 23rd April and 8th 
M a y  1906, the B o l s h e v i k s  con t i n u e d  to m a i n t a i n  s e p a r a t e  
organisations in the Transcaucasus, but by then their influ­
ence was a lready minimal. All the C a u c asian d e l e g a t e s  
elected to the Stockholm Congress were M e n s h e v i k s ,1 while 
at the Fourth Congress of Caucasian organisations in S e p t e m ­
ber of the sam e  year, the B o l s h e v i k s  were r e d u c e d  to a 
powerless minority. The Mensheviks, meanwhile, used their 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the May ele c t i o n s  to the First D u m a  to 
further enhance their prestige. D e s p i t e  g o v e r n m e n t  r e ­
p r e s s i o n  all five of their c a n d i d a t e s  were e l e c t e d  w h i l e
their c o m b i n e d  vote doubled that of all the r e m a i n i n g
1Q 3parties put together. 7
Signs too now began to emerge of a divergence of views 
a m o n g s t  the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  on the natio n a l  q u e s t i o n  and 
more specifically on the desirability or otherwise of a u t o ­
nomy. Here too there was a r g u m e n t  over what kind of 
autonomy was most appropriate to the Transcaucasus. Should 
there, for instance, be t e r r i t o r i a l  a u t o n o m y  and, if so,
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to the major nationalities, or should autonomy be devolved 
from the principle of territory altogether and confined to 
the cultural sphere?
No doubt influenced by the apparent growth of national 
self-consciousness among the peasantry, evidenced in their 
mounting demands for education in the vernacular and the use 
of Georgian in the courts and government offices, as well as 
by the increasingly strident chauvinism of the "Black Hun d ­
reds” and other Russian nationalist organisations operating 
in the Caucasus, certain Georgian Mensheviks sought new ways 
to satisfy these demands and protect national cultural dev­
elopment against Russification. Thus in late 1905 a small 
group advocating the inclusion of national territorial auto­
nomy in the party programme formed around V. Darchiashvili,
I. G o m a r t ’eli and E. Egvitashvili. W r i t i n g  for I veria in 
December 1905, which suggests that they were having diffi­
culties airing their views in the social-democratic press, 
the latter of these stated:
I, as a S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t , call on all c o n s c i o u s  
proletarians and all those Georgian Social-Demo- 
crats who in recent times have come to regard cen­
t r a l i s m  as in some way more to the a d v a n t a g e  of 
the proletariat, to cease their d u p l i c i t y  and 
recognise, once and for all, that the c u l t u r a l  
flourishing and development of the proletariat of 
every n ation d e m a n d s  broad s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  and 
that the image of broad self-government is d e m o ­
cratic national autonomy. ^
Ivane Go m a r t ’eli, one of the five Georgian Social-Demo- 
crats elected as deputies to the First Duma, developed this 
th e m e  in a lengthy p a m p h l e t  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  in 
early 1 906. Anxious to avoid the c r i t i c i s m  that they wer e  
nationalists, he argued that w h i l e  the vic t o r y  of the
alism, e r a d i c a t e  n a t i o n a l  frontiers i m p e d i n g  the further 
social and e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  of m a n k i n d  and even after 
time lead to the erosion of such national characteristics as 
l a n g u a g e , 1^  such a victory lay in the distant future and 
that in the meantime Social-Democrats should concern t h e m ­
selves wit h  the p r a c t i c a l  p r o b l e m s  of r aising the class 
consciousness of the proletariat and overthrowing the tsar­
ist r e g i m e .  I m p o r t a n t  to u n d e r s t a n d i n g  G o m a r t ' e l i ' s  
a p p r o a c h  was his belief, shared by most S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s , 
that the defeat of a u t o c r a c y  in Russia w o u l d  lead not 
d i r e c t l y  to socialism, but to an i n t e r i m  period of b o u r ­
geois -democracy which, amongst other things, would facili­
tate the development and expansion of the Russian bourgeoi­
sie. T h r e a t e n e d  by the d o m i n a t i o n  of a c e n t r a l  state 
ap p a r a t u s  by the Russians, the G e o r g i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  might 
well prove able to use the existence of national oppression 
to unite the p r o l e t a r i a t  and p e a s a n t r y  around itself, thus 
distracting them from the class struggle. It was precisely 
such a d e v e l o p m e n t ,  argued G o m a r t ’eli, that had f o r m e d  the 
basis for the existing class alliance of the Armenian prole­
tariat and b o u r g e o i s i e . ^97 Furthermore, since the emergence 
of a bourgeois government in Russia would exacerbate rather 
than ease national oppression, it was to be e x p e c t e d  that 
the n a t i o n a l  language, schools, courts and literature, all 
of which were essential to the development of the cultural 
level of the n a t i o n a l  proletariat, w ould be at risk. It 
was, therefore, not nationalism that drove him to advocate 
n a t i o n a l ’ t e r r i t o r i a l  autonomy, but concern for the f u ture 
socialist transformation of society. Consequently, under a 
’’liberal-bourgeois constitutional monarchy” of the type he
anticipated would come to Russia, every nationality should 
seek to win as fir m  a g u a r a n t e e  of internal f r e e d o m  as 
possible. ”^ 8
The demand for territorial autonomy was not, of course, 
new to Caucasian Social-democracy. It had been supported by 
the Union of Armenian Social-Democrats in their manifesto of 
1902 and approved by the Caucasian Union's first congress in 
March 1903. But since then, most of the local party commit- j
tees had come to regard it as unsuited to the Transcaucasus /
because of the extensive intermingling of nationalities in i 
the area and the risk that class consciousness might sink in 
inter-ethnic rivalry. Consequently, its resurrection, par­
ticularly at a time when the party's fortunes were at a low 
ebb, and the r e v o l u t i o n  of 1905 had been t h r o w n  onto the 
defensive, was regarded with hostility by most Social-Demo­
crats, w h e t h e r  B o l s h e v i k  or Menshevik, and as likely to
further divide the Russian workers' movement.
Nevertheless, the debate on the national question shar­
pened during the course of 1906 and occupied a central place 
in the d i s c u s s i o n s  of the Fourth Congress of C a u c a s i a n  
Social-Democratic Party organisations in September. Here, 
i n d i c a t i o n s  that a t t i t u d e s  to the issue were u n d e r g o i n g  a 
gradual transformation received further confirmation when a 
sm a l l  group from the K'ut'aisi delegation, led by the M e n ­
shevik, B. Nat'adze, criticised the territorial autonomists 
on the g rounds that there was no longer any such t h i n g  as a 
pure national territory, but w h ich instead of g o i n g  on to -\/ 
reassert the policies established by the Second RSDLP Con­
gress, proposed the a c c e p t a n c e  of n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  a u t o ­
n o m y ,  a c c o r d i n g  to w h i c h  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  the n a t i o n ' s
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cultu r a l  ana e a u c a t i o n a i  aiiairs w o u i a  oe g r a n i e a  not iu 
t e r r i t o r i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r ganisation, but to an e x t r a ­
territorial body entrusted with responsiblity for national 
cultural development.200
It was hoped that by d e v o l v i n g  national cu l t u r a l  
affairs from the t e r r i t o r i a l  p r i n ciple and thus r e m o v i n g  
them from the c o m p e t e n c e  of the state a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  it 
would be possible to ameliorate if not prevent what was seen 
as the tendency of the b o u r g e o i s i e  of the most p o w e r f u l  
nationalities in multi-national states to seek hegemony over 
the minority peoples, and in the interest of greater-econo­
mic and administrative efficiency, to use the power of the 
state to eradicate all linguistic and cultural impediments 
to the a s s i m i l a t i o n  of all parts of the state. H o w e v e r ,  
w h i l s t  this idea (drawn largely from the A u s t r o - M a r x i s t s , 
Otto Bauer and Karl Renner) was soon to be a d o p t e d  by the 
Transcaucasian Mensheviks it had not yet won the approval of 
the party majority and was overwhelmingly rejected.
For the moment, the position of the M e n s h e v i k s  on the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  ap p e a r e d  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  f r o m  that of 
the Bolsheviks. Zhordania, as was noted by his contemporary 
and f e l l o w  Menshevik, K. Zalevskii, c o n t inued to cont e n t  
himself with the demand for regional self-government and to 
oppose autonomy which
...in his view, was h a r m f u l  to the p r o l e t a r i a t  
since it was both utopian and set the G e o r g i a n  
workers special tasks, thus dividing them from the 
prole t a r i a t  of the rest of Russia (Rossiya) and 
h olding back the struggle for political f r e e ­
dom.2 0 '
Despite this apparent unity, however, it was a l r e a d y  
becoming clear that the Bolsheviks viewed the question from
a rather different perspective. Thus while the Mensheviks 
were concerned more with the problem of minimising national 
oppression in the period of bourgeois democracy and the r e ­
lated task of immunising the proletariat against the lure of 
nationalism, the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks' greater concen­
tration on the final victory of socialism was leading them 
to the view that since national oppression, like the pauper­
isation of the proletariat, was a product of capitalism and 
as such could only be overcome by the triumph of socialism, 
the national question should be entirely subordinated to the 
class struggle. In a manner indicative of his insensitivity 
to the national aspirations of the minority peoples Makhar- 
adze wrote that
...the m a i n  force in social r e l a t i o n s  is not the 
national question, but the class struggle, not the 
s u b j ect of e t hnography, but the social q u e s ­
tion .202
H owever, this e m p h a s i s  on u l t i m a t e  ends r ather than 
current tacti c a l  needs not only i gnored that the Second 
Co n g r e s s  p r o v i s i o n s  on this issue b e l o n g e d  to the RSDLP's 
minimum programme and were thus discussed in the context of 
a bourgeois democratic revolution, but further damaged the 
Bolsheviks' prospects of using the national aspirations of 
the indigenous nationalities to form a broad class alliance 
a gainst the autocracy. As the G e o r g i a n  B o l s h e v i k  A. Jap'- 
aridze w a r n e d  his colleagues, it was a m i s t a k e  to b e l i e v e  
that only the b o u r g e o i s i e  was c o n c e r n e d  with the n a t i o n a l  
question:
If the b o u r g e o i s i e  of the o p p r e s s e d  na t i o n  is 
i n t e r e s t e d  in d e f e n d i n g  its market, the p r o l e ­
tariat of the same nation is interested in defend­
ing its language, the tool by w h i c h  it b e c o m e s  
conscious of its class interests. Thus the entire
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an d  t a k e s  an a c t i v e  part... T h e r e f o r e  it is 
correct that we, i.e. s o c i a l - d e m o c r a c y , cannot 
afford to leave the national struggle unattended, 
b e c a u s e  the l a t t e r  is g e n u i n e l y  a n a t i o n a l  
struggle and not just a bourgeois struggle.
But where the Georgian Mensheviks were quick to recog­
nise the need for grea t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  to meet the g r o w i n g  
n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  of the p o p u l a t i o n  and for c l a s s  
alliances in a country whose proletariat remained very small 
and the peasantry dominated, the local Bolshevik leadership 
ignored Jap'aridze's a d v i c e  and r e m a ined, even in the face 
of reb u k e s  from Lenin, l u k e w a r m  on the right to n a t i o n a l  
self-determination and hostile to a u t o n o m y . T h u s ,  while 
the Mensheviks, despite government harassment, continued to 
strengthen their hold on public opinion contriving, despite 
the exceptionally limited franchise to send their deputies 
to each of the four a l l - R u s s i a n  d u m a s  and maintain, in the 
face of mass arrests and exile of party cadres, both an 
underground and a legal organisation through to the beginn­
ing of the war in 1914, the B o l s h e v i k s  found t h e m s e l v e s  
isola t e d  and unable to respond to local conditions. In 
Revolutsiis Matiane (The Chronicle of the Revolution), the 
journal of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist 
Party in the 1 920s, the old Bolshevik, Kaladze, s u m m e d  up 
the d e m o r a l i s a t i o n  of the B o l s h e v i k  party l e a d e r s h i p  in 
Georgia when he wrote:
From 1 905- 1 9 1 7, Koba (Stalin) moved to Baku, 
Filipp (Makharadze) became a cosmopolitan on the 
natio n a l  qu e s t i o n  and M i k h a  (Tskhakaia) could no 
longer bear the confines of Georgia and for 10-12 
years left G e o r g i a  c o m p l e t e l y  and s ettled in 
Europe.205
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concessions of 1905 were rolled back, the Caucasus began to 
suffer a period of reaction reminiscent of the worst years 
of the 1880s. The c o l o n i s a t i o n  r eferred to above was 
stepped up, whilst to voice criticism of tsarist educational 
policy or demand improved cultural and linguistic rights was 
to risk being labelled a separatist and subsequently arrest­
ed. In November 1907 the Chairman of the Council of M i n i s ­
ters, Stolypin, r e f l e c t e d  the new mood when, in an a ddress 
to the Third Duma, he c o n d e m n e d  the idea of n a t i o n a l  self- 
determination, demanded the defence of Russia "one and indi­
visible" and declared to the national minorities:
First trust in our point of view, g r a t e f u l l y  
accept the favour being g ranted you, r e c o g n i s e  
that to be a Russian c itizen is a s u p r e m e  tr e a s u r e  
...then we will give you every right.
It was, as the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k  paper, D s q a r o  (The 
Source) retorted,
...like the step-mother who says to her step-child 
wh i l s t  c o n s t a n t l y  s l a p p i n g  her face: first love
me, then I will help you.2^
But whereas in the 1880s the national movement had been 
limited in the main to the intelligentsia, by 1907 the situ­
ation was very different. Not only had the eff o r t s  of the 
t!ergdaleulni succeeded in engaging a greater proportion of 
the population in the struggle for national renaissance, but 
the events of 1905 had p o l i t i c i s e d  G e o r g i a n s  of all b a c k ­
grounds and given them an awareness of their corporate iden­
tity and abil i t y  to effect change in a way that no a m o u n t  of 
p r o p a g a n d a  work could have achieved. It is an i n d i c a t i o n  
too of the change that had a f f e c t e d  G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  that
place in the upper chamber of the Second Duma, was murdered
by a gang of u n i d e n t i f i e d  assassins, his death should have
t r i g g e r e d  an a l m o s t  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  o u t p o u r i n g  of c o m m u n a l
grief. Like his c o n t e m p o r a r y ,  Akaki Dseret'eli, he had
b e c o m e  one of the first m o d e r n  national h eroes of the
? n ftGeorgian people.
Against this b a c k g r o u n d  of of f i c i a l  c h a u v i n i s m  and 
offended national sentiment, many Georgian Mensheviks began 
to reassess their posit i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  question. Most 
importantly, Noe Zhordania wrote a pamphlet in 1908 entitled 
Kart’veli Khalkhi da natsionalizmi (The Georgian People and 
N a t i o n a l i s m )  in which he a b a n d o n e d  his o p p o s i t i o n  to the 
K'ut’aisi Group and decla r e d  his support for n a t i o n a l - c u l ­
tural autonomy. Maintaining that nationalism was very weak 
in Georgia, largely because the course of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  
development in the 19th century had prevented the emergence 
of a s trong i n d i g e n o u s  bourgeoisie, Zho r d a n i a  a r g u e d  that 
its place had been taken in Georgian society by a desire for 
na t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  adv a n c e m e n t .  The i m p o r t a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n  
was that while the Georgian people wanted national schools 
and th i r s t e d  for G e o r g i a n  l i t e r a t u r e  and culture as n e v e r  
before,
...it rejects natio n a l  polit i c s  today just as it 
did in the past. It set out on this path from the 
very beg i n n i n g  and even now has not deviated.
This is the historic path of the Georgian people, 
by w h i c h  it is d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from other c u l t u r a l  
nations. Therefore, when G e o r g i a n  s o c i a l - d e m o -  
cracy demands cultural autonomy for its nation and 
not pol i t i c a l  autonomy, it is r e f l e c t i n g  l i f e ’s 
course, reaches the h e a r t - f e l t  w i s h e s  of the 
people and u n e r r i n g l y  engra v e s  them in its p r o ­
gramme.2 ^
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support for n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  a u t o n o m y  in this passage, 
there was nothing more in this pamphlet either to explain or 
s u b s t a n t i a t e  his c o n v e r s i o n  and only in July 1912 in an 
article for the Menshevik paper Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life) 
did he make it a d e m a n d  of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  party p r o ­
gramme.21® Following this, however, the Vienna Conference 
of the All-Russian Menshevik Party organisation in September 
quickly succumbed to pressure from the Transcaucasians and
the Bund and accep t e d  n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  a u t o n o m y  w i t h i n  a
P 1 1united future democratic state as official party policy, 
a decision which received confirmation with its announcement 
by the Georgian Menshevik, A. Chkhenkeli, to the Fourth Duma
pip
on 10th December.
Zhordania's d e c i s i o n  to change course on the n a t i o n a l  
question was no doubt influenced by a number of factors, not 
least of which must have been the upsurge of national feel­
ing in the years i m m e d i a t e l y  after 1 905 and perh a p s  a fear 
too that if the Social-Democrats did not revise their posi­
tion to cater for the shift in mood, the nationalist parties 
might capture public support. But more import antly, Zhor­
dania had com e  to the conclusion, in the a f t e r m a t h  of the 
A r m e n o - A z e r i  viole n c e  of 1904 and 1905 and the s p o r a d i c  
clashes b e t w e e n  G e o r g i a n  and R ussian w o r k e r s  in T ’bilisi, 
that any attempt to settle the national question in m u l t i ­
ethnic areas on a t e r r i t o r i a l  basis alone was l ikely to 
exacerbate rather than solve the problem. He consequently 
cam e  to the c o n c l u s i o n  that the only way to r e s o l v e  the 
situation was to remove national-cultural affairs from the 
competence of the state:
all nations [he later wrote] but territorial auto­
n om y  open to question, b ecause the m i n g l i n g  of 
n ations w ould give rise to d o m e s t i c  riva l r y  and 
conflict.21^
Following the adoption of national cultural autonomy as 
official party policy and its subsequent fierce criticism by 
the Bolsheviks, Zhordania endeavoured to justify and explain 
the need for its inclusion in the party programme in a p a m ­
phlet entit l e d  N a t s i o n a l u r i  kitkhva chvenshi (The National 
Q u e s t i o n  in Our Country) w r i t t e n  in 1 9 1 3 ^ a n d a series of > 
articles for the Russian social-democratic journal, Bor1 ba.
In a c c o r d a n c e  with his o r t h o d o x  M a r x i s t  belief that the 
nations of the Russian e m p i r e  w o u l d  have to pass t h r o u g h  a 
relatively prolonged phase of bourgeois-democracy before a d ­
vancing to socialism, Zhordania saw the problem on the one 
hand from the perspective of the party organisation and the 
need for a united w o r k e r s ’ o r g a n i s a t i o n  to prov i d e  for the 
close c o o p e r a t i o n  of the p r o l e t a r i a t  of every n a t i o n a l i t y  
within the s t a t e , ^ ^  in preparation for the achievement of 
the ultimate goal and, on the other, from the more immediate 
p o l itical p e r s p e c t i v e  of c r e a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  w o u l d  
ensure the p eaceful c o e x i s t e n c e  of peoples l iving in the 
same state t e r r i t o r y  and a l l o w  for the free c u l t u r a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  of all of them. The p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  of 
the latter, moreover, lay not just in its immediacy, but in 
the ease with which nationalism, if allowed to emerge, di s ­
tracted w o r k e r s  from the class struggle. If the lat t e r  
could develop u n f e t t e r e d  by the n a t i o n a l  question, a r g u e d  
Z h o r d a n i a ,  its p r o s p e c t s  of r a p i d  f r u i t i o n  w o u l d  be 
considerably enhanced.
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the early 1890s, he reasserted that although the nation was 
a product of capitalism and divided by social conflict, its 
members were nevertheless united by their,
N a t i o n a l  l a n g u a g e ,  l i t e r a t u r e ,  art, s h a r e d  
memories, customs and morals, a shared psychologi­
cal outlook or cha r a c t e r  i n h e rited from their 
a n c e s t o r s  - in short, a whole s p i ritual c u l ­
ture .2 15
But n o w  he w e n t  a ste p  f u r t h e r  by c l a i m i n g  that 
a l t h o u g h  the close a s s o c i a t i o n  of peoples with p a r t i c u l a r  
territories had played an important part in the formation of 
national identity in the feudal period, this was now losing 
its former significance. The modern nation had become,
...a purely cultural manifestation ... conceivable 
only as a cultural community.
It was this, he argued, that enabled Armenians to live 
all over the world and yet retain their distinctive nation­
al-cultural identity. Conversely, with the intermingling of 
nationalities over time, territory had ceased to be coexten­
sive with any one ethnic group and b e c o m e  instead, one of 
the distinctive features of the state. Moreover, since the 
latter was the p o l i tical o r g a n i s a t i o n  of the r u l i n g  class 
or, more precisely, the ruling class of the dominant nation 
in the state, it was Zhordania's c o n t e n t i o n  that t e r r i t o r y  
had become a means by which the bourgeoisies of more p o w e r ­
ful n ations coul d foist their language, c ulture and goods 
upon the subjugated nationalities. It was, in other words, 
a major source of national oppression and nationalist anta­
gonism. Consequently, the resolution of the national que s ­
tion d e m a n d e d  its divorce from the t e r r i t o r i a l  principle,
0 17
theless the political organisation of the ruling classes. 1
The removal of the national question from the political 
arena, he concluded, w o u l d  defuse the n a t i o n a l i s m  of the 
w o r k i n g  class of both the o p p r e s s o r  and o p p r e s s e d  nati o n s  
and thus focus their a t t e n t i o n s  on the class struggle. 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the e x p a n s i o n  of the cultural rights of the 
minority nationalities and the expansion of teaching in the 
national languages would at last allow the mass of the popu­
lation to advance its own cultural level.
Whatever the weaknesses and impracticalities of Zhor- 
dania’s argument there can be little doubt that the Me n s h e ­
viks’ adoption of national-cultural autonomy and the influ­
ence of the Georgian Mensheviks, both in the Transcaucasus 
and the wider field of Russian Social-Democracy, at a time 
when n a t i o n a l i s t  f eeling was mounting, had a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
inf l u e n c e  on L e n i n ’s d e c i s i o n  to give grea t e r  s u b s t a n c e  to 
his own posit i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  question. Thus S t a l i n ’s 
pamphlet, 'Marxism and the national question’, as well as a 
series of p o l e m i c a l  articles by the A r m e n i a n  Bolshevik, 
Shaumian, and Makharadze in the Caucasian social-democratic 
press have to be seen against this background and the g r o w ­
ing awareness of both factions of the revolutionary poten­
tial of the national movement.
For all the v e h e m e n c e  of the polemics, h o w e v e r ,  the 
outbr e a k  of war t e m p o r a r i l y  swept the natio n a l  q u e s t i o n  
aside. A t t e n t i o n  now centred on the b e h a v i o u r  of the 
Socialist International, on the conduct of the w a r  and the 
correct a t t i t u d e  to be a dopted t o w a r d s  it. Three years 
later, however, with the collapse of the tsarist autocracy, 
the national question moved back into focus, only this time
as an urgent practical problem that threatened the unity of 
the Russian state.
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Chapter Six 
The Drift to Independence
6.1 The E f f e c t s  of W ar
Taken una w a r e s ,  like most people, by the o u t b r e a k  of 
war, Zhordania had been convalescing from a lung infection 
in S w i t z e r l a n d  whe n  the first new s  arri v e d  of G e r m a n y ’s 
advance through Belgium and Russia's involvement in the war 
on the side of B r i t a i n  and France. He a ppears not to have 
been taken aback, however, by the failure of mo st of the 
socialist parties of the belligerent powers to abide by the 
1907 resolution of the Socialist International which called 
on its members to do all in their power to prevent the out­
break of war, but, if unable to do so, to e xploit the 
ensuing crisis to "rouse the peoples and thereby hasten the 
a b o l i t i o n  of c a p i t a l i s t  class rule". In fact, Zhordania's 
first concern, as a s e l f - c o n f e s s e d  Francophile, was that 
France should be saved from Austro-German imperialism.
In R u s s i a ,  h o w e v e r  the a t t i t u d e  of m o s t  S o c i a l -  
D e m o c r a t s  p roved ra t h e r  different. The party f r a c t i o n  in 
the Duma, r e f u s i n g  to be caught in the tide of c h a u v i n i s m  
that had swept the European socialist parties, voted against 
credits for the war, w h i l s t  in G e o r g i a  the p r e v a i l i n g  
op i n i o n  a m o n g  both M e n s h e v i k s  and B o l s h e v i k s  was that 
Germany was more advanced in every respect than France and 
that a G e r m a n  vic t o r y  w ould be a v ictory for progress. 
Moreover, recalling the impact of Russia's war against Japan 
a d ecade earlier, many argued that a R ussian defeat n o w  
could lead to revolution and the overthrow of the monarchy.
Such was the mood in Georgia, in fact, that Zhordania, 
f o r  so l o n g  u s e d  to l e a d i n g  o p i n i o n  w i t h i n  t h e
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T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  organ i s a t i o n ,  found himself unaccustomedly 
isolated. Uratadze, who was one of the fe w  to share his 
v iews on the war, recal l e d  that he ca me close to being 
ostracised in the party press when he attempted, in a series 
of a r t i c l e s  en t i t l e d  Q m i da zavi (War and the peace), to 
justify the "defensist" position in the party’s legal jour­
nal T ’anamedrove Azri (Contemporary Thought). The editorial 
board, fin d i n g  itself c o n s t r a i n e d  by the g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
c e n s o r s h i p  from m a k i n g  the full case for the o p p o s i n g  
"defeatist” point of view, decided to halt polemics over the 
issue by ceasing to publish the series.
Zh o r d a n i a  and other "defensists" c o m p l a i n e d  to the 
party Regional Committee, but the latter upheld the decision 
and r e s t a t e d  its own o p p o s i t i o n  to the war. F r u s t r a t e d  by 
the ru les of party discipline, Z h o r d a n i a  and other ’’d e f e n ­
sists" requested permission to publish their views in their 
o w n  p a p e r ,  the K ' u t ’a i s i - b a s e d  v a__l i_ (The N e w
Furrow). Desp i t e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  op position, c onsent was 
finally given, but only after Silbistro Jibladze, one of the 
foun d e r  m e m b e r s  of M e s a m e D a s i , had a p p e a l e d  on th eir b e ­
half, arguing that such a senior figure in the party should 
not be denied the opportunity to express his views and that 
if permission was denied and the "defensists" nevertheless 
went ahead and published, it would create the impression of 
a split within the party. Even still, very few editions of
Akhali Kvali were prin ted before the Regio n a l  C o m m i t t e e
1
decided to prevent its further publication.
Despite this, and the apparent prevalence of pro-German 
sentiment among Georgian Social-Democrats, Zhordania was by 
no means without support in the party. Traditional fears of
Turkey had been r e a w a k e n e d  by t h e - O t t o m a n  t r o o p s ’ i n i t i a l
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successes on the Caucasian Front, with the consequence that 
many Georgians, and particularly those living in the south­
w e s t e r n  p r o v i n c e s  ad j a c e n t  to Turkey, had begun to g r o w  
c o n c e r n e d  that Rus s i a n  defeat w o u l d  lead to Turkish i n v a ­
sion. This fear, and Zhordania's a b i l i t y  to exploit it, 
became evident at a conference of Caucasian Mensheviks held 
in Akhali Senaki in October 1915. The meeting was attended 
by 15 d e l e g a t e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  1000 party m e m b e r s  but, of 
these, 500 were from Zhordania’s home province of Guria, one 
of the most vulnerable to Turkish attack. Not suprisingly, 
theref ore, the c o n f e r e n c e  s u p p o r t e d  Zhordania's d e f e n s i s t  
position, even a d v o c a t i n g  i n v o l v e m e n t  in the m i l i t a r y -  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o m m i t t e e s ,  a l t h o u g h  it dre w  the line at Z h o r ­
dania's proposal that the Social-Democrats should vote for 
war credits in the Duma.^
That the c o n f e r e n c e  may not have been e n t i r e l y  r e p r e ­
sentative, however, is suggested by a letter from Shaumian 
to Lenin and K r u p s k a y a  sent at the b e g i n n i n g  of O c t o b e r  
1915, the same month as the meeting in Akhali Senaki, which 
claimed that Zhordania was virtually alone in supporting the 
allied cause. Whatever the case, Zhordania himself made no
V.
m e n t i o n  of the c o n f e r e n c e  in his m e m o i r s ,  r e m a r k i n g  only 
that following the closure of Akhali K v a l i , he resolved to 
keep his v i e w s  to h i m s e l f  on the issue rather than cause 
divisions within the party.
This caution on Zhordania's part typified the attitude 
of the Caucasian Mensheviks throughout the war. With party 
m e m b e r s h i p  badly d e p l e t e d  by the cal l - u p  of over 200,000 
Gerogian workers and peasants, they were concerned to avoid
do ing a n y t h i n g  that the g o v e r n m e n t  could c o n s t r u e  as
t r e a s o n a b l e  and g r o u n d s  for the r e p r e s s i o n  of the party 
organisation. Even those who regarded German victory as the 
best p o s s i b l e  o u t c o m e  of the war a p p e a r  to have r e f r a i n e d  
from propagandising their views - though this may well have 
been b ecause these wer e  u n p o p u l a r  w i t h  the ma ss of the 
population. The party's main concern was to survive the war 
intact and be able to exploit whatever conditions developed 
fro m  the peace. In this respect, and as a m e a s u r e  of its 
p a s s i v i t y  du r i n g  the war, it is n o t e w o r t h y  that the C a u c a ­
sian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a l l o w e d  it to co n t i n u e  its a c t i v i t i e s  
virtually unhindered.^
In the meantime, however, economic conditions through­
out Transcaucasia deteriorated as first the closure of the 
D a r d a n e l l e s  cut a c c e s s  to w o r l d  m a r k e t s  a n d  t h e n  
m o b i l i s a t i o n  d e p r i v e d  a g r i c u l t u r e  of the labour force to 
wor k  the land. To mak e  m a t t e r s  worse, Georgia's g r ain 
supply fro m  the North Caucasus, by then one of its mai n  
sources, was diverted to meet the needs of European Russia. 
The mining industry too and in particular manganese mining, 
cut off fro m  w o r l d  markets, slumped, w h i l s t  i n d u s t r i a l  
production, starved of raw materials, spare parts, fuel and 
experienced workers ground almost to a standstill.
Against this background inflation, as elsewhere in the
Russ i a n  empire, rose rajpidly. Workers' w a g e s  in T'bilisi
f
had by 1916 risen only m a r g i n a l l y  above their 1913 level, 
but the cost of staple products had risen on average by over 
400 per cent. In addition, the cost of h o u s i n g  had s oared 
as the city strove to cope w i t h  the m a s s i v e  in f l u x  of sol- 
diers and Armenian refugees.
As the p r o b l e m s  of poverty, hunger and h o m e l e s s n e s s  
grew worse, so social tension throughout the Transcaucasus
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mounted. Zdanevskii, the T ’bilisi chief of police, reported 
in D e c e m b e r  1915 that s h o r t a g e s  and s p e c u l a t i o n  were 
b r i n g i n g  the poor to the verge of despair, and in 1916 the 
f r u s t r a t i o n  b u i l d i n g  up in the region gave way to viole n c e  
as food riots spread through the main Transcaucasian cities, 
b e g i n n i n g  in F e b r u a r y  in Baku. In July there we re mor e 
riots in T ’bilisi and violent attacks, often by wom e n ,  on 
merchant properties in the city’s bazaars. In the country­
side, and particularly those areas directly affected by the 
war, the s i t u a t i o n  was, if anything, worse. T ’a n e m edrove 
Azri described a picture of destitution in its correspond­
ence from the area in 1916:
It p r e s e n t s  a t e r r i b l e  picture: [The A t c h a r a n
pea sants] are emac i a t e d ,  filthy, long-haired, 
u n k e m p t  and naked. To see them is more d r e a d f u l  
than seeing corpses spread out on the field of 
battle. For me it was unimaginable... I saw 
people who were c o m p l e t e l y  naked who had not yet 
lost their sense of s hame and who had w r a p p e d  
t h e m s e l v e s  in rags, but none of them had a trace 
of clothing.^
The Georgian Menshevik leadership, however, and Zhor­
dania in particular, continued to stress the importance of 
maintaining a low profile and avoiding precipitate action. 
In his memoirs, the latter cited A t c h a r a a s  a case in point. 
The tsarist authorities, interpreting signs of unrest among 
the p o p u l a t i o n  as e v i d e n c e  of s y m p a t h y  for the Turks, had 
razed seve r a l  villages, ther e b y  e x a c e r b a t i n g  the a l r e a d y  
miserable existence of the local inhabitants. ’’From this”, 
Z h o r d a n i a  said, r e f e r r i n g  to the incident, "I l e arnt the
lesson that no step should be taken w h i c h  the g o v e r n m e n t
ftmight interpret as duplicitous."
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The sam e  cau t i o n  g o v e r n e d  the C a u c a s i a n  M e n s h e v i k s 1 
a p p r o a c h  to the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  d u r i n g  the war, an 
approach well illustrated by Noe Zhordania's categoric r e ­
jection of the Natio n a l  D e m o c r a t  M i k h a k o  Dseret'eli's r e ­
quest that the Social-Democrats help prepare the ground for 
an uprising in Georgia timed to coincide with an invasion by 
the Germans and Turks. The Menshevik leader wanted nothing 
to do with it:
We are not c o n d u c t i n g  war, nor do we belong to any 
coalit ion; we cannot sho w  d u p l i c i t y  t o w a r d s  
Russia - quite the o p p o s i t e  in fact. To the 
people's question: Should we accept mobilisation
or should we go into hiding? we advise acceptance 
and oppose any for m  of sabotage. In our c o u n t r y  
the Germanophile point of view predominates, but 
no one suppo r t s  rebel lion; our path leads not 
that way, but along the way of internal revolution 
within Russia.
However, w h i l e  the M e n s h e v i k s  m a r k e d  tim e  over the 
n a t i o n a l  question, the SFs and, in particular, their o f f ­
shoot, the National Democrats, saw the war as an opportunity 
for further propagating their views on what they regarded as 
the central issue in Georgian political life. Thus, the SF 
paper Megobari (The Friend) described the war as a "national 
war" and for that very reason "impregnated with great ideals 
and a i m s " , 1® w h i l e  a nother p r o m i n e n t  m e m b e r  of the party, 
T'. Ghlonti, d e c l a r e d  that the war was not about s tates 
extending their influence, but about nations defending their 
rights and existence. It had, he ma i n t a i n e d ,  s t r e n g t h e n e d  
national self-consciousness throughout Europe and even bol­
stered the national inclination in social-democracy. "The 
n a t i o n a l  direction", he wrote, "is n o w  d e v e l o p i n g  to an 
e x t r e m e  a m o n g  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s " .  P o i n t i n g  to Plekhanov's 
support for the war, he c l a i m e d  that the father of R u s s i a n
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M a r x i s m  had,
...turned his back on M a r x i s t  s o c i a l i s m  and a c k ­
nowledged the national question. First comes the 
defe n c e  of n a t i o n a l i t y  and then socialism. The 
anti-nationality Plekhanov is dead, but the bearer
of the n a t i o n a  1 - s o c i a  1 f l a g  P l e k h a n o v  has 
1 1a r i s e n .
Yet for all their n e w  found o p t i m i s m  on the n a t i o n a l  
question, most SFs continued to think in terms of autonomy, 
which they linked to the political changes they expected to 
develop in p o s t - w a r  Russia. The N a t i o n a l - D e m o c r a t s , h o w ­
ever, took a mor e  a g g r e s s i v e  a p p r o a c h  du r i n g  the war, b e ­
lieving that it presented Georgia with a chance to liberate 
itself from Russia and reestablish an independent Georgian 
state. As they had a l r e a d y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  in 1912 w i t h  the 
formation of the Georgian Separatist Committee (otherwise 
known as the Dadiani Committee) in Constantinople, and the 
p u b l i c a t i o n  in G e n e v a  the f o l l o w i n g  year of a n e w  journal, 
T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia), they no longer 
regarded autonomy as enough. In its first number the jour­
nal proclaimed,
Patri o t s  of Georgia! Crude force t h r e a t e n s  the 
annihilation, destruction and spiritual degenera­
tion of the G e o r g i a n  nation. Our na t i v e  land is 
in great peril. Our country demands sacrfices of 
you. Ga t h e r  round our n ative cou n t r y  and fight 
for the defe n c e  of its land... F r e e d o m  can on ly 
be a c h i e v e d  thro u g h  s t r u g g l e  and only p o l i t i c a l  
freedom can ensure Georgia’s existence. So fight 
for the p o l i t i c a l  f r e e d o m  of our h o m e l a n d . . .  
Let's gather our forces and w h o e v e r  t h i r s t s  for 
the h a p p i n e s s  of the G e o r g i a n  nation, unite. 
Let's raise the flag of Georgia's f r e e d o m , the 
flag of gr eat heroes... v i c t o r y  to the f i g h t e r s  
for our native land, victory to free Georgia!
A c c o r d i n g  to a n o t h e r  a r t i c l e  p u b l i s h e d  in the same 
journal in 1 91 A entitled, "Why do the G e o r g i a n  p e o p l e  need
their own state?" the latter represented a natural point in
the nation's evolution without which no nation could hope to
survive. No "historic nation", it said, had failed to
create its own state, or h a v i n g  lost its i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  not
1 Ss t r u g g l e d  to r egain it. For this n e w  strain of m i l i t a n t  
G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l i s m  the war a p p e a r e d  to pres ent an ideal 
o p p o r t u n i t y  for Geo r g i a  to r e a s s e r t  its n a t i o n a l  i d e n t i t y  
and reclaim its lost statehood by forcibly liberating itself 
from Russian domination. Mikhako Dseret'eli and G. Macha- 
beli, both o u t s p o k e n  p r o p o n e n t s  of separation, a p p r o a c h e d  
the G e r m a n  g o v e r n m e n t  and r aised the issue of supp o r t  for 
Georgian independence. The Germans, seeing an opportunity 
to u n d e r m i n e  the R u s s i a n  p o s i t i o n  on the C a u c a s i a n  Front, 
but no doubt dubious of the National Democrats' claim to be 
able to mobilise 50,000 people against the Russians when and 
if the need should arise, agreed to ma ke a v a i l a b l e  w e a p o n s  
stored in T r e b i z o n d  on the T u r k i s h  Black Sea coast on the 
condition that should Germany and Turkey invade the nation­
alists would stage an uprising in the Russian rear.
In the meantime the Germans helped them spread leaflets 
a m o n g  G e o r g i a n  p r i s o n e r s  of wa r  c l a i m i n g  that G e o r g i a  had 
signed a treaty with Germany and Turkey and that the latter 
states would recognise Georgian independence. Such e n dea­
vours, however, e njoyed little c r e d i b i l i t y  and, like the 
policy of s e p a r a t i n g  G e o r g i a n  p r i s o n e r s  fro m  the R u s s i a n s  
and a t t e m p t s  to recruit them for u n d e r g r o u n d  w o r k  w i t h i n  
Georgia and the Russian army, produced few results.
In October 1914 Machabeli returned to Georgia with the 
aim of preparing an anti-tsarist uprising. Joined later by 
M. D s e r e t ' e l i ,  the t w o  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t s  set a b o u t
persuading the other political parties and leading Georgian
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public figures to participate in the formation of a Georgian 
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e  w h o s e  task w ould be to prep a r e  for an 
uprising in the event of a Russian collapse in the Caucasus. 
However, a l t h o u g h  they had som e  success a m o n g  the SFs, 
particularly during the initial stages of the war when the 
Turks were still on the offensive, most lost interest when 
the Russian army regained the initiative. The Social-Demo­
crats, as is clear from Zhordania’s reaction (see above) to 
D s e r e t ’e l i ’s a p p r o a c h  on the matt er, w e r e  quick to d i s s o c ­
iate themselves from the project. As in the pre-war period, 
the p r o b l e m  fa c i n g  the SFs, and to an even g r e a t e r  extent 
the National Democrats, was their inability to establish any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  s upport a m o n g  the peasantry. Their v i e w s  ma y  
have won the m  gro u n d  a m o n g  G e o r g i a n  students, but to the 
peasantry and working class they seemed at best irrelevant 
and at worst threatening. In this respect, it would appear 
that Zhordania’s assessment of the popular mood was closest 
to the truth - with the Turks still active on the Caucasian 
Front and r u m o u r s  rife of a p o s s i b l e  Russ i a n  w i t h d r a w a l ,  
t h o u g h t s  stra y e d  not to i n d e p e n d e n c e  or even to a u t o n o m y ,  
but more to s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  and su r v i v a l  t h r o u g h  the 
m a t e r i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  posed by the war. Even the police, 
who were well-informed on the National-Democrats’ activities 
both in G e o r g i a  and abroad, wer e  d i s m i s s i v e  of their c h a l ­
lenge, confident in the belief that though the intelligent­
sia, and in p a r t i c u l a r  its y o u n g e r  m e m b e r s ,  m i g h t  s u p p o r t  
them, the p e a s a n t r y  r e m a i n e d  l a r g e l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  both to 
their and the SFs' propaganda.
A m o n g  the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  and n o t a b l y  a m o n g  the 
Mensheviks, in v i e w  of the i m p o r t a n c e  they a t t a c h e d  to it
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prior to 1914, the national question was scarcely discussed 
d uring the first two ye ars of the war. In O c t o b e r  1915, 
howev e r ,  the Bolsheviks, w h o s e  i n f l u e n c e  in G e o r g i a  was 
still very limited, held a conference of Caucasian organisa­
tions in Baku, at w h i c h  they b l a m e d  the r e v e r s a l  of their 
fortunes in the previous 10 years on the failure of the 1905 
revolution, the ensuing reaction and what they regarded as 
the consequent drift towards bourgeois-nationalist concepts 
like n a t i o n a 1 - c u 1 1ura 1 autonomy. B e l i e v i n g  that a proper 
understanding of the Leninist position on the national ques­
tion wa s all that was needed to co n v i n c e  the p o p u l a t i o n  of 
its merits, the c o n f e r e n c e  r e a f f i r m e d  the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
Bolsheviks’ opposition to federalism and restated the case 
for the right to national self-determination, without coming 
any ne a r e r  to* e x p l a i n i n g  how this might to a p p l i e d  in 
practice.
One of the few i n d i c a t i o n s  of p r e v a i l i n g  M e n s h e v i k  
o p i n i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  c a m e  in a r e p o s t e  to an 
a r t i c l e  by the SF w r i t e r  Archil Ja janashvi l i , w h o  had p r e ­
sented the d o c u m e n t  of the Baku C o n f e r e n c e  on the n a t i o n a l  
question as representative of all social-democratic opinion 
in the Caucasus. An e d i t o r i a l  in T ’a n a m edrove Azri r e ­
a f f i r m e d  the M e n s h e v i k s ’ p r e - w a r  supp ort for n a t i o n a l  
cultural autonomy and reminded Jajanashvili that the Lenin­
ists in the C aucasus r e p r e s e n t e d  an e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s m a l l  
m i n o r i t y . 1 ^  In fact, Zho r d a n i a  later a s s e r t e d  that a 
variety of views had existed among the Transcaucasian M e n ­
sheviks on the national question at this time and that,
...in this period we did not yet have a party view
or a g e n e r a l  policy on the q u e s t i o n  of i n d e p e n d ­
ence; everyone had their own ideas...15
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He, or so he a s s e r t e d  in his me m o i r s ,  b e l i e v e d  that 
should the o p p o r t u n i t y  arise to decl a r e  i n d e p e ndence, the 
s t e p  s h o u l d  be taken. It is, h o w e v e r ,  d i f f i c u l t  to 
r e c o n c i l e  this s t a t e m e n t  of his v i e w s  wit h  his s u b s e q u e n t  
c o m m e n t s  both in 1917 and even early 1918. W h i l e  it is 
quite conceivable that a shift did occur in the attitudes of 
the Mensheviks during the war, there is very little evidence 
on which to base an a s s e s s m e n t .  They may, of course, have 
been affected by the same mood of chauvinism that swept the 
E u r o p e a n  s o c i a l i s t  parties and it ma y  be the case that the 
p rosp e c t  of a R u s s i a n  defeat ma y  have e m b o l d e n e d  p r e v i o u s  
closet nationalists among them to abandon their inhibitions 
and d e c l a r e  t h e m s e l v e s  in f avour of either a s e p a r a t e  or a 
federal state. But the view expressed by Armenian and Osian 
emigres in Europe after the invasion of Georgia in 1921, at 
least, was that up until the February Revolution, the G e o r ­
gian M e n s h e v i k s  had a l w a y s  i m p r e s s e d  on them that they 
sought not the c r e a t i o n  of a G e o r g i a n  repub l i c  w i t h i n  the 
bounds of its old state borders, but rath er a s y s t e m  of 
national socialist cantons based on ethnicity in which each 
canton would have control over its own a f f a i r s . ^
A c c o r d i n g  to Zhordania, h o w e v e r ,  the c o n f u s i o n  on the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  by the end of 1916 was such that it was 
decided to call a conference of the Georgian organisations 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  to d r a w  up an o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  on the issue. 
The conference, w h i c h  met in the West G e o r g i a n  v i l l a g e  of 
Junjuat'i in J a n u a r y  1917, a greed that G e o r g i a  s h o u l d  be 
prepared to declare its independence, but only in the event 
of Russia abandoning the Caucasus while the war still co n ­
tinued. Moreover, on Zhordania's advice, it was decided not
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to make the decision known to party members. To do so, the 
l a t t e r  said, w o u l d  be to lay th e p a r t y  o p e n  to the 
accusation of treachery from the Russian government and risk 
r e p r e s s i o n . 1^ Thus w h i l e  the m e e t i n g  does suggest a move 
towards a territorial approach to the national question, the 
final d e c i s i o n  was so c a u t i o u s  and he d g e d  by c o n d i t i o n s  as 
to render it v i r t u a l l y  meaning l e s s .  Shortly a f t e r w a r d s ,  
moreover, n e w s  fro m  P e t r ograd of the o v e r t h r o w  of the 
m o n a r c h y  t h r e w  w h a t e v e r  c o n s e n s u s  had been r e a c h e d  into 
renewed confusion.
6.2 The February Revolution in Georgia
The first new s  of the r e v o l u t i o n  was r e c e i v e d  in 
T'bil'isi in the form of a cryptic telegram sent from Petro­
grad by the Na t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t  and future author of the 
G e o r g i a n  D e c l a r a t i o n  of Independence, G o g i t a  Paghava. In 
the absence, however, of corroborating evidence, or an offi­
cial statement from the local representatives of government, 
the major parties cautioned against precipitate action and 
awaited further developments. In the meantime rumour spread 
across T’b i l i s i •that a certain M t ’avrobadze (from the word, 
m ’tavroba, meaning government) had passed away.1®
On 3rd March, by w h i c h  t i m e  it was clear that the 
g o v e r n m e n t  had indeed collapsed, the Bolsheviks, led by 
P'ilipe Makharadze, decided to steal a march on their rivals 
by c a l l i n g  a m e e t i n g  of w o r k e r s  in M i k h a i l o v  Street, the 
p urpose of w h ich was to d e c l a r e  itself the T ’b ilisi Soviet 
of Workers’ Deputies. Zhordania, who learnt of the meeting 
purely by chance, m a n a g e d  to c o n v i n c e  those p r e s e n t  of the 
unrepresentative nature of the gathering and prevent Makhar- 
adze’s attempt to have himself elected chairman. Persuaded
420
VJ J  t—t X 1 >-/ X U  U  11 X  U  KJ X O  A .1 C/ V / X X U . U  1/ 11 V-* W  X u  i. V  i ij
ties should be elected by all w o r k e r s  and not by an ad hoc 
and selectively advertised meeting, those present elected an 
electoral commission to organise elections for the Soviet in 
the party organisations, workshops and enterprises.
That same day the Viceroy, Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich, 
bowing to the inevitable and in recognition of the authority 
of the M e n s h e v i k s  in T r a n s caucasia, a r r a n g e d  a m e e t i n g  
through the city mayor, A. Khatisian (Khatisov), with Zhor­
dania and Noe Ramishvili, at which he declared his intention 
to leave for P e t r o g r a d  and ceded cont r o l  of p o w e r  to the 
S o c i a l -D e m o c r a t i c  Party, w h i c h  he called upon to m a i n t a i n  
order and prevent e x c e s s e s .
On 4th March, w i t h  the r e v o l u t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  m o m e n t u m  
and the need to fill the v a c u u m  of p o w e r  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
urgent, the Georgian Mensheviks demonstrated both their own 
re a d i n e s s  to s a c r i f i c e  p r i n c i p l e  wh en it suited t h e m  and 
their a b i l i t y  to keep a step ahead of the B o l s h e v i k s  by 
calling a meeting of workers at Narodnyi Dom on Golovinskii 
Prospect at w h i c h  they d e m a n d e d  the r e m o v a l  of the old 
regime, the d i s a r m i n g  of the police, the c r e a t i o n  of a 
n a t i o n a l  m i l i t i a  and, mo re i m p o r t a n t l y  in v i e w  of Z h o r ­
dania's speech to the Mikhailov Street meeting the previous 
evening, agreed that the meeting should declare itself the 
T'bilisi Soviet of Workers' D e p u t i e s  until such t i m e  as 
elections could be arranged. Zhordania was elected chair­
man .
A nxious not to mo.ve ahead of events in P e t r o g r a d  and 
equa l l y  co n c e r n e d  to prevent the e r u p t i o n  of the sort of 
internecine conflict that had marked the 1905 revolution in
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i ' uiiioi, uxic a c w i y - u u u s n u u u e u  soviet, witn tne co-opera- 
tion of the city duma, set up a t e m p o r a r y  City E x e c u t i v e  
Committee whose purpose it was to replace the old a d m i n i s ­
t ra t i o n  and r e p r e s e n t  the c i t y ’s m a j o r  social and ethnic 
2 ngroups. Comprising 59 members, among them the representa­
tives of every political party and major nationality in the 
city, the new organisation perfectly reflected the Georgian 
M e n s h e v i k  v i e w  that in a b o u r g e o i s  r e v o l u t i o n  it w o u l d  be 
impossible for the proletariat to take the lead on its own. 
This same understanding of the revolutionary process appears 
e q u a l l y  evident in the e l e c t i o n  on 8th M a r c h  of the b ureau 
of the City Executive Committee. Only three of the nine-man 
body wer e  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  a l t h o u g h  i n t e r e s t i n g l y  and no
doubt indicative of the confusion in the Caucasian Bolshevik
? 1organisation, one of these was Makharadze. 1 Similarly, the 
three c o m m i s s a r s  a p p o i n t e d  by the bureau, Zhordania, A. 
K h a t i s i a n  and D. Popov, a R u s s i a n  Social R e v o l u t i o n a r y  
officer, represented not just the three main nationalities, 
but also the m a j o r  s ocial forces in T ’bilisi - the w o r k i n g  
class, the bourgeoisie, and the predominantly peasant army. 
The T ’bilisi Soviet thus avoided, at least s u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  
the paradox of the organ of the proletariat leading a bou r ­
geois revolution. As Zhordania said,
Such a p r o p o s i t i o n  was for us u n a c c e p t a b l e .  We 
w e r e  p r e p a r e d  to take on the p r o t e c t i o n  of law and 
order, but remained faithful to and ready to help 
the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t .  We did not want to 
create the i m p r e s s i o n  of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of 
workers’ power, as this would have frightened all 
l i b e r a l  e l e m e n t s  and cas t  t h e m  o v e r  to the 
R i g h t .22
On the same day, the new body d e c l a r e d  it s e l f  the 
supreme local power and called on the Provisional Government
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to r e c o g n i s e  its authority. The latter, however, w h i c h  
throughout 1917 viewed all attempts by the minority nation­
alit i e s  to secure mor e  a u t o n o m y  wit h  great suspicion, had 
other ideas. On 9th March, "with the ai m  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  
order in the Transcaucasian Region", the Provisional Govern­
ment o rdered the f o r m a t i o n  of a S pecial T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
Committee (Ozakom) to act as its representative in the area.
It w a s  e v i d e n t l y  i n t e n d e d  to p l a c a t e  the l o c a l  
n a t i o n a l i t i e s  by e n s u r i n g  that the f i v e - m a n  body, m a d e  up 
with one exception of members of the Fourth Duma, contain at 
least one Armenian, Azeri and Georgian. However, the inclu­
sion of the Soc i a l i s t  Federalist, Kita Abashidze, and the 
abse n c e  of a S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  was not to the l iking of the
T'bilisi Soviet: Zhordania pronounced Ozakom unrepresenta-
2 3tive of "Caucasian democracy" and demanded its abolition. 
Despite this protest, the seriousness of the soviet's objec­
tion must be open to doubt. It did, after all, relieve them 
of the responsibility of governing; was, with the notable 
e x c e p t i o n  of the a b s e n c e  of a Social- D e m o c r a t ,  b r o a d l y  
representative of the political, social and ethnic groupings 
of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , and, as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the 
Provisional Government, provided a direct link with Petro­
grad. W h a t e v e r  the case, the sovi et was p l a c a t e d  by the 
a d d i t i o n  of A. Ch khenkeli, a G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k ,  who, as a 
member of the Petrograd Soviet, also acted as the represen­
tative of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w i t h i n  O zakom, 
w h i c h  says Urat'adze, g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  the h a r m o n i o u s  
work of these organisations within Ozakom itself.
V i e w e d  by the centre as a t e m p o r a r y  organ of local 
g o v e r n m e n t  with p o w e r s  s o m e t h i n g  akin to that of the
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viceroy, Ozakom's authority remained severely circumscribed 
throughout 1917 by a government insensitive to the aspira­
tions of the minority nationalities and intent on preventing 
anything which it construed as leading to the disintegration 
of the empire. C o n s t a n t l y  f r u s t r a t e d  by the i l l - d e f i n e d  
n ature of its r e l a t i o n s h i p  wit h  the centre, O z a k o m  found 
itself forced on every major issue to consult with a govern­
ment that was not only e n t i r e l y  out of touch wit h  the events 
at the p e r i p h e r y  but which, in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of the 
time, was unab le to m a i n t a i n  a stable and rapid s y s t e m  of 
communicat ion s .
Fro m  the outset too it d e c l a r e d  that w h i l s t  it w o u l d  
e s t a b l i s h  f r e e d o m  of conscience, r e f o r m  the j u d i c i a r y  and 
city administration and introduce the zemstvo system to the 
T r a n s c a u c a s u s , the cruc i a l  issues of labour, land and 
na t i o n a l  righ ts w o u l d  r e m a i n  o u t w i t h  its remit, to be 
resolved in due time by the Constituent Assembly.
Even the w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d  d e c i s i o n  to e n sure ethnic 
bala n c e  in its m e m b e r s h i p  re s u l t e d  in the end in f u r t h e r  
c o n f u s i o n  and i n d e c i s i o n  w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  and n a t i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  h i n d e r i n g  all a t t e m p t s  to e s t a b l i s h  unity of 
purpose.
The p o w e r 1 essness of O z a k o m  to effect s i g n i f i c a n t  
change or, through its own authority, to establish any sort 
of control within Transcaucasia was inevitably accentuated 
by the almost anarchic atmosphere in which it found itself 
asked to govern. The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  of the c o e r c i v e  and 
administrative apparatus of the former regime and the reluc­
tance of the Georgian Social-Democrats to take direct co n ­
trol of government, had created a vacuum of power which very 
quickly began to giv e - way to violence and disorder.
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D e n i e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s  and l a c k i n g  e i t h e r  an 
e s t a b l i s h e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  basis or popular roots, O z a k o m  
found itself, in Z h o r d a n i a ’s words, "suspended in air". 
With the newly-appointed government body thus powerless to 
alleviate the situation and the army for the moment content 
to stand on the s i d e l i n e s  and watch, p r e s s u r e  built up for 
the E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  of the T'bilisi Soviet of W o r k e r s ’ 
D e p u t i e s  to a s s u m e  c o n t r o l . 2 ^ This, as had a l r e a d y  b e c o m e  
clear with the establishment of the T ’bilisi City Executive 
C o m m i t t e e ,  it was not yet p r e p a r e d  to do. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
such was the disorder, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in T ’bilisi, that the 
W o r k e r s ’ Soviet, as the only body wit h  popu l a r  sup p o r t  and 
the ability to exert control, quickly became established as 
the de facto centre of power.
O z a k o m  r e m a i n e d  in p o s i t i o n  as the s y m b o l  of c e n t r a l  
authority, but as a body, it was a w a r e  of its l i m i t a t i o n s .  
Thus, w h i l e  it c o n t i n u e d  to issue dec r e e s  t h r o u g h o u t  its 
period in office, it was wholly dependent on the soviets for 
their execution. This, of c o u r s e , also e n a b l e d  the la t t e r  
to exert a powerful influence on the administration without 
actually assuming direct control. Given the domination of 
the workers’ soviets by the Georgian Social-Democrats (the 
Mensheviks made up 80-85 per cent of m e m b e r s h i p )^6 this, as 
Z h o r d a n i a  poin t e d  out, meant that a l m o s t  all f u n d a m e n t a l  
political and organisational questions were first settled at 
meetings of the party bureau.
The w o r k  of the soviet and party went ahead as 
one, and the r e s o l u t i o n s  of their o rgans were 
implemented by agreement. The great majority of 
the soviet was Social-Democratic and it is hardly 
s u r p r i s i n g  that the wor k  of all its forces was c o ­
ordinated. In a word, the ideological and tacti­
cal leader of the e n tire m o v e m e n t  was our party,
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wh i l e  the role or e x e c u t i v e  was p e r f o r m e d  oy
various types of soviet. '
The Georgian Menshe viks’ domination of the soviets had 
further implications, insofar as it underlined the unfortun­
ate c o i n c i d e n c e  of class and n a t i o n a l i t y  in Georgia. Thus 
the desire frequently expressed by the Social-Democrats in 
1917 not to a l i e n a t e  the b o u r g e o i s i e  was r e n d e r e d  mor e  
d i f f i c u l t  by their close i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  with the G e o r g i a n  
p e a s a n t r y  and w o r k i n g  class on the one hand and A r m e n i a n  
d o m i n a t i o n  of c o m m e r c i a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  life in T r a n s c a u ­
casia on the other. Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
T'bilisi in 1917, w here the d r a m a t i c  s w i n g  in the social 
b a l a n c e  of forces in M a r c h  had led to a s udden shift in 
power away from the Russian bureaucracy and Armenian bour­
g e o i s i e  and back, after an inter v a l  of over 100 years, to 
the Georgians. The Social-Democrats1 prospects of convinc­
ing the bourgeoisie that its interests would not be jeopar­
dised by the n e w  r e g i m e  in the city wer e  thus c o n s i d e r a b l y  
redu c e d  by the p r e d o m i n a n t l y  A r m e n i a n  c o m p o s i t i o n  of the 
bourgeoisie.
Against a b a c k g r o u n d  of n a t i o n a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  that had 
at t i m e s  in the recent past spilled over into i n t e r - e t h n i c  
violence, the very real danger existed that the bourgeoisie 
would exploit its influence within the Armenian community in 
Georgia, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in T ’bili si w h e r e  it was mos t  
c o ncentrated, to depict any r e f o r m  w h i c h  t h r e a t e n e d  its 
interests, even, for instance, so libe r a l  a m e a s u r e  as the 
a b o l i t i o n  of the p r o p e r t y  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  in the m u n i c i p a l  
elections, as an attempt by the Georgian Social-Democrats to 
penalise Armenians on national grounds.
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On the i n i t i a t i v e  or tne x ' D i n s i  soviet or worKers' 
Deputies, on 18th March deputies from all 17 soviets in the 
Caucasus met in T ’bilisi for the first Regional Congress of 
W o r k e r s ’ Soviets, at w h i c h  Zhordania, n e w l y  e lected as 
c h a i r m a n  of the 1 0 - m a n  M e n s h e v i k - d o m i n a t e d  E x e c u t i v e  
Committee of the Regional Centre, advanced his theses on the 
tactics of the working class in the revolution. No doubt in 
part s e e k i n g  to a llay the fears of.the A r m e n i a n  c o m m u n i t y  
but also reflecting the Georgian Mensheviks' view that this 
was a b o u r g e o i s  revolution, he stressed that w h i l e  the 
proletariat was the major force in the revolution it would 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  have to share l e a d e r s h i p  wit h  th ose other 
classes who had taken part in it:
In order to work out the correct tactic, one must 
try to grasp the essence of the current revolution 
at the head of w h i c h  stand three mai n  forces: 1)
the p r o l e t a r i a t  2) the p r o g r e s s i v e  b o u r g e o i s i e  
and 3) the army, w h i c h  is made up of the sons of 
the people... If we c o m p a r e  the present r e v o l u ­
tion with 1905 it is clear that the d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  the s i t u a t i o n  then and n o w  is great. In 
1905 we did not see the b o u r g e o i s i e  d u r i n g  the 
movement, but observed the motley crowd led by the 
w o r k i n g  class... Today such a s i t u a t i o n  does not 
exist and it is impossible to subordinate to day’s 
tactics to the i n t e r e s t s  of one class. We must 
a dvance t o g e t h e r  w i t h  all those forces w h i c h  are 
taking part in the revolution, in order, t h r o u g h  
our c o m b i n e d  strength, to e s t a b l i s h  a republic... 
The workers, peasant and national question must be 
f i n a l l y  sett l e d  in the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s embly. We 
must not forget that the current r e v o l u t i o n  is 
based on the co-ordination of different forces and 
that c o n s e q u e n t l y  our course must c o r r e s p o n d  to 
this situation.
Zhordania's message was underlined by the main r esolu­
tion of the Congr e s s  w hich aside f r o m  c a l l i n g  for all 
disputes to be settled where possible by arbitration, stated 
that the aim was the formation of a democratic republic, the 
resolution of the workers and national questions within the
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limits imposed by a bourgeois structure, and the confisca­
tion of l a n d .
Other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  aside, there can be little doubt 
either that by steering clear of the demand for soviet power 
and i m m e d i a t e  r e s o l u t i o n  of the national question, the 
Georgian Mensheviks recognised the sensitivity of and enor­
mous potential for damage represented by inter-ethnic re la­
tions in G e o r g i a  and, in particular, its c apital city, for 
the three m a j o r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  w e r e  not only d i v i d e d  a l o n g  
class lines but also, b r o a d l y  speaking, a long pa rty lines. 
Thus while the majority of the Georgian population identi­
fied with the Social-Democrats, most Armenians and particu­
larly the so-called progressive bourgeoisie, supported the
Dashnaktsutiun, and the majority of Russians, most of whom
were soldiers, the SRs.
Nor, it shou ld be stressed, w e r e  the M e n s h e v i k s  a l one 
in t h i s  r e s p e c t .  B o t h  the D a s h n a k s  and the SRs w e r e  
committed to the success of the Provisional Government, and 
w h i l e  the R u s s i a n  s o l d i e r s  t h a t  m a d e  up m o s t  of the
Caucasian Army were by June disenchanted both with the war
and the g o v e r n m e n t  for f a i l i n g  to bring it to an end, 
throughout March, April and May the soldiers* soviet, led by 
the SRs, gave u n c o n d i t i o n a l  support, c o n v i n c e d  that the 
war's end was near and that land r e f o r m  w o u l d  s w i f t l y  
follow. The mood a m o n g  the so l d i e r s  was c o n s e q u e n t l y  
hostile to anything that appeared to threaten the successful 
conduct of the war effort, not least of which in their view 
was discussion of and agitation for greater national rights. 
Thus when the First Regional Congress of the Caucasian Army 
met on 22nd April, its r e s o l u t i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n
stated bluntly:
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The r e s o l u t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  in its 
totality is only possible through the Constituent 
Assembly. However, until the Constituent Assembly 
meets all attempts to settle it are inadmissable 
and would be harmful. y
A s i m i l a r  a t t i t u d e  i n f o r m e d  an a r t i c l e  in the D a s h n a k
paper O r i g o n  on 7th May w h i c h  w a r n e d  that the n a t i o n a l
q u e s t i o n  s h o u l d  not yet be b r o a c h e d ,  so as to a v o i d
disrupting the forces of revolution. The most important and
? oimmediate task was to support the Provisional Government.
The c o n v i c t i o n  that the t i m e s  d e m a n d e d  p a t i e n c e  and 
support for the Petrograd government was undoubtedly rein­
forced in the Cauca s u s  by the p r o x i m i t y  of the war and the 
g e n u i n e  fear of the i n d i g e n o u s  p o p u l a t i o n  that if the 
g o v e r n m e n t  were to collapse, so too w o u l d  the C a u c a s i a n  
Front, l e a v i n g  the way open to the Turks. Aga i n s t  such a 
background it is scarcely surprising that the endeavours of 
the S o c i a l i s t - F e d e r a l i s t s  and N a t i o n a l - D e m o c r a t s  in mid -  
M a r c h  to f o r m  a G e o r g i a n  s o l d i e r s ’ e x e c u t i v e  c o m m i t t e e  in 
the Caucasian Army and to organise a demonstration calling 
for national autonomy should have enjoyed so little success 
among the peasantry and working class. As in the past, the 
v i a b i l i t y  of the n a t i o n a l i s t  part i e s  c o n t i n u e d  to f o u n d e r  
upon their i n a b i l i t y  to extend their i n f l u e n c e  b e y o n d  the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  a w e a k n e s s  that the M e n s h e v i k  m a j o r i t y  in 
the T ’bilisi Sovi et was able to exploit whe n  it t h r e a t e n e d
to expel the nationalist parties if they continued to raise
s 1the issue of political autonomy.
However, w h i l e  there was a c o n s e n s u s  a m o n g  the m a i n  
p o l i t i c a l  parties that the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  s h o u l d  be 
the final arbiter over the future relationship between the
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n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  and the centre, and that they should 
p o s t p o n e  their d e m a n d s  until such tim e  as the C o n s t i t u e n t  
A s s e m b l y  was convoked, the e x p e c t a t i o n  that that date was 
not far off and that when it a r r i v e d  they w o uld have to have 
clarified their positions ensured that the national question 
continued to preoccupy them throughout 1917.
There appears too to have been a real fear a m o n g  the 
G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  that failure to a c h i e v e  i m m e d i a t e  and 
evident progress on national issues could lead to sufficient 
disenchantment among the peasantry, which although it still 
had little time for the advocates of separation was never­
theless i m p a t i e n t  to reap the benef i t s  of the F e b r u a r y  
revolution, for it to turn a mor e  s y m p a t h e t i c  ear to the SFs 
and N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as the n a t i o n a l i s t  
parties were less in h i b i t e d  about p r e s s i n g  for i m m e d i a t e  
concessions from the Provisional Government. It was a fear, 
moreover, that had been given grea t e r  s u b s t a n c e  by the 
caution the SFs in particular were taking to emphasise that 
n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m y  w o u l d  not mea n  s e v e r i n g  the tie w i t h  
Russia - a m a j o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  if they were to win the 
support of a population much of which had recently experi­
enced the reality of Turkish invasion.
Abandoning their pre-revolution machinations with the 
Germans, the n a t i o n a l i s t  parties turned their backs on 
Europe and called instead for the establishment of a federal 
state in the ne w  Russia. Thus, Grigol R t s k h i l a d z e ,  a 
l eading m e m b e r  of the SFs, argued that w h i l e  on the one han d 
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  d e m a n d e d  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of s e p a r a t e  
n a t i o n a l  states, other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  d e m a n d e d  a joint 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  for the w h ole of Russia. S e l f - e v i d e n t l y ,
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there could only be one solution to this apparent dilemma.
However, the best political form, which will c o m ­
ple t e l y  s atisfy both sets of interests, is a 
federation of national states, a federal republic 
of Russia. To ensure the solidity and strength of 
this federation, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of c o m m o n  
affairs would have to be based on the representa­
tion of all the peoples of Russia, rather than on 
agreement between national s t a t e s . ^
The p a r a m o u n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of the SFs r e m a i n e d  
n a t i o n a l  r e n a i s s a n c e  and w h i l e  there was d i v i s i o n  in the 
p a r t y  as to the s i g n i f i c a n c e  to be a t t a c h e d  to c l a s s  
s t r u g g l e  once n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m y  had been achieved, they 
c o n t i n u e d  to m a i n t a i n  that the n a t i o n a l  idea u nited all 
classes and that all parties should join together in pursuit 
of n a t i o n a l  freedom. In a book p u b l i s h e d  in 1917 e n t i t l e d  
A v t o n o m ia da p ’e d e r a t s i a  (Autonomy and Federation), T'edo 
Ghl o n t i  e x p r e s s e d  the moo d  of the party when he said that in 
the history of national-liberation movements there always 
occurred moments when all classes united in the struggle for 
liberation even though each class might have its own aims in 
that struggle. N o t i n g  what he p e r c e i v e d  to be a shift in 
the Menshevik position towards acceptance of federalism, he 
argued that such a m o m e n t  had indeed a l r e a d y  a r r i v e d  in 
Georgia and that the ground already existed for joint action 
on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n .  In s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  he 
declared,
...we consider it a crime to remain silent and not 
to f i g h t  for a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  the n a t i o n ’s 
various groups in defence of national i n t e r e s t s . ^3
In effect, this t h r e a t e n e d  to strike at the heart of 
Zhordania’s approach to national and class relations in 1917 
for by calling on Georgians to press their separate demands
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for a u t o n o m y  there was a very real risk that they w o u l d  at 
the s a m e  t i m e  al i e n a t e  both the Russian troops in the 
Caucasus, 1 00,000 of w h o m  w e r e  s t a t i o n e d  in T'bilisi, and 
the A r m e n i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  w h o s e  control of c o m m e r c e  and 
i n d u s t r y  in T ’bilisi stood to suffer a serious b l o w  should 
the Georgians reestablish it as their national capital. It 
is no surprise therefore that Zhordania should have gone to 
considerable lengths to silence the nationalist parties on 
this issue (above). What made it doubly s e n s i t i v e  for the 
leader of the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s ,  however, was that 
G h l o n t i ' s  c l a i m  of a s h i f t  in M e n s h e v i k  v i e w s  on the 
n a t i o n a l  question, w h i l e  not e n t i r e l y  accurate, was not 
w i t h o u t  foundation. There had, of course, been d i f f e r e n t  
views among the Menshevik wing of the RSDLP in Transcaucasia 
at least since the f o r m a t i o n  of D a r c h i a s h v i l i ’s g r o u p  of 
t e r r i t o r i a l  a u t o n o m i s t s  in 1905 (see Chapter 5), but there 
was little doubt either that support for national territor­
ial autonomy, as opposed to the national-cultural solution 
still favoured by Zhordania, had grown in popularity during 
the war and since the revolution.
The clearest e v i d e n c e  of this came at the C o n g r e s s  of 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  Peasants' De p u t i e s  in late June w h e n  Akaki 
Chkhenkeli, who prior to the wa r  had been one of the l e a d i n g  
proponents of national-cultural autonomy not just within the 
ranks of Caucasian Social-Democracy, but at the All-Russian 
M e n s h e v i k  C o n f e r e n c e  in Vienna in 1912 and as a d e p u t y  to 
the Fourth Duma, abandoned it in favour of a national terri­
torial solution.^ Such an about turn by a major figure in 
the Caucasian party organisation inevitably added weight to
the SF a r g u ment, but also did mu ch to s t r e n g t h e n  the p o s i ­
tion of the territorial autonomists within the party, whose
v i e w s  w e r e  n o w  f i n d i n g  a reg u l a r  outlet in the bi-weekly- 
literary and political paper Alioni (The Dawn), which ran a 
long series of a r t i c l e s  on the r e v o l u t i o n  and the n a t i o n a l  
q u e s t i o n  in 19 17,*^ and in the w e e k l y  Kh a l k h i s  E r t foba 
( U n i t y  of the P e o p l e ) ,  w h o s e  m a i n  c o n t r i b u t o r ,  I v a n e  
G o m a r t ’eli, was one of the longest s t a n d i n g  a d v o c a t e s  of 
national autonomy in the p a r t y . ^
It was in fact G o m a r t ’eli wh o  took the lead in 1917 in 
presenting the territorialist case with a lengthly pamphlet 
d i r e c t e d  p r i m a r i l y  at the G e o r g i a n  w o r k e r s  and peasantry, 
entitled Sak’art1 velos teritorialuri a v t o n o m ia anu e r o v n u l -  
terit orialuri t ’vit’m a r t ’veloba (The Territorial Autonomy of 
Georgia or National-Territorial Self-Government). Interest­
ingly, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in v i e w  of his own long support of the 
idea, G o m a r t ’eli was quick to conc e d e  that the p e a s a n t r y  
viewed autonomy in a negative light. This, however, he put 
down to poor education and lack of info r m a t i o n . ^
Citing Finl a n d  as an e x a m p l e  of the sort of r e l a t i o n ­
ship he e n v i s a g e d  b e t w e e n  G e o r g i a  and Russia, G o m a r t ’eli 
ca lled for an elected G e o r g i a n  p a r l i a m e n t  w i t h  p o w e r s  to 
raise tax and pass legislation. The power to raise tax was, 
he argued, e s s e n t i a l  in vie w  of the need to effect w i d e -  
r a n g i n g  changes in education, health, justice, c o m m u n i c a ­
tions and the economy. Georgia would, however, remain part 
of R u s s i a ,  and a l t h o u g h  G e o r g i a n  w o u l d  be the s t a t e  
language, Russian would be the lingua franca of the federa­
tion and the centre w ould be e m p o w e r e d  to i n t e r v e n e  in 
Georgian affairs should the Georgian administration contra-
*0 O
vene federal law.
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a s  m  m s  p r e v i o u s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  on the subject, 
G o m a r t ’eli’s arguments hinged on the conviction that Georgia 
and Russia would have to undergo a relatively long period of 
c a p i t a l i s t  d e v e l o p m e n t  before the p r o l e t a r i a t  w o u l d  be 
s trong enough and c o n s c i o u s  enough to advance s o c i e t y  
t o w a r d s  social ism. In this view, and it was one that was to 
g a i n  m a n y  a d h e r e n t s  b e f o r e  l o n g  a m o n g  the G e o r g i a n  
M e n s h e v i k s ,  the g o v e r n m e n t  in Petrograd, w h i l e  a l r e a d y  in 
the hands of the bourgeoisie, was still o p e r a t i n g  under 
severe constraints. With the progression of time, however, 
it w o u l d  be able to break free from the fetters i m p o s e d  by 
the P e t r o g r a d  Soviet a n d . i m p o s e  its will on Russia. Once 
that happened, the R u s s i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e s ,  led by the K a d e t s  
and Octobrists, would be loathe to grant any concessions to 
the national minorities that might hinder the economic e x ­
ploitation of the outlying parts of the former empire.
In this context, he argued, the only way to e n s u r e  
against future encroachments by the Russian bourgeoisie on 
Georgian national rights was to acquire the constitutional 
right to national territorial autonomy before.the bourgoisie 
wa s f i r m l y  e n s c o n c e d  in power. S u p p o r t i n g  a u t o n o m y  w o u l d  
not, he emphasised, mean selling out to the SFs, nor did the 
fact that the SFs and N a t i o n a l -D e m o c r a t s  were d e m a n d i n g  
a u t o n o m y  of n e c e s s i t y  mean that it should be opposed. On 
the contrary, it would accelerate the development of class 
struggle and expedite progress towards socialism. Autonomy 
wo u l d  p rovide the means, such as e d u c a t i o n  in the n a t i o n a l  
language, w h e r e b y  G e o r g i a n  w o r k e r s  w o u l d  a c q u i r e  g r e a t e r  
c o nsciousness. Moreover, he argued, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of 
T'bilisi as the G e o r g i a n  c apital and G e o r g i a n  as the l a n ­
guage of c o m m e r c e ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and law w o u l d  lead the
434
Armenian bourgeoisie to shift its sphere of activities to an
A r m e n i a n  n a t i o n a l  unit based, he suggested, in Erevan and
A l e k s a n d r o p o l  Gubernii. This w o u l d  have the i m m e d i a t e
effect of c l a r i f y i n g  the class strug g l e  in Georgia, w h i c h
until now had been obscu r e d  by the p r e d o m i n a n t l y  A r m e n i a n
3 q
composition of the bourgeoisie. y
In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  G o m a r t ’eli concluded, e c h o i n g  
the a r g u m e n t s  of the SFs, it was e s s e n t i a l  to a c h i e v e  a 
party agreement so that pressure could be brought to bear on 
the centre. The a u t o n o m y  of Georgia, he said, was not a 
party matter, but the ’’affair of the whole nation".^0
Against this background Zhordania attempted to hold the 
S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  to their p r e - w a r  p o s i t i o n  on n a t i o n a l -  
cultu r a l  a u t o n o m y  and r e g i o n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t .  In his 
first m a j o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the debate on the n a t i o n a l  
q u e s t i o n  in the a f t e r m a t h  of the F e b r u a r y  Revolution, a 
p o l e m i c  agai n s t  the SFs e n t i t l e d  Chven da p ’ederalistebi* 
(Us and the Federalists), w h i c h  b e t r a y e d  his a n x i e t y  at 
their growing influence if not among the mass of the popula­
tion, then at least w i t h i n  the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  and, mor e  
i m p o r t a n l y ,  the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  Party itself, Z h o r d a n i a  
attacked the concept of federalism which, he declared, could 
guarantee Georgia neither democracy nor socialism. It was, 
moreover, a territorial notion, implying a union of t e rri­
tories r ather than n ations and, as such, given the m u l t i ­
ethnic composition of the Transcaucasus, could only lead to 
n a t i o n a l  t e n s i o n  and deflect the w o r k i n g  people f r o m  the 
social movement, an argument that was to find ironic confir­
m a t i o n  in the pathos of the D e c e m b e r  1918 A r m e n o - G e o r g i a n  
c o n f l i c t ,  the c o n s t a n t  f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  A r m e n i a  and
A z e r b a i j a n  and G e o r g i a ’s p e r s i s t e n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  her 
own n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  in the years of independence. 
R e v e r t i n g  to his pre-war' a r g u m e n t s , Z h o r d a n i a  m a i n t a i n e d  
that as a c u l t u r a l  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  the n ation could only be 
p r o p e r l y  catered for by n a t i o n a 1 - c u l t u r a 1 aut o n o m y ,  a 
f o r m u l a  that could both meet the p r o l e t a r i a t ’s c u l t u r a l  
demands and maintain the unity of the social movement within 
Russia as a whole.^1
The a r t i c l e  was too a t e s t i m o n y  to the c o n s i s t e n c y  of 
Z h o r d a n i a ’s v i e w s  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  si nce he first 
began w r i t i n g  on the subject in the 1890s. T hough he 
adopted the idea of national-cultural autonomy rather later, 
the essence of his approach had remained largely unchanged 
since he w r o t e  Gazeti Iveria da e r o v n e b a  (The n e w s p a p e r  
Iveria and nationality) for Kva 1 i in 1897. Thus, he c o n ­
tinued to stress that w h i l e  n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  i n t e r e s t s  
could transcend class, economic advance, to which the future 
success of any n ation was tied, i n e v i t a b l y  led to class 
conflict, wit h  the c o n s e q u e n c e  that any a t t e m p t  to hin d e r  
its d e v e l o p m e n t ,  as he no w  a c c u s e d  the SFs of doing, w o u l d  
not only impede economic progress in Georgia, but would, as 
a consequence, also impede national renaissance.
On 23rd May, however, at a Caucasian Regional Congress 
of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Dep uties, and then in 
mid-June at the Sixth Congress of Transcaucasian Mensheviks, 
Z h o r d a n i a  in d i c a t e d  that he was m o v i n g  a w a y  f r o m  a p u r e l y  
national-cultural solution of the national question towards 
one that took in e l e m e n t s  of a t e r r i t o r i a l  approach. Thus 
w h i l e  at the m e e t i n g  of soviets in Ma y  he was on f a m i l i a r  
gro u n d  whe n  he a rgued that the n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the
proletariat flowed not from an interest in creating a strong
436
state, but from cultural development, and that the Social- 
D e m o c r a t i c  Party was t h e r e f o r e  c o n c e r n e d  to e s t a b l i s h  the 
cultural conditions for national development rather than a 
national state, he took a step closer towards the national- 
territorial autonomists within his own party, as well as to 
the SFs, when he argued that the three main nationalities in 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a  should have the right to e s t a b l i s h  self- 
governing bodies delineated along territorial lines for the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of na t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  affairs, and that the 
rights of natio n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  li v i n g  w i t h i n  those t e r r i ­
tories should be protected by setting up national cultural 
42un i o n s .
It is i n d i c a t i v e  of Zhordania's c o n t i n u i n g  hold over 
the party that desp i t e  e v i d e n c e  of a grad u a l  shift t o w a r d s  
acceptance of national autonomy for Georgia within a Russian 
federation, his speech at the Si xth Congress, w h i c h  was 
subsequently published under the title Natsionaluri kit'khva 
amierkavkasiashi (The National Q u e s t i o n  in T r a n s c a u c a s i a ) ,  
should have formed the basis of the party resolution on the 
national question. ^
Z h o r d a n i a  c arried on w h e r e  he had left off in May, 
b l e n d i n g  e l e m e n t s  of n a t i o n a  1 - c u 1 1 u r a  1 a u t o n o m y  w i t h  
a c c e p t a n c e  of the idea that a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  n e e d e d  to be 
based on territory. But instead of the formation of federal 
r e p u b l i c s  fa v o u r e d  by the SFs and g roups w i t h i n  his own 
party, Zhordania contented himself with proposing the all- 
Russian Menshevik idea of broad regional self-government in 
those ar eas d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by an i n d i v i d u a l  wa y of life and 
ethnic o r i g i n . ^  For the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , however, he p r o ­
p o s e d  the f o r m a t i o n  of a r e g i o n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
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intermediate between the major nationalities and the centre, 
based on the whole of Transcaucasia. Echoing Sergi Meskhi 
and D roeba in the. 1 8 70s, he a rgued that the future of the 
Transcaucasian nations lay in unity:
The n a t i o n s  of the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  must wor k  out a 
single, joint n a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m m e .  Only in such 
c o n d i t i o n s  will it be p o s s i b l e  to reduce the 
e x i s t i n g  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  and e n m i t y  b e t w e e n  the 
nationalities to a minimum within the confines of 
a modern bourgeois s t r u c t u r e . ^
What was required was a form of political organisation 
that ensured both the economic interests of the area and met 
the n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  of its c o n s t i t u e n t  
nationalities. Thus within the Transcaucasian admi n i s t r a ­
tion, which was to be responsible for overall economic and 
civic interests, Zho r d a n i a  p r o p o s e d  the c r e a t i o n  of three 
n a t i o n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  bodies which, he said, c o n c e d i n g  
that it was impossible to divorce government from territory, 
should be based on the areas in w h i c h  the three l argest 
n a t i o n a l  gr o u p s  in the area, the Georgi ans, A r m e n i a n s  and 
Azeris, formed the majority of the population, regardless of 
such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as t r a d i t i o n a l  natio n a l  b o r d e r s  and 
natural economic areas.
' It was not a proposal that enjoyed muc h  p o p u l a r i t y  
among the Georgian nationalist parties nor, for that matter, 
among the national autonomists within the Social-Democratic 
Party, most of w h o m  f a v o u r e d  e s t a b l i s h i n g  G e o r g i a  w i t h i n  
what they regarded as its historical borders.^6 The p r0blem 
here was that certain areas considered part of traditional 
G e o r g i a  had, since the 19th century, been o c c u p i e d  by so 
many Armenian refugees that the latter now formed the m a j o r ­
ity of the population. Under Zhordania's f o r m u l a  these
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w o u l d  have been placed under an A r m e n i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  
Ironically, Z h o r d a n i a  was to be r e m i n d e d  of this by the 
independent government of Armenia little over a year later 
in the dispute over Borchalo, Akhalk’alak* i and Akhaltsikhe 
districts. However, as Zhordania justifiably pointed out, 
his p r o p o s a l s  in 1917 had been made on the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
that all three national self-governments would be part of a 
broader Transcaucasian administration, and were inapplicable 
to the situation in 1918, by which time Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan had all declared themselves independent.
As wel l  as ac t i n g  as the e x e c u t i v e s  of central state 
policy, the n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  w o u l d  be able to p ursue 
their own cultural, economic and juridical interests, while 
the l a n g u a g e s  of the na t i o n a l  m a j o r i t i e s  w o u l d  b e c o m e  the 
languages of all state, educational and legal affairs within 
their own territories. The problem of national minorities 
living w i t h i n  these areas could be resolved, Z h o r d a n i a  
suggested, by s e t t i n g  up n a t i o n a l  units w h ich w o u l d  have 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for the c u l t u r a l  needs of their r e s p e c t i v e  
national groups but would in all other matters be subordin­
ate to the g o v e r n m e n t  of the t e r r i t o r y  in w h i c h  they w e r e  
situated.
It is quite clear, therefore, from the Menshevik p o s i ­
tion at the Sixth Congress that although the majority of the 
C a u c a s i a n  party had, by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t e r r i t o r y  into its 
conception of the nation, compromised the argument that it 
was a purely cultural manifestation, it still, even at this 
late stage, just months before the declaration of Transcau­
casian i n d e p e ndence, r e m a i n e d  stron g l y  opposed to any 
a t t e m p t s  to b r e a k  or w e a k e n  the l i n k  w i t h  R u s s i a .  
Never t h e l e s s ,  a chain of events had a l r e a d y  begun in 1917
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which was to erode s t m  luronei- ~
f e d e r a l i s m  and move him by the a u t u m n  to a p osition on the 
national question that was in many respects indistinguish­
able from the Socialist-Federalists.
A l t h o u g h  the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  on 19th M a r c h  
a b o l i s h e d  all r e s t r i c t i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i m p o s e d  on the 
n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  by the t s a r i s t  a u t h o r i t i e s  and 
established full equality before the law regardless of race, 
r e l i g i o n  or nationality, it d e m o n s t r a t e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
r e l u c t a n c e  to r e c o g n i s e  the n a t i o n a l i t i e s  as c o m m u n a l  
entities, arguing, as on so many other issues, that that was 
the proper c oncern of the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y . ^  At no 
time in its period of office, moreover, does it a ppear to 
have understood that although the Transcaucasian nat ional­
ities did not seek independence, they did, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
expect of the February Revolution rather more than Petrograd 
was ever p r e p a r e d  to concede. Part of the p r o b l e m  was no 
doubt that the g o v e r n m e n t  was mor e  p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  the 
issues of war and peace and the land question, but it seems 
likely too that few of its mini s t e r s ,  at least b e f o r e  the 
formation of the coalition government, were favourably d i s ­
posed to measures that might weaken the grasp of the centre 
over the o u t l y i n g  areas of the f o r m e r  empire. It is true, 
of course, that it co n c e d e d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  to Poland and 
autonomy to Finland, but the former was at the time occupied 
by the Germans and had already been offered independence by 
the c entral powers, w h i l e  in Finland's case it m e r e l y  r e ­
stored institutions that had been in existence prior to 1899 
without actually consulting the Finns about what they really 
wanted. Moreover, in July, whe n  the F innish Sej m  p a s s e d  a
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law limiting the authority of the Provisional Government to 
defence and foreign policy, the latter responded by dissolv­
ing it. When one considers too the determination of Foreign 
Minister Miliukov to ensure that Russia annex Constantinople 
as a price for its c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the a l lied war effort, 
one can r e a d i l y  u n d e r s t a n d  why many a m o n g  the n a t i o n a l  
m i n o r i t i e s  s u s p e c t e d  that the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  was 
more concerned to pursue the previous r e g i m e ’s practice of 
empire-building than placate its minority nationalities.
In Transcaucasia this suspicion was for many confirmed 
by the g o v e r n m e n t ’s refu s a l  to grant a n y t h i n g  m o r e  than an 
administrative function to Ozakom, with the consequence that 
it was quite unable to fulfil the aspirations of the popula­
tion for a greater say in the direction of its own affairs, 
a point that was soon u n d e r l i n e d  by its f ailure to settle 
the issue of the a u t o c e p h a l y  of the G e o r g i a n  Church (see 
Chap t e r  1). S h o r t l y  after the r e v o l u t i o n  the G e o r g i a n  
bishops expelled the Russian exarch and his bishops from the 
exarchate building, seized all church property and demanded 
the immediate restoration of autocephaly. Ozakom pronounced 
itself u n a u t h o r i s e d  to judge on the m a t t e r  and r e f e r r e d  it 
to Petrograd where the government acknowledged the national 
c h a r a c t e r  of the c h u r c h ,  but i n s t e a d  of g r a n t i n g  its 
de mands, gave it the right to w o r k  out a pro j e c t  on its 
legal p o s i t i o n  in Russia, w h i c h  w o u l d  then have to be s u b ­
m i t t e d  to the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  for a p p r o v a l  b e f o r e  
eventually being decided upon by the Constituent Assembly. 
To the church, however, w h i c h  felt there was n o t h i n g  to 
discuss, this merely proved the continuing insensitivity of 
the centre to the d e m a n d s  of the G e o r g i a n  people, a v i e w
that the nationalist parties were quick to endorse in their
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c a m p a i g n  to d e m o n s t r a t e  the urgent need for G e o r g i a  to
U Racquire greater control over its own destiny.
The incid e n t  p rovided a f urther i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the 
limitations of Ozakom's power and contributed to undermining 
what little a u t h o r i t y  it had in the region. R e q u e s t s  to 
expand its responsibilities helped maintain an almost con­
stant state of f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  O z a k o m  and P e t r o g r a d  but 
a c h i e v e d  nothing. Thus an a t t e m p t  by C h k h e n k e l i  to secure 
p o w e r s  of l e g i s l a t i o n  and a p p o i n t m e n t  was r e j e c t e d  by 
P r ime M i n i s t e r  K e r e n s k y  who b r u s q u e l y  r e m i n d e d  h i m  of 
O z a k o m ’s status and reaffirmed that it could neither remove 
nor enact l e g i s l a t i o n  and that its e x p e n d i t u r e  had to be 
strictly accounted for. This not only demoralised the staff 
but also d e s t r o y e d  the faith of G e o r g i a n s  in the w i l l  of the 
centre to s atisfy na t i o n a l  d e m a n d s  and helped c r e a t e  the 
climate for the idea that Georgia’s needs could only be met 
by greater devolution of power.
It was also an e m b a r r a s s m e n t  to the M e n s h e v i k s  w h o s e  
own insistence that the national question be left until the 
Constituent Assembly both made it awkward for them to cr iti­
cise the Provisional Government on this account, and allowed 
the other parties to take up the nation’s grievances almost 
unchallenged. It s e e m s  likely that Zhordania's g r a d u a l  
shift to a m o r e  p o s i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  
in 1917 was at least in part induced by a fear that the 
party might lose ground to its political opponents.
But w h ile party p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  no doubt 
i n f l u e n c e d  his a p p r o a c h  to the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  it is 
p r o b a b l e  that d e v e l o p m e n t s  in P e t r o g r a d  had the g r e a t e r  
i m p a c t  and did the mos t to u n d e r m i n e  his c o n v i c t i o n  in the
442
efficacy of a purely national-cultural solution. The belief 
of the leader of the Transcaucasian Mensheviks’, expressed 
shortly after the revolution, that the progressive bourgeoi­
sie had played a leading role in its fr u i t i o n  and w o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  to do so until such time as the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  
inherent in capitalism led to a socialist revolution and the 
e m e r g e n c e  of a n e w  form of soc i e t y  based on q u a l i t a t i v e l y  
different relations of production, did not extend as far as 
condoning the sharing of governmental office with the poli­
tical representatives of the bourgeoisie and amounted almost 
to an enshrinement of the principle of "dual power" then in 
operation in Petrograd. It was not the role of socialists, 
he m a i n t a i n e d ,  to help the b o u r g e o i s i e  m a i n t a i n  the e f f i ­
ciency of c a p i t a l i s m ,  but rather, with the aid of the 
soviets, to ensure that the government did not stray towards 
c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ,  to protect w o r k i n g  p e o p l e ’s i n t e r e s t s  
and to raise the political consciousness of the proletariat 
and focus its energies on the class struggle that lay ahead. 
The s o v i e t s  w o u l d  too be a b l e  to g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  the 
n a t i o n a l - c u l t u r a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the m i n o r i t y  peop l e s  w e r e  
protected against any hegemonist designs on the part of the 
Russian bourgeoisie. This faith in the watchdog role of the 
soviets for the m o m e n t  c o n v i n c e d  him, and wit h  h i m  the 
m a j o r i t y  of the C a u c a s i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  that the s c e n a r i o  
depicted by the territorial-autonomists within the party of 
gradual a s s i m i l a t i o n  by the R ussian b o u r g e o i s i e  of the 
nationalities was avoidable. It was not, however, a c onvic­
tion that was destined to survive much longer.
It s u f f e r e d  its first m a j o r  blo w  on 1st M a y  w h e n  the 
Petrograd Soviet voted in favour of socialist participation
in the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t .  In Zhordania's view, this
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could p roduce one of two results: either the s o c i a l i s t
ministers would accommodate their liberal colleagues in the 
government and thus compromise their own principles, betray 
the working class and play into the hands of the Bolsheviks, 
or they could attempt to impose socialist measures and run 
the risk of p r o v o k i n g  a c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ,  a p o s s i b i l i t y  
that the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  c o n s i d e r e d  very real, 
particularly after the rumours had filtered down to T'bilisi 
that dur i n g  the crisis in April e n g e n d e r e d  by M i l yukov's 
note to the allies on the 18th p r o m i s i n g  Russia's c o m p l e t e  
support for the war effort, he and Gene r a l  K o r n i l o v  had 
p lanned to provoke a conflict b e t w e e n  rival g r o u p s  of 
demonstrators in Petrograd as a pretext for a military coup. 
The r e s i g n a t i o n  in late May too of the M i n i s t e r  of Trade and 
Industry, Konovalov, just two weeks after his appointment, 
f u e l l e d  the s u s p i c i o n  in G e o r g i a  that the b o u r g e o i s i e  was 
indeed edging towards counter-revolution.-*^
This fear, combined with the warnings of Gomart'eli and 
others of the danger of a s s i m i l a t i o n  should the n a t i o n a l ­
ities fail to secu re r e c o g n i t i o n  of the right to n a t i o n a l  
autonomy while the Russian bourgeoisie was still weak, was 
for many strengthened by the government's hostility to the 
demands of the Ukrainian Rada for autonomy in April and its 
r e f u s a l  e v e n  to c o n c e d e  the t e r r i t o r i a l  u n i t y  of the 
Ukraine, a position it maintained until June, when, f o l l o w ­
ing a declaration from the Rada that without separating from 
Russia and w h e t h e r  the g o v e r n m e n t  liked it or not it was 
g o i n g  to take c ontrol of the Ukraine, the g o v e r n m e n t  ga ve 
wa y  and c o n c e d e d  the c o m p e t e n c e  of the Rada to speak for the
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U k r a i n i a n  people.-*1 W h i l e  on the one hand this no doubt 
encouraged autonomists in Georgia, on the other it gave rise 
ag ain to the s pectre of c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ,  for f o l l o w i n g  
the announcement of concessions to the Ukraine, five Kadet 
ministers undermined the coalition by resigning, a step that 
not only indicated where their sympathies lay on the issue 
of nationality rights, but also triggered a fresh crisis in 
a g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  was a l r e a d y  faced with the c o l l a p s e  of 
its much-vaunted June offensive.
Increasingly distrustful of the bourgeoisie, Zhordania 
began to q u e s t i o n  not just the v i a b i l i t y  of c o a l i t i o n  
government, but also the wisdom of allowing the bourgeoisie 
to p a r t i c i p a t e  in g o v e r n m e n t  at all. His c r i t i c i s m  of the 
participation of Mensheviks in the government now gave way 
to a derisive dismissal of the "democratic cretinism" of his 
erstwhile colleagues who, he said, had become fixated with 
earning the trust of the Kadet ministers and imagined they 
could placate the masses with rhetoric and ministerial r e ­
shuffles . 53
The n e w s  at the end of August of Gene r a l  Kornilov's 
a b o r t i v e  a t t e m p t  to o v e r t h r o w  the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
fin a l l y  con v i n c e d  him of the fu t i l i t y  of a t t e m p t i n g  to 
a p p e a s e  the b o u r g e o i s i e  which, in a r e s o l u t i o n  a d o p t e d  by 
the T'bilisi Soviet at the b e g i n n i n g  of S e p t e m b e r ,  he 
declared to have moved to the side of counter-revolution, a 
view which he upheld at the Democratic Conference in Pe tro­
grad a week later, when he declared that the Transcaucasian 
organisation favoured the abandonment of coalition and the 
f o r m a t i o n  of a g o v e r n m e n t  of d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i a l i s t  forces, 
including the Bolsheviks.5^ He found little support at the 
conference, however, and returned to T'bilisi convinced that
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the M e n s h e v i k s  and SRs had cut t h e m s e l v e s  off f r o m  their 
roots in the w o r k i n g  class and p e a s a n t r y  and had as a c o n s e ­
qu ence o pened the way to the Bolsheviks. In such c i r c u m ­
s t a n c e s ,  in w h i c h  the c e n t r e  w a s  " w i t h o u t  h o p e "  and 
t h r e a t e n e d  by c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n  fro m  both the Right and 
Left, the sole o ption fa c i n g  the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , he m a i n ­
tained, was to prepare to look after itself should the need 
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A g a i n s t  t h i s  b a c k c l o t h  of c o n f u s i o n  a n d  l o s s  of 
d i r e c t i o n  at the centre, Z h o r d a n i a  began to r e a s s e s s  his 
position on the national question and to ask whether in the 
circumstances national-cultural autonomy was a viable propo­
sition. In the knowledge of Bolshevik hostility to the idea 
and c o n c e r n e d  that a R i g h t - w i n g  c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ,  if it 
occurred, would, as Gomart'eli had argued, act as a catalyst 
for an upsurge of Russian nationalism, he inclined gradually 
thro u g h  the s u m m e r  and early a u t u m n  t o w a r d s  the latter's 
arguments on territorial autonomy. It should, however, be 
emphasised that Zhordania envisaged autonomy for Transcauca­
sia as a w h o l e  rather than its c o n s t i t u e n t  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
separately and that he remained convinced of the importance 
of unity with Russia to the development of the area.
It is proba b l e  too that the g a t h e r i n g  i n t e r - e t h n i c  
t e n s i o n  in G e o r g i a  - in spite of the effo r t s  of the m a j o r  
political parties to contain it - put pressure on Zhordania 
to revise his earlier insistence on postponing all debate on 
the issue till the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. 
Because of the d i v i s i o n  of social class and p o l i t i c a l  
sympathies along national lines, the danger always existed 
that the tensions between the major actors in 1917 would at
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times assume national form. Thus the different perceptions 
of the Georgians and of the predominantly Russian soldiers 
on such key issues as the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  and the 
conduct of the war, a l w a y s  t h r e a t e n e d  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
degenerating into nationalist conflict.
Disenchantment among the troops with the government’s 
policy on the war, fuelled by a p p a l l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  at the 
front and the s u s p i c i o n  that w h i l e  they were f i g h t i n g  the 
land was being d ivided in their absence, cam e  to a head in 
J u n e  w i t h  the a n n o u n c e m e n t  of a n e w  o f f e n s i v e .  The 
Bolsheviks, w h o  only began to o p e r a t e  as a s e p a r a t e  o r g a n ­
isation again in the Caucasus from 5th June,-^ were quick to 
exploit the mood, and in elections to the soldiers' section 
of the T'bilisi Soviet that m o n t h  served n otice of the 
seriousness of their challenge when they won 14 seats to the 
SRs' 12 and the Mensheviks' 8. The s h a r p e n i n g  d e l i n e a t i o n  
between the Menshevik-dominated Soviet, which took a r evolu­
tion a r y  - d e f e n s i s t  po s i t i o n  on the war, and the T'bilisi 
garrison, was further underlined on 25th June when a d e m o n ­
stration called by the Bolsheviks against the offensive and 
the Soviet's decision, albeit ha l f - h e a r t e d ,  to g r a n t  it 
support, rebuffed an attempt by the Mensheviks to co-opt it 
by voting in favour of a Bolshevik resolution condemning the 
offensive and calling for transfer of power to the soviets. 
Izvestiya, the soviets' newspaper, gave an indication of the 
national tensions underlying this division when it bemoaned 
the fact that "the peas ant s o l d i e r s  fro m  d istant R u s s i a n  
regions"^? were so easily convinced by counter-revolutionary 
forces in the army acting under cover of extremist slogans.
However, w h i l e  the slogan of peace at any p r ice
c on t i n u e d  to win the B o l s h e v i k s  support a m o n g  the R u s s i a n
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soldiers, they failed d i s m a l l y  to make any i m p a c t  on the 
M e n s h e v i k  h o l d  o v e r  the G e o r g i a n  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  and 
peasantry, a fact w h i c h  was in part cause and in part c o n s e ­
quence of their i n c r e a s i n g  r e s i g n a t i o n  to c o n c e n t r a t i n g  
their efforts on propagandising in Russian among the troops, 
limiting their work in Georgian largely to the publication 
of the u n s u c c e s s f u l  B r d z o l a  (The Struggle). On the other 
hand, while the Bolsheviks found their attentions settling, 
w i l f u l l y  or o t h e r w i s e ,  on the Russians, the M e n s h e v i k s ,  
w h o s e  d e f e n s i s t  stance on the war ena b l e d  the m  to exploit 
the G e o r g i a n  fear of a sudden a b a n d o n m e n t  of the front, 
b e c a m e  a l m o s t  e q u a l l y  p r e o c c u p i e d  wit h  the s t r u g g l e  for 
support a m o n g  the Georgians, so that just as the R u s s i a n -  
language Kavkazskii Rabochii became the focal point of Bol­
shevik pr opaganda, so the M e n s h e v i k s  devo t e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
more thought and energy to the publication of the Georgian- 
langu a g e  E r t 'oba (Unity) than they did to their r e l a t i v e l y  
weak Russian publication, Bor'ba.-*^
It is e v i d e n t  t h e r e f o r e  tha t  as the p o l i t i c a l  
differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks re-emerged 
in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , so they c o n t r i b u t e d  to e x a c e r b a t i n g  
the differences between the predominantly transient Russian 
population and the native Georgians, and so to strengthening 
the barriers between them. In such circumstances, for all 
the internationalist rhetoric of the rival organisations, it 
b e c a m e  all too easy for G e o r g i a n s  to find fault w i t h  
"peasant soldiers from distant Russian regions" and for the 
latter to see in the G e o r g i a n s  only an o b s t a c l e  to their 
desire to return home, failing either to u n d e r s t a n d  or 
s y m p a t h i s e  w i t h  the n a t u r a l  a n x i e t i e s  of th e  l o c a l
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population.
In July the e l e c t i o n s  for the T'bilisi D u m a  c o n f i r m e d  
the shift in the ethnic b alance of p o w e r  in the city wit h  
the M e n s h e v i k s  s e c u r i n g  50 of the a v a i l a b l e  108 seats and 
over 45 per cent of the vote, w h i l e  their c losest rivals, 
the Dashnaks won 24 seats, followed by the SRs with 20. The 
Bolsheviks gained only seven seats, the same as the Kadets, 
and s c a r c e l y  six per cent of the vote. Most s i g nificant, 
however, was the d r a m a t i c  d e c l i n e  in the f o r t u n e s  of the 
Armenian bourgeoisie, which had not only dominated the Duma 
since the 19th cent u r y  but, to the anger of the G e o rgians, 
also c o n s i s t e n t l y  ref u s e d  to support an e x t e n s i o n  of the 
franchise so as to incorporate the poorer and predominantly 
Georgian sections of T'bilisi society. The fear now existed 
among the Armenians that the resentment accumulated over the 
p r e c e e d i n g  30 years m i ght lead the G e o r g i a n s  to exploit 
their democratically acquired advantage to the detriment of 
the Armenian community. Consequently, although the M e n s h e ­
viks were still at that time convinced of the need to m a i n ­
tain an alliance with the bourgeoisie and between the main 
political parties to ensure that national conflict did not 
jeopardise the revolution, it was not long before the D a s h ­
naks were labelling the Mensheviks Georgian chauvinists and 
debate had degenerated into mutual accusations of national­
ism. N e vertheless, later that m o n t h  the p a r t i e s  d e m o n ­
strated their awareness of the dangers of allowing matters 
to get out of hand when they set up an i n t e r - p a r t y  bu r e a u  
with the express purpose of preventing national conflict.
With Zhordania's faith in the a b i l i t y  of n a t i o n a l -  
c u l t u r a l  a u t o n o m y  alone to settle the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  
u n d e r m i n e d  by events in Russia and T r a n s c a u c a s i a ,  the way
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was now open for M e n s h e v i k  a c c e p t a n c e  of the t e r r i t o r i a l -  
a u t o n o m i s t  a r g u ment, a d e v e l o p m e n t  w h i c h  the SFs had been 
predicting for some time and which would remove most of the 
remaining differences between them on the issue. Thus, in 
Se p t e m b e r ,  in a r e m a r k a b l e  shift of party policy, the 
Mensheviks came to an agreement with the SFs and National- 
Democrats on the formation on an inter-party soviet, which, 
in turn, declared their unity on the national question.^0 A 
few days later at the Democratic Conference in Petrograd, A. 
Chkhenkeli, a c t i n g  as of f i c i a l  s p o k e s m a n  for the group, 
c o n f i r m e d  that all the G e o r g i a n  parties were u nited in 
favour of national-territorial self-government and that all 
agreed that the strength of national feeling in Georgia was 
now such that it could only be s a t i s f i e d  by s o m e  f o r m  of 
state autonomy. He added that the national programme drawn 
up by the G e o r g i a n  parties was f ounded upon an a g r e e m e n t  
with the other nationalities of Transcaucasia.^
Although for the first time there was now a broad area 
of a g r e e m e n t  w i t h i n  G e o r g i a n  s o c i e t y  and b e t w e e n  all the 
main parties bar the Bolsheviks^2 on the national question, 
it still r e m a i n e d  the case just w e e k s  before the O c t o b e r  
R e v o l u t i o n  and the start of the chain of events that w o u l d  
u l t i m a t e l y  lead to independence, that most c o n t i n u e d  to 
regard separation as neither desirable nor realistic. Some 
of the N a t i o n a l - D e m o c r a t s , it is tr ue, did a d v o c a t e  
independence, but they formed a small group within a party 
whose influence was at most peripheral. It was too a point 
that Chkhenkeli was at pains to emphasise at the conference 
when he stated that the Constituent Assembly should still be 
the final a r b i t e r  on the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  and that any 
na t i o n a l  p r o g r a m m e  a dopted by the’ G e o r g i a n s  or any o ther
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nationality should first be acceptable to the international 
revolutionary democracy of Russia. The Georgian nation, he 
p r o c l a i m e d  p r o p h e t i c a l l y ,  w o u l d  only c o n t e m p l a t e  a cting 
separately if the revolution were to be d e f e a t e d . ^
That in the view of many in Georgia was precisely what 
did happen on 25th October when the Bolsheviks seized power 
in Petrograd, a l t h o u g h  it was a w h i l e  before mo st c a m e  to 
see it in those terms. But before then r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
the centre had already begun to deteriorate, particularly in 
the wake of the Petrograd Conference, from which Zhordania 
r e t u r n e d  to T'bilisi c l a i m i n g  that the Rus s i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  
had fin a l l y  s u r r e n d e r e d  p o w e r  to the bourgeoisie. Even 
be fore that, on 30th August, the T'bilisi Sovi et a n n o u n c e d  
the formation of the Temporary Central Caucasian Revolution­
ary C o m m i t t e e  (Revkom), c o m p r i s i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the 
Bolsheviks, M e n s h e v i k s ,  SRs, SFs and Dashnaks, which, it 
informed the Provisional Government, had temporarily assumed 
c o m p l e t e  c ontrol of the region, in or der to c o u n t e r  the 
threat of c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n  and c o m p e n s a t e  for Ozako m ' s  
m a n i f e s t  i n a b i l i t y  to meet the d e m a n d s  of the area. The 
Soviet d e m a n d e d  that O z a k o m  be r e c o n s t i t u t e d  so as to 
devolve more p o w e r s  on the local a u t h o r i t y . ^  S h o r t l y  
afterwards, following Kerensky's failure to respond to these 
demands, the Revkom declared itself the supreme authority in 
the Caucasus, a m o v e  w h i c h  f i n a l l y  p r o m p t e d  K e r e n s k y  to 
acknowledge its existence, even if only by demanding in vain 
that it i m m e d i a t e l y  disband. Such an act of d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  
however, was too much for the SR members of Revkom who, not 
w i t h o u t  reason, sa w  in it a step t o w a r d s  s e p a r a t i o n  and 
resigned as a consequence.
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In anot h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  of the M e n s h e v i k s  i n c r e a s i n g  
r e a d i n e s s  to act i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  the 
Re g i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  of C a u c a s i a n  M e n s h e v i k  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  on 
20th September reversed previous party policy by agreeing to 
the f o r m a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  a r m y  units, in order, so it was 
said, to prevent desertion by disenchanted Georgian soldiers 
fro m  the front.^^ W h a t e v e r  the true reason for the d e c i ­
sion, it s e e m s  not i m p r o b a b l e  that in light of the party's 
fears of c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n  in Russia and a n x i e t y  at the 
potential threat to Menshevik aspirations posed by the Bol­
shevik-dominated Caucasian Army, that it was intended as a ^  ) 
precautionary measure of self-defence. But despite this and 
e arlier act i o n s  that i n t i m a t e d  a g r o w i n g  i m p a t i e n c e  a m o n g  
Georgians with the inaction of the Provisional Government, 
there was n o t h i n g  to suggest that prior to the O c t o b e r  
R e v o l u t i o n  the M e n s h e v i k s  wer e  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  u n i l a t e r a l  
action over the constitutional relationship between Georgia 
and the centre. On the contrary, as even th eir recent 
agreement with the SFs and National-Democrats demonstrated, 
they held to the v i e w  that this was a m a t t e r  for the C o n ­
stituent Assembly. That position was, however, to be put to 
a sudden though not entirely unexpected test by the October 
Revolution, an event greeted with little enthusiasm in G e o r ­
gia, c e r t a i n l y  a m o n g  the i n d i g e n o u s  p o p ulation, and one 
w h i c h  in v i e w  of the B o l s h e v i k s  a n t i p a t h y  to the idea of the 
Constituent Assembly began gradually to undermine Georgia's 
commitment to the union with Russia.
6.3 Separation from Russia
To Zhordania and the other leaders of the Mensheviks in 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a  who had been p r e d i c t i n g  that the B o l s h e v i k s
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w o u l d  use the Second A l l - R u s s i a n  Congr e s s  of S oviets to 
e s t a b l i s h  t h e m s e l v e s  in power, the B o l s h e v i k  coup on 25th 
October was proof of the erroneous policies of the Petrograd 
Mensheviks. In Zhordania's view, the two rival forces of 
the r e v o l u t i o n  wer e the p r o l e t a r i a t  and b o u rgeoisie, but 
between them lay the petit-bourgeoisie, which was unable by 
itself to establish power. The victory of one or the other 
class w o u l d  depend on w h i c h  a c h i e v e d  h e g e m o n y  over this 
stratum of society. The Petrograd Mensheviks, however, had 
ignored this possibility and mistakenly chosen to ally t h e m ­
selves with the bourgeoisie, a policy that had merely driven 
the proletariat into the hands of the Bolsheviks and c u l m i n ­
ated in the O c t o b e r  Revolution. The B o l s h e v i k  coup, said 
Z h o r d a n i a  on 25th Octo b e r  at a m e e t i n g  of the E x e c u t i v e  
C o m m i t t e e  of the T ’bilisi Sovi et of W o r k e r s ’ and P e a s a n t s ’ 
Deputies, was the
i n e v i t a b l e  resu lt of the i s o l a t i o n  of the p r o l e ­
tariat at the Democratic Conference and the f o r m a ­
tion of power without its will.
The p r o b l e m  f acing all the p arties in G e o r g i a  now, 
however, was w h e t h e r  or not to r e c o g n i s e  the B o l s h e v i k  
cl a i m  to power, and if not, what to p ropose in its place. 
The B o l s h e v i k  m e m b e r s  of the T ’bili si Soviet i n e v i t a b l y  
declared their unanimous support for the "Petrograd revolu­
tionary democracy", while the SRs demanded that armed force 
be used to suppress it. The Mensheviks, however, sensitive 
to the possibility that armed suppression might extend b e ­
yond the Bolsheviks to themselves, took a more circumspect 
approach and proposed a resolution, which was adopted by the 
E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e ,  that called for a broad c o a l i t i o n  of 
democratic forces:
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The i n t e r e s t s  of the r e v o l u t i o n  d i c t a t e  the 
necessity of peaceful liquidation of the uprising 
on the basis of an a g r e e m e n t  of the entire r e v o l u ­
tionary democracy and in the spirit of creating a 
democratic power without the participation of the 
rich bourgeoisie. '
Drawing comfort from their own strictly linear inter­
p r e t a t i o n  of M a r x i s m ,  the M e n s h e v i k s  also m a i n t a i n e d  that 
any attempt to instigate a socialist revolution in a country 
so b a c k w a r d  as Russia was d o o m e d  to failure. Thus at a 
meeting of the T ’bilisi Duma on 28th October, the leader of 
the Caucasian Menshevik organisation not only repeated his 
call for the "peaceful liq u i d a t i o n "  of the B o l s h e v i k  coup, 
but also asserted:
The u p r i s i n g  in P e t r o g r a d  is living out its last 
days. From the very b e g i n n i n g  it was d o o m e d  to 
failure, because such a secret, c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  
seizure of p o w e r  is o p p o s e d  to the natural path of 
revolutionary development.®®
The opi n i o n  that it was still p o s s i b l e  to c o m e  to t e r m s  
wit h  the B o l s h e v i k s  and that they w ould be fo r c e d  to seek 
allies a m o n g  the other soc i a l i s t  parties c o n t i n u e d  to 
prevail into early November, as is indicated by a resolution 
issued on the third by the Re g i o n a l  Centre of S o v i e t s  of 
Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies which called for 
a c o a l i t i o n  of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e m o c r a c y  " f rom the 
Bolsheviks to the popular-socialists", but this time added 
the "essential proviso" that this take place w i t h i n  the 
context of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at a 
set d a t e . ® ^  it m a y  in part too have been e n c o u r a g e d  by the 
r e s t r a i n t  d i s p l a y e d  by the party's C a u c a s i a n  R e g i o n a l  
Committee (Kavkraikom), which although the only major force 
to r e c o g n i s e  the l e g i t i m a c y  of the n e w  g o v e r n m e n t ,
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nevertheless opposed the idea of a military seizure of power 
and in doing so e f f e c t i v e l y  ruled out its one r e a l i s t i c  
prospect of a s s u m i n g  cont r o l  in the Caucasus. Thus on 1st 
November, the soldiers’ section of the T ’bilisi Soviet Exe­
cutive C o m m i t t e e  a p p e a l e d  to the soldi e r s  to obey the 
recently established Committee for Public Safety, a M e n s h e ­
v i k - d o m i n a t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  w h i c h  incorporated representa­
tives f r o m  all the m a j o r  parties and was in t e n d e d  to c o ­
ordinate authority in the Transcaucasus.^
Despite this apparent reticence, the Bolsheviks took a 
n u m b e r  of m e a s u r e s  to s t r e n g t h e n  their i n f l u e n c e  ov er the 
army, i n c l u d i n g  the e l e c t i o n  in the T'bilisi g a r r i s o n  on 
28th October of a delegates' assembly whose main aims were 
to ar m  as yet u n a r m e d  m i l i t a r y  d e t a c h m e n t s  and to se c u r e  
f r e s h  e l e c t i o n s  b o t h  to the s o l d i e r s '  s e c t i o n  of the 
T'bilisi Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' De p u t i e s  and the 
Regional Soviet of the C a u c a s i a n  Army, w h i c h  had been 
e lected six m o n t h s  p r e v i o u s l y  and w h ose c o m p o s i t i o n  was 
undoubtedly over-weighted in favour of the SRs.^1 Alarmed 
at the evident p o p u l a r i t y  of these d e m a n d s  a m o n g  the s o l ­
diers, the T'bilisi Soviet became still more suspicious when 
the d e l e g a t e s '  a s s e m b l y  s u g g e s t e d  the f o r m a t i o n  of 
c o m m i t t e e s  to d i s t r i b u t e  w e a p o n s  a m o n g  the s o l d i e r s  and 
forbade the issue of weapons to members of "counter-revolu­
t ion a r y  and n a t i o n a l i s t  parties". At a m e e t i n g  of the 
T'bilisi Soviet Executive Committee and representatives of 
the T'bilisi g a r r i s o n  on 4th Nov e m b e r ,  the f o r m e r  a c c u s e d  
the B o l s h e v i k s  of a t t e m p t i n g  to seize p o w e r  and d e m a n d e d  
that they either d i s p e r s e  the delegates' a s s e m b l y  or le ave
the Executive Committee within three days.^2 The Bolsheviks 
duly r e s i g n e d  and in doing so helped bro a d e n  the a l r e a d y  
w i d e n i n g  gul f b e t w e e n  the a r m y  and the T'bilisi Soviet and 
weaken the increasingly fragile thread linking the Transcau- 
casus to Russia.
The Bolsheviks, however, remained unwilling to advocate 
m i l i t a r y  action, a step that, all other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
aside, w o u l d  have placed them in a p o s i t i o n  of c a l l i n g  for a 
transfer of p o w e r  to the s oviets on the one hand, w h i l s t  
a t t a c k i n g  the m  on the other. Instead, they c a u t i o n e d  
against precipitate action and appealed to the soldiers not 
to resort to force. In the event, it was the T'bilisi 
Soviet that broke the d e a d l o c k  whe n  on 10th N o v e m b e r  it 
agreed to the demand for new elections to the soviets. The 
f o l l o w i n g  day the B o l s h e v i k  K a v k r a i k o m ,  n o t i n g  the 
concession, announced that it considered the mission of the 
delegates' assembly achieved and agreed to its dispersal, a 
move that once again underlined the relative weakness of the 
Bolsheviks in the a r e a . ^
A l t h o u g h  they did enjoy c o n s i d e r a b l e  s upport in the 
army, the party leadership was nevertheless mindful of the 
fact that the p r i m a r y  conc e r n  of the troops was to r e t u r n  
h o m e  as q u i c k l y  as p o s s i b l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  e n g a g e  in 
i n t e r n e c i n e  conflict in Tr a n s c a u c a s i a ,  and that the vast 
m a j o r i t y  of G e o r g i a n  w o r k e r s  and p e a s a n t s  c o n t i n u e d  to 
support the Mensheviks. In such circumstances, an attempt 
to seize p o w e r  could have had u n f o r e s e e n  and p o s s i b l y  
disastrous consequences. On 2nd November, Zhordania warned 
that an a r m e d  u p r i s i n g  w o u l d  not have the support of the 
workers and added:
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Such an u p r i s i n g  w o u l d  a s s u m e  the c h a r a c t e r  of a 
military coup, with all its terrible consequences. 
Civil war in our c o u n t r y  w o u l d  f l o w  u n a v o i d a b l y  
into national war; a military coup would be c o m ­
pl i c a t e d  by s t r u g g l e  b e t w e e n  Russian, Georgian, 
Armenian and other native national regiments.
The risk of a bloody national conflict aside, it seems 
not i m p r o b a b l e  that one factor in the B o l s h e v i k s ’ r e l a t i v e  
moderation in early November was that having spent much of 
1917 working in tandem with the Mensheviks, even after the 
f o r m a l  split in June, the B o l s h e v i k  l e a d e r s h i p  did not 
imagine that either they or the Dashnaktsutiun, whose under­
standable fear of the Turks had made the party a consistent 
a d v o c a t e  of the union wit h  Russia, w o u l d  ever s e r i o u s l y  
c o n s i d e r  f o r m i n g  a se p a r a t e  g o v e r n m e n t  in T r a n s c a u c a s i a  
rather than recognise the new authority in Petrograd.
At the time of the October Revolution, the Transcauca­
sian parties, and in p a r t i c u l a r  the M e n s h e v i k s ,  had sought 
to s u b s t a n t i a t e  their a l m o s t  reflex r e j e c t i o n  of the 
legitimacy of the Bolshevik claim to power by denouncing it 
as u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y  and d o o m e d  to 
rapid collapse. In this optimistic expectation the Trans­
c a u c a s i a n  parties c o n t e n t e d  t h e m s e l v e s  in the first two 
w e e k s  of the r e v o l u t i o n  by m a r k i n g  time. As local c o n d i ­
tions de t e r i o r a t e d ,  however, and it b e c a m e  clear that the 
Bolshevik coup was not to be the transitory phenomenon they 
had imagined, it g r a d u a l l y  d a w n e d  on the p r i n c i p a l  a c t o r s  
that they w o u l d  either have to c o m e  to t e r m s  w i t h  the n e w  
a u t h o r i t y  in P e t r o g r a d  or set about f i l l i n g  the v a c u u m  of 
power in the Caucasus themselves.
Against this background, on 11th No v e m b e r ,  at the 
initiative of the Committee for Public Safety, a conference 
was held in T'bilisi of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of all the m a j o r
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p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g  the Bolsheviks, the Soviets, 
Ozakom, Muslim organisations, trade unions, and military and 
c o n s u l a r  o f f i c i a l s  of Britain, France and the USA, to d i s ­
cuss the formation of a temporary administration whose task 
it w o u l d  be to go v e r n  until such t i m e  as the C o n s t i t u e n t  
A s s e m b l y  was c o n v e n e d . ^  The f o r m a t i o n  of such a g o v e r n ­
ment, the M e n s h e v i k s  and Dashnaks, in particular, wer e  at 
great pains to stress, should not be seen as a move towards 
separ ation, but s i m p l y  an a t t e m p t  to restore order to the 
area at a tim e  whe n  g o v e r n m e n t  at the centre had b r o k e n  
down. Even now, few Georgians thought in terms of independ­
ence. Zhordania, just months away from becoming President 
of the independent Republic of Georgia, declared:
Transcaucasia has already worked hand in hand with 
Russia for 100 years, considering itself insepar­
ably linked w i t h  her. N o w  the link with R ussia 
has been torn apart... We must stand on our own 
two feet and help o u r s e l v e s  or perish in a n ­
archy... At present one cannot place one's hopes 
on the centre. The state is h eaded for f i n a n c i a l  
c o l l a p s e  and the gold rese r v e  has been seized by 
the Bolsheviks. In the T r a n s c a u c a s u s , m o n e y  is 
running out. The situation is further complicated 
by the p r e s e n c e  of a huge a r m y  for w h i c h  there is 
no food. All this n e c e s s i t a t e s  the o r g a n i s a t i o n  
of a local a u t h o r i t y  to lead T r a s c a u c a s i a  out of 
this catastrophic situation. The organisation of 
c ent r a l  power, des p i t e  our efforts, is b e ing 
d ragged out. We must create a r e g i o n a l  p o w e r  in 
the l o c a l i t i e s  w hich will lead the re g i o n  until 
the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  or the c r e a t i o n  of an 
authoritative central power.
H a v i n g  shi f t e d  b l a m e  for the rift to the B o l s h e v i k s ,  
the conference agreed, with the exception of the Bolshevik 
partic'pants (P'. Ma k h a r a d z e ,  M. T s k h a k a i a  and A. N a z a r e -
A-
tian), who w a l k e d  out, to the f o r m a t i o n  of a C a u c a s i a n  
administration in which "all revolutionary-democratic bodies 
of national or local significance" would be represented. On
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Safety ceased to exist and local a u t h o r i t y  passed into the 
hands of the n e w l y - c o n s t i t u t e d  T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  C o m m i s s a r -  
iat.77
C o m p o s e d  of three Georgians, three A r m e n i a n s ,  four 
Muslims and two Russians, it announced its existence to the 
peoples of Transcaucasia in a declaration which again sought 
to e m p h a s i s e  that it had been f o r m e d  in or der to avert 
e c o n o m i c  and social catastrophe. H owever, a l t h o u g h  the 
s t a t e m e n t  r e p e a t e d  that the C o m m i s s a r i a t  was a t e m p o r a r y  
body intended to govern Transcaucasia until the convocation 
of the Constituent Assembly, its appointment of commissars 
with full ministerial powers and its declared intention to 
take 11 e n e r g e t i c  m e a s u r e s "  to bring the war to a sp e e d y  
close, take steps towards a just resolution of the national 
question, introduce the zemstvo system throughout the region 
and legislate on such contentious issues as confiscation of 
land and labour rights, s u g g e s t e d  that even if the C o n s t i ­
tuent Assemby were to be convened, the Transcaucasian pa r ­
ties would be united in calling for wide-ranging autonomous 
powers. Should the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  fail to convene, 
moreover, for whatever circumstances, the Commissariat d e ­
cl ared its r e a d i n e s s  to cede its a u t h o r i t y  to a body to be 
f o r m e d  from the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  d e l e g a t e s  e l e c t e d  to the 
Assembly.
For the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  Zh or- 
dania, who had been outspoken in his criticism of Menshevik 
participation in the Provisional Government with representa­
tives of the bourgeois parties, the decision to cooperate in 
Transcaucasia with the SFs, Dashnaks, and the Azeri Musavat, 
a m o n g s t  o t h e r s ,  w a s  c l e a r l y  a p o t e n t i a l  s o u r c e  of
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the influence of the Dashnaktsutiun and Musavat within their 
o w n  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  that if the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  was to be held 
together, and if the potential conflict between the nation­
a l i t i e s  of the area was to be contained, that there w o u l d  
have to be c o m p r o m i s e  b e t w e e n  the main parties. For 
Z h o r d a n i a  too there was the c o n s o l a t i o n  that the idea of a 
united Transcaucasia within a Russian federation had formed 
one of the c entral planks in his a p p r o a c h  to the n a t i o n a l  
question since the summer.
Despite the powers invested in the Transcaucasian C o m ­
missariat, it suffered from all the weaknesses of its prede­
cessor, Ozakom, and proved equally incapable of surmounting 
the national, political, class and r e l i g i o u s  d i f f e r e n c e s  
di v i d i n g  it. In this respect, a m a j o r  p r o b l e m  c o n f r o n t i n g  
the new body lay in the burgeoning of national consciousness 
since the February Revolution and the growing prominence of 
national issues in the political life of the region as first 
the Azeris and then the A r m e n i a n s  took steps to e s t a b l i s h  
inter-party national organisations. Thus in the spring of 
1917, the two larg est Azeri parties, the M u s a v a t  and the 
Ganja Turkic Party of Decentralisation merged, despite c o n ­
s i d e r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in other areas, to present a u n i t e d  
front on the demand for national autonomy within a Russian 
federation. Their joint p l a tform, a d o p t e d  in October, d e ­
clared that each nationality possessing a defined territory 
in w h i c h  it c o n s t i t u t e d  a m a j o r i t y  should be g r a n t e d  the 
right to territorial autonomy, a principle which applied to
the Turkic lands, it stated, w o u l d  include A z e r b a i j a n ,
7 QTurkestan, Kirghizia and Bashkiria. 7
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The A r m e n i a n s  too stres s e d  the p r i m a c y  of n a t i o n a l  
un ity at an i n t e r - p a r t y  n a t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e  called by the 
D a s h n a k s  on 27th September. Better o r g a n i s e d  than the 
Azeris, the A r m e n i a n s  e l e c t e d  a N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  and a 
smaller National Committee of 15 members, which, well before 
the creation of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, established 
itself as the effective government of the Armenian popula­
tion of Transcaucasia.^ Thus by the time of its establish­
ment, the Transcaucasian Commissariat found itself rivalled 
not just by the soviets, but also by national organisations 
which enjoyed the considerable advantage of popular support 
and without whose cooperation there was little the C o m m i s ­
sariat could hope to achieve.
T h r o u g h  m o s t  of 1917 the m a j o r i t y  of G e o r g i a n  
Mensheviks had continued to resist the appeal of the SFs and 
the National-Democrats for a joint platform on the national 
question, but with the party’s consent in August to part ici­
pation in the I n t e r - P a r t y  Soviet and the p r e s e n t a t i o n  of a 
joint p r o g r a m m e  at the D e m o c r a t i c  Conference, m u c h  of the 
basis of their o p p o s i t i o n  to some form of c o a l i t i o n  wa s 
eroded. However, such was the strength of the party within 
Georgia that it was not until after the October Revolution, 
with its d e c i s i o n  to take part on 20th N o v e m b e r  in a G e o r ­
gian N a t i o n a l  Congress, that it gave serious a t t e n t i o n  to 
the idea. There were deep reasons, Zhordania declared, for 
this change of heart:
We are a s m a l l  n ation and we live in a c o u n t r y  
close to which stretches a massive military front. 
Therefore we must act very carefully. This front 
on the one hand, and the d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n  of the 
link wit h  Russia on the other, are f o r c i n g  us to 
take care of ourselves. All the political parties 
[with the exception of the Bolsheviks] have united 
on this ground and stated: Before us st and two
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questions around which we must unite both national 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  forces. The first q u e s t i o n  is 
one of provision for the physical existence of the 
G e o r g i a n  p e o p l e ,  w h i l e  the s e c o n d  is one of 
c r e a t i n g  the c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  will pro v i d e  the 
b a s i s  for our 
cultural edifice.
A l t h o u g h  a cting under the p ressure of events and, 
though he does not mention it here, the increasing national 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  of the A r m e n i a n s  and Azeris, Z h o r d a n i a  had 
c l e a r l y  m o v e d  closer to the SF posit i o n  on the n a t i o n a l  
question, w h i l e  for the first tim e  in G e o r g i a  since the 
February Revolution national issues began to gain prominence
op
over the class struggle. Before attributing an absolute 
volte-face to Zhordania, however, it is worth recalling that 
as early as 1 8 9 A he had a c k n o w l e d g e d  that at m o m e n t s  of 
great danger to the nation, national unity could temporarily 
overcome social antagonisms.
In light of G e o r g i a ’s recent hist o r y  of class and 
p o l i t i c a l  division, the c o n g r e s s  r e p r e s e n t e d  a r e m a r k a b l e  
display not just of national unity, but also of the distance 
n a t i o n a l  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  had a d v a n c e d  in G e o r g i a  since 
the 19th century. In m a n y  r e s p e c t s  too it can be seen as 
the real i s a t i o n ,  if only m o m e n t a r i l y ,  of the call of Ilia 
Tchavtchavadze, Akaki Dseret’eli and others of their g e n e r ­
ation for G e o r g i a n s  to e s t a b l i s h  a c o m m o n  g r o u n d  and, to 
recall the metaphor of the time, mend their broken bridges. 
Thus the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a , i n a 
gesture that was not entirely devalued by its expectation of 
a decree on the confiscation of large estates, set the tone 
for the occasion by offering to transfer its banks, estates, 
houses and the Jcakhet'i railway to the Georgian people. As 
always, declared Konstantine Abkhazi and Davit1 Nizharadze,
e o p l e  to c o n s t r u c t  its f r e e  
11
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the n o b i l i t y  was ready to serve the G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n  "not 
just through sacrifice of property, but also through sacri-
Q  O
fice of ourselves".
For all the atmosphere of national euphoria surrounding 
the meeting, however, the m a j o r i t y  of d e l e g a t e s  r e m a i n e d  
reluctant to envisage a Georgia separated from Russia, not 
least because Russia provided their main access to European 
culture. For many of those present the choice was a simple 
one: either to m a i n t a i n  the union wit h  Russia and w i t h  it
the link wit h  Europe, or to a b a n d o n  it and turn back to the 
East. For the W e s t e r n i s e d  G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  there 
appeared little option. Thus Zhordania, in his capacity as 
chairman of the congress, reemphasised that the formation of 
the Transcaucasian Commissariat and the plan to elect a Seim 
should not be re g a r d e d  as an i n d i c a t i o n  of the r e g i o n ’s 
i n t e n t i o n  to separ a t e  but s i m p l y  as m e a s u r e s  to r e s t o r e  
order to the periphery and meet the local demand for politi­
cal a u t h o r i t y  until such time as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c e n t r a l
O a
authority could be reestablished in Russia.
Nor, it should be stressed, did the N a t i o n a l  S oviet 
e lec t e d  by the c ongress ever a c q u i r e  the a u t h o r i t y  of its 
A r m e n i a n  and Azeri counterparts. Desp i t e  g r o w i n g  s u p p o r t  
among Georgian Mensheviks for inter-party cooperation on the 
national question, and despite a Menshevik majority on the 
National Soviet Executive Committee, many in the party r e ­
m a i n e d  h o s t i l e  to c o o p e r a t i o n  wit h  the SFs and N a t i o n a l -  
Democrats. The main force in Georgian political life, as it 
had been since February, c o n t i n u e d  to be the T ’bil i s i  
Soviet, w h o s e  p o s i t i o n  b e c a m e  still s t r o n g e r  at the end of 
N o v e m b e r  f o l l o w i n g  its seizure of the T'bilisi arsenal, an 
incident which many, Lenin included, regarded as of crucial
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significance in the struggle for supremacy with the Bolshe­
viks.
The p r o b l e m  of d efence aside, the a b a n d o n m e n t  of the 
C a u c a s i a n  front posed a serious threat to the s u r v i v a l  of 
the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  C o m m i s s a r i a t  as w h ole r e g i m e n t s  of 
s o l d i e r s  mad e  their way through the region to the North 
Caucasus. Already alarmed by threats from the Stavropol and 
Groznii regiments to destroy T’bilisi unless the C o m m i s s a r ­
iat co n c e d e d  to their d e m a n d s  for supplies, and by the 
r efusal of the B o l s h e v i k - d o m i n a t e d  Kars r e g i m e n t  to leave
Q B
the G e o r g i a n  c apital and r e s u m e  its journey n o r t h w a r d s ,  J 
the T’bilisi Soviet Executive C o m m i t t e e ’s fears were still 
further aroused when it intercepted a telegram from Stepan 
S h a u mian, the leader of the Baku Soviet, to Lenin on 23rd 
November calling for authorisation to use the soldiers and 
Baku Soviet to force the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  C o m m i s s a r i a t  to
ft ftrecognise the legitimacy of the October Revolution.
To cou n t e r  these d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  the T ’bilisi Soviet 
appealed to the Soldiers’ Committee of the Artillery Depots 
for 2,000 rifles to arm the so-called Red Guard, a voluntary 
militia created by the Soviet in August. When this request 
was turned down, the E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  d e c l a r e d  m a r t i a l  
law in the city, m o b i l i s e d  the Red Guard and f o r m e d  a c o m ­
m i t t e e  to plan the cap t u r e  of the T ’bilisi arsenal. On the 
night of the 29th a m o t l e y  band of som e  60 p o o r l y - a r m e d  
guards, ’’som e  w e a r i n g  top hats, o thers b a s h l y k s  and o t h e r s  
s h q p h e r d s ’ hats"®^ set off for the a r s e n a l  w i t h  the sole 
hope, as Z h o r d a n i a  put it, that the m o r a l  a u t h o r i t y  of the 
workers would prevail over the g a r r i s o n . R e m a r k a b l y  they 
achieved their goal without loss of life on either side and
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in doing so undermined the Bolsheviks’ prospects of a m i l i ­
tary seizure of power. V aliko Jugheli, leader of the Red 
Guard, later claimed that it had in large degree determined 
the course of the r e v o l u t i o n  in the Caucasus, w h i l e  the 
G e o r g i a n  B o l s h e v i k  K. T s i n t s a d z e ,  w h o  w a s  g i v e n  the 
u n e n v i a b l e  task of r e p o r t i n g  the event to Lenin, r e c a l l e d  
that the latter too had concluded that the Georgian M e n s h e ­
viks were now the "masters of their own a f f a i r s " .
Although the Bolsheviks subsequently performed well in 
the D e c e m b e r  e l e c t i o n s  to the Second Re g i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  of 
the C a u c a s i a n  Army, s e c u r i n g  52 seats in the A r m y  Soviet 
e l e c t e d  by the co n g r e s s  to the c o m b i n e d  total of 48 of the 
Mensheviks and Left SRs, and in the elections to the Consti­
tuent A s s e m b l y  in w h i c h  they cam e  close to e q u a l l i n g  the 
M e n s h e v i k  vote in T ’b i l i s i , ^  their success was u n a b l e  to
I
conceal their persistent failure to win substantial support 
among the indigenous population, a weakness the seriousness 
of w h i c h  only b e c a m e  fully clear in D e c e m b e r  as the ex o d u s  
of R u s s i a n  troops f r o m  T r a n s c a u c a s i a  began to a s s u m e  mas s  
proportions. Quick to exploit the Bolsheviks’ predicament, 
the Transcaucasian Commissariat on 18th December accelerated 
the p rocess by g i v i n g  the order for d e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  a mov e  
w h i c h  the B o l s h e v i k s  could s c a r c e l y  oppose and w h i c h  left 
them still more debilitated. By February 1918 their posi­
tion was so u n d e r m i n e d  that the T ’bilisi Soviet E x e c u t i v e  
Committee was able to disband its soldiers' section without
dispute, a fate w h i c h  was shared on 9th M a r c h  by the
q i
Regional Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies.
Conversely, the mid-December elections to the Regional 
Soviet of Workers' Deputies testified to the strength of the 
M e n s h e v i k s  a m o n g  the native proletariat: of the 248
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delegates elected to the Regional Congress on 19th December, 
155 were M e n s h e v i k s ,  43 B o l s h e v i k s  (reflecting their 
strength in Baku), 29 SRs, 14 Dashnaks, four members of the 
Musavat, two independents and one a Menshevik-International­
ist. In a clear d e m o n s t r a t i o n  of the M e n s h e v i k s 1 e n d u r i n g  
d o m i n a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  p o l i t i c a l  life, all but one of the
119 d e l e g a t e s  e l e c t e d  in K'ut'aisi and T'bilisi G u b e r n i i
Q ?were Mensheviks.
But w h i l e  the d e p a r t u r e  n o r t h w a r d s  of the R u s s i a n  
troops may have ruled out the likelihood of a Bolshevik coup 
d'etat in the i m m e d i a t e  term, and was in that resp e c t  
welcomed by most in the Transcaucasus, it also brought the 
region for the first t i m e  in over 100 years into direct, 
u n m e d i a t e d  contact wit h  the O t t o m a n  Empire, a d e v e l o p m e n t  
that before very long was to put e n o r m o u s  p r e s s u r e  on the 
Transcaucasian Commissariat to clarify its relationship with 
Petrograd. More urgently, the d e n u d i n g  of the C a u c a s i a n  
Front faced the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  wit h  the task of o r g a n i s i n g  
its own defence, a p r o b l e m  w h i c h  it sought to r e s o l v e  
thr o u g h  the f o r m a t i o n  of A r m e n i a n  and G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l  
regiments. The question of the discipline and dubious pol i ­
tical loya l t y  of man y  of the G e o r g i a n  soldi e r s  aside, h o w ­
e v er, it is q u i t e  e v i d e n t  t h a t  the s i z e  of the f o r c e  
assembled, 30,000 men, was wholly inadequate to cover a 300- 
mile front which until very recently had been defended by an 
a r m y  of 500,000. In late Nov e m b e r ,  therefore, w h e n  the 
Turks p r o p o s e d  to the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  C o m m i s s a r i a t  that it 
agree to an armistice, the latter, despite being aware that 
it was behaving increasingly like the government of a sover­
eign state, was quick to accept, and on 5th D e c e m b e r  the
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t e r m s  of a c e a s e f i r e  w e r e  a g r e e d . ^  It is n o t e w o r t h y ,  
however, that the Commissariat insisted that the armistice 
be regarded as an agreement between the Turkish and Russian 
armies. The leaders of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  p arties and 
organisations held on to the hope that the Bolsheviks would 
cede power to the Constituent Assembly and thus pave the way 
for the reunion of Transcaucasia with Russia. As Noe Zhor­
dania later argued, the mai n  con c e r n  at the tim e  was to 
ensure against Turkish attack:
Not one party, group or individual put forward the 
issue of independence. In those c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
such an idea was unthinkable. The Turkish troops 
were on our border, the Russian army was collaps­
ing and our p h v s i c a l  and e t h n o g r a p h i c  e x i s t e n c e  
were in danger.
Despite this, however, and the impending convocation of 
the Constituent Assembly, all were aware of the possibility 
that the Bolsheviks would reject the authority of the newly- 
elected body and confront the Transcaucasus with the choice 
of r e m a i n i n g  part of Russia and t h e r e f o r e  r e c o g n i s i n g  the 
B o l s h e v i k  c l a i m  to power, or of o p p o s i n g  it and t h e r e b y  
severing the link with R u s s i a . ^5 It was a dilemma that the 
Turks were quick to exploit. Recognising an opportunity to 
r e e s t a b l i s h ^  their influence over the region and create a 
buffer state on their n o r t h e r n  border, the Turks i n f o r m e d  
the commander of the Transcaucasian Army, General Odishel- 
idze, in a letter re c e i v e d  on 1st J a n u a r y  1918, of their 
r e a d i n e s s  to n e g o t i a t e  an end to the war and r e c o g n i s e  the 
i n d e p e n d e n c e  of T r a n s c a u c a s i a . ^  C a l c u l a t e d  to cause the 
Transcaucasian Commissariat m aximum embarrassment on the eve 
of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, it also further 
u n d e r m i n e d  the a l r e a d y  fragile unity of the r e g i o n  by
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appealing to the Azeris, whose enthusiasm for establishing 
an independent state in close alliance with Turkey was not 
shared by the Armenian population, many of whom, as recent 
refugees from Turkish Armenia, had good cause for question­
ing the intentions of Ottoman diplomacy.
The Turks, however, can have held out little hope that 
the G e o r g i a n s  and A r m e n i a n s ,  both c o n s i s t e n t  a d v o c a t e s  of 
the union with Russia, would change their views so close to 
the first meeting of the long-awaited assembly. There can 
have been little surprise therefore when on 4th January the 
Regional Centre of Soviets declared that as an integral part 
of the Russian Republic, Transcaucasia could only enter into 
peace n e g o t i a t i o n s  with the a p p r o v a l  of the A l l - R u s s i a n
Assembly.
To the last m o m e n t  the m a j o r i t y  in the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  
rested its hopes for r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the Russ i a n  
Repub l i c  and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a f ederal s y s t e m  of 
g o v e r n m e n t  on the C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly, but w i t h  its 
d i s s o l u t i o n  by the B o l s h e v i k s  on 5th J a n u a r y  that hope was 
finally extinguished. A resolution adopted at an emergency 
m e e t i n g  of the R e g i o n a l  Centre of S oviets on 6th J a n u a r y  
appeared to recognise as much:
The d i s s o l u t i o n  of the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  has 
broken the last thread which could have united all 
Russia and the a l l - R u s s i a n  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e m o ­
cracy. The struggle for the Constituent Assembly 
is the st r u g g l e  for the unity of R u ssia and the 
triumph of the revolution. The dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly has again left the Transcau­
casus, w h e r e  a n a r c h y  is b e c o m i n g  deeper and m o r e  
w i d e s p r e a d ,  to depend on its own forces. The 
vital interests of the region demand the convoca­
tion in the i m m e d i a t e  future of an a s s e m b l y  of 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  and C a u c a s i a n  F r o n t  d e p u t i e s  
elected to the Constituent Assembly, whose first 
task must be to create a strong, a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
power capable of supporting revolutionary order in 
the country and introducing urgent r e f o r m s . ^
Yet even now, after this reluctant acknowledgement of 
Transcaucasia's detachment from Russia, few supporters could 
be f o u n d  for i n d e p e n d e n c e .  E v g e n i  G e g e t c h k o r i ,  the 
President of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, expressed the 
Georgian Menshevik point of view at a meeting of Transcau­
casian deputies to the Constituent Assembly on 10th January 
to discuss plans for the formation of a Transcaucasian Seim, 
when he declared that any such body would only operate until 
the r e i n s t a t e m e n t  of the A l l - R u s s i a n  C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m -  
b l y . 100
This reluctance to concede defeat over the assembly was 
q uic k l y  b e c o m i n g  an i m p e d i m e n t  to the a g r e e m e n t  of p eace 
t e rms w i t h  the Turks, w h o  n o w  refu s e d  to draw up a t r e a t y  
with Transcaucasia unless the latter declared independence, 
pointing out that such an agreement would otherwise have no 
s t a n d i n g  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. The mu t u a l  s u s p i c i o n s  and 
a n t a g o n i s m s  of the A r m e n i a n s  and Azeris, howev e r ,  and the 
r efusal of the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  to accept the id e a l s  of 
the February Revolution as lost, ensured that Transcaucasia 
continued to prevaricate in the face of Turkish requests for 
clarification of its position.
E x a s p e r a t e d  by Tran s c a u c a s i a ' s  apparent i n a b i l i t y  to 
com e  to t e rms wit h  its s e p a r a t i o n  f r o m  Russia, the T u rks 
began to seek pretexts for b r e a k i n g  the a r m i s t i c e  and 
exploiting their military advantage on the Caucasian Front. 
Throughout January, Vekhib-Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the 
T urkish C a u c a s i a n  Army, made a series of c o m p l a i n t s  to 
General Odishelidze and General Przheval'skii, Commander-in- 
Chief of what was left of the Russian Caucasian Army, about 
a t r o c i t i e s  a l l e g e d l y  c o m m i t t e d  by A r m e n i a n s  a g a i n s t  the
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1 D 1M u s l i m  p o p u l a t i o n  in the area of Erzindzhan. u On 30th 
January, he informed Odishelidze and Przheval'skii that as 
these incidents were continuing, despite repeated requests 
for p u n i t i v e  action, he felt c o m p e l l e d  to order the i n t e r ­
ve n t i o n  of T u r k i s h  t r o o p s . T h e  f o l l o w i n g  day O t t o m a n  
units advanced almost entirely unopposed into Armenian and 
Georgian territory, occupying land which, had the Transcau­
c asian leaders s h o w n  a g r e a t e r  sense of urgency, m ight at 
least have been the subject of negotiation in peace talks.
The g r e a t e s t  threat to T r a n s c a u c a s i a  e m a n a t e d  not so 
much from the Turkish army, however, as the peace negotia­
tions then under way in Brest-Litovsk between Russia and the 
Central Powers, at which the Ottoman Empire had laid claim 
to much of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  t e r r i t o r y  ceded to R u s s i a  in 
the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Unlike the Ukraine, which had 
de c l a r e d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and sent its own d e l e g a t e s  to the 
negotiations, Transcaucasia remained hampered by indecision 
and held back from participation. On 1st February, however, 
Turkey again invited the Transcaucasian Commissariat to send 
its d e l e g a t e s  and re p e a t e d  its r e a d i n e s s  to do all in its 
p o w e r  to achi e v e  r e c o g n i t i o n  of T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  i n d e p e n d ­
ence. 1
Whilst one can safely assume that the Ottoman gov e r n ­
ment's m o t i v e s  wer e  not g o v e r n e d  by a l t r u i s m ,  and that the 
Transcaucasian leadership had ample grounds for suspecting 
Turkish intentions, the alternative of spectating whilst the 
hard-pressed Bolsheviks bargained away Transcaucasian land 
was scarcely more attractive. However, although this and the 
shock of the recent Turkish advance caused the Commissariat 
to respond f a v o u r a b l y  to the proposal, the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
leaders, both in the Soviet and bhe C o m m i s s a r i a t ,  a g a i n
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demonstrated their apparent inability to grasp the urgency 
of the situation. Instead of executing immediate measures, 
they i n f o r m e d  V e khib Pasha that the d i r e c t i v e s  for their 
delegates and the conditions for the negotiations would have 
to be drawn up by the Transcaucasian Seim which, following a 
r e s o l u t i o n  a d o p t e d  at the m e e t i n g  on 10th J a n u a r y  (above), 
was to hold its first session on 10th F e b r u a r y . 1 04
By that tim e  the course of the n e g o t i a t i o n s  in Brest- 
Litovsk had shifted dramatically following Germany's deci­
sion to break the a r m i s t i c e  and a d v a n c e  into Russia and it 
was already evident that the Bolsheviks would be forced to 
accept severe terms. The need, therefore, for Transcaucasia 
to have a p r e s e n c e  at the peace talks had b e c o m e  mor e  p r e s s ­
ing. This in part e x p l a i n e d  the n e w  s y m p a t h y  in the S e i m  
for i n d e p endence, not least a m o n g  the A r m e n i a n s ,  w h o  n o w  
recognised the inability of Russia to provide further pr o ­
t e c t i o n  against the Turks. Z h o r d a n i a  too on 15th F e b r u a r y  
p r o p o s e d  a j u r i d i c a l l y  s e p a r a t e  T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  Republic, 
d e c l a r i n g  that it was no longer p o s s i b l e  to wait for this to 
be a c h i e v e d  w i t h i n  a Russ i a n  c o n t e x t . 10  ^ A d d r e s s i n g  the 
Seim a week later, he added:
We [the Mensheviks] opposed not just separation, 
but also autonomy. But when conditions change and 
we're told it's either s l a v e r y  or s e p aration, of 
course I stand for separation.
Nevertheless, the Seim ignored the invitation to attend 
the B r e s t - L i t o v s k  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and p r o p o s e d  i n s t e a d  tha.t 
Turkey and Transcaucasia hold separate talks in Trebizond. 
On 16th February a special commission of the Seim, headed by 
Georgian Menshevik Noe Ramishvili, stated the Seim's c o m p e ­
tence in the p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  to c o n c l u d e  p e ace w i t h
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Turkey, called for the reconstitution of the pre-war Russo- 
T u r k i s h  state border and d e c l a r e d  the S e i m ’s i n t e n t i o n  to 
seek a u t o n o m y  for Turk i s h  A r m e n i a  w i t h i n  the O t t o m a n  
E m pire. 1
Ironically, just as the Transcaucasian leadership had 
come to terms with the need to negotiate directly with the 
Turks, the c o n s e q u e n c e  of its ref u s a l  to either d eclare 
independence or concede the Bolsheviks’ right to govern came 
to fruition. On 17th F e b r u a r y  n e w s  a r r i v e d  fro m  Brest- 
Litovsk that Russia had ceded the provinces of Kars, Ardahan 
and B a t ’umi to Turkey, losses that w o u l d  c l e a r l y  have 
undermined the defensive and economic viability of Transcau­
casia. Karlo Chkheidze, P r e s i d e n t  of the Seim, and Evgeni 
Gegetchkori, President of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, 
protested, declaring that the treaty's stipulations concern­
ing the Transcaucasus were invalid as they had been drawn up 
w i t h o u t  the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 1^® The 
Turks, however were unimpressed and demanded the withdrawal 
of all troops to within the borders agreed at Brest. Thus, 
although they accepted the Transcaucasian proposal for talks 
at Trebizond, w h e n  these began on 1st M a r c h  the l eader of 
the Ottoman delegation, Rauf Bey, made clear from the outset 
that T urkey had no i n t e n t i o n  of r e n e g o t i a t i n g  the t e r m s  
agreed with Russia. In view of the repeated failure of the 
Transcaucasian Commissariat to take up the Turkish invita­
tion to Brest-Litovsk and its insistence on being treated as 
a c o n s t i t u e n t  part of Russia, he said, the O t t o m a n  d e l e g a ­
tion considered the Transcaucasian claims unacceptable. It 
was, moreover, the T urkish v i e w  that no p u r p o s e  could be 
served by the Trebizond talks unless Transcaucasia declared
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independence, as Turkey could have no interest in negotiat­
ing with a part of Russia.10^
Wit h  its e c o n o m y  close to standstill, its s m a l l  arm y  
poorly e q u i p p e d  and its p o p u l a t i o n  faced with h u n g e r  and 
disease, T r a n s c a u c a s i a  was in no po s i t i o n  to contest the 
disputed provinces. But few in the Seim would concede that 
the alternative to accepting the admittedly onerous terms of 
Brest-Litovsk was the certainty of an unequal and disastrous 
confl i c t  w i t h  Turkey. We are not like the f o l l o w e r s  of 
Tolstoy, Zhordania declared, who do not oppose evil:
No, whe n  d e m o c r a c y  is faced by danger, be it
internal or external, we must fight for democracy.
To take fro m  T r a n s c a u c a s i a  the r egions they seek
to take w o u l d  be to deal a m o r t a l  blo w  to all
T r a n s c a u c a s i a  as rega r d s  its cultural, e c o n o m i c
1 1 0and political relations.
U n i m p r e s s e d  by what they no doubt r e g a r d e d  as the 
p o s t u r i n g  of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  leaders, the Turks on 6th 
March served warning of their mounting impatience by seizing 
Ardahan. Sobered by this news and the pleas of the delega­
tion in Trebizond for greater flexibility, the Seim on 12th 
M a r c h  a greed to make s o m e  c o n c e s s i o n s  and to grant m o r e
independence to the leader of the delegation, Akaki Chkhen- 
111keli. On the 23rd, howev e r ,  whe n  it b e c a m e  c l e a r  that
the concessions did not extend as far as recognition of the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Turks declared their intention to
resort to force. The f o l l o w i n g  day, Chkhenkeli, w h o  like
112most of the delegation, including its Armenian section, 
was by now convinced of the futility of further resistance, 
telegrammed the Transcaucasian Commissariat. The Seim had 
to ask itself, he said, w h e t h e r  it was in a p o s i t i o n  to 
defend the provinces. If not, it must state ho w  m u c h  it wa s
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p r e p a r e d  to concede. Two days later, his t e l e g r a m  still
u n a n s w e r e d  and Turkish troops a d v a n c i n g  rapi d l y  into the
Transcaucasus, Chkhenkeli informed the Turkish delegation of
1 1 ?Transcaucasia’s readiness to accept its terms.
On the 31st March, however, following an ultimatum to 
w i t h d r a w  fro m  B a t ’umi, the Seim r e p u d i a t e d  C h k h e n k e l i ’s 
concession. R e c o g n i t i o n  of the Treaty of B r e s t - L i t o v s k ,  
declared Gegetchkori, would transform Transcaucasia into a 
T urkish province, 1 a v i e w  f o r c e f u l l y  echoed by Irakli 
Dseret’eli, who categorically rejected any possibility that 
Transcaucasia might become party to a treaty that had sig­
nalled the death of revolutionary Russia.11  ^ The frustra­
tion of exclusion from the Russian revolution, the failure 
to come to terms with which had culminated in the disastrous 
losses at B r e s t - L i t o v s k ,  now gave wa y  to bravado. D e m o ­
cratic Transcaucasia would not be stifled by Turkish i m p e r ­
ialism, D s e r e t ’eli lectured, but w o u l d  unite to s t r u g g l e  
against the c o m m o n  enemy. All parties, he o p t i m i s t i c a l l y  
declared, would fight to the last drop of blood. Zhordania 
too harangued the Seim in similar vein.
D i s g r a c e  and sla v e r y  or war - we have no o t her 
choice... Every o n e  to arms! E v e r y o n e  to the 
front! Everyone to the defence of freedom and the 
homeland!1
Within two weeks Kars and Bat’umi were in Turkish hands 
and the Commissariat, its unity seriously undermined by the 
refusal of the M u s a v a t  Party to support the w a r ^ ^  was 
forced to sue for peace. Before the Turks would grant this 
h o w e v e r  they r e p e a t e d  their d e m a n d  that T r a n s c a u c a s i a  
declare its independence, a demand which even now provoked 
the resistance of the Menshevik Caucasian Regional Committee
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which, its r e l u c t a n c e  to f o r m a l i s e  the split with Russia 
aside, no doubt feared that once s e p a r a t e d  from its f o r m e r  
protector, Transcaucasia would become the object of further 
Turkish designs.
P r e s s u r e d  by the p r o v i n c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  however, 
many of whose territories were already under Turkish attack, 
the c o m m i t t e e  gave w a y  and on 6th April voted by nine to one 
in favour of independence. D espite his recent j i n goistic 
appeal for the defence of the rather nebulous concept of the 
"homeland" Zhordania abstained, arguing that it was essen­
tial that there should first be an agreement on recognition 
of borders.^ ^ ®
On the 9th, whe n  the issue was d ebated in the Seim, the 
Menshevik faction s o m e w h a t  u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  (Zhordania,
I 1 Q
R a m i s h v i l i ,  C h k h e i d z e  and Dseret'eli failed to speak) 7 
d e c l a r e d  its support for independence. R e f l e c t i n g  the 
party’s mood, A. Arsenidze maintained that the hostility of 
both B o l s h e v i k  Russia and the O t t o m a n  E m p i r e  had fo r c e d  
Transcaucasia to declare independence in order to save its
•t o n
own revolution. Such a step, he said, m ight n e ver have
been necessary had Russian democracy not been so divided, an 
argument taken up by fellow Menshevik Oniashvili who added 
that one of the rea s o n s  why the issue had a r i s e n  for the 
first time at this moment was the reaction being committed 
in Russia in the name of social-democracy. The alternative 
to i n d e p endence, he claimed, was for T r a n s c a u c a s i a  to be 
caught in the civil war sweeping Russia. ^
Now that the Georgians had joined the Muslim factions 
in support of i n d e p e n d e n c e  - though for quite d i f f e r e n t  
r ea s o n s  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  - the A r m e n i a n s ,  f e a r f u l  of the 
prospect of isolation, also felt compelled to join, leaving
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only the SRs and Kadets in o p p o s i t i o n . 122 On 10th April, 
following the election by the Seim of a new government and 
the appointment of Chkhenkeli as Prime Minister in place of 
Gegetchkori, a statement was promulgated to all the powers 
a n n o u n c i n g  T r a n s c a u c a s i a ’s d e c l a r a t i o n  of independence.122 
It was, said a meeting of the Regional Centre of Soviets on 
the same day,
...the sole wa y  out of the m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l
situation facing the entire country. 12Zf
Zhordania, among other leading Mensheviks, viewed the 
course of events with evident misgivings. Since the summer 
of 1917 he had a d v o c a t e d  the f o r m a t i o n  of a T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
federation, but had done so on the assumption that its ties 
wit h  Russia and the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d e m o c r a c y  w o u l d  r e m a i n  
undisturbed. Instead,, the formation of the Transcaucasian 
Federal Repub l i c  less than a year later s erved both to 
underline the separation from Russia and the further erosion 
of the h o p e s  e n g e n d e r e d  by the F e b r u a r y  R e v o l u t i o n .  
Z h o r d a n i a  was not alone in f e a r i n g  that the d e c l a r a t i o n  of 
i n d e p e n d e n c e  w o u l d  signal not the b e g i n n i n g  of a p e r i o d  of 
national regeneration but rather the exposure of Transcau­
casia to Turk i s h  i m p e r i a l  a m b i t i o n  and the p r o s p e c t  of 
degeneration as a provincial outpost of the Ottoman Empire.
Although Turkey announced its recognition of Transcau­
casia on 13th April, 12^ it r a p i d l y  b e c a m e  a p p a r e n t  that 
such c o n c e r n  was w e l l - f o u n d e d .  On 28th April in B a t ’umi, 
the site p r o v o c a t i v e l y  c hosen by the Turks as the l o c a t i o n  
for the next set of negotiations on border demarcation, the 
Turkish d e l e g a t i o n  a n n o u n c e d  that Turkey was no longer
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satisfied with its gains from Brest-Litovsk and that it had
pr e p a r e d  a n e w  treaty w h i c h  laid c l a i m  to A k h a l t s i k h e  and
A k h a l k ’a l a k ’i districts, the town and most of the d i s t r i c t
of Alexandropol, most of Etchmiadzin district and the Kars -
Alexandropol - Julfa railway, to most, in fact, of what was
left of Armenia.12® Moreover, with complete disregard for
the armistice agreed with Transcaucasia, the Turks invaded
Erevan Gubernia, taking Alexandropol on 2nd May.*12^
On 14th M a y  the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  learnt of
Turkey’s decision, made without consultation, to direct its
troops across the Transcaucasus to northern Persia using the
Aleksandropol-Julfa railway, an act which made a mockery of
its r e c o g n i t i o n  of T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  s o v e r e i g n t y . ^ 2 ® On the
20th, however, the government received still worse news in a
telegram from General Nazarbegian warning of a build up of
Turkish troops in Lore distr i c t  and an i m p e n d i n g  a t t a c k  on
Karaklis and T'bilisi.^2^
With the Turks now threatening to overrun Transcaucasia
r e g a r d l e s s  of the n e g o t i a t i o n s  in B a t ’umi and to seize the
vital Baku-Bat’umi rail link, Germany, which was close to an
a g r e e m e n t  wit h  Soviet Ru s s i a  on Baku -oil e x p l o i t a t i o n  and
saw the T r a n s c a u c a s u s  as a p o t e n t i a l  passage to Asia,
decided to intervene. On the 18th, however, a German offer
to m e d i a t e  at B a t ’umi was r e j e c t e d  by the Turks who, g i v e n
G e r m a n y ’s preference for an agreement based on the terms of
B r e s t - L i t o v s k ,  could see no us e f u l  purpose to t h e m s e l v e s
1 s nfrom their ally's involvement. As matters stood, their
military and diplomatic pressure had already stretched the 
fragile unity of the new state to the point w h e r e  its
*The Gregorian calendar was introduced in Transcaucasia on 
1st May 1918
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ethnic, religious, political and class divisions threatened 
it wit h  i m m i n e n t  disi n t e g r a t i o n .  N o w h e r e  was this more 
ap p a r e n t  than in Bat'umi, w h e r e  the Azeri m e m b e r s  of the 
T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  d e l e g a t i o n  had mad e  k n o w n  their r e f u s a l  to 
become involved in military action against Turkey, defensive 
or otherwise, and its support for Ottoman ambitions in the 
T r anscaucasus. Thus Hajinskii, the leader of the Azeri 
group, expressed the view that Turkey's territorial demands 
did not impinge on Transcaucasia's vital interests, an opin­
ion that can scarcely have endeared him to either his Geor-
1 "3 I
gian or his A r m e n i a n  colleagues. The latter, m o r e o v e r
complained that the Azeris were persistently undermining the 
delegation's plans by i n f o r m i n g  the Turks of the d e l e g a ­
tion's private deliberations.
As the p o l i t i c a l  div i s i o n s  in T r a n s c a u c a s i a  cam e  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  to a s s u m e  n a t i o n a l  form so too did r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  the A r m e n i a n s  and G e o r g i a n s  deteriorate. D e s p i t e  
the c o m m o n  danger, the u n d e r c u r r e n t  of i l l - f e e l i n g  that 
d i v i d e d  the t w o  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  the 
Georgians gained control of the T'bilisi city administration 
in 1917, p r e v e n t e d  them f r o m  uniting, even in adversity. 
Thus shortly after the declaration of Transcaucasian inde­
pendence, when Chkhenkeli ordered the surrender of Kars in 
c o m p l i a n c e  wit h  the B r e s t - L i t o v s k  treaty, the A r m e n i a n s  
acc u s e d  him of t r e a c h e r y  and i n i t i a l l y  r efused to serve in 
the same cabinet as "that perfidious Georgian".1 ^  Despite 
their rapid abandonment of this position, the atmosphere of 
mutual recrimination it engendered did nothing to facilitate 
the search for common ground in Bat'umi.
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Faced by the a p p a r e n t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of the M u s a v a t  
Party to cause the b r e a k - u p  of the federation, and its 
b e h i n d - t h e - s c e n e s  m a c h i n a t i o n s  in Bat'umi, the G e o r g i a n  
members of the Transcaucasian delegation, led by Chkhenkeli, 
began to take the v i e w  that in such c i r c u m s t a n c e s  G e o r g i a  
might have to co n s i d e r  d e c l a r i n g  its own independence. 
Aw a r e  that a m e r e  d e c l a r a t i o n  w o u l d  not prevent f u r t h e r  
territorial encroachments by the Turks, the Georgians opened 
secret n e g o t i a t i o n s  with G e n e r a l  Von Lossow, the G e r m a n  
military attache to Turkey, and the leading German represen-
1 Q  ”3
tative at the Bat'umi talks.
Called to Bat'umi on 21st Ma y  to a p p r o v e  the latest 
shift in events, Zho r d a n i a  was q u i c k l y  p e r s u a d e d  that the 
Azeri position had undermined the unity of Transcaucasia and 
that Georgia now had to seek its own way out of the crisis:
Consequently, the declaration of Georgian indepen­
dence was placed on the order of the day. This 
was completely unexpected and wholly unforeseen.
How to get it passed in our revolutionary organi­
sations became a major headache.
His mind already made up, Zhordania dismissed a sugges­
tion by A. Khatisian, the leading Armenian politician at the 
talks, that if Georgia and Armenia were to perish, it would 
be b etter if they did so together, as a "cry of d e s p a i r "  - 
w h i c h  indeed it w a s Y e t  this s o m e w h a t  c o n t e m p t u o u s  
r e s p o n s e  also r e f l e c t e d  the very d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
c o n f r o n t i n g  the t w o  n a t i o n s .  G e o r g i a ,  t h a n k s  to its 
str a t e g i c  position, m i n e r a l  w e a l t h  and the B a k u - B a t ' u m i  
railway, was on the verge of an agreement guaranteeing its 
independence with Germany, while Armenia having no immediate 
allies to turn to and no m i n e r a l  w e a l t h  to speak of, had
a l r e a d y  lost 75 per cent of its t e r r i t o r y  to the Turks. 
G ermany, moreover, was r e l u c t a n t  to b e c o m e  i n v o l v e d  in
A r m e n i a ,  r e g a r d i n g  it as a p u r e l y  T u r k i s h  s p h e r e  of
influence.136
On the 22nd Zhordania returned to T ’bilisi leaving the 
G e o r g i a n  d e l e g a t i o n  in Bat'umi to draft an a g r e e m e n t  wit h  
Germany and a declaration of independence, whilst he tried 
to c o n v i n c e  the party of its need. The draft was f i n a l l y  
s u b m i t t e d  for d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  the G e r m a n s  on the 2 4 t h , 1 ^  
the same day that Zhordania succeeded in convincing a joint 
meeting of the T'bilisi and Regional Social-Democratic Party 
C o m m i t t e e s  that the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of the Turkish m i l i t a r y  
threat and the Musavat's c o n n i v a n c e  with the Turks in
Bat'umi made it essential that Georgia declare its independ­
ence and accept G e r m a n  protection. The T r a n s c a u c a s i a n
1 TO
Federation, he said, was living out its last days.
The following day, Von Lossow informed the Transcauca­
sian d e l e g a t i o n  in Bat'umi that bec a u s e  of the i m p a s s e  in 
the talks and Turkey's rejection of his arbitration, he was 
returning to Berlin for i n s t r u c t i o n s . 139 In fact, he sailed 
no fur t h e r  than P'ot'i, where, f o l l o w i n g  an a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  
the Georgians, the p r o v i s i o n a l  d o c u m e n t s  w o r k e d  out in 
Bat'umi were signed. In T'bilisi, meanwhile, any lingering 
uncertainty over the wisdom or desirability of the move was 
d i s p e l l e d  by an u l t i m a t u m  fro m  the Turks to a c c e d e  to even 
g r e a t e r  t e r r i t o r i a l  d e m a n d s  or go to w a r . 1Zf0 At an 
emergency session of the Seim called to determine a response 
to this new crisis, Irakli Dseret'eli made no f u r t h e r  
attempt to conceal Georgia's intentions. Yet he could find 
nothing to celebrate in the step Georgia was about to take,
s e e i n g  it, like most of his colleagues, as a n o t h e r  blow,
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f o l l o w i n g  the c o l l a p s e  of the F e b r u a r y  Revolution, to the 
hopes of democracy in the Transcaucasus. Now that the unity 
of Transcaucasia had demonstrably been shown not to exist, 
G e o r g i a  found itself c o m p e l l e d  either to accept O t t o m a n  
tutelage or create its own state organism. In such c i r c u m ­
stances, Dseret'eli explained to the Seim, Georgian indepen­
dence was both a m a t t e r  of d e m o c r a c y  and the p h y s i c a l  
survival of the n a t i o n . 1^ 1
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Georgian M e n ­
sheviks felt very c o n s c i o u s  that their c r e d e n t i a l s  as 
socialist internationalists had been called into question by 
their decision, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as it i n v o l v e d  a c c e p t i n g  the 
patronage of imperialist Germany. In anticipation of such 
c r i t i c i s m  Z h o r d a n i a  and D s e r e t ’eli w r o t e  to the M e n s h e v i k  
C en t r a l  C o m m i t t e e  e x p l a i n i n g  the d e c i s i o n  and u n d e r l i n i n g  
their continuing commitment to internationalism.
We k n o w  that in f u l f i l l i n g  these duties we shall 
tread the sam e  paths as we have until n o w  been 
t r e a d i n g  to g e t h e r  wit h  you. On this we base our 
complete confidence that the old ideological bonds 
will not be weakened by the blows which history is 
d e a l i n g  us and you, T r a n s c a u c a s i a  and Russia. 
However, comrades, we do wan t  you to u n d e r s t a n d  
c o m p l e t e l y  the full trag e d y  of our situation... 
But i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the way s  in w h i c h  h i s t o r y  is 
f o r c i n g  us to go, our u l t i m a t e  g o a l  r e m a i n s  
unchanged. And in the fixed c o n s c i o u s n e s s  that 
this goal - s o c i a l i s m  - can only be a t t a i n e d  by 
the united powers of the proletariat of the whole 
world, we place our hopes on the st r u g g l e  of d e m o ­
cracy throughout the world.1Zf2
On the a f t e r n o o n  of 26th May the Sei m  p r o n o u n c e d  its 
final decree on the br e a k - u p  of the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  F e d e r a ­
tion and its o w n  dissolution. An hour later, the G e o r g i a n  
N a t i o n a l  Soviet g a t h e r e d  w i t h o u t  pom p  or c e r e m o n y  to hear 
Noe Z h o r d a n i a  d eclare G e o r g i a ’s independence. In a sp e e c h
48 1
devoid of n a t i o n a l i s t  rhetoric, the M e n s h e v i k  leader 
s t u d i o u s l y  a v o i d e d  r e f e r e n c e  to the c r e a t i o n  of a nation 
state, described the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federa­
tion as a tragedy and expressed his conviction that it would 
be revived. Conscious too that the same national rivalries 
that had undermined the federation might well do the same to 
Ge o r g i a  and, no doubt, that his own v i e w s  on the n a t i o n a l  
question would now be under closer scrutiny, Zhordania went 
out of his way to reassure the national minorities - and the 
A r m e n i a n s  in p a r t i c u l a r  - that their int e r e s t s  w o u l d  be 
protected. It had been the " f u n d a m e n t a l h i s t o r i c a l  a m b i ­
tion" of the Georgian people, he declared, to coordinate its 
interests with those of other peoples.1^
Only the N a t i o n a l - D e m o c r a t s  s h o w e d  no mi s g i v i n g s .  
S p e a k i n g  on t h e i r  b e h a l f  in the S e i m ,  G i o r g i  G v a z a v a  
expressed the party’s satisfaction that the Social-Democrats 
had at last e m b a r k e d  upon the correct path, the path of 
state construction on a national basis.
482
Footnotes
1 . 
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8. 
9.
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 .
13. 
14 .
15.
16 .
17.
18.
19.
20.
21 . 
22. 
23.
G r i g o l  U r a t a d z e ,  V o s p o m i n a n i y a , o p . c i t ., p. 271.
S .F . Jones, G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m ocracy: In Opposition
and P o w er 1 8 9 2 - 1 9 2 1 , (Ph.D. thesis, London School of 
Economics, 1984), p. 291.
S.G. S h a umian, Iz b r a n n y e  pr o i z b e d e n i y a ,  op.cit., pp. 
485-86.
K. Tsintsadze, ’Chemi Mogonebani’ (My reminiscences) in 
Revolutsiis M a t i a n e , 1924, no. 2-3, p. 248.
A. Surgudalze, 'Omis s i d z n e l e e b i  da s a m e u r n e o  n g r e v a  
sak’art'veloshi' (The difficulties of the war and econ­
omic destruction in Georgia) in Sak’art ’ velos istoriis 
narkvevebi, T.6 (T'bilisi, 1972), p. 377.
I b i d ., p . 378.
Ibid. , p . 38 1 .
Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p.cit., p. 99.
Ibi d . , p . 102.
E. Akhobadze, o p.cit., p. 338.
Ibid. , p . 339.
A. B e n d i a n i s h v i l i ,  Erovn u l i  sakit'khi, op.cit., pp. 
199-200.
I b i d ., p . 200.
E. Akhobadze, op.cit. , p. 383.
Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli , .op . c i t . , p. 103.
D. Vachnadze, K ’art’uli erovnuli dzirebi da rusuli bol- 
shevizmi (Georgian National Roots and Russian Bolshev­
ism) (Munich, 1957), p. 59.
Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, op . c i t . , pp. 103-05.
Ibi d . , p . 106.
G. Uratadze, Q b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i y a  Gruzinskoi 
Demokraticheskoi Respubliki (Munich, 1956), p. 16.
G. Zhvaniya, Pobeda v e l i k o g o  O k t y a b r y a  v Z a k a v k a z ’e 
(T’bilisi, 1977), p. 17.
I b i d ., p . 17.
Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p . c i t . , p. 111.
G. Uratadze, Qbrazovanie i konsolidatsia, op.cit., pp. 
20-21.
483
24. The m e m b e r s  of O z a k o m  were B.A. K h a r l a m o v  (Kadet, 
Russian), M .I . P a p a d z h a n o v  (Kadet, Armenian), M.Yu. 
Dzhafarov (Mussavat, Azeri), A.I. Tchkhenkeli (Social- 
Democrat, Georgian), and K. Abashidze (Socialist-Feder­
alist, Georgian).
25. Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p.cit., p. 110.
26. G. Uratadze, Q b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a , op . c i t ., p. 
1 6.
27. Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p.cit., p. 112.
28. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o 1 idatsia , op.cit., p. 
17.
29. E. Akhobadze, o p . c i t . , p. 388.
30. F. K a z e m z a d e h ,  The S t r u g g l e  for T r a n s c a u c a s i a  (New 
York, 1951 ), p. 42.
31. S.M. Kvachadze, T b i l i s s k i e  B o l ’sheviki v 1917 godu 
(T’bilisi, 1977) , p. 33.
32. G. R t s khiladze, A m i e r k a v k a s i i s  t’vit’m m a r t ’veloba (The 
Self-Government of Transcaucasia) (T’bilisi, 1917), p. 
23.
33. A. Bendianishvili, Erovnuli s a kit’k h i , o p . c i t . ,' p . 208.
34. U. Sidamonidze, Sak’art’veloshi burzhuaziul-demokratiu- 
li modzraoba da sotsialisturi garmarjvebis istoriogra- 
p’ia 1917-1921 ds.ds. (The B o u r g e o i s - D e m o c r a t i c  M o v e ­
ment in Georgia and a Historiography of the Victory of 
the Soc i a l i s t  R e v o l u t i o n  1917-21) (T’bilisi, 1970), p. 
185.
35. A. A b r a m i s h v i l i ,  G r u z i n s k a y a  p e r i o d i k a , o p . c i t ., p. 
183.
36. I b i d ., p. 186. The title of the paper later c h a n g e d  to 
Khalkis T ♦a visup’leba (The Freedom of the People).
37. I. Gomart'eli, S a k *a r t ’v e 1 os t e r i t o r i a l u r i  a v t o n o mia 
anu erovnuli teritorialuri t’vit’m m a r t ’veloba (The Te r ­
r i t o r i a l  A u t o n o m y  of G e o r g i a  or N a t i o n a l  T e r r i t o r i a l  
Self-Government) (T’bilisi, 1917), p. 3.
38. I b i d ., p . 38.
39. Ibi d ., pp. 40-42.
40 . I b i d ., p . 30.
41. U. Sidamonidze, op. c i t . , pp. 1 62-67.
42. Noe Zhordania, Za dva goda (1917-19) (Tiflis, 1919), p. 
28.
43. E r t ’o b a , no. 77, 21.6.17.
484
44. I. M i r t s k h u l a v a ,  'Sak'art1velos b o l s h e v i k e b i s  brdz o l a  
burzhuaziuli da dsvrilburzhuaziuli partiebis natsional- 
isturi p o l i t i k i s  d s i n a a g h m d e g  o k t o m b r i s  r e v o l u t s i i s  
morazadebisa da g a t a r e b i s  periodshi' (The s t r u g g l e  of 
the B o l s h e v i k s  of G e o r g i a  aga i n s t  the n a t i o n a l i s t  
policy of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois parties in 
the period of the p r e p a r a t i o n  and c a r r y i n g  out of the 
October revolution) in M a t s n e , 1965, no. 3, p. 4.
45. E r t ’o b a , no. 77, 21.6.17.
46. Z h o r d a n i a  r e c o m m e n d e d  that in m i x e d  areas w i t h i n  the 
three n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m o u s  t e r r i t o r i e s  in w h i c h  there 
wer e  s u b s t a n t i a l  n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  n a t i o n a l  units 
should be set up to deal w i t h  cultu r a l  affairs, w h i l e  
"territorial” matters should come under the authority 
of a joint a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  w h ich w o u l d  con d u c t  its 
a f f a i r s  in the l a n g u a g e  of the n a t i o n a l  a u t o n o m o u s  
t e r r i t o r y  in w h i c h  it was situated. W h i l e  the SFs 
continued to advocate the same federal solutions as in 
the past, Grigol Rtskhiladze had also begun to advocate 
n a t i o n a  1 - c u 1 1 u r a  1 a u t o n o m y  for m i n o r i t i e s  w i t h i n  
G e o r g i a .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  w o u l d  h a v e  to o r g a n i s e  
national-cultural and educational affairs at their own 
expense. Intere s t i n g l y ,  R t s k h i l a d z e  took a s i m i l a r  
view to Zhordania in 1917 on the principles to be used 
in establishing national borders.
47. M. F e r r o ,  The R u s s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n  of 1917 (London, 
1 970), pp. 1 37-6 1.
48. D. Vachnadze, o p . c i t . , p. 41.
4 9. B o r !ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii. Dokumenty
A  m a terialy (T'bilisi, 1958), p. 80.
50. Noe Zhordania, Za dva g o d a , op.cit. , p. 17.
51. R.P. B r o w d e r  and A.F. K e r e n s k y  (eds), _The R u s s i a n P r o ­
visional Government of 1917, Vol. 1 (Stanford, Califor­
nia, 1961), nos. 349-50.
52. L. Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Lon­
don, 1979), p. 524.
53. Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p . c i t . , p. 113.
54. Ibid. , p. 115.
55. Ibi d ., p . 116.
56. G. Zhvaniya, Pobeda velikogo Oktyabrya, o p . c i t . , p. 39.
57. " O t s d a k h u t ’i ivnisis m i t i n g i  n a d z a l a d e v s h i "  (The 25th 
June m e e t i n g  in Nadzaladevi), R e v o l u t s i i s  M a t i a n e , 
1927, No. 1, p. 84. Cited by S. Jones, op.cit., p. 
323.
58. R. Kaladze, ’Mushat’a k'art’uli zhurnal-gazetebis isto- 
r i a ’ (A h i s t o r y  of the w o r k e r s ’ G e o r g i a n  p apers and 
journals), R e v o l u t s i i s  M a t i a n e  1923, no. 3, p. 46.
485
59. S.M. Kvachadze, T i f l i s s k i e  B o l ' s h e v i k i, o p .cit., pp. 
116-18. At a joint meeting of the Mensheviks and Bol­
sheviks on 7th July, it was ag r e e d  to put f o r w a r d  a 
joint list of candidates. The T ’bilisi Bolshevik C o m ­
mittee, however, s u b s e q u e n t l y  put a stop to this.
After their success in the elections, the M e n s h e v i k s  
sent a letter to the B o l s h e v i k  o r g a n i s a t i o n  p r o p o s i n g  
that they coordinate their activities in the Duma.
60. U. S i d a m o n i d z e ,  o p.cit., p. 219. At the M o s c o w  State 
C o n f e r e n c e  in August, C h k h e n k e l i  had said that the
Georgian national question did not exist and that Geo r ­
gians' ideal was a united Russia. Only one m e m b e r  of 
the Georgian delegation had suggested that Georgia had 
its own a i m s .
6 1 . I b i d ., p . 239 .
62. I b i d ., p. 186.
63. Ibid. , p . 186.
64. G. Zhvaniya, op.cit. , p. 85.
65. Noe Zhordania, Za dva g o d a , o p . c i t . , p. 42.
66. Ibid . , p . 47 .
67. Ibid . , p . 47.
68. Ibid. , p . 47 .
69. Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkaz'ya
i Gruzii (Tiflis, 1919), p. 2.
70. The Public Safety Committee consisted of four represen­
tatives f r o m  O z a k o m  and the m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  
three each from the T'bilisi Soviet and Regional Soviet 
of Soldiers' Deputies, two each from the Regional Sov­
iet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies and the T'bilisi 
Duma, one from the Transcaucasian Railway Organisation 
and one each fro m  the Bolshevik, M e n s h e v i k ,  Dashnak, 
SF, SR, Musavat and other parties.
71. S.M. Kvachadze, op.cit. , pp. 179-80.
72. Ibid. , p. 182.
73. Ibi d . , p. 185.
74. Ibid. , p. 181 .
75. G. Zhvaniya, o p .c i t . , p. 131.
76. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a , op.cit., p.
27.
77. D o k u m enty i m a t e r i a l y , o p . c i t ., no. 6, pp. 7-8. The
following were appointed as commissars in the new body:
486
E. Gegetchkori Chairman and Commissar of
Labour and Foreign Affairs (Menshevik)
Commissar of InternalA. Chkhenkeli
Affairs
Commissar for Military and 
Naval Affairs 
Commissar for Finance 
Commissar for Education 
and Justice
Commissar for Trade and 
Industry
Commissar for Roads and 
Communications 
Commissar for Land 
Commissar for Production 
and Supply
Commissar for Social 
Security
Commissar for State 
Control
Commissar for Education
(Menshevik)
D. Donskoi
K h . Karchikyan 
S h . Meskhishvili
(SR)
(Dashnak)
(SF)
M. Dzhafarov
(M u s a v a t )
K h . Melik-Aslanov
A. Neruchev 
G. Ter-Gazaryan
(K a d e t ) 
(SR)
(Social- 
D e m o c r a t )
A. Ogandzhanyan
(D a s h n a k )
Kh.B. Khas-Mamedov
F. Khan Khoiski
(M u s a v a t ) 
(M u s a v a t )
78. Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit. , no. 7, p. 8.
79. T. S w i e t o c h o w s k i , ’National consciousness and political 
o r i e n t a t i o n s  in Azerbaijan, 1905-1920', in T r a n s c a u ­
casia, N a t i o n a l i s m and Social Change (Univ. of M i c h i ­
gan, 1983), pp. 219-20.
80. R.G. Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence, 
1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1 967), pp. 90 — 91 •
81. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a ,  op.cit., p.
38.
82. Ibid. , p . 37.
83. D. Vachnadze, o p.cit. , p. 42.
84. Noe Zhordania, Za dva g o d a , op . c i t . , p. 55.
85. V. Chubinidze, M o g o n e b a , op. c i t ., pp. 30-31.
86. G.S. Akopyan, Stepan Shaumyan (M o s k v a , 1973), p. 150.
87. V. Chubinidze, o p.cit. , p. 32.
88. Noe Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, o p . c i t ., p. 118.
89. K. Tsintsadze, 'Chemi mogonebani', op . c i t ., in R e v o l u ­
tsiis Mati a n e , 1924, no. 4-5, p. 225.
90. G. Zhvaniya, op.cit. , p. 148.
91.'’ S. Jones, op . c i t . , p. 359.
92. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a ,  op.cit., p.
42.
93. Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit. , p. 15.
487
94. N. Z h o r d a n i a ,  C h e m i  d s a r s u l i ,  o p .c i t ., p. 122.
95. E.H. Carr, T h e B o l s h e v i k  Revolution, 1917-1923, V o 1. 1
(London, 1973), p. 127. It was a s u s p i c i o n  s t r o n g l y  
confirmed by a resolution published in Izvestiya of 4th 
January 1918 from the Soviet Central Executive C o m m i t ­
tee d e c l a r i n g  that all p o w e r  in the R ussian r e p u b l i c  
belonged to the Soviets, and that many attempt to usurp 
that power would be crushed.
96. Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit., no. 15.
97. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i konsol i d a t s i a , op.cit., p .
32.
98. Noe Zhordania, Za dva goda, op.cit., p. 60.
99. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i kon s o l i d a t s i a , op.cit., p .
33.
100. I b i d . , p . 44.
101 . Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit., no. 26, pp. 41-42.
102. Ibid. , no. 31, p . 47.
103. I b i d ., n o . 34,
104. Z. Avalishvili, The Independence of Georgia in Interna-
tional Politics 1918-1921 (London, 1940), p . 27.
105. Noe Zhordania, Za dva goda, op.cit., p. 65.
106. Ibid. , p . 74 .
107. Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit., no. 45, pp. 73-83.
108. Ibid. , n o . 57, p . 117.
109. I b i d ., n o . 58, p . 119.
110. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a , op.cit., p.
48.
111. I b i d ., p p . 52-55.
112. D o k u m e n t y  i materialy, op.cit., no. 54, pp. 144-46.
The leader of the A r m e n i a n  sect i o n  of the d e l e g a t i o n  
said that in the existing conditions it would be e x p e d ­
ient to move t o w a r d s  the B r e s t - L i t o v s k  treaty. If 
Turkey r eally wer e  to oc c u p y  Bat'umi and Kars r e g i o n s  
then in the future T r a n s c a u c a s i a  could a p p e a l  for the 
right of these areas to self-determination.
113. Ibid., no. 77, p. 160.
114. G. Uratadze, O b r a z o v a n i e  i k o n s o l i d a t s i a , op.cit., p .
58.
115. I b i d ., p . 59 .
488
116. S. Jo n es ,  o p . c i t . , p. 373.
117. The party r e f u s e d  to i nvolve Azeris in the fighting, 
arguing that their religious ties would not permit them 
to fight a gainst the Turks, a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  given 
little c r e d e n c e  by the G e o r g i a n s  and A r m enians. D e ­
spite som e  r e s e r v a t i o n s  about union w i t h  Turkey, the 
M u s a v a t  party appears to have a l i g n e d  itself wit h  the 
imperial ambitions of the Ottoman empire.
118. Noe Zhordania, Chemi d sarsuli, op.cit. , pp. 126-27.
119. W.H. Roobol, Tsereteli - A Democrat in the Russian Rev­
o l u t i o n  (The Hague, 1976), p. 191. Dseret'eli later 
e x p l a i n e d  this in a reply to a q u e s t i o n  in the Seim: 
"In an a t t a c k  the leaders go ahead, but in a retreat 
they bring up the rear; the d e c l a r a t i o n  of i n d e p e n d ­
ence is a retreat and a defeat of the proleta r i a t ,  and 
it was impossible for me to give an address".
120. Dokumenty i materialy, op.cit. , no. 99, pp. 215-18.
121. I b i d ., p . 218.
122. The SRs and Kadets warned against Transcaucasian inde­
pendence, arguing that no party had advocated it prior 
to the attack by Turkey and that the move was merely a 
rash r e s p o n s e  to e x t e r n a l  pressure. There was, they 
m a i n t a i n e d ,  no desire for i n d e p e n d e n c e  a m o n g  the 
people.
12 3. I b i d ., no. 108, p. 229. *
124. Ibid. , p. 228.
125. Ibi d ., no. 122, p. 253.
126. Z. Avalishvili, op.cit. , pp. 35-36 .
127. D o k u m enty i m a t e r i a l y , o p.cit., no. 124, pp. 256-57. 
Georgian General Odishelidze complained of Muslim bands 
claiming to be Turkish detachments terrorising Georgian 
villages in the area of Akhaltsikhe. If they are Turk­
ish, he wrote, tell them to stop, and if they are not, 
allow us to wipe them out.
128. I b i d . , no. 133, pp. 269-70.
129. Ibid. , no. 150, p. 302.
130. The Turks also suspected that the Germans were ready to 
concede Russian control of Baku.
131. F. Kazemzadeh, o p . c i t . , p. 114.
132. R.G. Hovanni s i a n ,  The Re p u b l i c  of A r m enia. Vol.1 The 
First Year, 1918-1919 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), 
p. 27.
133. Z. Avalishvili, o p.cit., p. 43.
489
134. Noe Z h o r d a n i a ,  C h e m i  d s a r s u l i ,  o p . c i t .  , p. 128.
135. Ibid. , p. 128.
136. F. K a z e m z a d e h ,  o p . c i t ., p. 147. E x p l a i n i n g  Germany's 
motives, G e n e r a l  Von Ludendorff, Hindenburg's aide 
during the war wrote: "It had become essential for us 
to sho w  a st rong hand in this di s t r i c t  - not m e r e l y  b e ­
cause we hoped to secure some military assistance from 
this quarter, but also in order to o b t a i n  r a w  m a t e r i ­
als. That we could not rely on Turkey in this m a t t e r  
had once again been d e m o n s t r a t e d  by her conduct in 
Bat'umi, where she claimed the right to retain all the 
stocks for herself. We could expect to get oil f r o m  
Baku only if we helped ourselves". In Ludendorff's Own 
Story Vol.2, p. 302.
137. Z. Avalishvili, o p . c i t . , p. 52.
138. N. Zhordania, Chemi dsarsuli, op.cit., p. 129. D o k u m e n ­
ty i materialy, o p . c i t . , no. 157, p. 307 .
139. Z. Avalishvili, o p .c i t . , p . 55.
140. Dokumenty i materialy, o p.cit. , no. 159, pp. 309-10.
141. Ibid. , no. 161, pp. 317-30.
142. S t i m m e n  aus Russ l a n d , Ein Brief an das C e n t r a l c o m i t e
der Russiche Sozial-demokratische Arbeitpartei von N.N. 
D s c h o r d a n i j a  und Ir. Zeretelli, 2nd June 1918, in W.H. 
Roobol, o p.cit. , p. 195.
143. G. Uratadze, Obrazovanie i konsolidatsia, op.cit., pp. 
76-77.
144. Ibid. , p. 79.
490
Chapter Seven 
Independence: A Struggle for Survival
7. 1 Building the State: Campaign for National Unity
G e o r g i a n  r e l u c t a n c e  to e m b r a c e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  in 1918 
reflected the conviction prevalent among the intelligentsia 
since the mid-19th century that while the nature of Russia's 
relationship with Georgia had to be changed the relationship 
itself, which was considered crucial to the preservation of 
Georgia's ties with Europe, had to be maintained. It was a 
view too that had been considerably strengthened since the 
b e g i n n i n g  of the 20th c e n t u r y  by the close i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
not just of much of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  but also of the 
G e o r g i a n  p e a s a n t r y  and nascent w o r k i n g  class w i t h  the 
R uss i a n  s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  m o v e m e n t .  This sense of unity, 
w h i c h  reached its peak in the i m m e d i a t e  a f t e r m a t h  of the 
F e b r u a r y  r e v o l u t i o n  w a s  r e i n f o r c e d  by the G e o r g i a n s  
atavistic fear of the threat posed, in Zhordania's words, to 
their "ethnographic existence" by the Turks.
Against this, however, it is clear that the sense of 
n a t i o n a l  a w a r e n e s s  for w h i c h  the t 'e r g d a l e u l n i  and their 
successors had struggled, and which in the first decades of 
the 20th century had already given rise to a new generation 
of a r t i s t i c  and liter a r y  talent, b e c a m e  more a s s e r t i v e  
throughout the course of 1917. In part this can be ascribed 
to the frustration caused by the failure of the Provisional 
Government to end the war and settle the land question, its 
a ppar e n t  i n s e n s i t i v i t y  to the n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  of the 
m i n o r i t y  p eoples of the f o r m e r  e m p i r e  and its e v i d e n t  
reluctance to make concessions towards autonomy. But more
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positively, it ma y also be a t t r i b u t e d  to the n e w  moo d  of 
confidence brought by the revolution and freedom of expres­
sion, to the feeling that national renaissance was close at 
hand, and to the Georgians' dawning awareness, witnessed in 
the T'bilisi D u m a  elections, of their a b i l i t y  to regain 
control of their own affairs through the ballot box. Thus, 
while there can be little doubt, even by 1918, that very few 
shared the N a t i o n a l  Democrats' desire for an i n dependent, 
sovereign Georgian state, it is equally clear that the n e w ­
found support for t e r r i t o r i a l  a u t o n o m y  a m o n g  the G e o r g i a n  
Mensheviks in the early autumn of 1917 reflected a popular 
demand for Georgia and Transcaucasia to have greater control 
over their own affairs.
D e s p i t e  the r e l u c t a n c e  of the G e o r g i a n  l e a d e r s h i p  to 
d ecl a r e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  the c l i m a t e  for such a d e c i s i o n  had 
been at least partially prepared by the experience first of 
the Transcaucasian Commissariat and Seim and latterly of the 
Transcaucasian Federation. On the one hand this had severed 
the u m b i l i c a l  cord l i n k i n g  G e o r g i a  to R ussia and on the 
other demonstrated the inability of the main nationalities 
of T r a n s c a u c a s i a  to c o o p e r a t e  w i t h i n  the one g o v e r n m e n t .  
M o r eover, w h i l e  it r e m a i n e d  the case that the G e o r g i a n  
M e n s h e v i k s  hoped to r estore ties wit h  Russia, they w e r e  
ready to do so only in the unlikely event of the Bolsheviks 
giving way to the Constituent Assembly.
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks' standing in Georgia and, by 
association, that of the Russians suffered a severe blow as 
a consequence of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. By conceding 
Bat'umi to the Turks, the Bolsheviks deprived the people of 
West G e o r g i a  of their mai n  e c o n o m i c  ce n t r e  and a m a j o r
source of seasonal e m p l o y m e n t .  D e p i c t e d  as t r a i t o r s  and
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Turkish agents and their credibility among the local popula­
tion at stake, ma ny B o l s h e v i k s  found t h e m s e l v e s  f orced to 
reject the terms of the treaty and support the mobilisation 
against the Turks.
A l t h o u g h  Zhordania*s o b s e r v a t i o n  in his i n a u g u r a l  
speech that Georgia had been forced to declare independence 
in order to shelter f r o m  the "storm of h istory" and the 
s t a t e m e n t  w i t h i n  the Act of I n d e p e n d e n c e  i t self that 
p r e s s u r e  fro m  ex t e r n a l  forces had made it " i m p e r a t i v e l y  
necessary" for Georgia to create its own political structure 
p o i n t  to the c o n t i n u i n g  r e g r e t  f e l t  by m a n y  G e o r g i a n
p
Mensheviks at the course of events, Zhordania nevertheless 
served quick notice that the concepts of nation and national 
unity w o u l d  t h e n c e f o r t h  f e a t u r e  more p r o m i n e n t l y  in his 
plans w h e n  he r e j e c t e d  the o r i g i n a l  draft d e c l a r a t i o n  of 
independence drawn up by Giorgi Gvazava, a National-Democrat 
and member of the Georgian National Council, on the grounds 
that it c o n t a i n e d  a r t i c l e s  on social reform. These, he 
said, were misplaced in a document that had to be acceptable
p
to all Georgians. The absence, moreover, of any reference 
to class in the final Act of Independence, and its emphasis 
on G e o r g i a ' s  l o n g  h i s t o r y  of i n d e p e n d e n c e  u n d e r l i n e d  
Zhordania's conviction that the country's survival depended 
in large part on its ability, temporarily at least, to su r ­
m o u n t  the class d i v i s i o n s  that until very r e c e n t l y  he had 
been at pains to encourage.
More fundamentally, it also reflected the conviction of 
the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  tha t  a n y  a t t e m p t  to a c h i e v e  
socialism in a country as economically backward as Georgia 
w o u l d  a n t a g o n i s e  the vast m a j o r i t y  of the p o p u l a t i o n  and
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r i s k  the p r o s p e c t  of c i v i l  war. In J u n e  Z h o r d a n i a  
e n d e a v o u r e d  to p rovide a t h e o r e t i c a l  u n d e r p i n n i n g  for the 
party's new course in an article entitled Social Democracy 
and the Organisation of P o wer. In Georgia, he wrote, social 
revolution was an aim,
...an historical perspective and not an immediate 
practical task... We are giving the state a clear 
aim: the transformation of society on a socialist
b a s i s ,  but on our w a y  we m u s t  p a s s  t h r o u g h  
unavoidable political-economic stages which h i s ­
t o r y  n e i t h e r  p e r m i t s  us to j u m p  o v e r  or go 
around...there is no doubt that all g o v e r n m e n t s  
o p e r a t i n g  w i t h i n  the co n f i n e s  of a b o u r g e o i s  
soci e t y  wil l  one wa y  or a n o t h e r  serve the i n t e r ­
ests of the bourgeoisie. There is no way that the 
Georgian state can escape or avoid this...
As Z h o r d a n i a  c o n c e d e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h i s  r a i s e d  the 
q u e s t i o n  that had c o n f r o n t e d  the M e n s h e v i k s  in R u s s i a  in 
1917: How was the party to wor k  t o w a r d s  the c r e a t i o n  of
b o u r g e o i s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h o u t  at the same t i m e  b e c o m i n g  
subordinated to the bourgeoisie and abandoning the ranks of 
social-democracy? What, in effect, would there be to dis­
tinguish the party from its bourgeois rivals? The answer, 
in Zhordania's view, lay both in the l o n g - t e r m  a i m s  of the 
party, its "historical perspective", and its commitment to 
implementing the RSDLP's minimum programme. Thus while it 
would encourage the development of a native bourgeoisie in 
the hope of expanding industrial production, it would also 
strive to ensure social p r o t e c t i o n  for the w o r k i n g  class, 
the p r o p e r t y l e s s  and the poor by u sing its o w n  p o w e r  and 
that of the soviets and trade unions to mitigate the in flu­
ence of the bourgeoisie.
The government's most immediate task, however, was to 
establish its authority throughout the territory nominally
under its c ontrol and begin the p r o c e s s  of i n c u l c a t i n g  a
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sense of identification with the new state. This was parti­
cularly important as it both lacked the means to impose its 
policies through coercion and was committed to impressing on 
the population the benefits of the new state and its super­
iority over the tsarist and Bolshevik regimes. The Me n s h e ­
vik government’s survival in large part rested on the degree 
to w h i c h  it could co n v i n c e  the various social s trata to 
identify their interests with those of the state and on the 
extent to which it could induce a population that had tradi­
tionally played a passive role in the political life of the 
c o u n t r y  to b e c o m e  a c t i v e l y  involved. The gu lf that had 
s e p a r a t e d  the rule rs and the ruled, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the 
period of Russian domination, had to be bridged.
But the o b s t a c l e s  c o n f r o n t i n g  the M e n s h e v i k s  were 
enormous. Not only had the e c o n o m y  been ruined by w a r  and 
revolution, part of the cou n t r y  was occup i e d  by the Turks, 
parts wer e  c o n t e s t e d  by A r m e n i a  and Azerbaijan, n a t i o n a l  
s o v e r e i g n t y  was c o m p r o m i s e d  fro m  the outset by the tre a t y  
w i t h  Germany, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the c a p i t a l  and 
o u t l y i n g  dis t r i c t s  were a l m o s t  no n - e x i s t e n t ,  the r a i l w a y  
system was in a state of dilapidation, short of spare parts 
and oil, food was scarce, and the tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  had c o l l a p s e d  l e a v i n g  fe w wit h  e i t h e r  the 
skill or experience to fill the role of the Russian bureau­
cracy. The task too of w i n n i n g  a ctive p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  was 
complicated by the ethnic and religious divisions that split 
the c o u n t r y  and the need to s atisfy the c o m p e t i n g  e x p e c t a ­
tions of the peasantry, working class and bourgeoisie.
Anxious to avoid Russia's experience of ’’dual power" in 
1917 and determined to establish a strong central government
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able to direct G e o r g i a  t h r o u g h  the v i c i s s i t u d e s  that lay 
ahead, the Georgian Mensheviks decided markedly to curtail 
the powers of the soviets and strengthen those of the state. 
The m e r i t s  of the s oviets were great, Irakli Dseret'eli 
declared to a meeting of the Regional Soviet on June 8th,
...but they cannot e n t i r e l y  replace state power. 
Ideological organs are neither suited to transfor­
mation into state organs nor able to fulfil their 
functions.-*
Shifting the party's emphasis for the moment away from 
class struggle, the central theme of its campaign to win the 
active support of the population now became national unity, 
a concept l o n g - e s p o u s e d  by the SFs and N a t i o n a l - D e m o c r a t s  
and scor n e d  by the So c ia 1 -De mo cr a t s , but one w h i c h  in the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  the latt er felt justified in advocating. 
Soviet power, it was argued, was un s u i t e d  to a c o u n t r y  
possessing such a small proletariat, threatened to alienate 
the b o u r g e o i s i e  and thus u n d e r m i n e  Georgia's hopes for 
economic revival, and raised the possibility of a dangerous 
rift b e t w e e n  the t o w n  and c o u ntryside, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as 
i n f l a t i o n  was a l r e a d y  out of control, food in short s u p p l y  
and i n d u s t r i a l  output a l m o s t  at a stand still. The d i s p r o ­
p o r t i o n a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of Guri a n s  in the s o v i e t s  too 
risked exacerbating regional antagonisms and hampering the 
drive to weld the country's disparate elements into a united 
body.
The mai n  m e a s u r e  of the Mensheviks' a c h i e v e m e n t ,  
Konstantine Kandelaki, the Georgian Minister of Finance was 
later to write, was whether it,
...helped strengthen Georgian independence, was in 
accord with the aspirations of the great majority 
of the Georgian people and, at the same time, was
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a veni c i e  or progr e s s  as t m s  was and still is 
u n d e r s t o o d  by s i m i l a r  parties - d e m o c r a t s  and 
socialists - in the advanced countries, in Western 
Europe...or w h e t h e r  e v e r y t h i n g  that h a p p e n e d  in 
our c o u n t r y  was a mer e  r e f l e c t i o n  of the Russian 
revolution, w i t h o u t  a g r o u n d i n g  or f o u n d a t i o n  in 
our own country - an experiment without a future.
E x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  the s o v i e t s ,  the 
Mensheviks took the first steps towards ensuring their sub­
ordination to the state when on 8th June at a joint meeting 
of the party regional committee, the T ’bilisi Soviet and the 
staff of the Red Guard, it was a g reed that the soviets 
should transfer all armed forces still under their control 
to the govern m e n t .  A little over two w e eks later, on 24th 
June, the process was almost complete. Zhordania was able 
to an n o u n c e  to the N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  that the sovi e t s  had 
passed a resolution ceding all their executive functions to 
the g o v e r n m e n t  and that the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of e x e c u t i v e  
authority in one body had begun.
Conscious, h owever, that there was some d i s s a t i s f a c ­
tion, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a m o n g  the T'bilisi workers, w i t h  the 
d o w n g r a d i n g  of the role of the soviets, the M e n s h e v i k  
leaders persuaded Zhordania to abandon his original inten­
tion to confine his activities to party affairs and use his 
immense personal standing among the workers and peasantry to 
se cure their s u p p o r t .  ^ That s a m e  day, Z h o r d a n i a  p u b l i c l y  
e n d o r s e d  the d e c i s i o n  by a c c e p t i n g  the l e a d e r s h i p  of the 
c o a l i t i o n  go v e r n m e n t .  In his a d d r e s s  to the A s s e m b l y  he 
declared that conditions demanded the creation of a strong 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  structure, a s y s t e m  of d e m o c r a t i c  local 
g o v e r n m e n t  and a r egular n a t i o n a l  army. W i t h o u t  a s t r o n g  
coercive force, the new Premier went on, the state could not 
ex i s t .
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a c c o r d i n g l y ,  o n  ^ n a . j u i y  i n e  itea o u a r a ,  w n i c n  u n u i  
then had been c o m m a n d e d  by Z h o r d a n i a  in his c a p a c i t y  as 
c h a i r m a n  of the R e g i o n a l  Soviet, was brought under his
O
c on t r o l  in his n e w  role as head of go v e r n m e n t .  By the sam e  
law, the Natio n a l  A s s e m b l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a r e g u l a r  a r m y  of 
24,000 men.^ S t r i p p e d  n o w  of most of their powers, the 
soviets were to remain in existence, but with their respons­
ibilities reduced to agitation and propaganda and the almost 
notional function, given their domination by the Mensheviks 
and Zhordania's dual role as head of g o v e r n m e n t  and Soviet 
chairman, of control of g o v e r n m e n t  behaviour. W i t h  this, 
s a i d  Z h o r d a n i a ,  a n e w  era b e g a n  in the e v o l u t i o n  of
Georgia's internal affairs, a period in which the government
1 nb e c a m e  the sole l e g i s l a t o r  and ruler. u S y m b o l i c a l l y  too 
the Red Guard was renamed the Popular Guard.
If, as Z h o r d a n i a  claimed, a n e w  era had begun, it had 
done so in the most inauspicious of circumstances. Thus one 
of the i n d e p e n d e n t  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  first acts was to sign a 
p r o v i s i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t ,  the C o n v e n t i o n  of P'ot'i, w i t h  G e r ­
many that from the very outset imposed severe limitations on 
the new state's sovereignty, for while it may have bestowed 
de facto r e c o g n i t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and for the 
m o m e n t  at least have ens u r e d  Georgia's survival, the G e o r ­
gians were forc ed to grant G e r m a n y  the right to use t h eir 
r a i l w a y s  for the tra n s p o r t  of troops and s u p p l i e s  till the 
end of the war, and e x c l u s i v e  rights to the p u r c h a s e  and 
m i n i n g  of minerals. It is evident too that d e s p i t e  the 
p u b l i c l y  p r o c l a i m e d  n e u t r a l i t y  of the T'bilisi g o v e r n m e n t
that its f r e e d o m  of m o v e m e n t  in f o r e i g n  affa i r s  was very 
1 1c ircumscribed.
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However, while German occupation can scarcely be said
to have p r o v i d e d  the most c o n d u c i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  for the
country's return to independence, it is equally true that by
its recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as the basis
for its relations with Georgia and its rapid despatch of two
battalions to help in the defence of its borders, Germany at
least p r e v e n t e d  Georgia's i n c o r p o r a t i o n  into the O t t o m a n
Empire. Thus, a l t h o u g h  on 4th June the G e o r g i a n s  were
forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Bat'umi, according
to w h i c h  they wer e  to p rovide free transit to T u r k i s h
troops, demobilise, respect the faith and customs of Muslims
and permit the pronouncement of the Ottoman Sultan's name at
12public prayer meetings, the t r eaty was never ratified. 
M oreover, G e r m a n y  took Georgia's side in c a l l i n g  for its 
r e n e g otiation. E x t r a o r d i n a r i l y ,  too, G e r m a n  tro o p s  on a 
number of occasions took an active part in repulsing incur­
sions by their Turkish a l l i e s . ^
For a short while Georgia was also able to use Germany 
to secure i n t e r n a t i o n a l  reco gnition. Thus, a c c o r d i n g  to 
Zurab Avalishvili, a member of the Georgian delegation sent 
to Berlin to secure Germany's formal recognition of Georgian 
i n dependence, the G e r m a n s  on 27th August p e r s u a d e d  the 
Bolshevik government in Russia to sign a supplement to the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk recognising Georgia's independence. 
Only Germany's defeat in the war p r e v e n t e d  its r a t i f i c a ­
tion. 1/>
Karl Kautsky, who was an a d m i r e r  of the G e o r g i a n  
socialists' a p p r o a c h  and who vis i t e d  G e o r g i a  in 1920, not 
u n j u s t i f i a b l y  ob s e r v e d  that G e o r g i a  was one of the fe w  
places in the world w h e r e  G e r m a n  s o l d i e r s  had done p r o p a ­
g a n d a  w o r k  for G e r m a n y .  T h e y  w.ent to G e o r g i a  not as
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plunderers, he said, but as
...organisers of its p r o d u c t i v e  forces, as they 
needed the Georgian products, especially ma n g a n ­
ese, and also its railways. Thus they brou g h t  to 
G e o r g i a  p r e c i s e l y  what was most l a c k i n g  in the 
country, and what it could only obtain speedily by 
f oreign assistance, n a m e l y  e c o n o m i c  o r g a n i s a ­
tion.
Desp i t e  the u nequal nature of the relat i o n s h i p ,  the 
Georgian Social-Democrats were nevertheless satisfied that 
the Germa n s ,  with a few exceptions, had h o n o u r e d  their
agreement to refrain from interference in Georgian internal
1 fc\
affairs, a point that the M e n s h e v i k  g o v e r n m e n t  went to 
s o m e  t rouble to stress in a lett er to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Socialist Bureau after the war had ended. Before long, too, 
it was to compare the German occupation very favourably with 
that of the B r i t i s h . ^
H o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  is s o m e  t r u t h  in K a u t s k y ' s  
a s s e r t i o n  that the G e r m a n s  brought a m e a s u r e  of e c o n o m i c  
organisation to Georgia, their presence in the country was 
too s h o r t - l i v e d  and the scale of the task c o n f r o n t i n g  the 
government too vast for its influence to have been any more 
than superficial. On the negative side, moreover, Georgia’s 
association with Germany, however unavoidable, combined with 
the socialist convictions of its government, appear later to 
have formed the basis of a British prejudice, particularly 
among the military command in the Transcaucasus, against the 
new state.
A more f u n d a m e n t a l  o b s t a c l e  to the a m b i t i o n s  of the 
Z h o r d a n i a  g o v e r n m e n t  than the G e r m a n  a r m y  lay in the 
e c o n o m i c  chaos it i n h e r i t e d  and which, at least w h i l e  the 
war lasted, it was largely powerless to prevent. Georgia's
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d i f f i c u l t i e s  1 n this respect wer e  no doubt e x a c e r b a t e d  by
the deliberate neglect of its industrial development in the
tsarist period and its consequent dependence on Russia for
such basic items as bread, sugar, clothes and shoes as well
as industrial goods, chemicals and medicines. Such was this
dependence, in fact, that even before the war G e o r g i a  had
only pr o d u c e d  an a v e r a g e  of 10 rubles of fact o r y  p r o d u c t s
per head a year, as against an a verage of 50 in Ru s s i a  as a
1 ftw h o l e  and 110 in Latvia. Moreover, a l t h o u g h  w h e n  the 
Russian state had needed Georgian raw materials like m a n g a ­
nese it had e nsured their exploitation, it had ta ken a 
rather different approach when it had had adequate supplies 
within European Russia itself. Thus although the exploita­
tion of T q v a r c h e l i  coal in Ap'khazet'i would have p r o v i d e d  
Georgia with a relatively cheap supply of fuel, the govern­
ment preferred to keep it reliant on coal from the Donbass. 
No w  that it was i n d e p e n d e n t  and cut off fro m  the R u s s i a n  
m a r k e t  both by the h o s t i l i t y  of the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t  and 
the state of t u r m o i l  w i t h i n  Russia, Geor g i a  was to suffer 
the consequences of its dependence particularly acutely.
V i r t u a l l y  isolated fro m  the rest of the world, the 
G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  found t h e m s e l v e s  forced to a t t e m p t  to 
s atisfy people's e x p e c t a t i o n s  and meet the cost of g o v e r n ­
ment and defence through Georgia's meagre domestic r esour­
ces, a predicament that further committed them to the policy 
of na t i o n a l  unity. If G e o r g i a  was to develop its o w n  p r o ­
ductive forces, it was argued, encouragement would have to 
be given to private i n i t i a t i v e  and the still e m b r y o n i c  
Georgian industrial and entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.
Nevertheless, the foundation of the Social-Democrat s'
support c o n t i n u e d  to be f o r m e d  by the w o r k i n g  class and
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peasantry, both of whom expected rather more from the party 
than mere appeals for unity, however justified. But social 
r e f o r m  was also ex pensive, as Z h o r d a n i a  was to point out a 
year later to the Georgian Constituent Assembly:
All this demands expenditure, great expenditure, 
and if we bear in min d  the fact that f r o m  the day 
of the Bolshevik revolution the Georgian treasury 
has not recei v e d  a single ko p e c k  from Russia, it 
is easy to i m a g i n e  our e c o n o m i c  difficulties. 
Moreover, when we declared Georgia's independence 
the treasury was completely empty...
Such costs, he went on, mi ght in d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u m ­
stances have been covered by revenue from taxation, but the 
c o l l a p s e  of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  and the g o v e r n ­
ment's i n d e c i s i o n  about what c r i t e r i a  to apply t o w a r d s  
p r o p e r t y  in its f i s c a l  p o l i c y  w e r e  p r e v e n t i n g  its 
collection, a fact that found some reflection in the revela­
tion that in its first year government expenditure totalled
6 6 6 , 5 0  7,169 r u b l e s  w h i l e  its i n c o m e  t o t a l l e d  o n l y
p n174,254,169 rubles. u The above considerations aside, h o w ­
ever, the deficit can also be a t t r i b u t e d  in part to the 
country's need to r e m a i n  in a state of a l m o s t  c o n s t a n t  
military alert against first the Turks and later the A r m e n ­
ians and Denikin, who continued to regard the Transcaucasus 
as part of the Russian empire. The cost of meeting defence 
r e q u i r e m e n t s  in this period a c c o u n t e d  for over 30 per cent 
of all government spending.21
Even more worrying for the Mensheviks as they endeav­
oured to forge a spirit of national unity were the sporadic 
outbursts of peasant revolt that began even before independ­
ence had been declared. Cent r e d  for the mo st part in 
Lechkhumi, Senaki, Zugdidi and Ap'khazet'i in West Georgia,
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and Dushet'i, Shorapani, T’ianet’i and Gori in the east, the 
revolts above all reflected the peasantry's frustration at 
the fail u r e  of s u c c e s s i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  s e r i o u s l y  to 
address the land question, for although attempts were made, 
first by the Transcaucasian Commissariat and then the Seim, 
to r e f o r m  the syst em, it was not until 1919 that a n y t h i n g  
was done actually to redistribute land to the peasantry. In 
the meantime, and regardless of appeals for national solid­
a r ity in the face of the e x t e r n a l  enemy, the p e a s a n t r y  set 
about seizing the land for itself.
The failure of the Georgian Social-Democrats sooner to 
effect a redistribution of property to the peasantry could 
not however, be said to d e m o n s t r a t e  any w a n i n g  e n t h u s i a s m  
within the party for agrarian reform. On the contrary, the 
party press and Zhordania himself, who was well aware of the 
need for peasant support in a country as predominantly rural 
as Georgia, spoke on numerous occasions in 1917 and 1918 on 
the urgent need for reform. As the Menshevik paper Ert'oba 
put i t ,
We have to solve this p r o b l e m  on the spot...if we 
d o n ’t sat i s f y  the people now, d e m o c r a c y  will 
weaken a n d ... disorder will arise.22
Until G e o r g i a  decla r e d  independence, h o w e v e r ,  the 
Social-Democrats had to share office with politicians whose 
enthusiasm for reform did not always match their own. Thus 
the reform of December 1917, made in the wake of the a g r a r ­
ian r e f o r m s  in Russia, a greed in p r i n c i p l e  to the t r a n s f e r  
of .treasury, crown, private, church and monastery estates to 
specially set-up land committees but failed to establish the 
norms above which land would be transferred to the c o m m i t ­
tees. The result, as N. K h o m e r i k i ,  the f uture M i n i s t e r  of
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Agriculture in the independent Georgian government a c k n o w ­
ledged, was a decree that was "more declarative than practi­
cal". The land committees, moreover, were often made up of 
members of the nobility whose commitment to the reform was 
in man y  cases q u e s t i onable. O p p o s e d  by the M u s a v a t  party 
and hindered by the attempts of the Dashnaks to prevent the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of c o m m i t t e e s  in m u l t i n a t i o n a l  areas, the 
d ecree a c h i e v e d  little of note. It was, as Z h o r d a n i a  put 
it, a "paper reform". J
In March 1918 however, more serious attempts to address 
the p r o b l e m  of land o w n e r s h i p  led to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of 
maxi m u m  norms for private estates which varied according to 
the n a ture and qual i t y  of the land in question. Thus the 
m aximum permitted for high-value crop land, which included 
viney ards, was set at seven d e s y a t i n y , for land s o w n  to 
grain crops 15 desyat iny, and for pasture 40 desyat iny. The 
land committees were empowered to alter these in accordance 
w i t h  local c o n d i t i o n s  but could in no c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a l l o w  
the norms to exceed 10, 20 and 50 desyatiny respectively.2  ^
H owever, w h i l e  these m e a s u r e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  the legal 
norms for land ownership and held out the promise of redis­
tribution, they left unresolved the problems of who should 
get the land and what f or m  land o w n e r s h i p  should take in the 
future. They did n o t h i n g  to ease land hunger a m o n g  the 
peasantry. In June, Zhordania conceded:
We have an a g r a r i a n  law, but it is one-sided, for 
w h i l e  it notes ho w  much to take from w h o m  and h o w  
m u c h  to leave, we need to issue a ne w  law about 
whom to give it to, the peasant or the state.
Ne v e r theless, w h i l s t  the p r o b l e m  and the ne ed to do 
s o m e t h i n g  about it were clear enough, the c o n t i n u i n g
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pressure of war, the collapse of the administrative appara­
tus, particularly since the disintegration of the Transcau­
casian Federation, and the d i s l o c a t i o n  of the e c o n o m y  all 
h a m p e r e d  progr e s s  t o w a r d s  r e s o l v i n g  the issue. Nor were 
matters helped by the confusion within the Social-Democratic 
Party about the form a g r a r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  should take. 
Should the land owners be compensated for land expropriated 
and if so, could the state afford to pay t h em? S h ould the 
party a b a n d o n  the l o n g - s t a n d i n g  M e n s h e v i k  c o m m i t m e n t  to 
m u n i c i p a l i s a t i o n  or should it c o m m i t  itself to priv a t e  
o w n e r s h i p ?  And if the latter c o urse w e r e  adopted, s h ould 
land be given or sold to the peasantry?
W h i l e  the party debated these issues, h o w e v e r ,  the 
p e a s a n t r y  began to r esolve m a t t e r s  for itself. In late 
F e b r u a r y  and early M a r c h  1918 a n u m b e r  of u p r i s i n g s  broke 
out in the i m p o v e r i s h e d  m o u n t a i n  p r o v i n c e s  of R a t c h a  andI
South Oset'i, and in Ap'khazet'i and Samegrelo. Emboldened 
by the steady return of soldiers from the Russian army, many 
of them still armed and sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, the 
p e a s a n t r y  began to take by force what it had in vain a s k e d  
successive governments to grant it by decree.
The revolts, however, remained sporadic, isolated and 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y  e c o n o m i c  in nature, w h i l e  a t t e m p t s  by the 
Bolshevik Party organisation to exploit the unrest and thus 
r egain lost ground, came to n o t h i n g  desp i t e  the u n d o u b t e d  
presence of Bolshevik sympathisers among the peasantry. In 
part this can be e x p l a i n e d  by the d e m o r a l i s a t i o n  of the 
party since the return h o m e  of the R u s s i a n  a r m y  and the b l o w  
to its reputation among the indigenous population caused by
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the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 0 Thus the Georgian Bolshevik 
K. Tsintsadze, like others of his contemporaries who in the 
early 1920s recorded the history of the party in this period 
in R e v o l u t s i i s  M a tiane (The C h r o n i c l e  of the Revol ution), 
recalled that the Regional Committee had been too weak and 
d i s o r g a n i s e d  to lead the p e a s a n t r y  and that g o v e r n m e n t  
harassment had forced it underground.2 *^
Mor e  i m p o r t a n t l y  it also r e f l e c t e d  the c o n t i n u i n g  
support for the Georgian Mensheviks among the vast majority 
of the population, particularly among ethnic Georgians, and 
the feeling that national survival had for the meantime to 
take p r i o r i t y  over e c o n o m i c  s elf-interest. Such was the 
level of public support for the M e n s h e v i k s ,  in fact, and 
their i n t i m a t e  k n o w l e d g e  of the B o l s h e v i k  o r g a n i s a t i o n  in 
Georgia that many Bolsheviks found themselves forced to take 
refuge in the forests. In June 1918 they w i t h d r e w  f r o m  
Transcaucasia to regroup in Vladikavkaz.
W h i l e  e c o n o m i c  g r i e v a n c e s  p r o v i d e d  the fuel for the 
peasant revolts in the spring and early summer, their coi n ­
cidence, whether fortuitous or not, with moments of crisis 
on the Turkish front appeared to the Georgian Mensheviks, at 
least, to prov i d e  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e  e v i d e n c e  of a g r a n d  
design to m a x i m i s e  d i s o r d e r  at the rear. Thus the O s i a n  
r e b e l l i o n  in March, w h i c h  spread t hrough Gori and Dushet'i 
districts to Tskhinvali and Java, though relatively easily 
s uppressed, d r e w  off Red Guard (as they were k n o w n  u ntil 
July 1918) d e t a c h m e n t s  that the d e s p e r a t e l y  s t r e t c h e d  
Transcaucasian forces defending the front were in no pos i ­
tion to spare. Moreover, no sooner had the Red G u a r d  r e ­
stored order to South Oset'i and its forces d e p a r t e d  to
s t r e n g t h e n  Bat'umi's defen c e s  than n e w s  a r r i v e d  of f r esh
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revolts in Ap'hazet'i and Samegrelo.
Although neither revolt in itself constituted a serious
threat to s t a b i l i t y  - as is w i t n e s s e d  by the re l a t i v e  ease
with w h i c h  they were brought un der control, desp i t e  the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  wit h  the w a r  against Tu r k e y  -
their coincidence with the attack against Bat'umi may well
have f a c i l i t a t e d  the T u r k i s h  capt u r e  of the city. V aliko
Jugheli, the c o m m a n d e r  of the Red Guard, was in no doubt.
At a m e e t i n g  of the T'bilisi Soviet in April he m a i n t a i n e d
that the u p r i s i n g s  in Oset'i and S a m e g r e l o  had played an
important role in the "tragic" loss of Bat'umi, while Zhor-
dania too was convinced that the Megrelian revolt had been
an attempt by "Bolshevik hooligans" to undermine the Trans-
*
? ftCa ucasian war effort.
Among Georgians the knowledge that at the moment of the 
loss of their second city and mai n  access to the Black Sea 
and w o r l d  trade, the Ap'khaz, M e g r e l i a n  and O s i a n  n a t i o n a l  
minorities had taken up arms against the government created 
a legacy of ill-feeling that was to deteriorate through the 
year and u n d e r m i n e  from the outset Zhordania's ho pes for 
national unity. In June, Georgian anger manifested itself 
in the violent suppression of another revolt among the Osian 
peasantry which again, although fuelled by the agitation of 
B o l s h e v i k  s y m p a t h i s e r s ,  was p r e d o m i n a n t l y  a r e s p o n s e  to
economic deprivation.^
However, with the c ountry in a state of p e r p e t u a l  
crisis and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  faith in the Osian p e a s a n t r y ,  
many of whom lived along the Georgian Military Highway, the 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  a rtery that linked G e o r g i a  w i t h  
southern Russia, seriously undermined, the Mensheviks began
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j .  n o  i  c c i c j  . n i g x y  i/ kj l u c u u i i ^  a n y  o x g , n  u i  u i s d i i e ^ i i u i i  c t o  c v x u -
ence of Bolshevik intrigue.
The uprisings too confirmed Zhordania in his mistrust 
of the peasantry, w h i c h  he n o w  d e c l a r e d  to be the "single 
serious threat to the republic and revolution". Wary, h o w ­
ever, of undermining the long tradition of peasant support 
for the Mensheviks in parts of Georgia, he hastened to draw 
a d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  those w h o s e  level of p o l i t i c a l  c o n ­
sciousness had been raised by regular interaction with urban 
life - in particular the Gurians - and those like the Osian 
inhabitants of Dushet'i and Tskhinvali, whose rebellions he 
d e s c r i b e d  as c lassic e x a m p l e s  of the vendee. It was time, 
he said, for the Social-Democratic Party to stand firmly for 
the defence of the revolution against peasant r e a c t i o n . ^
Not everyone in the party, however, was quite as ready 
as Zhordania to dismiss the unrest as the product of peasant 
re a c t i o n  and B o l s h e v i k  agitation. The party paper Ert'oba 
expressed the anxiety of many when it blamed it on the s l o w ­
ness of the land reform:
The bridge of mutual relations between ourselves 
and the pe a s a n t s  has been destroyed; we cannot 
give the m  land and this is wh y  the p e a s a n t r y  is 
not submitting to the government.
W h a t e v e r  its cause, the O s i a n  revolts, t h eir v i g o r o u s  
suppression by the Red Guard and the accusations of a troci­
ties level l e d  by both sides in the c onflict c r e a t e d  an 
a t m o s p h e r e  of m u t u a l  distrust and a n t a g o n i s m  that was to 
plague the g o v e r n m e n t ’s r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the O s i a n  m i n o r i t y  
thro u g h o u t  its period in office. W i t h i n  m o n t h s  of the 
d e c l a r a t i o n  of independence, the Mensheviks' h o pes that 
Geo r g i a  could survive through c o m m i t m e n t  to a po l i c y  of
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n a t i o n a l  unity were a l r e a d y  b e g i n n i n g  to foun d e r  a gainst 
peasant impatience and national resentment.
It was a gainst this b a c k g r o u n d  of T urkish invasion, 
G e r m a n  o c c upation, e c o n o m i c  disorder, food s h o r t a g e s  and 
d o m e s t i c  unrest that the g o v e r n m e n t  took its first steps 
t o w a r d s  c o n s o l i d a t i n g  the G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l  state and 
w e l d i n g  its p o p u l a t i o n  into a uni f i e d  citizenry. Even in 
more favourable circumstances it would have been an unenvia­
ble task, not l e a s t  b e c a u s e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  ha d  c o m e  so 
u n e x p e c t e d l y  to G e o r g i a  and b ecause the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  
for the mo st part, had in the past been so u n e q u i v o c a l l y  
o pposed to the idea. It was Zhordania, after all, w h o  in 
1908 had c l a i m e d  that the h i s t o r i c  path of the G e o r g i a n  
people and the characteristic that distinguished them from 
all other cultural nations was their rejection of national 
politics, a vie w  he had r e i t e r a t e d  still more s t r o n g l y  
four years later when he dismissed the possibility of find­
ing a t e r r i t o r i a l  s o l u t i o n  to the n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n .  
Nationalities were so intermixed, he had said, that attempts 
to form national states could only give rise to inter-ethnic 
conflict. Moreover, as the state was the political o rgani- 
sation of the ruling class, territory had become a means by 
w h i c h  the b o u r g e o i s i e  of the d o m i n a n t  na t i o n  c o uld i m p o s e  
its language, culture and goods on minority peoples.
Wh i l e  Z h o r d a n i a  m i g h t  argue that the M e n s h e v i k s  w e r e  
trying to create a state w h i c h  did not s u b o r d i n a t e  the 
people thr o u g h  the state a p p a r a t u s  to the b o u r g e o i s i e  and 
that the party and the soviets would guard against any such 
deviations, it also r e m a i n e d  the case that the M e n s h e v i k s  
firmly believed that the success of Geor gia’s socio-economic
d e v e l o p m e n t  was t i ed to the e m e r g e n c e  of an e n e r g e t i c
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i n d i g e n o u s  b o u r g e o i s i e  and that the c ountry w o u l d  have to 
pass thr o u g h  a long p eriod of c a p i t a l i s t  e v o l u t i o n  before 
the conditions would exist for the transition to socialism. 
Moreover, as Zhordania had argued in 1912, however demo c r a ­
tic a state might be, it remained nevertheless the political 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  of the ru l i n g  class of the d o m i n a n t  ethnic 
group. The ironic p o s s i b i l i t y  was thus cre a t e d  that Zhor- 
dania's government would fulfil his own judgement.
Alongside its measures for consolidating the power of 
the state, the government sought also to instil in the pop­
u l a t i o n  a sense of civic r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and s ecure its 
a ctive c o m m i t m e n t  to the n e w  state. In this r e s p e c t  the 
problem, as Zhordania later expressed it, was that Georgians 
had no "state t r a d i t i o n s  or m e m o r y  of a united, w h o l e  
n a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e " , ^  and no t r a d i t i o n  of d e m o c r a c y .  In 
these circumstances it proved immensely difficult even among 
party workers, let alone the peasantry, to c o n v i n c e  pe o p l e  
to s u b o r d i n a t e  their pe r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  to those of the 
state.
A m o n g  the m e a s u r e s  taken to counter this and to br eak 
d o w n  the barri e r s  b e t w e e n  state and society, the S o c i a l -  
Democrats on 2nd July nationalised all government institu­
tions and made the use of G e o r g i a n  by all state o f f i c i a l s  
compulsory, a step which on the one hand had the benefit of 
making the administration more accessible to the majority of 
the population, and on the other helped to drive from office 
m an y  of the Rus s i a n  sur.vivors of the tsarist civil s e r v i c e  
wh o had been in T ’bilisi since before the r e v o l u t i o n  and 
whose commitment to the aims of the Georgian revolution the 
M e n s h e v i k s  s e r i o u s l y  doubted. To avoid a c c u s a t i o n s  of
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d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  howev e r ,  the g o v e r n m e n t  offe r e d  those who 
did not speak G e o r g i a n  but w i s h e d  to stay in office the 
opportunity to learn the language. ^
O z a k o m  paved the way for the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the 
zemstvo system of local government into the Transcaucasus in 
1917, but the revolution and subsequent events prevented it 
fro m  being put into practice. In the s u m m e r  of 1918, 
however, local government elections were held in which the 
Mensheviks secured a comfortable majority over the SFs, the 
National-Democrats and the SRs. Encouraged by this success, 
the government set about the reorganisation of local g overn­
ment, abolishing the gubernii created by the tsarist a d m i n ­
i s t r a t i o n  in the 1840s and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n e t w o r k  of 21 
distr i c t  local s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t s  or e r o b a s , w h o s e  task it 
w o u l d  be to take over all a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of local a f f a i r s  
from the soviet executive committees and district commisars. 
Assigned responsibility for all local administrative affairs 
and for the militia, the erobas were also given the tasks of 
s e t t i n g  up a n e t w o r k  of local courts and c r e a t i n g  w i t h i n  
their own territories small self-governing units at village 
and lower level.
The r e f o r m  had the benefit on the one hand of r e u n i t i n g  
the w e s t e r n  and eastern halves of the coun t r y  into one 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  entity, thus a b o l i s h i n g  the a r t i f i c i a l  
division of the country introduced by the Russians and c o n ­
tributing to the unity of the new state, and on the other of 
bringing the process of government closer to the people and 
gi v i n g  everyone, even in the s m a l l e s t  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  the 
opportunity to participate in public affairs. It was hoped 
too that this w o u l d  in part bridge the gap b e t w e e n  s t ate and
s o c i e t y  a n d  h e l p  i n c u l c a t e  a s t r o n g e r  s e n s e  of
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identification with the state.
The r e o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  however, was not c o m p l e t e d  until 
1 920 , l e a v i n g  it only one year before the Rus s i a n  i n v a s i o n  
brought its operation to a close, thus making impossible, as 
with virtually everything else the Georgian Mensheviks did, 
a fair assessment of how successful it would have been given 
peacetime conditions and a more conducive economic environ­
ment. What can be said though is that the w o r k  of local 
government was seriously impaired throughout by disorganisa­
tion, and the irresponsibility, corruption and nepotism of 
eroba officials.
Continuing the process of Georgianisation, the g overn­
ment in early 1919 issued dec r e e s  that made G e o r g i a n  the 
o f f i c i a l  langu a g e  of all civil and c r i m i n a l  l i tigation, 
although the languages of the minorities could also be used 
p r o v i d e d  t h e y  w e r e  a c c o m p a n i e d  by t r a n s l a t i o n ,  and 
established Georgian as the language of instruction in all
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state p r i m a r y  and s e c o n d a r y  schools. The t e a c h i n g  of 
G e o r g i a n  l a n g u a g e  and l i t e r a t u r e  was made c o m p u l s o r y  too 
during the first four years of secondary education, even in 
the private schools for national minorities set up by their 
respective national councils. Allied to the foundation of 
the U n i v e r s i t y  of T'bilisi in J a n u a r y  1918 and the g o v e r n ­
m e n t ’s drive to improve literacy in the villages by building 
more schools and libraries, these measures demonstrated the 
i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  by the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  to e d u c a t i o n  
both as a m e ans to s t r e n g t h e n  l oyalty to the n e w  s t a t e  and 
shape political culture and to raise the overall educational 
level of the population. In a report to the g o v e r n m e n t  in 
May 1919 Minister of Education Noe Tsintsadze wrote:
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M o s t  of all the M i n i s t r y  [of E d u c a t i o n ]  has 
e f f e c t e d  a r e g r o u p i n g  of pupils on the basis of 
the national principle and has attempted in every 
way possible to make education national. ^
D e s p i t e  the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ’ efforts, h o w e v e r ,  the 
economic crisis and the government’s costly defence require­
me n t s  c o m b i n e d  wit h  other f actors to limit s p e n d i n g  on 
e d u c a t i o n  in its first year in office to 2.73 per cent of 
the state budget and to 4.7 per cent in its second. Thus 
wh i l e  the e d u c a t i o n a l  r e f o r m s  looked good on paper, the 
r e a l i t y  was that teachers, w h e n  they could be found, wer e  
often starving, that s chools had no or very few t e x t b o o k s  
and that in w i n t e r  they had no heating. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the 
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  of education, its n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  and the 
promotion of Georgian language and literature to a prominent 
position in the curriculum led initially at least to chaos. 
Not only w e r e  there no t e x t b o o k s  to meet the n e w  r e q u i r e ­
ments, but no sylla b u s  had been desig n e d  to r e f l e c t  the 
Ministry of Education's intentions.^ Each school was left 
much to its own devices.
In another sign that preoccupation with the survival of 
the state was leading the government to accord rather more 
prominence to national unity than to ideology, the Georgian 
Mensheviks adopted a conciliatory approach to the Georgian 
Or t h o d o x  Church, h o p i n g  no doubt to expl oit the latter's 
role in the development of a Georgian national consciousness 
and to avoid a l i e n a t i n g  those s e c t i o n s  of the p o p u l a t i o n ,  
particularly the peasantry, that might have been offended by 
its repression. Co-opting the Church as a symbol of n a t i o n ­
al unity and at times coming close to breaching the c o m m i t ­
ment contained in the party's mini m u m  programme to sever the
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link between state and church, the government invited m e m ­
bers of the Cat ho li cosat e to all m e e t i n g s  of the N a t i o n a l  
Assembly and subsequently the Constituent Assembly, and to 
stand a m o n g  the d i g n i t a r i e s  at natio n a l  and m i l i t a r y  
parades. In a further demonstration of the party’s c o m p r o ­
mise in this respect, B. Chkhikvishvili, the Menshevik mayor 
of T'bilisi, d e l e g a t e d  by the party o r g a n i s a t i o n  to greet 
the head of the G e o r g i a n  Church at a r e l i g i o u s  f e s t i v a l  in 
Mtskhet'a, the anci e n t  c apital of G e o r g i a  and a centre of 
the G e o r g i a n  Church, prai s e d  the h i s t o r i c a l  s ervice it had 
r e n d e r e d  the na t i o n  and ho ped that it w ould c o n t i n u e  to 
point the Georgian people in the right direction.^2
But the g r e a t e s t  i n d i c a t i o n  of Zhordania's n e w - f o u n d  
commitment to the independence he and other leading members 
of the party had welcomed so unenthusiastically in May came 
at the 8th Congress of Caucasian Social-Democratic Orga nisa­
tions in November 1918, when he declared:
All soc i a l i s t  p arties have a c o m m o n  a i m  - the 
r e a l i s a t i o n  of s o c i a l i s m .  But e v e r y  p a r t y  
opera t e s  w i t h i n  specific state c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
created by p a r t i c u l a r  conditions. These d i f f e r ­
e n c e s  h a v e  p r o v o k e d  the n e e d  for a s e p a r a t e  
w o r k e r s ’ p a r t y . ^
A c c e p t i n g  Z h o r d a n i a ’s s t r i c t u r e s  against "naive c o s ­
mopolitans" who could only visualise worldwide changes, the 
c o n g r e s s  voted h e a v i l y  in favour of a s e p a r a t e  G e o r g i a n  
party organisation. Z h o r d a n i a  denied the a c c u s a t i o n  that 
this would mean yet another step towards the formation of a 
bloc with the nationalist parties by arguing that the party 
was o r g a n i s e d  on a t e rritorial, not an ethnic basis, and 
that there was no precedent for two states having a common 
Social-Democratic Party and central committee. Bringing to
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an end what had b e c o m e  in the previ o u s  18 m o n t h s  an i n c r e a s ­
ingly fraught relationship with the Russian Mensheviks, the 
Georgian party leader stressed that the decision should also 
be seen to reflect the historical and philosophical differ­
ences in the development of their respective societies and 
party organisations, noting in particular the authoritarian­
ism that characterised the R S D L P . ^
By the first anniversary of the declaration of indepen­
dence, the c o n v e r s i o n  was e v i d e n t l y  com plete. M a k i n g  a 
virtue of what at the time had been considered a regrettable 
ne cessity, the g o v e r n m e n t  paper Sak'art'velos R e s p u b l i k a  
(The Republic of Georgia) stated:
The 26th of May is the c o n c l u s i o n  of the r e v o l u ­
tionary course, 26th May is the logical result of 
the great struggle. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  
and the r e v o l u t i o n  led to g l ory on that day and 
that day m a r k s  the end of the past and the great 
day of the start of the future. That day f r e e d o m  
and independence became a f a c t . ^
7.2 Inter-Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Nationalism
While these measures may have appealed to ethnic G e o r ­
gians and thus a c h i e v e d  in part the u n i f y i n g  e ffect sought 
by the government, the latter was sensitive to the possibi­
lity that over i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the state with the i n t e r ­
ests of the majority nationality ran the risk of alienating 
the n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  that made up a l m o s t  a third of the 
country's p o p u l a t i o n  and w h o s e  l oyalty to the state it 
considered crucial to the preservation of stability. H o w ­
ever, while the Social-Democrats acknowledged from the ou t ­
set the p r i n c i p l e  of n a t i o n a l  e q u a l i t y  and the right of 
nations to self-determination, it was evident that national 
state i n t e r e s t s  w o u l d  be a c c o r d e d  g r e a t e r  we i g h t  in their
list of p r i o r i t i e s  than the d e m o c r a t i c  right to secede.
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Georgia was simply too small and the strategic position of 
the Ap'khaz and Osian populations, in particular, too vital 
to its survival for the government seriously or willingly to 
c o n t e m p l a t e  putting p r i n c i p l e  into practice. The party 
paper Ert'oba accurately expressed the government's feelings 
on the subject when it w r o t e  in 1918:
In our t e r r i t o r y  we have s m a l l  peoples - Os i a n s  
Ap'khaz, Armenians and others - who wish to secede 
and for m  their o w n  states. If that happened, we 
w o u l d  all perish... The Osians can have i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e  in their i n t e r n a l  affairs, but ma y  not 
leave Georgia...
Nevertheless, the government did agree on 8th June 1918 
to grant a considerable degree of autonomy to Ap'khazet'i.^ 
In a d d i t i o n  to the a p p o i n t m e n t  of a M i n i s t e r  of Ap'khaz 
Affairs in T'bilisi, and from August the establishment of an 
Ap'khaz Affairs Department to review all central legislation 
r e l a t i n g  to the region, the Ap'khaz N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  was 
given c ontrol over i n t e r n a l  affairs, a l t h o u g h  c o n t r o l  of 
f inance and the local d e t a c h m e n t s  of the P o p u l a r  Guard 
remained with the centre.
Despite these concessions, frequent disputes concerning 
the r e s p e c t i v e  areas of c o m p e t e n c e  of the r e g i o n a l  and 
central administrations and the behaviour of Popular Guard 
units led to repeated demands for the government precisely 
to d efine the status of the region. This, h o w e v e r ,  it 
refused to do before the convocation of the Georgian Consti- 
uent Ass e m b l y ,  the e l e c t i o n s  for w h i c h  were to be held at 
the b e g i n n i n g  of 1919, and the c o m p l e t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l  
constitution.
Following a steady deterioration of relations which was 
only halted by the el e c t i o n  in M a r c h  1919 of a n e w  Ap'khaz'
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National Council, whose views were more attuned to those of
A Q
the government, the basis for a more workable relationship 
was laid by a r e s o l u t i o n  passed by the c ouncil on 28th M a r c h  
in which it first declared the region an autonomous unit of 
the Republic of Georgia and then called for the appointment 
of a commission composed equally of members of the Georgian 
C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  (which was e lected wit h  a m a s s i v e  
Social-Democratic Party majority in February 1919) and the 
Ap’khaz National Council for the purpose of determining its 
relationship with the central authority. Both the Consti-
A Q
tuent Assembly and the government acceded to this request. 7
The problems posed by the other nationalities, however, 
proved less a m e n a b l e  to a t e r r i t o r i a l  solution. Thus the 
Osians, who, historically, had been driven through poverty 
to seek wor k  as k h i  z_ n £_b _i t h r o u g h o u t  East Georgia, had 
s ettled in large n u m b e r s  in Borchalo, Gori, D u s h e t ’i and 
Java di stricts, w h i l e  the p o s i t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  M u s l i m  
minority was complicated by the occupation of Bat'umi region 
by first the Turks and s u b s e q u e n t l y  the B r i t i s h  b e f o r e  it 
finally reverted to Georgian control in 1920.
The situation in South Oset'i had been made still more 
d e l i c a t e  by the violent clashes in M a r c h  and June 1918 
between the peasantry and the Red Guard, one of the predict­
able c o n s e q u e n c e s  of w h i c h  had been the a d d i t i o n  of a 
national dimension to a struggle that until then had r evol­
ved a round the q u e s t i o n  of land. With m u t u a l  trust at a 
very low ebb, the g o v e r n m e n t  r e j e c t e d  the a p p e a l s  of the 
South Oset’ian National Council for autonomy on the grounds 
that there were too few Osians to merit the formation of an 
autonomous unit and that their population was insufficiently
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concentrated. Adding insult to injury, the government's 
constitutional commission reported in its examination of the 
Osian appeal that such a unit would be unnecessarily expens­
ive, while in reply the national council refused to collect 
taxes, demanded a separate system of courts and threatened 
to unite with the North Osians. In r e f l e c t i o n  of an i n ­
creasingly rancorous relationship Ert'oba in June 1920 c o n ­
t e m p t u o u s l y  d i s m i s s e d  the Osian d e m a n d s  in the f o l l o w i n g  
terms:
It is nations that have a right to self-determin­
a t i o n  as far as i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  not the m i n o r  
survivals of nations who have resettled within the 
bounds of a n o t h e r  nationality... On this basis, 
the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of Oset'i should h a p p e n  
w i t h i n  s o - c a l l e d  North Oset'i, w h e r e  91 per cent 
of Osians live, and not in Java where there are at 
most a few Osian villages.
Ne v e r t h e l e s s ,  w h i l e  Zhordania's c l a i m  in his m e m o i r s  
that not a single d e m a n d  made by a n a t i o n a l i t y  in G e o r g i a  
went unsatisfied is manifestly untrue,^2 it is equally clear 
that the Georgian Social-Democrats did try in very difficult 
circumstances to ensure that national cultural rights were 
respected. It was, for instance, precisely this considera­
tion that on 15th October 1918 led the National Assembly to 
introduce a law granting the national minorities a m i n i m u m  
of 26 d e p u t i e s  in the p a r l i a m e n t  until the c o n v o c a t i o n  of 
the C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly, fro m  w h i c h  point r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
was to be based en t i r e l y  on e l e c t o r a l  r e s u l t s . ^  It is 
not a b l e  too that the G e o r g i a n  S o c i a 1 - D e m o c r a t i c  Party 
d e p u t i e s  in the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e  
A r m e n i a n s ,  three Ap'khaz, two Osians, two G e r m a n s ,  tw o  
Russians, one Greek and a Turk.-^
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The G e o r g i a n  Const i t u t i o n ,  moreover, when f inally 
approved by the Constituent Assembly on 22nd February 1921, 
f o r m a l i s e d  the a u t o n o m y  of Ap'khazet'i, g r a n t e d  i d e n t i c a l  
status to the Georgian Muslim minorities in Bat’umi region 
and Zak'at'ala on the border with Azerbaijan, and reaffirmed 
the eroba status reluctantly conceded to South Oset'i in May 
1919 with its attendant responsibility for the direction of 
e c o n o m i c  and e d u c a t i o n a l  affa i r s  w i t h i n  its t e r r i t o r y . ^  
The const i t u t i o n ,  too, e n t i t l e d  Osians, like all ot her n a ­
tional m i n o r i t i e s ,  to a s t a t e - f u n d e d  e d u c a t i o n  in their 
na tive l a n g u a g e s  and o b l i g e d  the £  r£j3a£  to e nsure that the 
number of minority schools in their respective territories 
was p r o p o r t i o n a t e  to m i n o r i t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  w i t h i n  the
c f.
local population.
The crucial issue, however, on w h i c h  the G e o r g i a n  
M e n s h e v i k s  were not p r e p a r e d  to c o m p r o m i s e  was that of 
Georgia's state integ rity, a point s t r o n g l y  u n d e r l i n e d  by 
Z h o r d a n i a  in an a ddress to the n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  on 18th 
February 1919, immediately prior to the establishment of the 
Constituent Assembly:
To the M u s l i m s ,  Ap'khaz, A r m e n i a n s  and other 
peoples i n h a b i t i n g  the o u t l y i n g  areas, we state 
that we do not wish their forced annexation but a 
vo l u n t a r y  union based, however, on r e c o g n i t i o n  
from their side of democratic Georgia... We know 
that the o u t l y i n g  areas differ fro m  the c e n t r e  
cultu rally. H i s t o r y  there has p r o d u c e d  quite 
d i f f e r e n t  c u s t o m s  and i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s .  We have 
g iven this c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and the g o v e r n m e n t  has 
resolved to grant autonomy over their inner lives 
on one condition: that they preserve the strate­
gic, historical and economic unity of Georgia. We 
can accept all their demands on autonomy, however 
broad, but one thing we cannot accept: their
separation from u s . ^
The S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s '  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to e s t a b l i s h  the 
state on firm ground brought it into confrontation not just
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with its national minorities but also with its neighbours in 
Transcaucasia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, an eventuality that 
i r o n i c a l l y  had been a m a j o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in Zhordania's 
o p p o s i t i o n  to the d i v i s i o n  of the area, for it had c o n s i s ­
tently been his position that the population of Transcauca­
sia was so intermingled and its economic life so integrated 
that attempts to reassert old historical borders would not 
only i m p e d e  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  p r o g r e s s  but also lead to d i s ­
putes over territory, a conviction that in 1917 (see above) 
led him to advocate the formation of national self-governing 
bodies based on the areas in which the major nationalities 
p r e d o m i n a t e d  and w h i c h  w o u l d  be d i r e c t l y  s u b o r d i n a t e  to a 
central T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  responsible for the 
over a l l  p o l i t i c a l  and e c o n o m i c  life of the area. In this 
way, he rather optimistically hoped, it would be possible to 
sat i s f y  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  on the one hand and 
neutralise territorial rivalries on the other.
From the s u m m e r  of 1918, however, Z h o r d a n i a  faced 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  In the a b s e n c e  of an 
overall Transcaucasian administration, he now gave priority 
to factors such as n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  unity and defence. 
While in 1917 he had been prepared to envisage the possibil­
ity of parts of the old southern Georgian provinces of Lower 
K'art'li (Lore in Borchalo district) and Meskhet'i (Akhalk1- 
alak'i district) coming under an Armenian administration on 
the grounds that these areas were predominantly populated by 
Armenians, he now argued that they formed an integral part 
of the G e o r g i a n  economy, that g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  they were 
n a t u r a l l y  divided f r o m  A r m e n i a  by m o u n t a i n  ranges, that 
historically they had belonged to Georgia and that strateg­
ically they oc c u p i e d  a crucial place in Georgia's s o u t h e r n
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and eastern defences.^® Similarly, he rejected Azeri claims 
to Zak’a t ’ala and parts of Sighnaghi district in East Geo r ­
gia, 5 9 t)U t whereas the dispute with Azerbaijan was settled 
r e l a t i v e l y  a m i c a b l y  at the n e g o t i a t i n g  table, the d ispute 
with Armenia became the focal point of an animosity that had 
been breeding throughout the previous year.
Although the roots of the conflict have to be sought in 
Russian settlement policy in the 19th century, the growing 
social struggle between the Armenian commercial bourgeoisie 
and the Georgian nobility and peasantry, and the aspiration 
of Armenian nationalists to incorporate south-east Georgia, 
including T’bilisi, into a Greater Armenia stretching from 
the southern Caucasus to the Mediterranean, its more recent 
deterioration was traceable to the resentment and frustra­
tion of the Armenian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia as the 
r e a l i s a t i o n  d a w n e d  that not only had the 1917 T ’bilisi 
municipal elections brought their domination of the city to 
an end, but that the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federa­
tion had effectively isolated them from the administrative, 
commercial and intellectual centre of the Transcaucasus, for 
while T'bilisi was reestablished as the political centre of 
Georgia, the A r m e n i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  had to retire to the p r o ­
vincial setting of Erevan.
R e s e n t m e n t  too was further f u e l l e d  by the be l i e f  that 
the G e o r g i a n s  had b e t r a y e d  A r m e n i a  over the loss of Kars 
(see above), and the not-unfounded suspicion that the G e o r ­
gian g o v e r n m e n t ' s  desire to p r o m o t e  the e m e r g e n c e  of a 
strong indigenous bourgeoisie would be achieved at Armenian 
expense.
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With both sides still smarting at the mutual rec rimina­
tions that f o l l o w e d  the G e o r g i a n  d e c l a r a t i o n  of i n d e p e n d ­
ence, relations entered another downward spiral in June when 
the G e o r g i a n s  o c c u p i e d  n o r t h  Lore, o s t e n s i b l y  to block the 
path of the Turkish forces in south Lore to T ’bilisi, but no 
doubt also to p r e e m p t  the A r m e n i a n s ,  who also had a c l a i m  to 
the area. It was left to Irakli Dseret'eli to i n f o r m  a 
d e l e g a t i o n  f r o m  the A r m e n i a n  N a t i o n a l  Council that the 
break-up of the Transcaucasian Federation had compelled the 
Georgian Social-Democrats to abandon their previous readi­
ness to abide by the ethnic p r i n c i p l e  in d i s p u t e d  t e r r i ­
tories. Georgia, he said, now laid claim to every district 
in T'bilisi Gubernia.^®
The A r m e n i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n s i s t i n g  on the c o n t i n u i n g  
relevance of the ethnic principle, responded by laying claim 
to Akhalk'alak’i district and all of Lore, the importance of 
w h i c h  for both sides had been r aised out of all p r o p o r t i o n  
by n a t i o n a l  c h a u v i n i s m  and the state of their r e s p e c t i v e  
e c o nomies. Armenia, w hose losses to Turkey i n c l u d e d  the
fertile Araxes v alley and had v i r t u a l l y  d e p r i v e d  it of the
f) 1
m e ans to exist, was d e s p e r a t e l y  in need of a r a b l e  land, 
w h i l e  the G e o r g i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  m i n d f u l  of its p r o m i s e s  to 
the p e a s a n t r y  and a c u t e l y  a w a r e  that not even the total 
redistribution of the t'avadaznauroba’s estates was likely 
to satisfy its needs, was loathp to cede any territory, and 
least of all A k h a l k ’a l a k ’ i and B o r c h a l o  (of w h i c h  Lore was 
the southernmost part) districts, which were among the most 
fertile and least populated in Georgia(see Fig. 6a).
W h i l e  the Turkish o c c u p a t i o n  of most of the d i s p u t e d  
areas in the summer and early autumn prevented direct c o n ­
frontation, relations nevertheless continued to deteriorate
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w i t h  the A r m e n i a n s  a c c u s i n g  the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  of 
colluding with the t'avadaznauroba to oppress the Armenian 
p o p u l a t i o n  of T ’bilisi and the G e o r g i a n s  c o m p l a i n i n g  that 
the Dashnaktsutiun Party in Armenia was souring inter-ethnic 
relations and undermining mutual trust by inciting Armenian 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and p rivate c i t i z e n s  in G e o r g i a  a gainst the 
government. The Armenian National Council too was accused 
of acting as a recruiting agent for the Armenian army.^3
Against this background, Armenian and Georgian troops 
in O c t o b e r  c a m e  face to face for the first t i m e  w h e n  the 
A r m e n i a n s ,  f o r e w a r n e d  by the Turks, o c c u p i e d  the latter's 
p o s i t i o n s  in south Lore f o l l o w i n g  the c a p i t u l a t i o n  of the 
Ottoman Empire.
Allied victory now radically transformed the situation 
in Transcaucasia. By the Treaty of Mudros, s i g n e d  on 30th 
October, Turkey co n c e d e d  to the Bri t i s h  o c c u p a t i o n  of 
Bat'umi and Baku, t o g e t h e r  with its i n t e r l i n k i n g  r a i l w a y  
system, and acknowledged the Allies' right to occupy the six 
Armenian villayets in eastern Turkey in the event of "disor­
der", ^  while quite suddenly the humiliating terms and the 
suffering endured by Armenia since its declaration of inde­
pendence were turned to its advantage. Whereas the Allies, 
however unjustly, took a jaundiced view of Georgia's recent 
r e l a t i o n s  with Germa n y ,  they saw A r m e n i a  as the i n n o c e n t  
victim of Turkish barbarism, one of the immediate practical 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  of w h i c h  was their r e c o g n i t i o n  at the Paris 
Peace C o n f e r e n c e  in Janu a r y  1919 that the A r m e n i a n s ,  t o ­
g ether with the other c o m m u n i t i e s  f o r m e r l y  under T u r k i s h  
rule, had reached a point in their development where "their 
e x i s t e n c e  as i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e s  can be p r o v i s i o n a l l y
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r e c o g n i s e d " . j ^  was an approach, however, that they d i d  
not extend to either G e o r g i a  or Az erbaijan, w h o s e  t e r r i ­
tories the Al l i e s  c o n t i n u e d  to regard as b e l o n g i n g  to the 
f o r m e r  Russ i a n  Empire, hope for the r e s t o r a t i o n  of which 
they placed on General Denikin’s White Army.
On 27th October the Georgian government tried to break 
the deadlock over territory by inviting Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and the M o u n t a i n e e r s ’ Re p u b l i c  to send d e l e g a t e s  to a 
conference in T ’bilisi to discuss the issue of mutual recog­
nition, the resolution of outstanding problems, and mutual 
supp ort at the Paris Peace C o n f e r e n c e  for de jure r e c o g n i -  
tion of their respective states. In the event of failure 
to reach a g r e e m e n t  on c o m m o n  b orders it was p r o p o s e d  that 
international arbitrators be appointed to review the situa- 
tion. The Armenian government, however, believing that it 
stood to gain more from Allied support than Transcaucasian 
unity and fearing that in a multilateral conference Georgia 
and Azerbaijan might cooperate to its disadvantage, chose to 
take offence at the peremptory tone of the invitation as an 
excuse for turning it down.6? The representtatives of Azer­
baijan and the Mountaineers’ Republic, who received the same 
invitation, both a p p e a r e d  at the start of talks on 10th 
November.
Following repeated attempts to satisfy its objections, 
A r m e n i a  on 17th N o v e m b e r  c o m m u n i c a t e d  its r e a d i n e s s  to 
p a r t i c i p a t e  so long as the border issue was not raised, a 
condition to which the others conceded, postponing the start 
of the c o n f e r e n c e  to the 30th so as to a l l o w  the A r m e n i a n s  
to attend. By 2nd December, however, the Erevan government 
had still not sent its delegates.6®
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With the path to negotiations blocked and the situation 
along the border d e g e n e r a t i n g  into violence, the A r m e n i a n  
Premier, Hovhannes Kachaznuni, on 14th December authorised 
m i l i t a r y  units to adv a n c e  into B o r c h a l o  d istrict on the 
pret ext of p r o t e c t i n g  A r m e n i a n  c i t i z e n s  fro m  the v i o l e n c e  
and lawlessness of Georgian troops, while Foreign Minister 
Ti g r a n i a n  i n f o r m e d  his G e o r g i a n  counterpart, G e g e t c h k o r i ,  
that Armenia’s decision could not be construed as interfer­
ence in Georgian internal affairs as the district rightfully
6  Q
belonged to Armenia. 7
The Georgians, predictably, took a different view, but 
a l t h o u g h  G e g e t c h k o r i  struck an indignant note on 15th 
December when he declared that Georgia protested before the 
entire w o r l d  the t r e a c h e r y  of the A r m e n i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
Zhordania, s p e a k i n g  to the G e o r g i a n  p a r l i a m e n t  two days 
later, was more moderate and appeared deliberately to avoid 
appealing to national chauvinism. Instead, he presented the 
conflict as a tragedy brought on Transcaucasia by the folly 
of the Armenian government:
Citizens! What should not have h a p p e n e d  has 
happened. At a t i m e  when the fires of w o r l d  war 
have been extinguished, when the major states are 
r e t u r n i n g  their sw o r d s  to their s c a b b a r d s  and 
resuming a peaceful existence, the government of 
A r m e n i a  is s e c r e t l y  a t t a c k i n g  the r e p u b l i c  of 
Georgia... We call the G e o r g i a n  d e m o c r a c y  to a 
struggle not against the A r m e n i a n  people...but 
against that government and that militarist party 
responsible for undertaking this terrible crime.
The brief conflict brought n e i t h e r  side s i g n i f i c a n t  
material gain, but lost-both a great deal of world sympathy 
at a time when their representatives in Paris were s truggl­
ing to c o n v i n c e  the state leaders a s s e m b l e d  for the Peace 
Conference of their readiness for statehood. Initially the
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A r m e n i a n s ,  wit h  the a d v a n t a g e  of s u r p r i s e  on their side,
made rapid advances into Borchalo, coming within 50 miles of
T ’bilisi, but w i t h i n  a wee k  the G e o r g i a n s  had turned the
tide and gone onto the counter-offensive, recapturing much
of the lost t e r r i t o r y  and a d v a n c i n g  into A r m e n i a  before
Anglo-French mediation brought the hostilities to a halt on
30th December. A c o n f e r e n c e  of Georgian, A r m e n i a n  and
Allied officials in early January agreed provisionally that
G e o r g i a  should r etain A k h a l k ’a l a k ’ i district, on c o n d i t i o n
that it be placed un der Allied supervision, and that a
neutral zone be established in North Lore, leaving the south 
7 1to Armenia.'
Though s h o r t - l i v e d  and inconclusive, the G e o r g i a n -  
Armenian conflict had a considerable impact both on inter­
state r e l a t i o n s  in Tra n s c a u c a s i a ,  d r i v i n g  A r m e n i a  f u r t h e r  
into isolation, and on the G e o r g i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ’s i n t e r n a l  
policies, l eading it to lay still grea t e r  e m p h a s i s  on 
loyalty to the state. Undoubt e d l y ,  the real v i c t i m  of the 
affair was the large Armenian community in Georgia which now 
became the target of indiscriminate government suspicion and 
a new mood of national chauvinism which derived in part from 
the belief that the national minorities were undermining the 
state.
Al t h o u g h  it is clear fro m  the c onstant d i s t i n c t i o n  
dr a w n  by the G e o r g i a n  leaders b e t w e e n  the " m i l i t a r i s t  
clique" in Erevan and the A r m e n i a n  p eople that the S o c i a l -  
D e m o c r a t s  were anxious to avoid s t i m u l a t i n g  a w a v e  of 
jingoism - not least because the SFs and National-Democrats 
m ight have b e n e f i t e d  on the eve of the e l e c t i o n s  to the C o n ­
stituent A s s e m b l y  - they were n e v e r t h e l e s s  p r o p e l l e d  by 
their demand for undivided loyalty and the obvious potential
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danger constituted by the Armenian community, particularly
7 2
in T'bilisi, where they formed a third of the population, 
to instigate a series of measures directed specifically at 
any threat it might pose to state security. The possibility 
cannot be discounted either that the long-standing ideologi­
cal p r e j u d i c e  of the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  against the 
Armenian bourgeoisie concealed a more nationalist hostility 
t o w a r d s  an ethnic group that had d o m i n a t e d  the G e o r g i a n  
capital for the last 50 years. It was also a p p a r e n t  that 
the g o v e r n m e n t  found it d i f ficult to fit the A r m e n i a n  
b o u r g e o i s i e  into its i m a g e  of Georgia's future, for w h i l s t  
the Mensheviks were adamant that Georgia's path to socialism 
would take it first through a period of capitalist deve lop­
ment, there were man y  in the party, a d o p t i n g  the a r g u m e n t  
put f o r w a r d  by Sergi M e s k h i  in the 1870s, who also felt 
that it was crucial to Georgia's national development that a 
major part in this process be played by the native bou rgeoi­
sie.
The government declared its intentions to the Armenian 
c o m m u n i t y  w i t h i n  days of the i n v a s i o n  by i s s u i n g  a d e c r e e  
o r d e r i n g  all A r m e n i a n s  fro m  Lore r esident in T'bilisi to 
r e g i s t e r  w i t h i n  24 hours or face the p o s s i b i l i t y  of b e i n g  
charged with treason, an offence which on 24th December the 
G e o r g i a n  P a r l i a m e n t  r e s o l v e d  s h o u l d  be p u n i s h a b l e  by 
d e a t h . ^  Several papers, including the Dashnak Ashkhatavor 
(Labourer) and Nor Orizon (New Horizon) and the Kadet and SR 
papers K a v k a v skoe S l o vo and T r u d o v o ye Znamya were closed, 
the latter two on account of their pro-Armenian sympathies, 
w h i l e  the D a s h n a k  d e p u t i e s  in the city d u m a  wer e  a r r e s t e d  
and the A r m e n i a n  Natio n a l  Council offices b o a r d e d  up.
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E x p l a i n i n g  the d e c i s i o n  t e m p o r a r i l y  to s u s p e n d  the 
activities of the Council, Noe Ramishvili, the Minister of 
the Interior, stated in p a r l i a m e n t  that a l t h o u g h  most 
Armenians were loyal (a claim treated with derision by the 
n a t i o n a l i s t  deputies), some m e m b e r s  of the cou n c i l  wer e
known to be acting directly on behalf of the Erevan govern-
7 h m e n t .'
Although Ramishvili proclaimed the government’s opposi­
tion to n a t i o n a l i s m  in all its guises, the wa r and the 
o f f i c i a l  r e a c t i o n  to it n e v e r t h e l e s s  c reated a c l i m a t e  in 
w h i c h  n a t i o n a l i s m  co uld thrive. Thus for all the g o v e r n ­
m e n t ’s assurances that it regarded the majority of Armenians 
as loyal citizens, these m e a s u r e s  i n e v i t a b l y  pl a c e d  t h e m  
collectively under a cloud of suspicion and contributed to 
the mood of c h a u v i n i s t  h y s t e r i a  being w h i p p e d  up by the 
nationalist parties.
D es p i t e  the many p r o t e s t a t i o n s  of l o y a l t y  to the 
Georgian state published in the press by Armenian c o m m u n i ­
ties from all over the republic, popu l a r  opinion, o u t r a g e d  
by the invasion and stories of Georgian Armenians organising 
peasant r e b e l l i o n s  behind the G e o r g i a n  lines, r e m a i n e d  
hostile. For the ma ny who had s u f f e r e d  in the past at the 
hands of Armenian money-lenders, moreover, the war offered 
the prospect of e x a c t i n g  revenge. A r m e n i a n  w o r k e r s  wh o  
e x p r e s s e d  a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  v i e w s  found t h e m s e l v e s  out of 
work, businessmen were arrested and their property expropri­
ated, civic officials and militia officers were sacked, and 
in-K’u t ’a i s i , although this decision was quickly reversed by 
the g o v e r n m e n t ,  an order was issued that all A r m e n i a n s  
working for Georgian railways should be d i s m i s s e d . ^
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Under criticism from the National-Democrats for ending 
the h o s t i l i t i e s  when Geor g i a  was on the offensive, the 
government itself succumbed to the pressure to be seen to be 
taking action against the enemy, whether mythical or other­
wise, by arresting scores of Armenians in T'bilisi in early 
January, a gesture which led to their further isolation and 
intimidation. Against this background there could be little 
surprise that in the T'bilisi municipal elections held later 
in the month that the Georgians further consolidated their 
hold over the city a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Man y  A r m e n i a n s  and 
Ru s s i a n s  e i ther a b s t a i n e d  or w e r e  d enied a vote by the n e w  
law limiting the franchise to Georgian citizens.
In February, the country's first n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  
presented the government with a major test of its popular­
ity. Wit h  the f r a n c h i s e  e x t e n d e d  to all G e o r g i a n  c i t i z e n s  
aged over 20, it was important to the Social-Democrats not 
only that they win, but that the electorate also demonstrate 
its c o m m i t m e n t  to the state and d e m o c r a c y  by p o l l i n g  in 
large numb ers. In the event, w h i l s t  just over 70 per cent 
of the rural population voted (433,000 out of 614,000) only 
52 per cent (81,000 out of 156,000 registered voters) of the 
u r b a n  e l e c t o r a t e  did so, a f a c t  w h i c h  can l a r g e l y  be 
attributed to the heavy concentration of Russians and A r m e n ­
ians in the t o w n s . ^
Those that did vote, however, voted massively in favour 
of the Social-Democrats, giving them 109 of the 130 deputies 
in the Constituent A s s e m b l y . The elections in the border 
districts of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalk'alak'i, too, which were 
held over till August beca u s e  of c o n t i n u i n g  t e n s i o n  in the 
area, provided the government with a propaganda coup in its
territorial dispute with Armenia. In the former, 24,000 of
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the 35,000 electorate voted for the Social-Democrats, while 
in the latter 13,000 from an electorate of 25,000 voted for 
the Social-Democrats and only 7,000 for the Dashnaktsutiun 
P a r t y . T h e  result, Sak'art'velos Respublika wrote, was a 
vict o r y  not just for the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  but also for the 
state:
The G e o r g i a n  state idea has a c h i e v e d  a bri l l i a n t  
victory in Meskhet’-Javakhet !i , a victory that is 
made still more beautiful by the victory of d e m o ­
cracy. This last triumph will forever consolidate 
the democratic culture of Georgia in Akhaltsikhe- 
A k h a l k ’a l a k 1i . "
F o l l o w i n g  the i n a u g u r a l  ses s i o n  of the C o n s t i t u e n t  
A s s e m b l y  on 12th M a r c h  and a debate on the for m  of g o v e r n ­
ment on the 14th, the new legislature on 21st March elected
o n
Noe Z h o r dania P r ime M i n i s t e r  and head of state. But
despite the occasion and the sense of achievement that per­
v a d e d  the e v e n t ,  c r a c k s  w e r e  a l r e a d y  a p p a r e n t  in the 
previous year’s facade of unity. Zhordania, who had earlier 
expressed a preference for multi-party representation in the 
government, chose to select his cabinet entirely from within 
the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  Party, w h i l e  the SFs and N a t i o n a l -  
Democrats, frustrated by their exclusion, as well as their 
r e p e a t e d  failure to win s i g n i f i c a n t  support o u t s i d e  the 
intelligentsia, broke the closed ranks of the previous year 
by r e f u s i n g  to support the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  pol i c y  s t a t e m e n t  
promising to elaborate a republican constitution and estab­
lish an independent democratic state, the SFs on the grounds 
that it paid i n a d e q u a t e  a t t e n t i o n  to social ch a n g e  in the 
wo r l d  and was t h e r e f o r e  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  socialist, and the 
National-Democrats because the Mensheviks' past views on the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  made the m  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  i l l - s u i t e d  to
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independence and the task of building a national state. The 
government, National-Democratic deputy S. Kedia accused, was 
guilty of wavering to Georgia's cost between international-
O -I
ism and a real national-state policy.
In reply, the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  Razhden Arsenidze, on 
behalf of the government, reiterated the latter's commitment 
to socialism as an aim and to its construction through d e m o ­
cracy, a r g u i n g  that Georgia's wea k  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
pr e c l u d e d  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of its ea rly at t a i n m e n t .  In the 
meantime, encouragement would be given to private incentive, 
just as it would also be given to the collective endeavours
O  p
of the municipal governments, erobas and cooperatives.
The readiness of the opposition parties to confront the 
g o v e r n m e n t  d e m o n s t r a t e d  both their c o n v i c t i o n  that their 
el e c t o r a l  f ailure was a t t r i b u t a b l e  to the public's lack of 
familiarity with their policies, and a feeling that with the 
war now over G e o r g i a  had su r v i v e d  its tough e s t  hurdles. 
That Zho r d a n i a  also shared this v i e w  is e vident f r o m  his 
assertion to the Assembly on 14th March:
The w o r l d  war has ended in such a way that G e o r g i a  
has e m e r g e d  a l m o s t  unscathed, w h i l e  the Great 
F e b r u a r y  r e v o l u t i o n  ended in a way that saved 
G e o r g i a  f r o m  a n a r c h y  and p r e s e r v e d  al l  its 
a c h i e v e m e n t s .  Conse q u e n t l y ,  our b e n e f i t s  today 
are threefold: external and internal calm and the 
a c h i e v e m e n t s  of the revolution. No C o n s t i t u e n t  
A s s e m b l y  has % o er met in such a u s p i c i o u s  so c i a l  
circumstances.
Whatever the basis for his extraordinary optimism, it 
was quick to disappear. The o p e n i n g  of the C o n s t i t u e n t  
Assembly was to prove among the last occasions the Social- 
D e m o c r a t s  w o uld have for s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t i o n .  A g a i n s t  a 
b a c k g r o u n d  of conflict with the M u s l i m  p o p u l a t i o n  of
A k h a l t s i k h e  district, Denikin's V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  in April
531
invaded n o r t h - w e s t  Georgia, b r i n g i n g  to a head a d i s p u t e  
that had t h r e a t e n e d  to d e g e n e r a t e  into vi o l e n c e  since its 
b e g i n n i n g  in S e p t e m b e r  1918. O s t ensibly, the cause of the 
clash was the G e o r g i a n  o c c u p a t i o n  of Sochi d u r i n g  the Red 
Guard's M a r c h  c a m p a i g n  to drive a K u b a n - b a s e d  B o l s h e v i k  
force out of Ap'khazet'i and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  s u b s e q u e n t  
agreement to a request from the local soviet to establish a 
t e m p o r a r y  p r o t e c t o r a t e  over the area. In S e p t e m b e r ,  h o w ­
ever, a s u c c e s s f u l  V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  o f f e n s i v e  aga i n s t  the 
Bolsheviks brought it into direct contact with the Georgians 
south of Tuapse and into disp u t e  over the o w n e r s h i p  of 
Sochi.84
An a t t e m p t  by both sides on 2 5 t h - 2 6 t h  S e p t e m b e r  to 
r esolve their d i f f e r e n c e s  in talks in E k a t e r i n o d a r  was 
undermined by mutual intransigence over an area that was of 
no s t r a t e g i c  or e c o n o m i c  benefit to either and G e n e r a l  
Alekseev's chauvinistic and hectoring arrogance. Reluctant 
to r e c o g n i s e  the i n d e p e n d e n c e  of what he c o n s i d e r e d  an 
integral part of the Russian empire and antipathetic to the 
ideological persuasion of the Menshevik government, Alekseev 
not only d e m a n d e d  Georgia's u n c o n d i t i o n a l  w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  
Sochi but acc u s e d  it of m a l t r e a t i n g  Rus s i a n  o f f i c i a l s  and 
officers, w a r n i n g  that f ailure to correct the s i t u a t i o n  
would lead the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  to halt grain s u p p l i e s  f r o m  
North Caucasia,88 a threat that he repeated when the leader 
of the Georgian delegation, Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegetch- 
kori, refu s e d  even to d iscuss the bo r d e r  issue, r e m i n d i n g  
A l e k s e e v  that he was the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  not of a state but a 
p r i v a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n . 88 W h i l e  t h i s  w a s  t r ue, it w a s  
s c a r c e l y  wise for Geor g i a  n e e d l e s s l y  to a n t a g o n i s e  a
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potentially dangerous opponent over a strip of land to which
it had no p e r m a n e n t  pretensions. In c l o s i n g  the meeting,
A l e k s e e v  was quick to r e m i n d  G e g e t c h k o r i  of G e o r g i a ’s 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  p o i n t i n g  out its d e p e n d e n c e  on S o u t h e r n
Russia for grain and numerous other products. The Germans
m i ght be able to give G e o r g i a  a little, but its p e r m a n e n t  
source, he warned was in North C a u c a s i a . 8 "^
Germany's defeat shortly afterwards and British support 
for Denikin underlined Alekseev's threat. Moreover, as the 
G e o r g i a n s  we re to learn to their cost, the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in Paris were able c o n s i d e r a b l y  to d a m a g e  
their g o v e r n m e n t ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  a m o n g  the m a j o r  p o w e r s  and 
s e r i o u s l y  to u n d e r m i n e  Georgia's i m m e d i a t e  p r o s p e c t s  of
Q  Q
securing broad recognition for its independence.
E m b o l d e n e d  by the appar e n t  back i n g  of the B r i t i s h  
military in the Caucasus and irritated by Georgian support 
for the G reens and C h e c h e n s  in North Caucasia, D e n i k i n  
stepped up the p r e s s u r e  on Geo r g i a  in F e b r u a r y  1919 by 
claiming that it was oppressing the Ap'khaz population and 
that Prince Shervashidze, the most prominent member of the 
Ap'khaz ari s t o c r a c y ,  w h o s e  est a t e s  had r e c e n t l y  been c o n ­
s i d e r a b l y  reduced by the land reform, had a p p e a l e d  on 
A p 'k h a z e t ' i ' s behalf for help.8  ^ On 6th F e b r u a r y  Denikin's 
forces attacked Sochi.
In April, by w h i c h  time it was clear that they w e r e  not 
going to achieve a rapid victory, the British intervened and 
persuaded the Georgians to evacuate Sochi on the understand­
ing that Denikin would not occupy it. Denikin, however, not 
only reneged on this agreement but advanced beyond Sochi to 
attack and capture Gagra. Almost immediately the Georgians
counter-attacked and recaptured the town, establishing a new
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line along the River Mekhadir, between Sochi and Gagra (see 
fig. 6b).90
Despite the evidently defensive nature of the Georgian 
o p e r a t i o n s ,  the B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  s t a f f  r e v e a l e d  its 
hostility towards the Social-Democratic government when Maj- 
Gene r a l  W.M. T h o m pson, C.O. North Persian Forces in Baku, 
warned that this might undermine Georgia in the eyes of the 
Paris Peace Conference and that further attacks on Denikin’s 
forces would be construed as unfriendly acts against Britain 
itself.91
Georgian distrust of the British was further confirmed
in talks on 23rd May, when L t - G e n e r a l  Briggs, a l l e g e d l y
ac t i n g  not in his c a p a c i t y  as a Brit i s h  o f f i c e r  but as an
envoy for Denikin, r e i t e r a t e d  the l a t t e r ’s d e m a n d  that the
G e o r g i a n s  w i t h d r a w  beyond the River B z i p ’i, just to the
north of Bitchvint'a, and guarantee the protection of Russian
c i t i z e n s  in Georgia. A p p a r e n t l y  a b u s i v e  t h r o u g h o u t  the
meeting, Briggs informed the Georgian Foreign Minister that
" s m a l l  p eoples like the G e o r g i a n s  should not a s p i r e  to 
Q ?independence".
On 11th June, the new Brit i s h  C.O. in the Caucasus, 
M a j - G e n e r a l  Corey, i n f o r m e d  Z h o r d a n i a  that a d e c i s i o n  had 
been reac h e d  - c l e a r l y  w i t h o u t  G e o r g i a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  - 
g r a n t i n g  Sochi and Gagra to D e n i k i n  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n e w  
d e m a r c a t i o n  line a l ong the B z i p ’i. Wel l  a w a r e  that D e n i ­
kin's ambitions extended beyond Gagra and no doubt irritated 
by the unilateral nature of the decision, Zhordania refused 
to comply, reasserting Georgia's determination to remain in 
Gagra pending a final decision on border demarcation by the 
Paris Peace Conference. Denikin, however, encouraged by his
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s u c c e s s e s  in the Rus s i a n  Civil War, was adamant. At talks 
a r r a n g e d  by G e n e r a l  T h o m p s o n  on 23rd June he refu s e d  to 
recognise Georgia's independence and demanded that it submit 
to his a u t h o r i t y . ^  U n d i s m a y e d  by Georgia's p r e d i c t a b l e  
response, D e n i k i n  shor t l y  a f t e r w a r d s  d e s p a t c h e d  G e n e r a l  
B a r a t o v  to T'bilisi to p repare the g round for T r a n s c a u c a ­
sia's reincorporation into Russia and to demand that Georgia 
recognise itself as part of Russia or face the consequences. 
In N o v e m b e r  B a r a t o v  left G e o r g i a  his m i s s i o n  unfulfilled. 
Under B ritish pressure, however, the Georgians, still 
a nx i o u s  to secure A llied r e c o g n i t i o n  and aid, a g r e e d  to 
p e r m i t  the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  to recruit Rus s i a n  o f f i c e r s  in 
T'bilisi and gave u n i m p e d e d  p assage to "White" s o l d i e r s  
fleeing south across the Cauc a s u s . ^
The need for const a n t  v i g i l a n c e  a gainst D e n i k i n  mad e  
the g o v e r n m e n t ,  in the a b s e n c e  of r e l i a b l e  allies, still 
mor e  i n w a r d - l o o k i n g  and defensive. Fee l i n g  b e s i e g e d  f r o m  
all sides, it proved hard not to regard any sign of o p p o s i ­
tion, particularly among the non-Georgian peoples populating 
the border areas, as e v i d e n c e  of a c o n s p i r a c y  to u n d e r m i n e  
the state. Moreover, w h i l e  the party l e a d e r s h i p  m a y  have 
understood the need for caution in dealing with minorities, 
the need to recruit g o v e r n m e n t  p e r s o n n e l  f r o m  the u r b a n  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  w h i c h  f o r m e d  the basis of the N a t i o n a l -  
D e m o c r a t s '  s u p p o r t ,  b r o u g h t  i n t o  o f f i c e  a s t r a t u m  of 
G e o r g i a n  s ociety that r e g a r d e d  failure to give a b s o l u t e  
support to the G e o r g i a n  n a t i o n a l  idea, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the 
prevailing conditions, as tantamount to treachery.
A similar attitude appears too to have prevailed among 
the Popular Guard, which, although formed predominantly from
the working class and Gurian peasantry and dominated by the
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S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s , had mad e  the g r e a t e s t  s a c r i f i c e s  d u r i n g  
the p r e v i o u s  year and had little s y m p a t h y  for those w h o s e  
e n t h u s i a s m  for G e o r g i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  did not m a t c h  their 
o w n .
In early 1919, a c o m b i n a t i o n  of these fact o r s  and 
c o r r u p t i o n  a m o n g  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  led to c o n f l i c t  in 
A k h a l t s i k h e  district, mu ch of w h i c h  was c o n t e s t e d  by the 
S o u t h - W e s t  C a u c a s i a n  Republic, set up with e n c o u r a g e m e n t  
f ro m  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  whe n  the Turks we re forced out of 
Bat'umi in October 1918, and supported by Azerbaijan. Par­
ticularly galling from a Georgian point of view was the fact 
that many Georgian Muslims had joined the Tatars and Azeris 
in supporting the republic and had too supplied its leader, 
Jihangiradze Ibrahim B e y . ^  While initially this could be 
a t t r i b u t e d  to the success of Turk i s h  agents and M u s l i m  
clergy in convincing them that they could expect nothing but 
repression from Georgian Christians, the heavy-handed behav­
iour of the Popular Guard when sent to assert Georgian co n ­
trol over the area undoubtedly contributed to their al i e n a ­
tion. In March and April 1919, Valiko Jugheli, the c o m m a n ­
der of the Guard, r e p o r t e d  v i l l a g e s  "dest r o y e d  and b u r n t 11 
and accused his own troops of "marauding",^ while a British 
officer stationed in the district in March observed that the 
Muslim population was "bitterly incensed against the G e o r ­
gian government" and that it was accusing Georgian troops of 
a t r o c i t i e s . ^  Valiko Chubinidze, who had been w i t h  the 
Guard since its inception, r e c a l l e d  the c o n c e r n  at its 
T'bilisi headquarters in May that the Akhaltsikhe eroba was 
r e s p o n s i b l e  for d r i v i n g  the local p o p u l a t i o n  into a r m e d  
resistance, and noted too Silbistro Jibladze's reminder when
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s e n d i n g  him to r e s t o r e  order in the area that the p a r t y ’s 
s t r e n g t h  lay not in its a b i l i t y  to coerce, but in its wo rk 
a m o n g  the people and the fact that it was built from the 
roots.
Ironically, in view of the fact that the British
controlled the area in 1919, the position in Bat'umi region
was rather more f a v o u r a b l e  to the T'bilisi go v e r n m e n t .
Despite the obstacles put in the way of a Georgian National
Front, the latter, a r g u i n g  in f a vour of r e u n i f i c a t i o n  with
Ge orgia, won a clear m a j o r i t y  in the F e b r u a r y  e l e c t i o n  to
the city d u m a  desp i t e  a s trong a n t i - G e o r g i a n  c a m p a i g n  by
Denikin supporters and P a n - I slamists.^ Nevertheless, there
can be little doubt that the efforts of the T u r k i s h  M u s l i m
clergy and the lega cy of Russian o p p r e s s i o n  of M u s l i m
G e o r g i a n s  had mad e  man y  of the 70, 000 G e o r g i a n  M u s l i m s  in
the region wary of s e p a r a t i o n  fro m  Turkey. Evidently,
d espite a g e n e r a l  a w a r e n e s s  of shared cu l t u r a l  a t t r i b u t e s
with their Christian kinsmen, religious affiliation remained
for many the prime determinant of political loyalty.1®^ A
Georgian Foreign Minis t r y  report p e s s i m i s t i c a l l y  o b s e r v e d
that they considered themselves Turkish, wanted nothing to
do with C h r i s t i a n  G e o r g i a n s  and had been h o s t i l e  to the
1 o 1Georgian government since the Turks had occupied Bat'umi.
While the Social-Democrats could not actively intervene 
in Atchara (Bat'umi region), they nevertheless sought to win 
the support of its M u s l i m  population. A G e o r g i a n  M u s l i m  
Liberation Committee was able in January 1919 to promise the 
creation of a free, autonomous Muslim Georgian region with 
complete control over religious affairs,1 *^2 a promise upheld 
within days, moreover, by the government.1^  By August the
committee was claiming to have the support of the majority
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of the M u s l i m  population. In S e p tember, too, Niko
Nikoladze, the last s u r v i v o r  of the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i , felt 
ju s t ified in c l a i m i n g  at a m e e t i n g  with a d e l e g a t i o n  from 
the Atchara Mejlis that whereas in 1878, when he had at ten­
ded a similar occasion, Russia had stood between Christian 
and Muslim Georgia, no power now existed to prevent unifica- 
t i o n . 105
W h i l e  there was no doubt som e  basis for Nikol adze's 
o p t i m i s m ,  it n e v e r t h e l e s s  b e c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  a p p a r e n t  
t hrough 1919 and 1 920 that the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  r etreat into a 
siege mentality was destroying its faith in the minorities. 
In July 1 920 when Bat'umi r e t u r n e d  to G e o r g i a n  control, no 
a t t e m p t  was made to rec r u i t  n ative M u s l i m s  and r e l a t i o n s  
with the Atcharan population quickly deteriorated. General 
Kvinitadze's proclamation promising execution for all those 
who r e s i s t e d  G e o r g i a n  troo ps c o n t r a s t e d  sta r k l y  w i t h  the 
pr e v i o u s  year's e x p r e s s i o n s  of good will and r e c o n c i l i a ­
t i o n . 10^
Threatened by Denikin in Ap'khazet'i, opposed by Azeri 
and Georgian Muslims in Atchara and Akhaltsikhe, in dispute 
with Armenia over Akhalk'alak'i and threatened constantly by 
Bolshevik agitation among the Osian peasantry in the north, 
the g o v e r n m e n t  turned g r a d u a l l y  to rely for its s u p p o r t  on 
the ethnic Georgian population. Thus on 1st June 1919 at an 
emergency session of the Constituent Assembly to discuss the 
threat posed by the V o l u n t e e r  Army, the A s s e m b l y  i s s u e d  a 
statement appealing not to the people of Georgia, or to the 
w o r k e r s  and peasants, but to the na t i o n  (£££) to s t a n d  by 
the government and army at its moment of crisis.10*^
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The course of the conflict with Denikin lent conviction 
to the G e o r g i a n  and Azeri s u s p i c i o n  that the A r m e n i a n  
government was acting in collusion with the "Whites", a view 
Zhordania and others had expressed in January following the 
hostilities in Borchalo, and in February when the Georgians 
had a c c u s e d  the A r m e n i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  of S o k h u m i  region of 
h e l p i n g  the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  a gainst G e o r g i a . 10® In April 
this appeared to be confirmed when at a second Transcauca­
sian Conference in T’bilisi, again at the initiative of the 
G e o r g i a n s , 100 the A r m e n i a n s  both r e s i s t e d  all a t t e m p t s  to 
draw them into multilateral negotiations over territory and 
refused to join a regional defence pact against Denikin.110 
Coming just as the Volunteer Army was stepping up its o pera­
tions against G e o r g i a  and the Repub l i c  of North C a u c a s i a n  
Mountaineers, the decision clearly demonstrated the Dashnak 
government's disregard for Caucasian unity. Feeling itself 
p r o t e c t e d  by the Allies, it now, s h o r t - s i g h t e d l y  as it 
turned out, imagined that with European and American support 
it could gain p o s s e s s i o n  of the six Turkish v i l a y e t s  most 
p o p u l a t e d  by A r m e n i a n s  and e s t a b l i s h  a G r e a t e r  A r m e n i a  
s t r e t c h i n g  to the M e d i t e r r a n e a n .  W i t h  such a s p i r a t i o n s  
there was little to be gained from antagonising the Allies 
by uniting against Denikin.
In June, f o l l o w i n g  the defeat of the M o u n t a i n e e r s '
Republic, Georgia and Azerbaijan again called on Armenia to
join them, but in vain, leaving the former to sign a defence
pact on 16th June c o m m i t t i n g  th em to defend each o t h e r  in
the event of attack and to refrain from concluding military
conventions with other governments or initiating military
111action without the knowledge or consent of their partner. 
A r m e n i a  had not o n l y  e a r n e d  the r e s e n t m e n t  of its
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neighbours, it had also confirmed its isolation in Transcau­
casia.
As in the p r e c e d i n g  D e c e m b e r  and January, the real 
v i c t i m s  wer e  the many A r m e n i a n s  still living in Georgia, 
most notably the 150,000 refugees (of whom 100,000 were co n ­
centrated in and around T’bilisi), who became the subject of
1 1?renewed Georgian hostility and suspicion. The activities
of the Armenian National Council, in particular, even though
r e s t r i c t e d  n o w  to cu l t u r a l  and e d u c a t i o n a l  matters, cam e
under close s c r u t i n y  and in August it was banned at the last
moment from holding elections on the spurious grounds that
1 1 ?these would interfere with the collection of grain.
In July, the A r m e n i a n  paper A s h k h a t a v o r  was a gain 
banned f o l l o w i n g  a series of a r t i c l e s  in w h i c h  it had 
accused the Georgians of forcibly resettling Armenians ou t ­
side T ’bilisi and encouraging the local authorities’ pe rse­
cution of refug e e s  in A k h a l k ’alak'!' district, a c c u s a t i o n s  
w h i c h  the g o v e r n m e n t  v i g o r o u s l y  denied, c l a i m i n g  in r eply 
that they were intended to undermine its attempts to improve 
n a t i o n a l  relations. The paper had also p r o v o c a t i v e l y  
d e s c r i b e d  the G e o r g i a n - A z e r i  d e f e n c e  pact as a c o a l i t i o n  
d i r e c t e d  at the d e s t r u c t i o n  of A r m e n i a . 1 1 In the te nse 
c o n d i t i o n s  of 1919 it w a s  no l o n g e r  e n o u g h  to a p p e a r  
neutral, let alone w r ite with such u n d i s g u i s e d  h o s t i l i t y  
against the government; increasingly one had to demonstrate 
one's support for the s t a t e . A s  Z h o r d a n i a  e x p r e s s e d  it 
himself:
I have to declare that no paper, be it in Russian, 
Armenian or any other language, will be published 
within Georgia which does not stand decisively on 
the grounds of Georgian independence.^
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7.3 Social and Economic Crisis
The need to be on a co n s t a n t  state of m i l i t a r y  alert 
and the i n c e ssant f i g h t i n g  in first one and then a n o t h e r  
part of the cou n t r y  proved an e n o r m o u s  drain on G e o r g i a ’s 
m e a g r e  m a t e r i a l  and h u m a n  resources. M i l i t a r y  spending, 
w h i c h  in 1918-19 had been 201,021,373 G e o r g i a n  rubl es 
( m ane t ’ i ) or 30.8 per cent of the state b u d g e t , 11 *^ rose the 
following year to 1,196,511,000 rubles, or 36.56 per cent of
1 1 o
the total budget, w h i l e  the drain on m a n p o w e r  f r o m
Georgia's small working class was almost as great a problem, 
particularly as the Popular Guard, which drew heavily from 
the T'bilisi p r o l e t a r i a t  and was r e g a r d e d  as the best 
trained and most committed section of the armed forces, bjore 
a disproportionately large share of the fighting.11® Valiko 
Chubinidze recalled that during the Armenian confrontation 
the Guard o p e r a t e d  a shift s y s t e m  in T'bilisi's f a c t o r i e s  
that enabled workers to fight at the front:
...when one shift of w o r k e r s  was w o r k i n g  in the 
f a c t o r i e s  and p r i n t i n g  presses, the other was 
hurrying, rifle in hand, to the field of b attle 
and defence of the republic...every worker rotated 
in this way t h r o u g h o u t  the c o u n t r y  in d e f e n c e  of 
the republic and production.1^®
On 19th N o v ember, with G e n e r a l  Baratov's a b o r t i v e  
m i s s i o n  to T'bilisi n o w - a t  an end, D e n i k i n  added to the 
country's difficulties by imposing an economic blockade of 
both Georgia and Azerbaijan.
I cannot a l l o w  the s e l f - s t y l e d  f o r m a t i o n s  of 
G e o r g i a  and A z e r b a i j a n  [he wrote], which have 
s p r u n g  up to the d e t r i m e n t  of R u s s i a n  s t a t e  
i n t e rests and w h i c h  are clea r l y  h o s t i l e  to the 
i d e a  of the R u s s i a n  s t a t e ,  to r e c e i v e  f o o d  
s upplies at the expense of the areas of Ru s s i a  
being liberated from the Bo lsheviks. 1 21
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In March 1919, at one of the first sessions of the Co n ­
stituent Assembly, Foreign Minister Gegetchkori, ackn o w l e d g ­
ing the dire, state of Georgia's finances, stres s e d  the 
importance attached by the government to restoring normality 
to its foreign trade relations. In large part, however, as 
Denikin's blockade underlined, this was something that lay 
outwith Georgia's control. Economic recovery continued to 
be i m p e d e d  by the c losure of the D a r d a n e l l e s  (which wer e  
only opened by the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920), the 
British occupation until 8th July of Bat'umi, the depressed 
state of trade t h r o u g h o u t  Europe, and Georgia's lack of 
a merchant fleet of its own.
The virt u a l  c e s s a t i o n  of trade wit h  the rest of the 
w o rld brought about by the war and the clos u r e  of the D a r d a ­
nelles had a devastating effect too on the Georgian m a n g a n ­
ese industry, the country's main source of foreign currency. 
Denied access to world trade, companies were forced to close 
down and stockpile vast quantities of the mineral. Between 
1913 and 1920 the n u m b e r  of w o r k e r s  e m p l o y e d  in the 
Tchiat'ura mines fell from 3,500 to 250, while output, which 
in 1913 had reached 59,100,000 puds (about 970,000 tonnes), 
de c l i n e d  in 1918 to 1,600,000 puds (about 26,200 tonnes). 
Mo reover, w h i l e  outp ut d o u b l e d  in 1919, e xports a c t u a l l y  
fell again d e s p i t e  the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  that year to 
impose a state monopoly on the export of manganese. Only in 
1920, when Denikin's blockade had ended and the Dardanelles 
opened, did both production and export figures show signs of 
recovery. By then, however, the government had very little 
time left. A similar situation prevailed in the mining and
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export of coal, copper, zinc, gold and barite.122
D e n i k i n ’s block a d e  of North C a u c a s i a n  grain and the
collapse of Georgia’s fragile manufacturing industry forced
the g o v e r n m e n t  to imp o r t  an e n o r m o u s  var i e t y  of goods,
ra n g i n g  fro m  food (37.2 per cent of the total) to clothing,
thread, shoes, rope, matches, medicines, chemicals, petrol,
nails, m a c h i n e r y  and far m  i m p l e m e n t s ,  a c i r c u m s t a n c e  that
had a progressively negative effect on the country's balance
of trade, w h i c h  in 1920 r e c o r d e d  a deficit of over 1,259
1 ? 3million Georgian rubles.
Table 19:
Imports Exports
(in millions (in millions
of rubles) of rubles)
1918 (7 m o n t h s ) 1 40. 9 1 53.0
1919 962.8 383.0
1920 (11 months) 2,592.2 1,332.7124
Forced to spend h e a v i l y  on d efence and the up k e e p  of 
the road and railway network, the government found itself in 
constant deficit. Thus while in 1918-19 revenue, which came 
mainly from state property (50 per cent) and indirect taxa­
tion (33.06 per cent), t o t a l l e d  174.25 m i l l i o n  rubles, e x ­
p e n d i t u r e  e x c e e d i n g  663.5 m i l l i o n . 12^ It had been h o ped 
that in 1 920 the sale of state land to the p e a s a n t r y  w o u l d  
help offset g o v e r n m e n t  spending, but of the 252 m i l l i o n  
r u b l e s  e n v i s a g e d  f r o m  t h i s  s o u r c e ,  o n l y  2.45 m i l l i o n  
m a t e r i a l i s e d ,  w i t h  the c o n s e q u e n c e  t h a t  e x p e n d i t u r e  
(3 ,, 2 5 2 , 8 1 3 , 0 0 0  G e o r g i a n  r u b l e s )  e x c e e d e d  r e v e n u e  
(771,059,021 G e o r g i a n  rubles) by a p p r o x i m a t e l y  40 0 per 
c e n t .12^
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The g r o w t h  of s p e n d i n g  and the f oreign trade defi cit 
led the government to begin printing more money in what it 
hoped would be a short-term measure, quickly to be abandoned 
once the f iscal s y s t e m  was o p e r a t i n g  p r o p e r l y  and r egular 
trad i n g  conta c t s  had been e s t a b l i s h e d  with the rest of the 
world. However, this and the decision in July 1919 to begin 
iss u i n g  bonds led to a d r a m a t i c  fall in the value of the 
G e o r g i a n  ruble and a rise in prices. Thus w h e r e a s  at the 
b e g i n n i n g  of 1920 there had been an ex c h a n g e  rate of 900 
rubles to the pound, and in June of 1,474, in the latter 
half of the year i n f l a t i o n  s p i r a l l e d  so far out of c o n t r o l  
that by mid-December the rate had risen to 18,000 rubles to 
the pound.12^
I n f l a t i o n  q u i c k l y  p ushed up the cost of living. A 
k i l o g r a m  of mea t that in 1914 had cost 14 k o p e c k s  in 1920 
cost 15.5 rubles, while the cost of the same amount of bread 
rose from 8 kopecks to 10.58 rubles.12® Moreover, according 
to the Minister of Finance, K. Kandelaki, while the average 
daily wage increased by 48.7 per cent, the cost of living in 
the same period increased by 154.9 percent. Whereas in 1914 
the a v e r a g e  daily wage of a w o r k e r  w o u l d  have b ought 1.5 lbs 
e a c h  of m e a t ,  b r e a d ,  b e a n s ,  c a b b a g e ,  c h e e s e ,  o n i o n s ,  
potatoes, rice, salt, c o o k i n g  oil, coal and oil, in 1 920 it 
could only buy 0.44 lbs.12^
Despite the hardships it had to endure, including u n e m ­
p l o y m e n t  of 9,000 in T ’bilisi, a l m o s t  25 per cent of the
13 0c a p i t a l ’s w o r k f o r c e ,  the h i g h l y  o r g a n i s e d  G e o r g i a n
13 1working class remained remarkably loyal to the government 
throughout its period in office, a fact which in part can be 
attributed to the strong ties retained by most workers with
the villages, which shielded them from the worst effects of
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t h e  f o o d  s h o r t a g e s  a n d  p r i c e  r i s e s ,  a n d  t h e  s o - c a l l e d
"workers' table", a s y s t e m  o p e r a t e d  by the M i n i s t r y  of
S u p p l i e s  for sell i n g  food and i m p o r t e d  c l o t h i n g  to the
1 3 ?workers at subsidised rates, but which equally reflected 
the l a s t i n g  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  w o r k e r s  with the 
Social-Democratic Party and, not least, the personal author-
1 ”3 0
ity of its leader, Noe Zhordania.' While strikes did take 
place, they were infrequent, short-lived and never acquired 
a mass character.1 £ S z h o r d a n i a  was later to write, the 
T ' b i l i s i  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  f o r m e d  the " m a i n  b a s i s  of the 
Georgian Republic from the beginning to the e n d " . 135
The succ ess or f a i l u r e  of the n e w  state, h o w e v e r ,  as 
Zhordania acknowledged, depended on the extent to which the 
p e a s a n t r y  could be i nduced to o v e r c o m e  its s u s p i c i o n  of 
g o v e r n m e n t  and ident i f y  its int e r e s t s  wit h  those of the 
state. But convincing Georgia's peasants that independence 
and the n e w  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  we re of r e l e v a n c e  to 
their existence, let alone in their best interests, part icu­
larly while the country remained beset by war and economic 
disruption, was in much of Georgia, and most notably in the 
non-Georgian areas, to prove an intractable problem.
Nevertheless, it was the Social-Democrats' awareness of 
the peasantry's i m p o r t a n c e  and the need to o v e r c o m e  its 
alienation from the state that underpinned the government's 
decision on 23rd January 1919 to authorise the sale of land 
to the p e a s a n t r y  as p rivate property. A l t h o u g h  Z h o r d a n i a  
still professed "in principle" to be in favour of municipal- 
i sation of the land, he and the party as a w h o l e  had laid 
the basis for the shift to support for private p r o p e r t y  at 
t h e  8 t h  C o n g r e s s  of C a u c a s i a n  S o c i a  1 - D e m o c r a t i c
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O r g a n i s a t i o n s  the p r e v i o u s  N o v e m b e r .  In m a k i n g  the 
dec ision, Zho r d a n i a  c l a i m e d  that the party had sought a 
s o l u t i o n  that w o u l d  ga in the in t e r e s t  of the p e a s a n t r y  in 
the n e w  order and provide r e s o u r c e s  for the t r e a s u r y  at a 
time when the country's financial situation was critical.
Fi n a n c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  aside, a m a j o r  f actor in the 
government's decision was its conviction that the desire for 
private property was so well established among the Georgian 
p e a s a n t r y  that it w o u l d  have r e j e c t e d  any other solution. 
More positively, the Social-Democrats also sought to over­
c o m e  the i n d i f f e r e n c e  of the r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  to 
c o n v i n c e  it that it had a stake in the p r e s e r v a t i o n  of 
Georgian independence.
Our guiding principle [Zhordania wrote] was that 
the great majority of the population of Georgia - 
the peasantry - should see that Georgian indepen­
dence had given them their land, that it had given 
t he m  ne w  m e a n s  for life. The a g r a r i a n  r e f o r m  
acquired therefore an exceptionally national form 
in our country. ^ '
The d e c i s i o n  to sell the land, however, wa s m o r e  c o n ­
troversial, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in v i e w  of the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t  s' 
repeated assertion in the past that the land belonged to the 
people, as was Zhordania's s p u r i o u s  c l a i m  that the p s y c h o ­
logy of the peasant was such that unless he bought his land 
he would doubt the validity of his claim to it.^38 Not only 
condescending, it also ignored the fact that those whom the 
reform purported to benefit most - peasants who either had 
no land at all or very litte - w e r e  the least able to pay. 
Those who were likely to benefit from the government's low 
prices, in fact, were the p e a s a n t s  who a l r e a d y  o w n e d  a 
certain a m o u n t  of land and we re not e n s n a r e d  in an e n d l e s s
cycle of debt.
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The greatest failing of the reform, however, and one it 
was beyond the powers of the government to correct, was the 
over a l l  sh o r t a g e  of land. Of the 5,537,207 desyat iny o f 
productive land in Georgia in 1918, 2,020,212 desyatiny were 
o w n e d  by the tr e a s u r y  and only 621,695 by the t'avada- 
z n a u r o b a , w h o s e  e states had been w h i t t l e d  a w a y  since the 
19th c e n t u r y  by land r e f o r m  and b a n k r u p t c y  to a third of 
their area in the 1860s, w h i l e  the r e m a i n d e r  b e l o n g e d  to 
peasants and peasant societies.
Based on the norms established by the agrarian reforms 
of March 1918 (see above), a total of 6 10,553 desyat iny were 
c o n f i s c a t e d  d uring that year, of w h i c h  forests, rivers, 
lakes, pastures, m i n e r a l  de p o s i t s  and l a r g e - s c a l e  m o d e r n  
f a rms were d e c l a r e d  state p r o p e r t y . T h e  r e m a i n i n g  
247,203 desyat iny wer e  made a v a i l a b l e  for sale to 317,633 
peasant families.1 "^1 According to Minister of Agriculture 
Noe Khomeriki, this meant that in East Georgia each peasant 
h o u s e h o l d  r e c e i v e d  on a v e r a g e  only 1.16 de syat iny and in 
West G e o r g i a  0.16 d e s y a t i n y , 1Zf2 which, c o m b i n e d  w i t h  the 
indifference, corruption and inexperience of the land c o m ­
m i s s i o n s  r e s p o n s i b l e  for e f f e c t i n g  the reform, as wel l  as 
the delays caused by a multitude of conflicting local laws 
and boundary disputes, formed the basis for a fresh wave of 
peasant unrest in 1919.
Yet there were very few a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to the 
g o v e r n m e n t  b eyond b r e a k i n g  up the p r o f i t a b l e  l a r g e - s c a l e  
estates and operating land reclamation schemes, although it 
did a t t e m p t  to e n c o u r a g e  ethnic G e o r g i a n s  to se t t l e  in the 
r e l a t i v e l y  s p a r s e l y  p o p u l a t e d  b o r d e r  d i s t r i c t s  of 
Akhalk'alak*i and Akhaltsikhe. Notably, it also s o u g h t  to
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prevent Georgians from moving either from these districts, 
which were heavily populated by Armenians, or from Gori and 
Dushet'i, both of which had a large Osian p o p u l a tion.^®
A l t h o u g h  the r e f o r m  d e m o n s t r a b l y  did very little to 
assuage the peasantry's land hunger and therefore failed to 
a c h i e v e  the pupose i ntended of it by Z h o r d a n i a  of w i n n i n g  
peasant support for the state, it did f i n a l l y  break the 
p o w e r  of the t 'a v a d a z n a u r o ba and, in c o m b i n a t i o n  wit h  the 
d e c i s i o n  of the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  in F e b r u a r y  1920 to 
annul the Transcaucasian's Seim's law of February 1918 bann­
ing the sale and purchase of land,1ZfZf paved the way for the 
bourgeois revolution in the countryside. According to Noe 
K h o m e r i k i ,  the estates of the t'av a d a z n a u roba in East 
Geo r g i a  were redu c e d  to only 5.1 per cent of their f o r m e r  
size, and in West Georgia to 6.1 per c e n t . 1Zt®
The extent of peasant d i s a f f e c t a t  ion q u i c k l y  b e c a m e  
clear in 1919 whe n  instead of r e a c t i n g  p a t r i o t i c a l l y  to 
Denikin's e c o n o m i c  squeeze and the d i f f i c u l t i e s  and hi gh 
cost of i m p o r t i n g  grain by s u p p l y i n g  mor e  to the t o w n s  to 
e n s u r e  t h a t  the u r b a n  p o p u l a t i o n  did not s t a r v e ,  the 
p e a s a n t r y  chose instead to hoard its gr ain and force the 
m a r k e t  price to soar. For the latter the s i t u a t i o n  was 
a g g r a v a t e d  by the f a c t  t h a t  the c o l l a p s e  of G e o r g i a n  
industry, i n f l a t i o n  and the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  
normal trade links with the rest of the world had combined 
to ensure that there was virtually nothing for it to buy in 
the towns and that what was available was on sale at highly
1 Ixfs
inf-lated prices.
M a t t e r s  b e c a m e  s t i l l  w o r s e ,  m o r e o v e r ,  w h e n  the 
peasan try, in order to take a d v a n t a g e  of the high p r ice of
grain, began to move away from the cultivation of intensive
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export crops like tob a c c o  and s i l k . 1 Z f ^  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  for 
the government, while this meant that more grain was grown, 
the loss of these crops d e p r i v e d  it of an i m p o r t a n t  source 
of fore i g n  currency, thus r e d u c i n g  its c a p a c i t y  either to 
buy grain abroad or import the manufactured goods required 
to induce the peasantry to part with its surplus production.
D e s p i t e  s e v e r e  f o o d  s h o r t a g e s  in the t o w n s ,  and 
T'bilisi in particular, caused by the economic blockade, war 
and the constant influx of refugees, the peasantry continued 
t h r o u g h o u t  1919 to w i t h o l d  its grain, thus t h r o w i n g  into 
jeopa r d y  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  town and c o u n t r y  and 
Zhordania's hopes of maintaining national unity.
Desp i t e  its w e l l - g r o u n d e d  fear that r e q u i s i t i o n i n g  
w o u l d  s e r i o u s l y  u n d e r m i n e  the p rospect of w i n n i n g  ac t i v e  
support in the c o u n t r y s i d e  for the n e w  order and, e q u a l l y  
seriously, f urther e x a c e r b a t e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  the a l m o s t  
e x c l u s i v e l y  rural Osian p o p u l a t i o n  of Gori and Dushet'i 
dis tricts, the g o v e r n m e n t  c o n c l u d e d  in the s p r i n g  of 1919 
that there was no alternative. H o a r d i n g  b e c a m e  a s e r i o u s  
c r i m e .
R e q u i s i t i o n i n g  [ Z h o r d a n i a  wrote] spread like a 
disease. The g o v e r n m e n t  was o v e r l o a d e d  by c o m ­
plaints. I fought f i e r c e l y  aga i n s t  this d i s e a s e  
and f r e q u e n t l y  a c h i e v e d  my aim. This was d i f f i ­
cult because the majority of the government, or at 
least half of it, s u p p o r t e d  the disease. In this 
respect, the l e a d e r s h i p  of the T'bilisi Soviet 
stood out in particular; it occupied first place 
in the initiation of requisitioning.1^®
Forced to use the Popular Guard to help e n f o r c e  the 
collection of a tax in kind, the government's relations with 
the p e a s a n t r y , as feared, d e t e r i o r a t e d  rapidly. By the 
summer, Valiko Jugheli, the leader of the Guard, was calling
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for 11 h eroic m e a s u r e s "  to o v e r c o m e  its r e s i s t a n c e  and for a 
"tour" of Kakhet'i and Gori d i s t r i c t s  in order f o r c i b l y  to 
g a t h e r  the g r a i n  b e i n g  c o n c e a l e d  f r o m  the l o c a l  t a x -  
collecting bodies.
By the end of 1919 the s i t u a t i o n  had d e t e r i o r a t e d  to 
the e x t e n t  that Noe R a m i s h v i l i ,  the M i n i s t e r  of the 
Interior, was forced to a c k n o w l e d g e  on 12th N o v e m b e r  that 
there was now serious disorder even in Guria, which together 
with T'bilisi had f o r m e d  the b a c k b o n e  of s upport for the 
G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  since 19 05.1^^ On 19th Nov e m b e r ,
peasants, l a b e l l e d  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  as B o l s h e v i k s  by the 
g o v e r n m e n t ,  seized all state and social i n s t i t u t i o n s  in 
Mejvriskhevi, cut the telegraph wires and took hostage the 
village's elected representative. Uprisings broke out the 
same day in Supsa and Chokhatauri.
While the government put down these and other revolts 
e l s e w h e r e  in the country, it was by n o w  clear that it was 
losing the battle to overcome the peasantry's indifference 
and engage it a c t i v e l y  in the n e w  order. In October, just 
four m o n t h s  before the Soviet army's i n v a s i o n  b rought 
Georgia's independence to an end, Zhordania lamented to the 
Second Congress of the Popular Guard that Georgian democracy 
had yet to bridge the gulf b e t w e e n  the g o v e r n m e n t  and 
people, that the population's continued resistance to paying 
tax was undermining the viability of the state and that the 
p e r s i s t e n t  refu s a l  of the p e a s a n t r y  to sell its p r o d u c e  to 
the tow n  r e f l e c t e d  its n a r r o w  inter e s t  in i m m e d i a t e  gain. 
It was es sential, he concluded, that the party c a rry out 
ideological work in the villages to convince the peasantry 
of the i d e n t i t y  of its i n t e r e s t s  with those of the state. 
On that, as Z h o r d a n i a  c l e a r l y  u n d e r s t o o d ,  r e s t e d  th e
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prospects for survival of G e o r g i a ’s i n d e p e n d e n c e . 1^
But while the difficult conditions and the government’s 
measures for overcoming them engendered a mood of sceptical 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  a m o n g  m u c h  of the ethnic G e o r g i a n  peasantry, 
the reaction of the non-Georgian population, and in particu­
lar of the Osians, was more hostile. At a time w h e n  the 
m e m o r y  of the p r e v i o u s  y e a r ’s clashes was still fresh, the 
refu s a l  of the C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y  to grant South O s e t ’i 
autonomy, disappointment at the land reform and the govern­
m e n t ’s resort to requisitioning brought new tension to re la­
tions b e t w e e n  the p r o v i n c e  and T ’bilisi, w h i l e  the a p p e a r ­
ance of m i l i t a r y  d e t a c h m e n t s  in Osian v i l l a g e s  to enf o r c e  
the sale of grain and c o u n t e r  a spate of a r m e d  r o b b e r y  in 
the area awakened fears of more government reprisals, thus 
greatly reducing the Social-Democrats’ prospects of convinc­
ing the Osians that they had their int e r e s t s  at heart, a 
point r e f l e c t e d  in the c o m p l a i n t  by the g o v e r n m e n t  pa per 
Sak’art♦velos Respublika that rumours were being spread in 
Gori district that the govern ment’s measures were directed 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  a gainst the Osian p o p u l a t i o n . 1^ 1 W h i l e  the 
paper dismissed these as provocations designed to sow a n t a ­
g o n i s m  b e t w e e n  the na t i o n a l i t i e s ,  it was a v i e w  that was 
gaining wide acceptance among the peasantry.
Relations between the South Osian National Council and 
the g o v e r n m e n t  d e t e r i o r a t e d  still fur t h e r  in M a y  w h e n  the 
council fled the provincial capital, Tskhinvali, suspecting 
that m i l i t a r y  forces in the area had been g i v e n  o r d e r s  for 
its arrest. From its place of hiding, the re bel c o u n c i l  
began to spread the word that the G e o r g i a n  a r m y  wa s  i ntent 
upon the e x t e r m i n a t i o n  of the Osian people, and u r g e d
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the p o p u l a t i o n  to refuse to pay tax and to evade c o n s c r i p -
t i o n . 1 5 2
Although the national council did not in itself pose a 
serious danger to the Georgian' Republic, its position on the 
Russian border and Bolshevik support for Osian unity within 
the Russian Federation made the Georgians wary of the possi­
bility of Bolshevik infiltration into the area and accounts 
in part for the Social-Democrat s' heavy-handed response to 
unrest. Far fro m  e r a d i c a t i n g  the problem, h owever, the 
government’s measures stimulated the emergence of an Osian 
n a t i o n a l  m o v e m e n t  that w a n t e d  n o t h i n g  to do w i t h  G e o r g i a  
and, perhaps more o m i n o u s l y ,  paved the way for the re- 
e m e r g e n c e  from ’’o b l i v i o n ” in early 1919 of the C a u c a s i a n
I C Q
Bolshevik Party organisation, if only in South Oset’i.
Emboldened by the evidence of disenchantment among the 
peasantry, the C a u c a s i a n  Re g i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e  in S e p t e m b e r  
laid the first of its plans for a g e n e r a l  u p r i s i n g  in 
Georgia. Intended for late October, the u p r i s i n g  was, 
however, pre-empted on the 22nd by the arrest in T'bilisi of 
its organisers. But in N o v e m b e r  the B o l s h e v i k s  e n j o y e d  
greater success in Gori district and although their expecta­
tions that this w o u l d  prove the catalyst for n a t i o n w i d e  
r e b e l l i o n  cam e  to nothing, the s e v e r i t y  of the P o p u l a r  
Guard's reprisals further fuelled the antagonism between the 
Osian population and the Georgians.1
I n c r e a s i n g l y  d i s t r u s t f u l  of the Osians, as of its 
Ap'khaz, Armenian and Russian minorities, the government's 
reliance on the ethnic Georgian population became still more 
pronounced, a c o n s e q u e n c e  of w h i c h  was to e x c l u d e  the 
national minorities from active involvement in the life of
the state and deepen their mutual estrangement. Faced with
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a s t r u g g l e  for survival, the G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  
Party edged closer to the unashamedly nationalist position 
of the National-Democratic Party. Valiko Jugheli, who was 
c o n c e r n e d  by this t e n d e n c y  w i t h i n  the party, a c c u s e d  the 
government at a meeting in January 1920 of
devoting all its attention to the construction of 
na t i o n a l  form, to the n e g l e c t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
socialism,
and called on the P opular Guard to "put a more p r o l e t a r i a n
1 c  c
po licy into action", J J a p o s i t i o n  shared by the M e n s h e v i k  
Avshtrov at the same meeting, who observed,
...in our party n a t i o n a l  t e n d e n c i e s  are g r o w i n g  
stronger and stronger and international tendencies 
moving further and further a w a y . . . 1^
In June 1920 rebellion broke out again in South Ose t ’i, 
aided on this o c c a s i o n  by a force of 1,000 o r g a n i s e d  by the 
B o l s h e v i k s  in Vladikavkaz. The O sians q u i c k l y  c a p t u r e d  
Tskhinvali, but Georgian reaction was swift and u n c o m p r o m i s ­
ing. No longer distracted by the threat of invasion by the 
Volunteer Army, the government resolved to mete out what it 
hoped would be a decisive lesson to the province. An appeal 
by M i n i s t e r  of D efence G. L o rt'k’i p ’anidze to the army,
c
p u b l i s h e d  in Er t 'ob a , not only left no roo m  for do ubt as to 
the government’s intentions but also gave clear indication 
of the extent of Georgian frustration with Osian behaviour. 
The happiness of the Georgian people, he said, demanded that 
trait o r s  and the o f f s p r i n g  of p o i s o n o u s  snakes be crushed, 
that the t r a i t o r s ’ nests be swept a w a y  with an iron b r o o m  
and that bur n i n g  irons be used to e r a d i c a t e  the " p u s t u l e n t  
spots and sores w hich t h r e a t e n  to poison and d e s t r o y  the
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entire system". lJI
On 12th June G e o r g i a n  a r m y  and P opular Gu ard units 
counter-attacked, quickly regaining Tskhinvali before tu rn­
ing their attention on the population centres suspected of 
h a r b o u r i n g  rebels. The i n t e r e s t s  of the w o r k i n g  class and 
so c i a l i s m ,  Jugh e l i  w r o t e  in his diary as the P o p u l a r  Guard 
r a z e d  v i l l a g e s  to the g r o u n d ,  d e m a n d e d  tha t  t h e y  be 
c r u e l . T h o u s a n d s  were forced to flee northwards or seek 
refuge in the for e s t s  in a c a m p a i g n  w h o s e  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  
violence not only brought into question the moral standing 
of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  but g r e a t l y  e x a c e r b a t e d  the b u r g e o n i n g  
a n i m o s i t y  b e t w e e n  the two n a tionalities. By 1920 both 
national and class antagonism were already threatening the 
unity of the state.
7.4 The search for International Recognition
A l t h o u g h  internal r e l a t i o n s  r e m a i n e d  tense, i n t e r n a ­
tional d e v e l o p m e n t s  and, in particular, the defeat of 
Denikin in the Russian Civil War, gave the Georgian g overn­
ment hope that its position might improve. The collapse of 
the V o l u n t e e r  Army, it was believed, would r e m o v e  a m a j o r  
obstacle to recognition of the Transcaucasian republics and 
thus enhance their p r o s p e c t s  of s e c u r i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
acceptance, a c o n v i c t i o n  borne out by the d e c i s i o n  of the 
Allied Supreme Council on 12th January 1920 to grant Georgia 
de facto recognition.1^  also removed a major obstacle
to economic recovery, although the continued closure of the 
D a r d a n e l l e s  and the A llied o c c u p a t i o n  of Bat'umi r e m a i n e d  
impediments.
Encouraged nevertheless by the decision of the Supreme 
Council, G e o r g i a  pressed n o w  for de jure r e c o g n i t i o n  and
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permission to join the League of Nations, in the belief that 
this would consolidate its international standing, improve 
the p rospect of a t t r a c t i n g  for e i g n  credit, w h i c h  was 
e s s e n t i a l  to e c o n o m i c  e x p a n s i o n  and a vital factor in 
e n s u r i n g  stable e c o n o m i c  and social r e l a t i o n s  w i t h i n  
Georgia, and deter both Russia and Turkey from armed aggres­
sion. Thus on 8th July the G e o r g i a n s  sent a note to the 
Treaty Cou n c i l  stat i n g  that de facto r e c o g n i t i o n  did not 
meet the expectations of the Georgian people. ^ 0
The d e l e g a t i o n  in Paris r e s p o n s i b l e  for p u t t i n g  the 
Georgian case, led by Irakli Dseret'eli and Karlo Chkheidze, 
felt that its case was strengthened by the treaty then being 
d r a w n  up by the Allies to settle the fate of the f o r m e r  
Turkish empire which, among other things, involved d e t e r m i n ­
ing A r m e n i a ’s bor d e r s  wit h  both Turkey and Georgia, a c i r ­
cumstance which, in the delegation's opinion, required first 
of all that international recognition be accorded to G e o r ­
gia. On the n e g a t i v e  side, howev e r ,  the USA c o n t i n u e d  to 
oppose the fragmentation of the former Russian empire, m a i n ­
taining that it should be reconstituted as before, with the 
e x c e p t i o n s  of Finland, Poland and Armenia, which, q u ite 
arbitra r i l y ,  it argued m e r i t e d  special c o n s i d e r a t i o n
because of their p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t rong desire for i n d e p e n d -
161e n c e .
G e o r g i a ’s h o p e s  of the t r e a t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  p r o v e d  
misplaced. When it was signed in the French town of Sevres 
on 10th August, it not-only failed to extend de jure r e c o g ­
nition but declared Bat’umi a free port and excluded Georgia 
f r o m  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n  to c o n t r o l  the
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D a r d a n e l l e s . ^ 2 Undeterred by this setback, the government 
c o n t i n u e d  to press the Leag ue of Nations to accept its 
application for membership. In November, the League r e c o m ­
mended that its Assembly inform Georgia that its application 
had been t reated with s y m p a t h y  and that, p e n d i n g  a final 
decision, it could p a r t i c i p a t e  in the L e a g u e ’s t e c h n i c a l  
organisations.^^ On 16th December, however, swayed by the 
continuing resistance of the major powers to grant de jure 
recognition, the League, by 13 votes to 10 and w i t h  19 
abst e n t i o n s ,  turned d o w n  G e o r g i a ’s r e q u e s t . O n l y  whe n  
the Allies fin a l l y  g r a n t e d  de jure r e c o g n i t i o n  on 26th 
J anu a r y  1921 was the wa y  opened for its i n c l u s i o n  in the 
League. By then, however, Georgia's i n d e p e n d e n c e  had only 
one month to run.
The i m p e n d i n g  defeat of the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  and the 
g r o w i n g  need for the Allies to c o m e  to t e rms wit h  the B o l ­
sheviks gave rise to the hope in T'bilisi that Georgia would 
n o w  be able to a b a n d o n  the delic a t e  role of n e u t r a l i t y  in 
the Civil War and n o r m a l i s e  its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  Russia. To 
this end it sought the a s s i s t a n c e  of Britain. The head of 
the Georgian delegation in Paris on 6th March wrote to Lloyd 
George that although Georgia and Azerbaijan had been forced 
onto the defensive in their relations with Russia, it n e ver­
theless r e m a i n e d  the case that the ma in a i m  of their 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  was to secure R u s s i a ’s r e c o g n i t i o n  of 
their independence.
We hope [he w rote] that you will help our r e p u b ­
lics to secure de jure r e c o g n i t i o n  and that you 
will play the role of a r b i t e r  in the r e c o n c i l i a ­
tion of the Transcaucasian republics with Russia, 
which will probably lead to the recognition of our 
independence by our northern neighbour. ^
556
Georgia's r e l a t i o n s  with Britain, h owever, r e m a i n e d  
cool, c o n s t r a i n e d  by their d ispute over the o c c u p a t i o n  of 
Bat'umi, w hich in G e o r g i a n  eyes was r apidly b e c o m i n g  a 
s y m b o l  of n a t i o n a l  t e r r i t o r i a l  integr ity, and the g r o w i n g  
c o n v i c t i o n  of the Bri t i s h  cabinet, c o n f i r m e d  by the Red 
Army's o c c u p a t i o n  of Baku in April, that a s y m p a t h e t i c  
G e o r g i a  w o u l d  not c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to Bri t i s h  
strategic or economic interests in the Middle East.
No doubt a w a r e  of Bri t i s h  r e s e r vations, the G e o r g i a n s  
on 14th April took the i n i t i a t i v e  t h e m s e l v e s  by a p p e a l i n g  
directly to Moscow for treaty negotiations, a gesture which 
reflected both anxiety that Bolshevik victory in the Civil 
War might lead Moscow to concentrate greater effort on d e ­
stabilising Transcaucasia and the understanding of the Geo r ­
gian l e a d e r s h i p  that n o r m a l i s a t i o n  of its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
Russia was crucial to Georgia's future economic viability. 
It d o u b t l e s s  hoped too that bet ter r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  R u s s i a  
would have a marked effect on the situation in South Oset'i, 
much of the blame for which it attributed to Bolshevik a g i ­
tation . 1 ^
The Bolshevik leadership had cause for considering the 
G e o r g i a n  a p p r o a c h  favourably, not least b e c a u s e  o u t s i d e  
Oset'i, where Bolshevik activities were facilitated by the 
proximity of Vladikavkaz, the inability of the party o r gani­
sation to win significant support among either the peasantry 
or the w o r k i n g  class in G e o r g i a  had a l r e a d y  c a u s e d  the 
P o l i t b u r o  to r e c o n s i d e r  the for m  of party o r g a n i s a t i o n  in 
the area. At a m e e t i n g  on 3rd J a n u a r y  it c o n c l u d e d  that it 
was c rucial to the success of the s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  "local 
chauvinism" and for the creation of conditions conducive to
the propagation of socialist revolution that the communist
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organisations in Transcaucasia operate as separate national 
parties, a d e c i s i o n  w h i c h  in spite of v e h e m e n t  o p p o s i t i o n  
from the k a v k r a i k o m  (C aucasian Re g i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e ) ,  the 
Politburo succeeded in enforcing by the spring.1^  In May, 
perhaps because its resistance had been deemed too vigorous, 
the k a v k r a i k o m  was d i s b a n d e d  and r e p l a c e d  by the k a v b u r o  
(Caucasian Bureau), which was directly subordinate to Moscow 
and led by O r j o n i k i d z e  and K i r o v . T h e  n o t i o n a l  i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e  of the A r m enian, Azeri and G e o r g i a n  p a r t i e s  wa s 
e m p h a s i s e d  by their dual s u b o r d i n a t i o n  to the k a v b u r o  and 
the RCP Central Committee.
That these changes had had little b e a r i n g  on the 
party's fortunes in Georgia, aside perhaps from undermining 
its s a g g i n g  morale, was d e m o n s t r a t e d  on Ma y  Day w h e n  an 
attempt by members of the Georgian CP to exploit the uncer­
tainty and anxiety caused by the almost unimpeded annexation 
of A z e r b a i j a n  by the Red A r m y  to stage an u p r i s i n g  in 
T'bilisi ended in ignominy. The Bolsheviks were surrounded 
by a c r o w d  of h o s t i l e  w o r k e r s  and handed over to the a u t h o r ­
i t i e s . ^ ^  A similarly ill-advised attempt to stage a coup 
d'etat the f o l l o w i n g  day and to a t tack the m i l i t a r y  s c h o o l  
ended in d i s a s t e r  and fur t h e r  d e m o r a l i s a t i o n ,  w h i l e  an 
attempted invasion via Dsit'eli Khidi on the Georgian-Azeri 
border by the Red Army, t i m e d  to c o i n c i d e  with the e v e n t s  in 
T'bilisi, was repulsed.1^® Despite the privations endured 
by the Georgian population and its waning enthusiasm for the 
national revolution, it was evident that dissatisfaction did 
not yet extend as far as support for the Bolshevik a l t e r n a ­
tive or the overthrow of the government.
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There were other reasons too for the Bolshevik leader­
ship to look f a v o u r a b l y  on an a g r e e m e n t  wit h  Georgia. A 
peace t reaty could n e u t r a l i s e  the area w h i l e  the Red Arm y  
focused its attention on driving Wrangel out of the Crimea 
and m ight ease the c o n d i t i o n s  under w h i c h  the C o m m u n i s t  
Party operated in Georgia. Furthermore, by regaining Baku 
the B o l s h e v i k s  now had control over G e o r g i a ’s oil s u p p l i e s  
and w e r e  in a po s i t i o n  to d i c t a t e  t e rms w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  to 
resort to force
Secret negotiations between the Georgians and Russians, 
c o n d u c t e d  even w h i l e  the Red A r m y  was a t t e m p t i n g  to cross 
Georgia's s o u t h - e a s t e r n  border, led on 7th M a y  1 920 to the 
signing of a treaty in Moscow by which the Bolsheviks recog­
nised Georgia's i n dependence, r e n o u n c e d  all c l a i m  to the 
t e r r i t o r y  of G e o r g i a  and its people, r e n o u n c e d  all i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  in the i nternal affa i r s  of G e o r g i a  and agreed, in 
Article Six, not to permit on their territory
...the s o j o u r n  and a c t i v i t y  of any g r o u p s  or 
organisations pretending to the role of Government 
of Georgia, or any part thereof, nor of any g r oup 
or organisation seeking to overthrow the G o vern­
ment of Georgia.1^2
In return, however, G e o r g i a  not only a greed both to 
deny access to its t e r r i t o r y  of troo ps and o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
ho s t i l e  to the Rus s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  and to re f u s e  the m  
t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  across G e o r g i a  but, in A r t i c l e  10, 
conceded, in effect, to the n e g a t i o n  of the a g r e e m e n t  by 
R ussia not to i n t e r f e r e  in Georgia's i n t e r n a l  affairs, by 
a g r e e i n g  to rele a s e  all those it had i m p r i s o n e d  for acts 
c o m m i t t e d  in the interest of the RSFSR or the C o m m u n i s t  
Party, r e g a r d l e s s  of w h e t h e r  or not such a c t i v i t e s  had
endangered the interests of Georgia. '
At no cost to itself Russia thus forced G e o r g i a  to 
apply more pressure for British withdrawal from Bat'umi at a 
tim e  w h e n  a British m i l i t a r y  presence, h o w e v e r  g a l l i n g  it 
m ight have been to n a t i o n a l  pride, might have acted as a 
deterrent to Bolshevik military incursion, deprived strag­
glers fro m  the V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  of a safe haven, and, in a 
supplement to the treaty, induced the Georgians to legalise 
the activity of the Communist Party even though it remained 
c o m m i t t e d  to the e x p l o i t a t i o n  of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  tensi o n s  
within the country and the overthrow, by force if necessary, 
of the government.
Despite the protestations of Foreign Minister Gegetch- 
kori that the treaty v i o l a t e d  G e o r g i a n  s o v e r e i g n t y ,  the 
m a j o r i t y  of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n c l u d i n g  Zh ordania, took the 
view that Russia's de jure recognition of Georgian indepen­
dence outweighed all other considerations. The way was now 
open, they believed, for recognition by the major powers.
The treaty did little in fact for the f o r t u n e s  of the 
Georgian CP, for although the government released 900 people 
fro m  prison s hortly after the treaty and l e g a l i s e d  the 
party, it did not toler a t e  furt h e r  a c t i v i t y  by B o l s h e v i k s  
that it felt j e o p a r d i s e d  state interests. L e g a l i s a t i o n ,  
moreover, brought the underground cells to the surface and 
facilitated the task of identification of party members by 
Georgian intelligence, while no sooner had Bolshevik papers 
begun to r e a p p e a r  than steps were taken to e n f o r c e  their 
closure again for violating state interests. Between July 
and O c t o b e r  1920, 1500 party m e m b e r s  were e x p e l l e d  f r o m
Georgia, while morale among those left behind was very low. 
As one member of the T'bilisi Committee described it,
560
...our o r g a n i s a t i o n  was a l m o s t  d e s t r o y e d  at its 
roots. Cells su r v i v e d  only in a few places. The 
comrades released from prison were not given back 
their work...so it was impossible to re-establish 
cells. The mas s  of the party was in low spirits.
The treaty, which left the Mensheviks at the head 
of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  ange r e d  our comrades. There 
was a strong desire to leave for Soviet Azerbaijan 
and R u s s i a ...1^5
But for the Russians, the low m o r a l e  of the local 
Bolshevik organisation, however, was a small sacrifice for 
the gains made from the treaty, particularly as the former 
had proved so ineffectual in the past. Moscow was now able 
to exploit the terms of the treaty to increase the pressure 
on and u n d e r m i n e  the m o r a l e  of the G e o r g i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .  
Thus w h i l e  the k a v b u r o  o r g a n i s e d  the Os ian force that 
entered Georgia in June and played a major part in planning 
and f o m e n t i n g  the uprising, and w h i l e  the G e o r g i a n  CP was 
encouraged to agitate against the government and encourage 
revolutionary change, Moscow cited Georgian counter-measures 
as e v i d e n c e  of the Z h o r d a n i a  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  f a i l u r e  to a bide 
by the terms of the treaty.
A m o n g  a series of i n c i d e n t s  that at the least s u g g e s t  
an a b s e n c e  of g o o d  w i l l  on the part of M o s c o w ,  the 
Bolsheviks in October accused the Georgians first of conni­
vance wit h  W r a n g e l  f o l l o w i n g  an incident in w h i c h  5,000 
C o s s a c k s  i n t e r n e d  near the Black Sea coast w e r e  f r e e d  by a 
V o l u n t e e r  A r m y  raid, ^ 6  and then, in early N o v e m b e r ,  of 
p l a n n i n g  to lease Bat'umi to Britain, an a c c u s a t i o n  which, 
whatever its basis in truth, kept the Georgian government on 
the d e f e n s i v e  in its d e a l i n g s  w i t h  R u s s i a . 1 ^  T h r o u g h o u t  
this period too evidence was gathering that the Bolsheviks, 
s c e p t i c a l  of the l i k e l i h o o d  of b eing able to o v e r t h r o w  the
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g o v e r n m e n t  fro m  w i t h i n  Georgia, we re c o n t e m p l a t i n g  a 
m i l i t a r y  s o l u t i o n  to the p r o b l e m .  In the l i g h t  of 
informat ion received from Baku, the cabinet met in T ’bilisi 
in early N o v e m b e r  to set up a secret defe n c e  c o u n c i l  and 
initiate measures to counter the threat of invasion. In an 
i n t e r n a l  report, Evgeni G e g e t c h k o r i  dre w  a dist i n c t i o n ,  
shared it s e e m s  by Zhordania, b e t w e e n  the " c a utious and 
loyal" attitude of Moscow and the more belligerent kavburo, 
and c l a i m e d  to have i n t e l l i g e n c e  repo r t s  s t a t i n g  that the 
Soviet Army Command in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latter of 
w h i c h  came under Soviet a u t h o r i t y  on 2nd D e c e m b e r , w a s  
p l a n n i n g  to invade G e o r g i a  on the p retext of a t e r r i t o r i a l  
d isp u t e  and peasant revolt in Borchalo, p r e c i s e l y  the 
g r o u n d s  used by the B o l s h e v i k s  to justify the Red A r m y ’s 
invasion in February 1921.
Orjonikidze, who had been urging Moscow to invade since 
May 1920, in December began a campaign of misinformation to 
persu a d e  the P o l i t b u r o  to act. The G e o r g i a n s  learnt, for 
instance, that Moscow had been wrongly informed that Shein- 
man, the head of the Soviet m i s s i o n  in T ’bilisi, had be en 
arrested, and that Georgia was colluding with the Allies to 
declare war on Russia. Unimpressed by Orjonikidze's claims, 
however, the Politburo on 12th January 1921 resisted another 
appeal from the head of the kavburo for invasion. ^
The escalation of clandestine military pressure and the 
more overt use of e c o n o m i c  and p o l i t i c a l  m e a n s  a g a i n s t  
Georgia forced the government into still heavier expenditure 
on d e f e n c e  at a time when i n f l a t i o n  was a l r e a d y  out of 
control and whe n  food s h o r t a g e s  had brought s o m e  a r e a s  to 
the brink of famine. Many industries had stopped work a l t o ­
gether bec a u s e  of the a b s e n c e  of fuel and r a w  m a t e r i a l s .
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Such was the state of the economy, in fact, that on 13th 
O c t o b e r  Z h o r d a n i a  decla r e d  to a m e e t i n g  of the E c o n o m i c  
Council:
We said that fro m  an e c o n o m i c  point of vie w  we 
were heading for catastrophe...today we all feel, 
all suffer b i t t e r l y  in the k n o w l e d g e  that we are 
no l o n g e r  h e a d i n g  for c a t a s t r o p h e ,  but h a v e  
already arrived.
Matters became still worse at the end of 1920 when the 
B o l s h e v i k s  used a dispute over the o w n e r s h i p  of ships left 
by W r a n g e l  in G e o r g i a n  ports as an excuse to cease oil 
supplies from Baku and to seize Georgian trains carrying oil 
in Azerbaijan, an ac t i o n  w h i c h  had a d e v a s t a t i n g  ef f e c t  on 
the e c o n o m y  and f u r t h e r  sapped popular m o r a l e  at the 
a p p r o a c h  of winter. The G e o r g i a n s  gave wa y  over the ships 
on 16th D e c e m b e r ,  but a l t h o u g h  a g r e e m e n t  was r e a c h e d  over 
the r e s u m p t i o n  of s upplies the Russians c o n t i n u e d  to 
prevaricate and the trains were never returned.1® 1
On 27th January 1921 the Georgian government’s struggle 
for i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c e p t a n c e  was at last r e w a r d e d  w i t h  de 
jure r e c o g n i t i o n  by the A llied C ouncil in P a r i s . 1®^ The 
celebrations that greeted the announcement in Georgia were, 
however, to prove short-lived. On 1 1th February, just four 
days after Sheinman had congratulated Zhordania and spoken 
of their c o u n t r i e s ’ c o m m o n  aim s  at a banquet to c e l e b r a t e  
Georgia's new status, the Red Army invaded, just as Gegetch- 
kori had predicted, on the pretext of a peasant uprising in 
Borchalo. 1 ®®
The G e o r g i a n  Army, d e p r i v e d  of the w e a p o n s  it had 
p le a d e d  for in vain fro m  the Allies, lacked the m a n p o w e r ,  
the morale, the e x p e r i e n c e  and the e q u i p m e n t  to c o n t a i n  a
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force twice its size. On 17th March the government capitu­
lated and left Bat'umi on an Italian boat for C o n s t a n t i n ­
ople .
It is do u b t f u l  that any G e o r g i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  h o w e v e r  
popu l a r  and h o w e v e r  str o n g  its economy, could, w i t h o u t  
international support, have withstood for long a determined 
Russian invasion, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as M o s c o w  had c o n t r o l  of 
Georgia's oil supplies. Never t h e l e s s ,  it is e vident that 
the l e t h a r g y  of the r e s p o n s e  to the attack, w h i l e  due in 
part to the i n a d e q u a c y  of the G e o r g i a n  Army's leadership, 
r e f l e c t e d  too the low m o r a l e  of the p o p u l a t i o n  and the 
g r a d u a l  w i t h d r a w a l  of c o m m i t t e d  support for the "Ge o r g i a n  
r e v o l u t i o n "  of the p e a s a n t r y  d uring the p r e c e d i n g  year. 
Z h o r d a n i a  h i m s e l f  was a w a r e  of the i m p o r t a n c e  of this 
descent into indifference of the peasantry:
This attitude of mind had already appeared during 
the w e eks of our defeat w h e n  the vie w  was heard 
a m o n g  the people: 'The M e n s h e v i k s  have been
r uling for all this t i m e  and n o w  the B o l s h e v i k s  
will take over - what's the big difference?'
T h r o u g h o u t  the ye ars of i n d e p endence, the g o v e r n m e n t  
had sought to c o n v i n c e  the p o p u l a t i o n  that its i n t e r e s t s  
would necessarily best be served within a national Georgian 
state. That this should have been an onerous task, however, 
could s c a r c e l y  have been s u r p r i s i n g  in v i e w  of the c l ear 
reservations about independence expressed by the Mensheviks 
themselves and their long history of opposition to separa­
tion fro m  Russia, a position, moreover, w h i c h  they had 
vigorously defended in frequent polemics with the National- 
D e m o c r a t s  and S o c i a l i s t -Federa 1 ists since b efore the 1905 
revolution.
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While it welcomed the Georgianisation of local govern­
ment, education and justice, the peasantry ultimately proved 
more c o n c e r n e d  with its i m m e d i a t e  s t a n d a r d  of living than 
the defence of such an a b s t r a c t  concept as the n a t i o n a l  
idea. For many in the countryside, too, the Bolsheviks were 
not e n e m i e s  but f e l l o w  G e o r g i a n s ,  o f t e n  e v e n  f e l l o w  
villagers who lived and worked alongside them. It was not 
easy in such circumstances, particularly as the Bolsheviks 
were promising to give away land free of charge, to convince 
the p e a s a n t r y  that the worst of G e o r g i a ’s e c o n o m i c  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  w e r e  o v er, that t h i n g s  w o u l d  be w o r s e  u n d e r  
Bolshevik rule and that their future would best be served by 
Georgian independence.
R e c a l l i n g  a visit to his h o m e  in L a n c h k h u t ’i in 1 920, 
Zhordania commented on the general disbelief of the Gurian 
peasa ntry, for the past 20 years the b a c k b o n e  of M e n s h e v i k  
support in the country, when told of the situation in Russia 
and the policies of the Bolsheviks. For the first time, he 
wrote, he realised that the party’s cause was lost and that 
the ideological conviction of the people was w a v e r i n g .
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C o n c l u s i o n s
T h e  f o c u s  of  t h i s  s t u d y  h a s  b e e n  on t h e  e m e r g e n c e  in
the 19th and e a r l y  2 0 t h  c e n t u r i e s  of a n e w  s t a g e  in
Georgians' perception of their collective identity. This is
not to suggest, however, that hithe r t o  G e o r g i a n s  had been
u n a w a r e  of their c o m m u n a l  e x i s t e n c e  or that it had never
been a matter of any consequence to them. On the contrary,
given the relatively small size of Georgia, the g r o w t h  of
social and g e o g r a p h i c a l  m o b i l i t y  during the 11th-13th
centuries, the a s s e r t i v e  role of the central state, the
extension of a common religion, Christianity, to all parts
of the country, and the need for a l m o s t  constant m i l i t a r y
alert against n e i g h b o u r i n g  states and peoples, it seems
highly probable that Georgians had developed a strong sense
of ethnic community by the 13th century. It is notable that
G e o r g i a n s  came to use the ter m  Sak'art'velo (Georgia) for
the first tim e in this period to refer to the w h o l e  of the
1
area occupied by the Georgian people.
Even Soviet G e o r g i a n  historians, d espite the M a r x i s t  
emphasis on the nation as a product of the capitalist epoch 
and Stalin's assertion that "Georgia came on the scene as a 
nation only in the latter half of the 19th c e n t u r y " , 2 have 
sought to locate the f o r m a t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  na t i o n  in 
this period. P r o fession Ap'ak'idze, for instance, w h ile 
a g r e e i n g  with Stalin that a unity of language, territory, 
economic life and psychological make-up are the prerequis­
ites of nationhood, re j e c t e d  the vi ew that the n a t i o n  is 
exclusively a phenomenom of the capitalist stage of develop­
ment and argued that the Georgian nation already existed by
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the end of the 12th c e n t u r y . J Ot her historians, like 
Pro f e s s o r  Katcha rava, have also stressed the e x i s t e n c e  of 
national consciousness in this period, although they distin­
guish between the feudal nation that they claim existed in 
the Middle Ages and the bourgeois nation that emerged in the 
19th c e n t u r y /  The d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  them, they argued, 
was not one of kind, however, but of degree. Others, like
S. Janashia, have argued that the lingu istic, t e r r i t o r i a l  
and cultural unity of Georgia lacked only solidity, the 
internal e c o n o m i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which c o n s o l i d a t e  the 
nation's separate parts into one w h o l e /  w h i l e  G. B r e g a d z e  
has st r e s s e d  the i m p o r t a n c e  of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  n e t w o r k  
s t r e t c h i n g  across the whole country to the p rocess of 
national integration in the Middle Ages. It was indicative 
of the high level of internal communications, he noted, that 
it took only 10 days for the m o b i l i s a t i o n  of the entire 
Georgian a r m y /
However, w h ile Ge o r g i a n s  wer e u n d o u b t e d l y  a w a r e  of 
their shared ethnic, cultural and linguistic traits, for no 
section of the population did national identity assume the 
a l l - e m b r a c i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  that it was to a c q u i r e  for the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  in the late 19th century. Ethnicity, in 
fact, was but one of a n u m b e r  of factors that made d e m a n d s  
on the individual's loyalty, and was by no means always the 
most powerful. Religion f r e quently cut across ethnic 
boundaries, and service to p r o v i n c i a l  lords could still be 
placed before service to the monarchy. The Georgian crown 
too f r e quently used n o n - G e o r g i a n s  both in its e x t e r n a l  
campaigns and in its struggle to overcome the resistance of 
the G e o r g i a n  nobility. Moreover, w h a t e v e r  the level of 
ethnic c o n s c i o u s n e s s  attai n e d  there can be no doubt that
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much of that sense of community was eroded in the 14th-18th 
cen t u r i e s  by the s u c c e s s i v e  invasions of the Mongols, 
Tamurlane, Persia and the Ottoman Empire.
Georgia's "golden age" was n e v e r t h e l e s s  to prove of 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to the r e - e m e r g e n c e  of ethnic 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  in the 19th century and the a t t e m p t s  of the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to r e d i s c o v e r  Georgia's past and instil in 
contemporary Georgians a sense of pride in their history and 
nation. For not only did awareness of the unity achieved in 
th e  M i d d l e  A g e s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  d i s a p p e a r ,  b u t  t h e  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was able to use the s u r v i v i n g  h i s t o r i e s  of 
the "golden age", the folk m e m o r i e s  of that and earl i e r  
periods p r e served in the oral t r a d i t i o n  of the G e o r g i a n  
peasantry, and the p e r s i s t e n t  u n i f y i n g  i n f l u e n c e  of the 
G e o r g i a n  O r t h o d o x  Church to r e m i n d  G e o r g i a n s  of what they 
had once a t t a i n e d  and inspire them to fresh ambition. The 
"golden age" was proof that Georgia was an "h i s t o r i c a l  
nation", fit to join the emerging world of nations. It was 
the task of the intelligentsia to unravel its laws of growth 
and reveal the key to its future development.
The p o l itical and e c o n o m i c  r e u n i f i c a t i o n  of Georgia, 
brought about by its forced incorporation into the Russian 
Empire and the reforms of the 19th century, had an enormous 
impact on the country, leading to i n c r eased s p a c i a l  and 
social mobility, econorrfic integration, the emergence of new 
classes and class allian ces, the fall of the t'av a d z a n a u r -  
oba, .and the rise of na t i o n a l  tension, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the 
towns, where a coincidence of class and ethnicity brought a 
predominantly Armenian bourgeoisie into conflict with the 
predominantly Georgian workers.
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ror tne Geo rgians, cne cost 01 s t a o m t y  ana n a t i o n a l  
s ecur i t y  was the loss of control of their ow n  affairs, the 
gradual replacement of Georgian practice and law with Rus­
sian methods, the R u s s i f i c a t i o n  of all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a f ­
fairs, the d e n i g r a t i o n  of their language and customs, and 
the domination of their capital city by Armenians and Rus­
sians. Their lowly status within T'bilisi reflected indeed 
their subjugation within Georgia as a whole.
N obody felt this mor e  than the inte l l i g e n t s i a ,  w h o s e  
numbers and radicalism considerably increased in the 1860s 
with the e x p a n s i o n  of h igher e d u c a t i o n  in Russia and the 
spread of the "student movement" through its universities. 
Angered and embittered by the fact that just as Georgia had 
regained its unity that its ethnographic existence should be 
t h r e a t e n e d  by the a s s i m i  lationist i n t e n t i o n s  of tsarist 
policy, and humiliated by the knowledge that their opportun­
ities for advancement within the Russian Empire were condi­
tional upon their a s s s i m i l a t i o n  to Russian culture, it is 
sc a r c e l y  s u r p r i s i n g  that its m e m b e r s  should have been i n ­
fluen c e d  by the spread of n a t i o n a l i s m  t h r o u g h o u t  Europe. 
Identifying themselves with the nationalist argument that 
the uniqueness of every ethnic community demanded political 
separatism in order for it to run its affairs in accordance 
with its inner laws, the Georgians came to regard the demand 
for n a t i o n a l  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as a n atural e x t e n s i o n  of 
the d e m a n d  for r e c o g n i t i o n  of the individual's d e m o c r a t i c  
rights.
Self-determination, moreover, held out to the intelli­
gentsia the prospect of a platform from which to effect its 
ambitions for the transformation of society. Very conscious 
of Georgia's b a c k w a r d n e s s ,  the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  was g r e a t l y
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j. iiipressfciu uy uae aciiievemeoia ui s c i e n c e  ana lecrinoiogy 1 n 
Europe and America and the enormous advances in the produc­
tive capacity of the major Western states. Determined that 
Georgia should follow the same path, though without losing 
its specific n a t i o n a l  features, the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i  of the 
1860s and 1870s saw the key to natio n a l  r e g e n e r a t i o n  in 
science and education, without which Georgia would be con­
signed to b a c k w a r d n e s s  and ignorance. It was to this end 
that they undertook their campaign for the standardisation 
of the Georgian language and the spread of literacy.
Despite its evident desire for greater control over its 
own dest i n y  and a c o n t r o l l i n g  influence over the f uture of 
the nation, there was nevertheless an ambivalence about the 
i n t e lligentsia's a t t i t u d e  to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  that was 
later to convey itself to the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  and w h i c h  
u n d o u b t e d l y  af f e c t e d  the m a n n e r  in which the mas s  of the 
G e o r g i a n  people cam e  to perceive the issue. All G e o r g i a n s  
were a c u t e l y  conscious of the danger still c o n s t i t u t e d  by 
Persia and, in particular, the O t t o m a n  Empire, and e q u a l l y  
a w a r e  not o n l y  that R u s s i a n  p r o t e c t i o n  had b e e n  the 
essential condition of Georgia's reunification and limited 
economic recovery (within the limits permitted by the auto­
cracy), but that the union wth Russia p rovided the c o u n t r y  
with its only direct access to European culture. To abandon 
the union, therefore, w o u l d  be to expose G e o r g i a  a g a i n  to 
the risk of invasion and to consign to oblivion the intelli­
gentsia's ambition for Georgia to aspire to the cultural and 
scientific standards of the most advanced nations in Europe.
Confronted by this dilemma, the t'ergdaleulni a c k n o w ­
ledged that the future national enlightenment of Georgia was 
not entirely in its own hands, but was largely dependent on
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the ability of the Russian radical intelligentsia to shake 
off the autocracy and institute democratic reforms through­
out the empire. Identifying the interests of Georgia close­
ly with that of what they referred to as "young Russia", the 
t ’e r g d a l e u l n i  were c o n f ident that such r e f o r m s  w o u l d  both 
provide Georgia with control over its internal affairs and 
preserve the union with Russia.
In spite of this a m b i v a l e n c e  at the core of their 
a p p r o a c h  to the n ational question, they were u n d o u b t e d l y  
successful, particularly among the urban classes and among 
the t ’a v a d a z n a u r o b a , of g e n e r a t i n g  a c o n c e r n  for and 
i nterest in G e o r g i a n  natio n a l  culture. At a time w h e n  the 
G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  and w o r k i n g  class wer e  p r e j u d i c e d  
against within their own capital city, when Georgians could 
even be persecuted for speaking their own language and when, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  d uring the 1880s, a s s i m i l a t i o n  b e c a m e  the 
publicly avowed aim of the administration, the work of the
t ' e r g d a l e u l n i  to o p e n  n a t i v e -1 a n g u a g e  s c h o o l s ,  w r i t e
Georgian textbooks, research Georgian history, customs and 
folklore became a source of inspiration and national pride. 
Akaki Dseret’eli and Ilia Tchavtchavadze became the a c k n o w ­
ledged lead ers of the c a m p a i g n  for national e n l i g h t e n m e n t  
and the nationalist poetry of the former became as popular 
among the workers of T’bilisi at the turn of the century as 
a m o n g  the int elligentsia. For the u p r o o t e d  p e a s a n t r y  who 
made up the m a j o r i t y  of the w o r k i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  of the
capital, the stress by the t 'e r g d a l e u l n i  on their shared
language, religion, ethnic origin, c u s t o m s  and hist o r y  
p r o v i d e d  a s u b s t i t u t e  for the loss of their t r a d i t i o n a l  
communities.
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sentiment into a national movement, already complicated by 
the t 1e r g d a l e u l n i 's a m b i v a l e n c e  on the n a t i o n a l  question, 
w a s  set b a c k  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  in the 1870s and 1880s by 
divisions within the nationalist intelligentsia itself about 
the future of the Georgian nation. Thus whereas Ilia Tchav- 
tc h a v a d z e  regar d e d  an idyllic variant of the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  the no b i l i t y  and peasantry, in w h ich the f o r m e r  
wo u l d  act as the fount of the nation's w i s d o m  w h i l e  the 
latter p e r f o r m e d  its t r a d i t i o n a l  funct i o n  of w o r k i n g  the 
land, albeit using scientific methods of production, as the 
d e f i n i t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the nation (see Cha p t e r  4), 
Sergi M e s k h i  and others disagreed, arguing, a m o n g  other 
things, that the nobility was a spent force. While sharing 
the concern that lay at the heart of Tc h a v t c h a v a d z e ' s  
approach, that Georgia's n ational revival s h ould avoid the 
pain of Europe's industrialisation, Meskhi maintained that 
industrialisation, the emergence of an indigenous bourgeoi­
sie and the a c c u m u l a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  capital r e p r e s e n t e d  
Georgia's only route to progress.
Even had the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  been united be h i n d  one 
strategy, however, the obstacles to achieving a mass-based 
national movement would have been formidable, for while the 
t'ergdaleulni were beginning to enjoy some success in their 
efforts to ge n e r a t e  an interest in the fate of the nation, 
relations between the t'avadaznauroba and the peasantry, the 
tw o clas ses that made up the m a j o r i t y  of the G e o r g i a n  
p o p u l a t i o n  were b e c o m i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  a n tagonistic. Ilia 
T c h a v t c h a v a d z e ' s  a p p e a l  for n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  in s u c h  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  his failure to a p p r e c i a t e  the 
depth of the social divisions that alre a d y  f i s s u r e d  the
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country .
A m a j o r  d i f f i c u l t y  facing the t E r g d a l e u l n i  was the 
need to overcome their isolation in society, a problem that 
the n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  e l s e w h e r e  in Europe most 
successfully overcame in alliance with the entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie. The latter's w i l l i n g n e s s  to p r o p a g a n d i s e  on 
behalf of the nation and mobilise the population had played 
a crucial role in p o l i t i c i s i n g  ethnic c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  an 
essential task if the t’ergdaleulni were to convert national 
sentiment into a political movement for some form of self- 
determination .
Suc h  an o p t i o n  did not r e a l l y  e x i s t  in G e o r g i a ,  
however, where the tendency for social class to c o i n c i d e  
with ethnic d i v i sions rendered such an a l l i a n c e  e x t r e m e l y  
unlikely. The b o u r g e o i s i e  was p r e d o m i n a n t l y  A r m e n i a n  and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  h ostile to the n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ' s  
ambitions to re-establish Georgian hegemony over T'bilisi, 
the i n d u s t r i a l  and c o m m e r c i a l  centre of Transc a u c a s i a .  
D e p r i v e d  of the support of the b o u r g e o i s i e  and o p p o s e d  to 
the c o n s e r v a t i v e  social a t t i t u d e s  of the t'av a d a z n a u r o b a ,  
the intelligentsia had no immediate ally in its struggle to 
d i s s e m i n a t e  its i d e a s  a m o n g  the p e a s a n t r y .  B o t h  the 
indigenous bourgeoisie and the working class were as yet too 
small to make a significant contribution.
Although the e c o n o m i c  and political r e i n t e g r a t i o n  of 
the country, the growth of mobility, particularly since the 
peasant reforms of 1864-71, improved communications, greater 
c o n t a c t  w i t h  the t o w n s ,  and the e n d e a v o u r s  of the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  to spread literacy and a w a k e n  a sense of 
pride in Georgia's history and culture had done m u c h  to
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strengthen the ethnic awareness of the peasantry, the latter 
remained largely indifferent to appeals for national unity. 
Its mo st p r e s s i n g  concern was the a c q u i s i t i o n  of land and 
the abolition of all further dependence on the nobility.
M o r e o v e r ,  w h i l e  p e a s a n t s  f r o m  G u r i a ,  S v a n e t ' i ,  
Khevsuret'i and Kakhet'i were more aware now of their shared 
attributes, they continued to regard themselves primarily as 
Gurians, Svans, Khevsurs and Kakhians, a point s t r e s s e d  by 
Noe Z h o r dania in 1894 when he argued that a l t h o u g h  the raw 
material of nationhood existed in Georgia, the differences 
d i v i d i n g  the peasants in the various parts of the coun try 
were still far greater than their similarities.^ The role 
of n a t i o n a l i s m  in e m p h a s i s i n g  the p rimacy of the s h ared 
i nterests of the wider ethnic group by b r e a k i n g  d o w n  
loyalties to provincial and other sub-groups and replacing 
them by loyalty to the nation was far fro m c o m p l e t e  in 
Georgia by the turn of the century, and in many parts of the 
country was yet to be c o m p l e t e d  even by the d e c l a r a t i o n  of 
independence in 1918.
Why then did s o c i a l i s m  succeed in Georgia, p r o v i d i n g  
the b a s i s  for the e m e r g e n c e  of a m a s s - b a s e d  s o c i a l -  
democratic party, where nationalism had failed?
Although the Georgian Social-Democrats were scornful of 
the t 'ergdal e u l n i  'a appeal for natio n a l  unity, they both 
shared the latter's concern for the defence of language and 
culture and recognised the popularity of this aspect of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ' s  work. I n c o r p o r a t i n g  the 
latter's demand for national cultural rights into the party 
programme, they also added the political right to national 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  c o n fident firstly that the G e o r g i a n  
people's requirements were more modest, and secondly that to
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concede the right considerably reduced the likelihood of the 
people ever insisting on it.
S o c i a  1 - d e m o c r a c y  a l s o  b e n e f i t e d  f r o m  the c l o s e  
relationship between class and nationality, particularly in 
T ’bilisi, where the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n s  in the most 
d i s a d v a n t a g e d  strata of the city p o p u l a t i o n  - the petit- 
b o u r g e o i s i e  and the w o r k i n g  class - and the p r e v a l e n c e  of 
Armenians and Russians in the more privileged strata exacer­
bated the i n c r e a s i n g l y  fraught social tensions w i t h i n  the 
capital. An ideology that called not just for political and 
economic emancipation, but which also predicted the inevit­
able expropriation of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat had 
an o bvious appeal to a G e o r g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  that had been 
e x c l u d e d  fro m  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in m u n i c i p a l  affairs, had the 
worst jobs and lived in the poorest districts.
Although the Georgian Social-Democrats frequently spoke 
out against all forms of nationalism, encouraged members of 
all n a t i o n a l i t i e s  to join the party and o pposed the f o r m a ­
tion of separate national organisations on the grounds that 
these would u n d e r m i n e  the unity of the socia 1 - d e m o c r a t i c  
movement in Transcaucasia and impede the ultimate victory of 
the proletariat, there can be little doubt that their 
success in Georgia was in part at least due to the national 
animosity felt by the urban workers and much of the intelli­
gentsia towards the Armenians and Russians.
S o c i a 1 - d e m o c r a c y , wi th its e m p h a s i s  on p r o l e t a r i a n  
solidarity, was able to provide G e o r g i a n  w o r k e r s  w i t h  a 
sense of iden tity and b e l o n g i n g  that may in s o m e  measure, 
like their heightened awareness of shared ethnic, linguistic 
and cultural traits, have c o m p e n s a t e d  for the loss of the
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s u p p o r t  of t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o m m u n i t i e s .  U n l i k e  
n a t i o n a l i s m ,  however, w hich a w a k e n e d  fears a m o n g  all 
G e o r g i a n s  of i s o l a t i o n  and r e n e w e d  h o s t i l i t i e s  with the 
Ottoman Empire, the Marxist ideology of the Social-Democrats 
called for unity with the international proletariat and c o ­
o p e r a t i o n  with the o p p r e s s e d  classes and p eoples of the 
Russian Empire.
For the new generation of the Georgian intelligentsia 
with its vision - not dissimilar to that of the t’ergdaleul­
ni - of a rationally organised and democratic Georgia whose 
s c i e n t i f i c  and cultural s t a n d a r d s  w o uld be those of the 
ad v a n c e d  states of Europe, M a r x i s m  provided a theory of 
revolution based on scientific laws that promised the early 
a t t a i n m e n t  of those goals. It was an ide ology too w h i c h  
both a d d r e s s e d  the qu e s t i o n  of social inequality, an issue 
which, like the national question, had been at the centre of 
intellectual debate in Georgia since the 1860s, and, through 
its t h e o r y  of c l a s s  s t r u g g l e ,  p o i n t e d  the w a y  to its 
solution.
Conscious of the failure of the preceding generation of 
the intelligentsia to win the support of the peasantry, the 
S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s ,  many of w hose lead ers were from 
families and familiar with the concerns and aspirations of 
the rural population, campaigned for the redistribution of 
land in the p e a s a n t s ’ favour. Of crucial i m p o r t a n c e  to 
their success in winning the latter's support, the Georgian 
M e n s h e v i k s  conceded not only that n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of the 
land was i l l -suited to G e o r g i a n  conditions, but that the 
m u n i c i p a l i s a t i o n  a d v o c a t e d  by their Russian c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  
unless a c c o m p a n i e d  by c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r i v a t i s a t i o n ,  w o u l d
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ownership had long been the established practice. It should 
be e m p h a s i s e d  too tha t  the f a i l u r e  of the S o c i a l i s t -  
Federalists to win the support of the peasantry can in large 
part be a t t r i b u t e d  to the i n s i s t e n c e  that all c o n f i s c a t e d  
land be t r a n s f o r m e d  into c o m m u n a l  property. In addition, 
the SFs overt n a t i o n a l i s m ,  despite r e a s s u r a n c e s  that they 
sought to m a i n t a i n  the link with Russia, r e a w a k e n e d  the 
fears of the peasantry, e s p e c i a l l y  in West G e o r g i a  w h e r e  
there were recent memories of Turkish occupation.
A number of other factors contributed to the success of 
G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a c y , a m o n g  them the nature of the 
party organisation. Eschewing the Leninist idea of small, 
t i g h t l y - k n i t  p a r t y  c e l l s  d o m i n a t e d  by p r o f e s s i o n a l  
revolutionaries, social-democracy in Georgia became a mass 
m o v e m e n t  that c h a m p i o n e d  all o p p r essed social st r a t a  and 
whose party organisations emphasised democratic control from 
below, rank and file decision-making, genuine involvement by 
the w o r k i n g  class, and the use of all forms of legal, as 
well as underground, activities. The openness of the party 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  and the high p r o p o r t i o n  of w o r k e r s  in its 
membership greatly facilitated the party’s task of expanding 
to meet the surge of support for social-democracy in 1 903-
05. The high profile of G e o r g i a n  S o c i a 1 - D e m o c r a c y , the 
nature of the party organisation and the encouragement given 
by the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  to w o r k e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in its 
l e a d e r s h i p  a l s o  h e l p  to e x p l a i n  t h e i r  s u c c e s s  in the 
strug g l e  for c ontrol of the party o r g a n i s a t i o n  w i t h  the 
Bolsheviks. The idea that the central committee of a party 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  d r a w n  p r i m a r i l y  f r o m  the 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  and based in Russia could, e n t i r e l y  on its
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own initiative, appoint and disband local committees and c o ­
opt and d i s m i s s  membe r s ,  was entirely at odds wi th the 
methods developed in Transcaucasia.
Social-democracy was aided too by the heavy turnover of 
labour in the towns, a circumstance that was encouraged both 
by the practice of employing staff on a short-term basis and 
the ten dency of many work e r s  to return to their rural 
c o m m u n i t i e s  w h e n e v e r  seasonal work was needed, and by the 
policy a dopted by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in the early 20th 
c e n t u r y  of e x p e l l i n g  r e c a l c i t r a n t  w o r k e r s  to the 
countryside. As a c o n s e q u e n c e  of the con stant flo w  of 
labour back and forth" between the towns and villages, aided 
by the r e l a t i v e l y  s mall size of the country and i m p r o v e d  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  s o c i a l - d e m o c r a c y  was able to e xtend its 
inf l u e n c e  into the rural areas. N o w h e r e  was this more 
apparent than in Guria, which provided much of the workforce 
for the rapid-industrial expansion of Bat’umi at the turn of 
the c e n t u r y .  It s h o u l d  be a d d e d  too th at it w a s  the 
i d e o l o g i c a l  flexi b i l i t y  of the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  that 
enabled them to tap the unrest a m o n g  the p e a s a n t r y  and 
f a c i l i t a t e d  the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of the party into a m a s s -  
based organisation.
The se n s i t i v i t y  of G e o r g i a n  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a c y , and 
perhaps of Noe Zhordania in parti cular, to the s h i f t i n g  
m o o d s  of the popu l a t i o n  play ed an i m p o r t a n t  part in its 
success, a point made by W. Woytinskiy in his book La D e m o- 
£ £ £ £i£_2.££ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ »  in w h i c h  he d e s c r i b e d  Z h o r d a n i a ’s 
greatest strength as his ability to understand the thoughts 
and wishes of the people:
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To explain the place which he occupies in Georgia, 
it would also be appropriate to highlight another 
of Zhordania's ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  he is the most
national of the country's politicians in the sense 
of his D s y c h o l o g i c a l  affinity with the popular 
masses.
This aspe ct of the party l e a d e r s h i p  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
evid ent in the difficult years of 1906-17. R e s p o n d i n g  to 
the g r o w t h  in natio n a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  that a c c o m p a n i e d  the 
r e v o l u t i o n  in 1905 and the subs e q u e n t  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of 
react i o n  and R ussian c h a u v i n s i m ,  the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  
revised their approach to the national question and, at odds 
with the curr ent M e n s h e v i k  posit i o n  on the issue, began to 
a d v o c a t e  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  a u t o n o m y .  The c h a n g e  in 
Zhordania's a p p r o a c h  was already evident by 1908 in his 
pamphlet on the national question K'art'veli khalkhi da nat- 
sionalizmi (The Georgian People and Nationalism), although 
it was not until 1912 that national cultural autonomy became 
a demand of the Caucasion Social-Democratic Party programme.
Despite this shift, however, Zhordania remained adamant 
on the issue of t e r r i t o r i a l  aut o n o m y ,  a r g u i n g  that it wa s 
the " h i s t o r i c  p a th" of the G e o r g i a n  p e o p l e  to r e j e c t  
national politics and that what they wanted was cultural not 
p o l i t i c a l  a u t o n o m y .  In thi s  c o n v i c t i o n ,  he not onl y  
insisted on the need for close unity with democratic Russia, 
but also maintained that so intermingled were the peoples of 
Transcaucasia and such was the level of integration of their 
economic life that their separation into national units was 
a l m o s t  impossible. Any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i v i s i o n  a long 
na t i o n a l  lines would, mor eover, retard e c o n o m i c  progress, 
set back the u l t i m a t e  victory of s o c i a l i s m  and f a c i l i t a t e  
the triumph of nationalism.
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Zhordania's solution - the establishment of a limited 
f o r m  of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  for T r a n s c a u c a s i a  w i t h i n  a 
centralised Russian state and the devolution of control of 
national cultural affairs to bodies specially designated for 
the purpose - provided the Georgian people with a programme 
wh i c h  both took into account their p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and 
physical need for security against attack from their Muslim 
neighbours, and their desire for greater national freedom.
Despite a shift t o w a r d s  a more fede r a l i s t  a p p r o a c h  in 
the a u t u m n  of 1917, the e m p h a s i s  in G e o r g i a n  S ocial- 
Democracy on the union with Russia and its perception of the 
n a t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  as p r i m a r i l y  a cultural issue go a long 
way to explaining the confusion within the party leadership 
in the a f t e r m a t h  of the Octo b e r  Revolution. All its plans 
for Georgia's future had been posited on the belief that the 
Russ i a n  R e v o l u t i o n  w o u l d  go through a period of b o u r g e o i s  
d e m o c r a c y ,  d u r i n g  w h i c h  the p o l i t i c a l  and e c o n o m i c  
conditions for the socialist transformation of society would 
g r a d u a l l y  ripen. Quite suddenly, however, the coup d'etat 
in Petrograd had placed in power a party whose ideas on the 
future course of the r e v o l u t i o n  and on the o r g a n i s a t i o n  of 
the state were radically at odds with their own.
P r e v ented fr om r e c o g n i s i n g  the l e g i t i m a c y  of the 
October Revolution by their long-standing disagreement with 
the Bolsheviks on the possibility, or even the desirability, 
of socialist revolution in Russia in the immediate term, and 
t h e i r  d i s t a s t e  for the l a t t e r ' s  v i e w s  on i n n e r - p a r t y  
d e m o c r a c y  and organisation, yet u n w i l l i n g  to a b a n d o n  the 
u n i o n  w i t h  R u s s i a ,  the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  s t u m b l e d  
reluctantly towards independence.
There is no doubt so me truth in the c laim made by 
nationalist politicians that the Social-Democrats1 position 
on the n ational q u e s t i o n  made them p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  ill- 
suited to independence, though to be fair to the latter, 
hardly anyone can seriously have anticipated, even in the 
a u t u m n  of 1917, that it w o uld be a c h i e v e d  so soon. M o r e ­
over, once independence had been declared, the Mensheviks, 
perhaps less out of c o n v i c t i o n  than necess ity, a b a n d o n e d  
their former reservations to devote themselves to the task 
of building the state. In his instructions on the drafting 
of the declaration of independence, Zhordania was insistent 
that its e m p h a s i s  should be on n a t i o n a l  unity rather than 
social reform.
W h e t h e r  or not i n d e p e n d e n c e  changed the t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o n v i c t i o n s  of the G e o r g i a n  M e n s h e v i k s  on the n a t i o n a l  
q u e s t i o n  is a l m o s t  i m p o s s i b l e  to assess, as mo st of their 
decisions in this, as in almost every other sphere in 1918— 
21, w e r e  d e t e r m i n e d  by e v e n t s  b e y o n d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l ,  
re s p o n s e s  to the e x i gencies of the m o m e n t  rather than the 
consequence of a deliberate scheme for social change. Thus 
the d e c i s i o n  to e m p h a s i s e  n a t i o n a l  unity in 1918 and play 
down social revolution not only reflected the party’s view 
that G eorgia would have to pass through a r e l a t i v e l y  p r o ­
tracted period of capitalist development before conditions 
w o u l d  be r e a d y  for s o c i a l i s m ,  but the p a r t y ' s  ne ed, 
especially now that it was cut off from the R u s s i a n  m o v e ­
ment, in the middle of an economic crisis, and threatened by 
atta ck on several fronts, to avoid civil war and a c h i e v e  a 
national consensus for its policies.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that in their 
ende a v o u r s  to hold the state t ogether that the S ocial-
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D e m o c r a t s ’ stress on national unity came to be seen by the 
n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  as a d e m a n d  not so much for a b s o l u t e  
loyalty to the state as to the G e o r g i a n  nation, in which 
view they were confirmed by the intolerance with which the 
g o v e r n m e n t  reacted to any sign of unrest in the m i n o r i t y  
a r e a s ,  its m a n i p u l a t i o n  of the s y m b o l s  of G e o r g i a n  
n a t i o n h o o d  to secure the e m o t i o n a l  c o m m i t m e n t  of the 
Georgian people, its appointment of Georgians to key posts 
in South O s e t ’i and its policy of s ettling G e o r g i a n s  in 
s t r a t e g i c  areas p o p u l a t e d  by n ational minorities. It was 
against this b a c k g r o u n d  that the Osians, u n m o v e d  by the 
g o v e r n m e n t ’s appeals on behalf of n ational unity and the 
national interest, demanded the right to autonomy.
Conversely, such d i s l o y a l t y  to the state at a t i m e  of 
acute crisis played a part in s t i m u l a t i n g  the x e n o p h o b i c  
nationalism which showed signs of appearing towards the end 
of G e o r g i a ’s i n d e p e n d e n c e  and to w h i c h  not even l eading 
m e m b e r s  of the S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  Party were immune. Such 
d e v e l o p m e n t s  have to be set, however, into the context in 
which the government was forced to operate, and are balanced 
too by its c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t s  to m e e t  the n a t i o n a l  
cultural needs of the m i n o r i t y  n a tionalities. These i n ­
cluded the g r a n t i n g  of a u t o n o m y  to A p ' k h a z e t ’i, B a t ’umi 
region and Z a k ’a t ’ala, the right to an e d u c a t i o n  in o n e ’s 
own language and the right of all ethnic minorities to form 
national unio ns to organise and direct their c u l t u r a l  
affairs.
Despite the mobilisation of national sentiment in 1917 
in favo ur of s o m e t h i n g  more than just n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  
autonomy, the a n t a g o n i s m  b e t w e e n  the t * a v a d a z n a u r o b a  and
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peasantry, the abse n c e  of a strong Ge o r g i a n  b o u r g e o i s i e  to 
propagandise on behalf of the nation, the fears of exposure 
to invasion and, not least, the success of Georgian Social- 
D e m ocracy's o p p o s i t i o n  to n a t i o n a l i s m  ensured that the 
na t i o n a l  idea never acqui r e d  an a l l - c o n s u m i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  
a m o n g  the mass of the p o p u l a t i o n  in Georgia. This b e c a m e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  evid ent during 1918-21 wh en the g o v e r n m e n t ’s 
p l e a s  for n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  in the f a c e  of the e n o r m o u s  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  c o n f r o n t i n g  the country f o u n d e r e d  on the 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  of the p e a s a n t r y .  This, the p r o b l e m  of 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  a new state at time of war, the m u l t i - e t h n i c  
c o m p o s i t i o n  of the population, the depth of the e c o n o m i c  
crisis, the absence of sufficient international support, and 
the uneq ual nature of the struggle for s u r v i v a l  a gainst 
Soviet Russia ultimately contrived to deny Georgian Social- 
D e m o c r a c y  the c o n d i t i o n s  it needed properly to apply its 
policies.
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Glossary
The f o l l o w i n g  is a list of G e o r g i a n  and R ussian terms 
and a b b r e v i a t i o n s  that appear frequently in the text. 
Plural forms are, where appropriate, given in brackets.
G eorgian:
a m k 1ari (amk'rebi) - guild.
aznauri_ (aznaurebi/aznaurni) - l o w e r  tier of the G e o r g i a n  
nobility.
batonqmoba - Georgian variant of serfdom. 
begara - c o r v e e .
chalandari - West Georgian wine trader. 
didi ojakhi - extended family. 
eri - nation.
eroba - unit of local government, initially modelled on the 
z e m stvo system introduced in the European gubernii of Russia 
in 1864 (but not in G eorgia until 1918), but then d e v o l v e d  
greater powers in 1918-21.
ghala - grain tax paid to l a n d lords by peasants for use of 
l a n d .
karmidamo - farmstead. 
khalkhi - p e o p l e .  
khalkhosani - populist.
khjlssan^i (khiznebi) - a category of peasant in Georgia, of 
which there were two main types: those who rented land, but
had the right to its use in perpetuity, so long as they paid 
rent and dues; and the so-called q m a-khizani, who belonged 
to one landlord but was compelled to seek land on another's 
estate, often many miles away.
khutsuri - Georgian ecclesiastical script.
kodi_ - G e o r g i a n  unit of m e a s u r e  equal to b e t w e e n  four and 
five puds depending on the part of the country.
kodis puri - a form of grain tax.
komli - household.
k'tseva - old Georgian land measure. One k'tseva = a pprox­
imately 1 . 3 acres .
kulukhi - wine tax paid by peasants to landlords for use of 
land.
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J± £i£ ” or L e z g h i n :  a m e m b e r  of a m o u n t a i n  p e o p l e  in
Daghestan.
mamasakhlisi - village headman.
mazra - a n  administrative unit equivalent to a district.
mejlisi - assembly or council of Georgian Muslims.
mesame dasi - an informal grouping of Georgian intellect­
uals, set up in 1 893, w h i c h  was to p rovide the n u c l e u s  of 
the future leadership of the Social-Democratic Party organi­
sation in Transcaucasia.
mevakhshe - money-lender.
moijaradre - tenant.
mouravi - an official.
m ok'alak'e (mok'alak'eebi) - m e r c h a n t s  and a r t i s a n s  of 
T'bilisi who, prior to the 19th c entury belonged to the 
crown or church.
ostati - master craftsman.
q a z a r m e l e b i  - those i m p r i s o n e d  in the a r m y  ba r r a c k s  af ter 
the a b o r t i v e  a t t e m p t  to restore G e o r g i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  in 
1832.
qma (qmebi/qmani) - serf.
saadgilmamulo banki - land bank set up by the nobility for 
the nobility.
sabatono - adjective used to describe those peasants owned 
by nobility.
sakhazino - treasury (adjectival form). 
s a t 1emo - communal.
SFs - Socialist-Federalists.
shedsqaloba - feudal practice of bestowing privileges. 
siraji - East Georgian wine merchant. 
sursat1i - main state grain tax. 
t'avadaznauroba - collective term for nobility. 
t 1avadi - upper tier of Georgian nobility. 
t 1emi - commune.
t'ergdaleulni - members of the radical intelligentsia of the 
1860s and 1870s. The term l i t e r a l l y  means "those who have 
drunk from the T'ergi", the river d e m a r c a t i n g  the n o r t h e r n  
border b e t w e e n  G e o r g i a  and Russia, and refer r e d  to the n e w  
g e n e r a t i o n  of G e o r g i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  who had r e c e i v e d  a
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m g n e r  education in Kussia. 
ustabashi - head of guild, 
vatchari - merchant.
Russian:
Bund - Jewish General Work e r s ’ Union.
chetvert - a unit of m e a s u r e  equal to a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3 
litres; also used as a m e a s u r e  of distance, in w h i c h  case 
it is equal to \ of an arshin (0.71 metres).
chinovnik - official or functionary in tsarist Russia.
d e s y a t i n a  (desyatiny) - unit of m e a s u r e  eq ual to a p p r o x ­
imately 2.7 acres.
duma - (i) the elected parliament first introduced in tsar­
ist Russia in 1906; (ii) name of municipal governments.
dvoryanstvo - Russian service nobility; the dvoryanstvo was 
relieved of the need to perform obligatory state service by 
Catherine II in 1785.
G reens - A p r o - p e a s a n t  group f o r m e d  in the a u t u m n  of 1919 
and b a s e d  in the B l a c k  Sea c o a s t a l  area. Its n a m e  
e m p h a s i s e d  the r u r a l  s y m p a t h i e s  of its m e m b e r s  and 
distinguished them from the ’’Reds" and ’’W hites".
gubernia - largest administrative-territorial unit in Rus­
sian Empire.
kavkraikom - Caucasian Regional Committee of Bolshevik party 
organisation.
kulak - rich peasant.
mir - village commune.
mirovoi posrednik - arbitrator.
okhrana - tsarist secret police.
0 z a kom - Special T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  C o m m i t t e e  a p p o i n t e d  to 
a d m i n i s t e r  T r a n s c a u c a s i a  by the P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  in 
1917.
pud - unit of measure equal to approximately 16.3 kg.
RSDLP - Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.
R e v k o m - C a u c a s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  C o m m i t t e e  set up by the 
T ’bilisi Soviet in 1917 from all parties and soviets.
SRs - members of Social-Revolutionary Party.
zemstvo - units of rural self-government introduced in the 
European gubernii of Russia in 1864.
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